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ABSTRACT
Situated on the edge o f  mass communication studies and transition studies, this PhD 
thesis examines the process o f  media reform in countries undergoing post-communist 
transition. By performing three very different single country studies -  a relative 
success story o f transition (Hungary), a struggling post-Soviet society (Ukraine), and 
a post-conflict, international-administered province (Kosovo) -  the work seeks to 
compile a thorough account o f  the problems that have plagued the region's media 
reform process in the last decade.
The primary goal is to contribute to the discussion on media démocratisation through 
preparing comprehensive case studies on the basis o f  carefully selected empirical 
material. While focusing on the most important elements o f the complex interaction 
between political and media systems, the thesis reviews the new structural and 
cultural organisation o f  the media systems. It focuses on the policy decisions that 
were adopted by political elites, and on the discussions which surrounded the 
theoretical grounding and/ or the implementation o f  these decisions. The work 
hypothesises that media systems undergoing transition can be fruitfully analysed 
according to four normative media models -  the libertarian, social democratic, 
authoritarian and development assistant models.
These theoretical models help to ascertain the fundamental organisational and 
structural principles which define a given media segment, and also help to identify the 
basic commonalities and differences between the various development paths. The 
work argues that the success o f media reform ultimately depends on the political 
elites' commitment to implementing the above models in an appropriate balance. It 
concludes that a "transitional media model" might make sense fo r  some o f these 
countries, in which continued party political presence and political parallelism  -  
particularly in the print segment -  may be justified.
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Chapter I. 
Introduction
The post-communist transition in Central Europe, South Eastern Europe, and the 
former Soviet Union (hereinafter post-communist region) has been a very complex 
process with several interdependent institutional and cultural dimensions. It has been an 
unprecedented transformation, where political, economic and, in most countries, even 
territorial changes occurred simultaneously with a radical societal change. Fifteen years 
after the fall of the Berlin wall, the countries in the region have produced an extremely 
mixed record -  while some have made substantial progress on all aspects of democratic 
reform, some have retained authoritarian governing structures, and some have declined 
into ethnic conflict and war. The under-performing countries are increasingly seen to be 
in a “grey” or “twilight” zone. (O'Donnell, 1996; Diamond, 1999; Carothers, 2002)
Scholars of democratic theory are in debate over the applicability o f concepts 
such as “democracy”, “democratic transition” and “democratic consolidation”, and 
academic attention is gradually shifting toward the more informal characteristics of 
post-communist change, and to the actual “quality” of democracy. The degree of 
démocratisation is increasingly measured through the development of civil societies, the 
functioning of independent judiciaries and media systems, the quality of political 
representation systems, as well as the degree of participation by the publics. In his 
revision of some basic transitology concepts, Guillermo O ’Donnell (1999) argued that 
democratic theory must include a historically-oriented political sociology of democracy, 
as well as an analysis of certain aspects of the overall social context.
The diversity of development paths has called into question the validity of some 
of the basic assumptions that governments engaging in “democracy promotion” have 
operated with, such as the directional trajectory of political change, the stages of 
development, the importance of elections, the underlying structural conditions of 
political change, and the strength of the state as the foundation of the political system. 
(Carothers, 1999) The concept of “reform” has also gradually lost its positive 
connotation, developing instead a more realistic meaning, i.e. that reforms are not 
naturally forward-moving processes. It has also emerged that perhaps even some of the 
fundamental questions guiding post-communist research should be posed differently. 
Instead of assessing development according to predetermined stages, we should 
formulate more open-ended queries. (Carothers, 2002: 18) All in all, it is increasingly 
recognised that the terms “post-communist” and “transition” have outlived their 
usefulness, and the assessment o f post-communist political developments in the 
framework of deterministic conceptual approaches has become rather 
counterproductive. (O’Donnell, 1996).
Given that this research project does not aim to contribute to conceptual 
innovation, it will have to work with some of the existing concepts for reasons of 
simplicity. The terms “transition” and “transformation” will be used interchangeably
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throughout this work, but it is acknowledged that the overall democratic transition is an 
open-ended process, which can take many different directions, speeds, and typologies. 
The thesis will also continue to apply the term “post-communist transition” , although 
recognising that this does not imply that the three different countries1 discussed here are 
classified as one homogenous category. The main theme of this work is the reform 
effort in the media sector, which has been one of the most controversial and protracted 
areas of reform, even in relatively successful transitions. This research project organises 
empirical information in a comprehensive and structured manner about three different 
cases, seeking to identify, clarify and contextualise the reasons for this negative 
outcome. Hungary, Ukraine and Kosovo were chosen for their potential to exhibit 
diverse patterns of post-communist media transition.
Many recent enquires have discussed whether and how the media system 
contributes to democratic transition and consolidation, or whether a free and democratic 
media system is the cause or effect of overall démocratisation. In this research, the goal 
is different -  it is to explore the more open-ended question of what happens to the 
media’s organisational and institutional forms after the collapse of communist regimes 
and the introduction of electoral democratic systems. It is in this light that the thesis 
seeks to reconstruct the major policy steps and bones o f contention that the media 
reform process has generated between the various power- and stakeholders (i.e. 
different political parties, governments, media organisations, media owners and elite 
groups). Meanwhile, conceptually speaking, the thesis touches upon the question of 
whether a “systemic approach” is necessary for a successful development o f media 
reform strategies, and whether this might be an appropriate lens through which to assess 
media reform.
Basic concepts. The term “media” is understood in a narrow sense and is defined 
as the ensemble of all traditional media institutions (both broadcast and print) which 
have the potential to shape the quality o f the political discussion in the public sphere. 
Also referred to as the “news media”, it refers to the nationally available broadcast 
channels and newspapers, which all have the potential to cast significant influence on 
political developments. Theoretically speaking, the media is thus perceived as the 
central instrument of the public sphere, and our definition naturally excludes non- 
mediated forms of the public sphere, such as cinemas, theatres, exhibitions and other 
public communications fora. Given that the research began in 1998, when technology 
was not as advanced as it is today, this definition also excludes communication 
platforms such as the internet. (Although the internet will be covered where it is of key 
importance.) The media is conceptualised as a system which is to some degree 
integrated with the political, economic and civil societies* in every country under 
review, but a system where the degree of this integration, as well the degree of pressure 
coming from either field, vary according to the country’s particular development path. It 
is posited here that the media provides a “space of interconnection” between these three 
societies, and often represents a certain complementarity between them.
Generally, the declared goal of the media reform process is the creation of a 
“free and democratic” media system, and the process can be conceptualised to
1 While it is acknowledged that Kosovo is not an independent country, for reasons of simplification, it 
will be referred to as part of the group of “countries”, or “cases”, examined in this thesis.
■ These three societies are understood in the sense of Linz & Stepan (1996).
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encompass two fundamental layers of reform -  the elite-driven reform measures as well 
as the internal professionalisation of news media organisations. The goal of media 
reform is usually understood as the creation of new institutional and cultural 
foundations for the post-communist political communication system, or more 
operationally, the creation of a sustainable institutional and organisational environment, 
which moves the media system as a whole, as far away as possible from the institutional 
and organisational patterns of the communist media system. The process of media 
reform can also be understood as the renegotiation of the macro-environment for 
political communication. The theoretical end goal is usually designated as a media 
system founded upon and representing the highest European standards, and the corpus 
of non-binding recommendations by the Council of Europe provides a clear set of 
principles and benchmarks which could guide the reform process.
The media system’s general organisational principles are thus changed from 
political subordination to independence from political and economic interests, from 
singularity to pluralism of ideas, and from serving as the primary space to channel 
official state propaganda to accommodating the individual citizen’s right to freedom of 
expression. Reform entails the design of a system of regulatory frameworks and 
institutional structures which reflects the new social and political realities (including 
democratic principles upon which the new states are founded), and should also result in 
improved citizen participation through the media, and perhaps even an effective societal 
representation by the media. The media, in this sense, is structurally and operationally 
organised to have a socially unifying (centripetal) as opposed to a fragmenting 
(centrifugal) influence.
This thesis endorses the position held by Monroe E. Price & Peter F. Krug 
(2000: 4) that “law alone, efforts o f aid-givers alone, or efforts by the host government 
alone rarely determine how free, pluralistic and independent media can be [... and that] 
there is a close interaction between what might be called the legal-institutional and the 
socio-cultural, the interaction between law and how it is interpreted and implemented, 
how it is respected and received”. It also recognises the position advocated by Daniel C. 
Hallin & Paolo Mancini (2004: 8) that the news media cannot be understood without 
studying the nature of the state, the system of political parties, the pattern of relations 
between economic and political interests and the development of civil society, among 
other elements of social structure.
Following this logic, the media reform process -  if viewed comprehensively -  
encompasses a multiplicity of dimensions, including structural, legal, organisational, 
and financial reform, and essentially all parts of the five arenas of democracy (listed by 
Linz & Stepan, 1996) have a crucial impact on the development and direction of 
process. For it to occur smoothly, it is necessary to have a stable national-political 
environment, a functioning rule o f law, a sound political commitment to reform, as well 
as a consensus-seeking, democratic political culture. In addition, this research will argue 
that in order to achieve these targets, it is necessary to have a clear concept about the 
principled foundations of the new media systems, as well as transparency over the 
reform process and the political convictions which guide it.
Despite the complexity o f the reform process and the high number of variables, 
this work will focus on the emerging relationship between political elites and the media 
system. We will adopt a perspective in which the focus is on the process o f  negotiation
between political elites, media community and the civil society about what 
characteristics the new media landscapes should have. In other words, the primary focus 
is on the new institutional relationships that are promoted through government policies, 
as well the impact of tensions on the internal growth potential of the media. This way 
the thesis could assemble the most important qualities o f the changing media systems, 
and document the changing culture through studying the issues which cause most 
cultural and political controversy throughout this process. This perspective is buttressed 
by research which has identified a high correlation between the conduct o f political 
elites and the success of democratic transitions (e.g. Schmitter, 1992, Linz & Stepan, 
1996).
It is also supported by the perception that the media is imperative in influencing 
the creation of new party systems, reality definitions, and generally the consolidation of 
party legitimacy and societal support base. The elites’ attempts to establish a firm 
control or monopoly over the channels of mediated societal communication are thought 
to be rooted in a very basic need to use all possible peaceful means to obtain and retain 
power within the framework of democracy. It is thus assumed here that the problems 
surrounding media reform can be understood through interpreting them as part of the 
societal, and particularly elite negotiation over the new political power structures.
Methodology and theoretical foundations. The thesis builds on a num ber of 
ideas and concepts that were developed either in political communication (mass 
communication) or in transitology (democratic theory) research, and is thus positioned 
on the edge of both these disciplines. However, since no comprehensive theoretical 
framework and methodology has been widely endorsed so far as applicable for the study 
post-communist media systems, the thesis will apply a policy studies approach as its 
main method o f inquiry. The work does not seek to develop new concepts or definitions 
in the area of “democracies with adjectives” but instead is seeks to analyse in a 
systematic fashion what changes have occurred in media structure and culture in the 
aftermath of a radical system change. All in all, the study is primarily exploratory in 
character and does not seek to test complicated hypotheses.
It aims to gather information in a comprehensive manner, which could serve as 
the foundation of future theoretical research and possibly, theory development. We 
attempt to gather and synthesise empirical material on the media reform process in 
countries which had markedly different initial conditions and development paths. 
Hungary, Ukraine and Kosovo are three countries which have gone through starkly 
different transition routes, and their respective civil societies have been empowered to 
different degrees prior to and throughout the transition process. Through this method, 
the work seeks to demonstrate the wide range of problems which have plagued the 
region, and to identify the problem areas which have a generic validity. It is believed 
that due to its focus on the relationship between the media and the emerging political 
order, the findings of the research will be especially interesting for policy-makers and 
researchers of post-communist démocratisation.
Central argument. Given that the thesis has a “systemic” orientation, one o f the 
central arguments is that the analysis should give a comprehensive treatment to all main 
structural units of the media system. This also entails the print and broadcast segments -  
which are organised according to different structural and philosophical guidelines -  
should be studied separately. At the same time, the various policy decisions, conceptual
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arguments and general behavioural patterns by stakeholders should be categorised 
according to normative media systems theories, based broadly on Frederick S. Siebert, 
Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm’s “Four theories of the press” (1956). By 
placing the media reform process into the context of macro media systems models, it is 
hoped that the analysis would clarify the main direction where the systems are heading, 
and the main obstacles that are being produced. It also hoped that this would lead to an 
understanding of the basic characteristics of the new media systems, as well as the 
underlying principles guiding policy reform. It is hoped that this approach would help to 
dissect the anatomy of political and societal conflicts arising from incompatible ways of 
theoretical conceptualisation and argumentation.
Challenges o f media reform. The creation of an open, democratic public sphere 
was a fundamental goal of the reforming elites across the region. Soon after the 1989- 
1991 system-change, both freedom o f speech and freedom o f expression -  key 
characteristics of procedural democracy -  were widely declared basic constitutional 
rights. However, the establishment of free and democratic media -  the discursive space 
which allows those rights to be practiced -  has turned out to be more challenging than 
imagined by both local elites and the international academic community. The media’s 
structure and organisation has been the subject of an important debate, mostly rooted in 
different views on what constitutes the “public interest”, what the state’s rights and 
obligations are during the transition process, and ultimately whether the markets can be 
trusted to create a democratic media system. While political elites in the more advanced 
countries rhetorically agreed about the need for reform, no consensus was reached on 
how to best transform the media system from political into civil society institutions. In 
less developed nations, political elites had no real incentive to democratise, as the 
existing institutional and structural frameworks were helping them to stay in power, 
while civil societies proved to be too weak to make substantial change.
It is a widely accepted notion today that the media’s potential is enormous in 
facilitating the dialogue of transition between political elites and societies, and the 
success of media reform has overarching implications for the success of democratic 
consolidation. Because of the diversity in the post-communist region, no standard 
reform strategy or applicable model has emerged, but it is generally acknowledged that 
-  theoretically speaking -  the democratically elected governments’ responsibilities in 
the media field pertain to two fundamental and interrelated tasks. The basic transitology 
paradigm applies (Schmitter & O ’Donnell, 1986: 6-11, Linz & Stepan, 1996: 3), 
according to which on the one hand, there is a need to liberalise the media market, and 
on the other, to democratise the overall system. While “liberalisation” is a relatively 
simple task, requiring an adequate political consensus to open up markets to private 
competition, “démocratisation” is a complex undertaking involving the design and 
implementation of an adequate legal framework, the establishment of supporting 
institutions, and a variety of decisions with regard to financial and political re­
organisation. Démocratisation also involves placing certain limitations on the state (e.g. 
to allow political independence of the public media) as well as financial commitments 
(e.g. print media subsidies or public service funding). Both elements of reform are 
imperative for the creation of a sustainable media landscape which serves the long-term 
needs of an emerging democratic society.
5
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Today, few policy-makers would doubt the importance of both aspects of 
reform, and Western European media theorists agree that liberalisation alone would 
handicap political and societal discourse by blocking the development of equality, and 
possibly quality, within the public sphere. Aware of the potential negative ramifications 
of a liberalisation-only policy, theorists of post-communist media reform have argued 
for a need to implement a comprehensive framework of legal, political, and financial 
arrangements, which would lead to a complete restructuring of the state’s role, would 
enable the business community to invest in the media sector, and would also empower 
civil society to actively engage in the political process. Regarding the conduct of 
political elites, they also argued that the adoption of ambitious legal frameworks must 
be followed by rigorous and transparent implementation.
Free or democratic? Attached to the two aspects of the process are the concepts 
of “free” and “democratic” media. Given that these are often used interchangeably, it is 
essential to provide a clarification early on. The concept of “free media” emphasizes 
freedom from political manipulation, essentially based on the libertarian theory of the 
press (Siebert et al, 1956), which takes the individual’s right to free speech as a basic 
principle, and assumes that market-based media pluralism reflects social diversity. 
Meanwhile, the notion of “democratic media” incorporates the idea of equality, 
attributes a role to the state which embodies the principle of politics-neutral 
constructivism, as opposed to a politicised, possibly destructive influence on the 
institution of the media. These two concepts are not only useful bases of analysis, but 
also reflect the difference between the American and the European approach regarding 
the role of media in democracy, with the emphasis being on freedom in the US and on 
democracy in Europe.
Past approaches. In the last fifteen years, the post-communist transition process 
has been studied through every major discipline and within those, a wide range of 
perspectives. Several enquiries have attempted to evaluate the conduct of political elites 
and the general state of the media through a review of legislative work, constitutional 
debates, ownership trends, and concentration figures. There have also been historical 
and sociological surveys, analysing cultural variables within the framework o f a “path 
dependence” approach, focusing on the historical conditions of media démocratisation. 
The subject of media reform has also become a topic for political scientists, primarily 
because the media sector has been one o f the most radically changing aspect of the post­
communist political reality. It was widely recognised that the post-communist 
governments’ treatment of their national media systems hot only indicates their 
achievements in the overall démocratisation project, but also mirrors their relationship 
with their respective societies. Focused political analysis was also considered necessary 
due to the fact that post-communist policy-makers were under immense pressure to 
produce swift results in media reform, and have been held against the highest principle 
benchmarks by their Western European and American counterparts.
There has been an understanding among the academic community that changes 
in the media-political relationship reveal an important aspect of the changing political 
culture in these societies. Scholars also assume a circular relationship between media 
démocratisation and the political transformation process, and generally accept that 
media démocratisation, in itself, is not a sufficient variable to draw overall conclusions 
about the quality of democracy. The recognition of the media’s importance by scholars
6
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is underscored by the fact that during the 1990s, “media studies” became one of the 
fastest growing academic industries, both in terms of theoretical and empirical output. 
This coincided with swift technological changes in the 1990s, which also invigorated 
the Western debate about the potential of the public sphere and the importance of 
mediated deliberation.
The interplay between media and democratic transition and consolidation has 
been analysed by several scholars, including AÍ Hester & Kristina White (1993), Liana 
Giorgi (1995), Farrel Corcoran & Paschal Preston (1995), John Downing (1996), David 
Paletz et al (1995) Karol Jakubowicz (1996, 2002, 2003) Patrick H. O’Neil (1997, 
1998), Colin Sparks & Anna Reading (1998), Owen V. Johnson (1993, 1995, 1998), 
Monroe E. Price et al (2002), and Miklós Sükösd (2003). Among others, Karol 
Jakubowicz also analysed a series of theoretical perspectives with regard to measuring 
media change (1998), and the applicability of normative media models (1999), while 
Attila Âgh and Elemér Hankiss focused on cultural aspects of reform (1992). Jean 
Cohen, and Gabor Halmai & Maria Vâsârhelyi developed a public sphere angle (1996), 
Peter Gross focused on the relationship between the new political elites and the media 
(2001, 2002, 2003), while Monroe E. Price and Peter F. Krug wrote about the enabling 
environment for free and independent media (2000) as well as the media development 
effort ran by international organisations (2002).
In addition, significant attention has been paid to the theory and patterns in 
media privatisation (Slavko Splichal, 1993, 1995), the political economy of the media 
(Mihâly Gâlik & Zoltán Jakab, 1991, and Mihâly Gâlik, 2001), as well as the concept of 
public service broadcasting (e.g. Colin Sparks, 1998, Tamâs Terestyéni, 1995). Policy 
analysis on broadcasting regulations has also been performed (Karol Jakubowicz, 1999; 
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, 2001), as well as the study of cultural aspects of communication 
(Nora Schleicher, 2000). In relation to theory, John Downing (1996) pointed to the 
interdisciplinary nature of media research, arguing that a wide range of theories must be 
used to support the analysis of post-communist media démocratisation, while Andrew 
K. Milton (2000) used both democratic theory and organisational analysis to analyse 
media reform. Last but not least, Oleg Manaev & Yurij Pryluk looked at the more 
general transition from totalitarianism to democracy (1993), Bruce Parrott & Karen 
Dawisha analysed media reform in Russia and the Western peripheries o f the CIS 
(1997), while Natalya Krasnaboka & Kees Brants studied media landscapes in Russia 
and Ukraine (2002).
By the mid-1990s, the subject’s importance was also indicated by the growth of 
grassroots advocacy groups, and the strengthening of the institutional frameworks for 
funding and assistance. High on the list of important NGOs is Freedom House, 
Reporters Without Borders, Article 19, Freedom Forum, The International Research and 
Exchange Board (IREX), and the International Federation of Journalists. Also indicative 
of the media’s importance was the OSCE’s appointment of a Representative on the 
Freedom of the Media (1998), and the increasing attention paid by the World Bank, 
UNESCO, and the Council of Europe. The state of media reform became a key indicator 
influencing a given country’s standing in international politics (e.g. a condition for 
negotiations on, or admittance to the European Union), and -  for some countries -  it 
also became the basis for economic assistance by Western donors.
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Across the region, despite the variations on organisational structure, investment 
climate and legal environment, many of the challenges facing the media reform process 
have been similar. Political elites -  particularly in the “grey zone” -  strongly interfered 
in developments within the media sector through manipulation of frequency allocations, 
r\ the excessive fining of media outlets, as well as different forms of administrative 
persecution i.e. police raids and tax inspections. There have also been examples where 
governments failed to liberalise the markets, to decriminalise defamation laws, or where 
they applied economic pressure on media outlets through the placing of targeted state 
advertising, or the allocation of direct subsidies to partisan media. Many governments 
have denied access to public information, have designed sophisticated systems of 
official censorship, or have kept a state monopoly on printing. In places, governments 
have also failed to curb the emergence of media oligarchs and to provide adequate 
safety guarantees for journalists.
In an attempt to maximise their discursive power, emergent political parties have 
competed not only for electoral votes but for domination over the primary channels of 
societal communication, despite the fact that these battles infringed upon the 
constitutionally-protected principles of democracy. In fact, Karol Jakubowicz observed 
that in some countries, the only thing political elites agreed on was that post-communist 
political parties should have a legitimate right to own media outlets in order to generate 
a pluralistic media system and to promote the process of transition. (1995: 39-40) The 
over-politicisation of the new media systems has been aptly demonstrated by the 
, widespread use of lotizazzione, especially in regard to the appointment of public service 
managements and supervisory boards, promoting the interest of political parties rather 
than the radically changing societies. (Jakubowicz 1998: 19, Mungiu-Pippidi 1999).
The theoretical justifications put forward by different governments have also 
been quite similar. Political elites widely held the view that the emerging media system 
should be subordinated to the political realm, arguing that the only legitimate way to 
articulate societies’ interests was within political institutions. As the people’s elected 
representatives, government elites often asserted that they must be able to deliver their 
message directly to the people, and not have to compete in the marketplace. In several 
countries -  including Hungary -  politicians openly said that the media have a 
“responsibility” to serve the political establishment, and always articulate the “correct 
view” as opposed to representing a diversity of voices and interests. Some governments 
argued for the need to create a balance within private media to reflect the power 
relations between political forces, while some theorised that the state needed to protect 
society from the media itself. Overall, the elites widely argued that a free and open 
media system could not be tolerated when the economies and the democratic 
institutional structures are still fragile. (Johnson, 1995: 161)
Not only that the decades of communism locked these societies away from the 
gradual media démocratisation process which occurred in Western Europe in the second 
part of the 20th century, but the close scrutiny of international human rights and 
advocacy groups put significant political pressure on political elites to achieve swift 
results. At the same time, many of the challenges are shared with advanced Western 
. European democracies. The effects of technological change, commercialisation,
, globalisation, changing political communication, news-gathering and distribution 
patterns, and what Daniel C. Hallin & Paolo Mancini more generally call “the
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homogenisation of media systems and the public sphere”, (2004b: 25) have placed an 
external pressure on the national social and political systems in which media systems 
have been traditionally rooted. The combined effect of these dynamics generated 
significant pressure within the media-political relationship and often produced 
unexpected results in both media consumption patterns and media landscape structures.
While the media reform does reveal a lot about the changing political culture, its 
success is also firmly rooted in the very political culture which it is about to change. 
The academic community agrees that for democratic systems to consolidate and endure, 
a supportive political culture and a strong civil society must develop, while corruption 
and authoritarian government practices must be eradicated. Political culture, understood 
here as the cultural aspect of the way authority is exercised (i.e. political behaviour, 
political values, as well as the prevailing political communication patterns) remains 
weak in most countries, and has retained an authoritarian flavour, leading to the 
compromising of political values for short-sighted gains.3 Meanwhile, an analysis into 
political communication patterns shows a series of negative trends such as an increasing 
nationalist-populist discourse (and in some instances anti-Semitic discourse) as well as 
other aggressive efforts to dominate the discursive space. Empirical evidence points 
toward the conclusion that there is a generic lack of a consensus-seeking rational 
dialogue. (Agh, 1992,1998)
The development of more democratic political cultures has been complicated by 
the endurance of communist-era, cynical mindsets across societies (Sztompka, 1993) 
and particularly in the cultural heritage of the political elites and the journalistic 
community. At the outset, the level of social capital, defined by Putnam as “the features 
of social organisations, such as networks and trust that facilitate co-ordination and co­
operation for mutual benefit” (1995: 67) also proved very low across the region, (e.g. 
Paldam & Svendsen, 2000, Letki & Evans, 2002) Post-communist political elites are 
mostly derivatives of the old communist elites and of the anti-communist, dissident 
intellectual community -  both of which fragmented into competing groups throughout 
the 1990s.4 While political culture is hard to measure and compare, political 
participation patterns suggest that despite the hardships, societies remained relatively 
involved and active in elections. However, citizen involvement in public life through 
media consumption seems to have deteriorated across the region. In almost every 
country, newspaper penetration and audience figures are lower within the political 
media than they were during communist times.5 This is due partly to the continued 
political interference and a combination of economic factors and market trends.
3 Country reports in Freedom House annual démocratisation indexes, EU progress reports
4 Across the region, Âgh (1998) has divided elites to the following categories: a) “Politicians o f morals” -  
who played a role in opposing the Communist regime (predominantly in Hungary, Poland and the former 
Czechoslovakia); b) “Politicians of historical vision” -  who represent a direct or indirect (e.g. József 
Antall of Hungary) continuity with the pre-Communist political past; c) “Politicians by chance” -  who 
were catapulted to power by the chaos of the transition, and who are “aggressive exhibitionists” but 
“unable politicians”; d) “Old nomenklatura” -  a mixed group of Communist Party members or leaders, 
half-hearted opponents of the communist rule and reformers; and lastly e) “New professional political 
elites" -  old and new politicians, mostly from the younger generation, who emerged in the second half of 
the first post-Communist transition decade. Source: Âgh, A.: The Politics of Central Europe. London, 
Sage Publications, 1998, p. 112.
5 Norris (2000), and annual surveys by World Association of Newspapers
Also, in the initial years o f the transition, one common pattern can be identified 
across the most developed part o f region i.e. that post-communist governments had 
fairly limited policy options in the areas of political institution building, as well as 
economic, and legal reforms. Innés (2001) observed that in some countries, the 
development of post-communist parties may be compared to the development of 
Western European catch-all parties -  to use Otto Kirchheimer’s phrase (1966) -  in 
terms of the competitive logic of minimising ideological positions in order to embrace a 
large constituency. In order to cope within a transitional environment that offers few 
alternatives, the parties have moved most of the political competition to the media, and 
clashed over “operating styles” rather than over substantive policy preferences.
The phenomenon of corruption has also had a dramatic influence on 
démocratisation efforts. Broadly defined here as “the misuse of public power for gain 
other than the public interest,” corruption per se is hard to measure in any society, but 
“perceptions of corruption” have been widely accepted as trustworthy indicators of the 
phenomena. In the transitional era, persistent corruption can cause irreparable damage 
within the civil society-political society relationship, it can thwart economic 
development and undermine political legitimacy. It also leads to increased inequity in 
resource distribution, less political competition, and greater distrust in government. In 
most post-communist countries, the public perceives corruption to be woven into the 
basic institutional framework, undermining governance and weakening the credibility of 
the state.
The level of corruption has been proved to be strongly interlinked with media 
démocratisation, and reformed m edia systems can significantly contribute to fighting 
corruption. As a result, even financial institutions such as the World Bank recognised 
that anti-corruption strategies must include a media component.6 The media’s potential 
in fighting corruption has unfortunately also been recognised locally -  more than 200 
journalists have been killed while investigating stories on corrupt officials or criminal 
groups in the territory of the former Soviet Union alone.7 Due to the combined effect of 
the above examined cultural aspects, it has been theorised that media reform was always 
going to be a difficult process, and Western governments have been far too optimistic 
about its smoothness. (Gross, 2001) Many argued that while institutions can be 
changed, the reform of mindsets, behavioural patterns and other cultural variables will 
be a long-lasting process, one that could take as long as a generation to complete.
Basic research questions. Based on the empirical evidence available about post­
communist transitions, it seems that the importance of direct media-political relations 
has been advocated not only by political elites but also by some parts of the journalistic 
community. We therefore have to take it as an unavoidable element of the discussion, 
and one which we need to conceptually integrate into our research framework. Among 
others, we need to ask ourselves -  to what extent is it legitimate for political elites to 
stay involved in media affairs? A nd if they do stay engaged, how should their 
engagement be organised so that it does not protract the overall démocratisation project?
6 Since 2000, the World Bank has included the “fostering of independent media” as its basic programme 
points to fight corruption. Others include a) increasing political accountability, b) strengthening 
institutional restraints within the state, c) strengthening civil society participation, d) creating a 
competitive private sector, e) reforming public sector management.
7 Glasnost Defense Foundation (www.gdf.ru) Cited in Nelson et al (1999)
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In this regard, how can the state’s neutral constructivist role be conceptualised, and do 
political parties have any legitimate place in crafting this role? Is the emergence of 
media-political parallelism a natural side effect of democratic transition, or is it the 
result of the undesired but unavoidable regression from the initially ambitious 
commitments? And last but not least, is it fruitful to set the highest standards of press 
freedom at the outset of the reform -  will that keep the process sustainable, and on the 
right track?
Structure. Transitologists have argued that the characteristics of the regime prior 
to the system change have a determining influence both on the path, pace and direction 
of the transition process. Therefore it can be assumed that the establishment of free and 
independent media systems is highly dependent on the initial conditions. In order to 
maximise the results of the empirical study, the research will thus perform a brief 
examination of the initial conditions first. It will then continue to assess the methods of 
liberalisation and démocratisation, as well as the journalistic community’s ability to 
participate and influence these reforms. During the comprehensive reconstruction of the 
media reform process in three single country studies, we will use a framework of 
normative media systems theories in order to illustrate the internal heterogeneity of the 
emerging media systems. While not every aspect of media reform can be categorised 
according to these models, it is hoped that the most essential features can be clearly 
identified, and that the external and internal aspects will prove to be complementary and 
mutually feeding into each other.
The work will be divided into five further chapters. The next one will review the 
theoretical foundations and conceptual development of the key notions associated with 
media and democracy research, and will designate a theoretical framework. The 
subsequent chapters will contain detailed case studies, which will be divided into 
similar subsections in order to focus the analysis and facilitate comparison. The last 
chapter will attempt to synthesise the findings, and identify the commonalities and 
differences between the three countries, with a view to drawing some recommendations 
regarding possible conceptual and theoretical avenues for the future.
Empirical data. The thesis predominantly relies on existing information, and 
does not generate new empirical data. The compilation of the material is the result of 
years of extensive library, internet, and field-based research, and significant analytical 
selection. The bulk of the empirical evidence was gathered from local newspaper 
reports, policy documents, legal texts, as well as reports by the European Union, OSCE, 
Council of Europe, USAID and other international organisations and development 
agencies. In the case of Kosovo, a one-year assignment was completed to gather the 
necessary information. Various political statements regarding media freedom issues 
have also been analysed, as well as opinion polls related to perceptions of the political 
and media situation. Other sources included surveys obtained from various local and 
international NGOs, as well as media monitoring surveys by international organisations. 
Also useful have been the reports by advocacy groups such as Freedom House, IREX, 
Human Rights Watch, the International Press Institute, and Article 19 etc. Scholarly 
literature and analysis by international think tanks (including the European Institute for 
the Media and the Open Society Institute), as well as international newspapers and 
policy journals were also consulted throughout this research project. The list of persons 
who gave in-depth interviews for this thesis can be found in the Appendix.
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As this thesis will show, there is a good reason to be pessimistic about the media 
reform process, but let us nevertheless begin this project with the words of John Keane 
who once wrote that the scope and meaning of freedom of communication and the 
process o f representation will always be contentious, and societies in which there are no 
controversies over the media are societies which are dying a slow death. (1991: 127- 
129, paraphrased here) In relation to post-communist Europe, this could be seen as an 
encouraging statement. The sub-text of Keane’s message is that the debates not only 
raise consciousness around the issues of press freedom, and enhance the strength and 
stamina o f civil societies, they also carry the potential of distinctly positive outcomes, 
which might strengthen the societal-cultural foundations of emerging democracies.
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Chapter II.
Literature Review, Theoretical 
Framework and Methodology
This chapter reviews relevant literature on democratic theory, mass 
communication theory, and media démocratisation research, in particular the 
discussions on the media’s perceived influence on societal developments. It then looks 
at possible theoretical approaches, and proposes an analytical framework based broadly 
on the normative media theories proposed by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956). 
The chapter also discusses the background for choosing the case studies, and closes 
with the introduction of the hypotheses and the central assumptions regarding the 
dependency relationship between the media and the political system, the role of the 
media in democratic transition and the treatment of political parallelism.
1. C o n c e p t u a l is in g  t h e  M e d i a -D e m o c r a c y  R e l a t io n s h ip
The oldest source of ideas about the contribution of mediated public 
communication to societal and political developments can be found in classical 
democratic theory. In the 18th and 19th centuries, several liberal thinkers reflected on the 
importance of public discourse -  Rousseauideemed it essential for the formation of a 
general public will,1 and John Stuart Mill outlined a philosophical rationale for 
“government by discussion.”2 In this tradition, the media was considered central to the 
democratic process through facilitating the formation of public opinion, and through 
guaranteeing certain individual civil rights, i.e. allowing citizens to articulate their 
views, and to gather information on public matters.
Throughout the first half of the 20 century, scholars assumed a fairly 
straightforward, sequential relationship between the media, socio-economic 
development and the process of démocratisation. It was believed that the more liberal 
the media system, the more it can contribute to economic growth and democratic 
consolidation. The spread of communism strengthened this view, but at the same time 
called for a major rethinking o f the media’s potential in the establishment, maintenance 
and/or demise of various political systems. (Norris & Zinnbauer, 2002: 5) The 
communist media model emerged as the exact opposite of the principles upheld by
1 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques: The Social Contract, Book IV, Chapter II. For a discussion of Rousseau’s view 
of deliberation, see Manin, B.: “On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation” in Political Theory, Vol. 15, 
No. 3, August 1987
'  John Stuart Mill: On liberty, 1859. For an overview of this concept, see Kinder, Donald R. & Herzog, 
Don: “Democratic Discussion,” in Marcus & Hanson (eds.): Reconsidering the Democratic Public, 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993
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liberal democracy, in regard to the media system’s structure, organisation, and 
philosophical justification.
The two different types of systems can be simplistically described as “open” and 
“closed” systems, following Popper’s allegory of open and closed societies.3 An open, 
liberal model is based on a combination of individual values (i.e. freedom of 
expression) and societal values (i.e. openness, democratic political system), and has a 
complex internal structure, with multiple layers of vertical and horizontal 
communication. Meanwhile, the closed system is based either upon coercive structures 
or fake societal values (i.e. peace and order), and stresses the dangers of unrestricted 
communication and expression. Its lines of communication are simplistic and controlled 
from above. At this point, it was assumed and widely advocated by developmental 
theories o f the 1960s4 that Western open models, when exported to developing regions, 
could contribute to the success of transitions to democracy.
With the gradual development of interpretative audience research, and of mass 
communication theory in the Western world, the media’s role and influence became the 
focus of a stand-alone research strand -  mass communication research.5 Included in this 
field was also the sub-field of political communication, which specialised in studying 
the relationship between political systems, electorates and the media. The development 
and growth o f mass communication research was embedded in a more general need to 
develop new theories which would explain -  through media research methods -  the 
experience with the second, “reverse wave” of démocratisation (in Latin America, Sub- 
Saharan Africa, and Asia). These political developments swiftly eliminated the validity 
of the “sequential” arguments in developmental theories, and many scholars admitted to 
the possibility of a strong conflict within transitional societies over media freedom. The 
media gradually came to be regarded as a potentially powerful propaganda agency, 
capable of sustaining authoritarian regimes, even if partially liberalised. (Norris & 
Zinnbauer, 2002)
In response to the emerging need to constmct media theories for different 
political systems, Siebert, Peterson and Schramm suggested in 1956 (hereinafter Siebert 
et al) that the organisation and function of the media should be studied in the framework 
of four normative theories -  the authoritarian, the libertarian, the social responsibility, 
and the Soviet (in order of historical emergence) -  which illustrate the media’s position 
in relation to their political environment. Siebert et al implied that the division between 
open and closed systems continues to be valid, by pointing out that the social
3 See Popper, Karl: The open society and its enemies, London Routledge, 1980 (first published in 1945)
4 More specifically, the modernisation theories in the 1950s and 1960$ stressed the media’s positive 
influences on society, and held that the growth of mass communication was a direct consequence of 
political and economic development. Theorists of modernisation argued that mediated communication 
lays the foundation for an informed, politically engaged society, and assists the policy dialogue between 
citizens and political elites. For example, Lerner (1958) positively conceptualised the media’s role as a 
catalyst of societal development by raising expectations and aspirations, and bringing about a demand- 
based transition from below. Developmental theories of the 1960s argued that the power of 
communication may smoothen the difficulties of transitions and modernisation, and contribute the growth 
of an informed citizenry, (e.g. Schramm, 1964)
3 “Mass communication" was defined as “the institutionalised production and generalised diffusion of 
symbolic goods via the fixation and transmission of information and symbolic content.” Source:
Thompson, L: The media and modernity, in Mackay, H. & O’Sullivan T. (eds.): The Media Reader: 
Continuity and transformation, 1999
mmmmm
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responsibility and the Soviet theories were only modified versions of the libertarian and 
authoritarian models (1956: 2). As the first attempt to clarify the link between media 
and political systems, the “Four theories of the press”6 had a key impact on mass 
communication research, and especially with regard to studies of national media 
systems. Even though the Four theories were developed within the discipline of mass 
communication research, they have also had a strong relevance to the areas studied by 
scholars of democratic theory.
/  - *
Essentially rooted in the US experience, the open models in Siebert et aVs 
classification were “ideal” models, based on prescriptive concepts, which did not 
necessarily reflect the true nature of the 1950s societies and their media systems. The 
libertarian model’s main aim was to empower the individual and to allow freedom of 
speech and freedom of expression through full liberalisation of the media market, and a 
total ban on state interference. In relation to the practical application of this model, it 
has been observed my many scholars that a market-based media approach has created 
an environment which is prone to the emergence of oligarchic power, (e.g. McQuail,
1983: 88-89) In other words, the liberal dimension of this model has, in reality, proved 
to be more dominant than the libertarian dimension -  it provided for diversity but not 
the sort which would necessarily empower the individual citizen. Also, it was never 
flexible enough to provide a platform for individual freedom of expression.
This was confirmed at the time by the findings of the US Commission on the 
Freedom of the Press -  also known as the Hutchins Commission (1947) -  which found 
that the free market approach within the media sphere had only increased the power of 
the business elites, and failed to serve the interests of the society-at-large. To resolve the 
challenges generated by full liberalisation, the Commission recommended a limited 
state involvement in media affairs to make sure that the public’s right to receive 
balanced information is ensured. Meanwhile, two years later, the Royal Commission of 
the Press in Britain suggested that the only way to reconcile market flaws with the 
traditional conception of press freedom is to increase journalistic professionalism. In 
their recommendations, both agencies urged the adoption of values such as neutrality, 
detachment and commitment to truth. They also asserted that a structural reform of the 
media was not necessary, but the implementation of “internal pluralism” principles was 
unavoidable.
The model, which was encouraged and partially developed in the aftermath of 
these developments, is what Siebert et al call “social responsibility model”. This ' ,
represented an admission by both the state and the media that the principles of external 
pluralism and freedom of expression are not sufficient to produce democratic public 
communication. (Siebert et al 1956: 73-105) In the US, these ideas were applied 
through a strict practice of balanced reporting (which became known in broadcasting as 
the “fairness doctrine”). The idea of a socially responsible media system was 
implemented more vigorously in Europe. By setting up the institution of public service 
television, policy-makers strove to balance the rights of the individuals against the 
needs of society. This occurred simultaneously with the gradual dissolution in most 
European countries of the strong financial link between political parties and the press.
At the same time, some European countries embarked on démocratisation measures
6 By “press’ Siebert etal means all types of mass media i.e. television, radio, and newspapers.
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within the print realm, such as introducing subsidies, in order to counterbalance the 
effects of growing concentration. (McQuail, 2000: 151)
The media's contribution to advancing démocratisation. In the meantime, an 
influential group of democracy theorists began to argue that the media’s increasing 
power should be placed under closer scrutiny. The Marxist-dominated Frankfurt School 
submitted a prominent theoretical critique of the classical liberal conception of the 
media and their role within societal communication structures. These influential 
thinkers held that the media are, in fact, part of a capitalist industrialisation o f culture, 
which serves to reconcile people to a dominating social order in a totalising way. In 
their seminal work, Dialectic o f Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno (1944 [1973]) 
argued that the new cultural and communication patterns made systems of social 
domination more efficient and effective. Using the term “culture industry” instead of 
“mass communication”, they pointed to the commodified nature of culture, and 
suggested that the culture industry supplied “substitute gratification”, while at the same 
time promoting the cult of personality and other authoritarian attitudes.
Habermas remained within the framework of this paradigm when he designed 
the concept of the “public sphere” {Öffentlichkeit) in his historic contribution, The 
Structural transformation o f  the public sphere (1962). He claimed that the combination 
of modem communication patterns and industrialized welfare states o f advanced 
capitalism no longer allow for a universally accessible public sphere to emerge. He 
suggested that an ideal public sphere did exist at the end o f 18th and early 19th centuries 
as a result of the appearance of a market-based press, and the intensification of face-to 
face public discussions. This sphere served essential functions for the political process 
by protecting fundamental communication values through allowing participation and 
representation for the wider society. According to Habermas, the public sphere 
collapsed as a result of a mutual interpenetration between public and private spheres and 
it cannot be reinstalled under the conditions of modernity.
Habermas argued that with the “demise” o f the public sphere, its functions are 
assumed by institutions which can only reproduce it in a distorted form. He suggested 
that in the course of the 20th century, party politics and manipulation of the media lead 
to a “refeudalisation” of the public sphere, where representation and appearances 
outweigh rational-critical debate. By means of these transformations, the public sphere 
became a setting for state and corporate actors to develop legitimacy not by responding 
appropriately to an independent and critical public, but by seeking to instill in social 
actors motivations which conform to the needs of the overall system they dominate. 
Negt & Kluge (1972 [1993]) further elaborated the problem of participation and 
representation, and argued for a so-called “proletarian public sphere”, set against a more 
comprehensive “context of living”. (Negt & Kluge, 1993: 54-96)
All in all, the Frankfurt School viewed the media as ideological agencies that 
play a central role in maintaining class domination in Western societies, and their output 
was seminal in raising awareness about the detrimental effects of mediated 
communication. Their work contributed to the recognition within empirical 
communications research that more attention needs to be paid to the influence of the 
media on the ideological categories and frames of reference through which people view 
the world. Their criticism brought an additional spotlight to the work of mass
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communication researchers, who were already beginning to measure negative media 
effects.
The media’s demonstrated negative effects. In the 1960s, empirical mass 
communication "research broke new ground in our understanding of media-political 
relations. In stark contradiction to the 1940s “limited effects paradigm,”7 Lang & Lang 
(1966) claimed that there was a clear connection between political programming (and 
particularly news programming) and public disillusionment with politics. While 
studying the linkage between media coverage and political trust, Robinson (1976: 425) 
found that people who rely mainly on television for political information reveal 
significantly lower degrees of internal efficacy and institutional trust, than those who 
read newspapers as well. He termed this phenomena “videomalaise”. Subsequent 
research by Miller (1979) measured the exact amount of negative coverage any single 
respondent was exposed to, by linking content analysis data with survey data -  thereby 
confirming the general assumptions of videomalaise.
Gradually, the media became directly blamed for a wide variety of effects which 
fragment and deconstruct the imagined workings of a democratic system. Even though 
he could not prove causality, Patterson (1993) claimed that the growing scepticism and 
negativity in US news coverage matched an increasing popular distrust in government 
and a general disengagement from civil life. Sullivan et al (1978) concluded that US 
citizens* views on certain policy issues are largely dependent on various politicians’ 
presentation techniques, and “framing theory” went as far as suggesting that citizens are 
incapable of political judgement.8 Several scholars reiterated the Habermasian position 
that the media might impose undesired identities and political preferences, and 
ultimately lead to an ideological domination in the sense of Gramsci. (Stokes, 1998:136; 
Przeworski, 1998: 140-160)
At the same time, scholars testing mass society theories rejected the argument 
that citizens in Western societies were vulnerable to media manipulation by elites, and 
developed theories according to which the individuals played a more active role in 
adopting or rejecting the guidelines offered by the news media. They asserted that the 
news media are more likely to offer a “raw material” for constructing social images and 
forming political opinions, than to impose their definitions. (McQuail & Windahl, 1993: 
9) Despite these findings, the perception remained strong throughout the 1970s and 
1980s that the news media are not neutral interpreters of social and political realities, 
and the actors benefit most from mass communication are the elites. (McQuail & 
Windahl, 1993: 10)
In Europe, the emerging negative influence of the media was widely thought to 
be connected to the increasing tabloidisation within the print media, and the rise of
7 In the 1940s, Katz & Lazarsfeld suggested that the media have only minima! effects on citizens’ 
political choices, (i.e. the “limited effects paradigm”) For details, see Katz, E. & Lazarsfeld, P.F.: 
Personal influence, New York, Free Press, 1955
8 The idea of framing first appeared in Goffman, E.: Frame Analysis, New York: Harper and Row, 1974. 
However, Nelson et al (1979) provide the best, most comprehensive common definition, one which links 
framing and deliberation. They see framing as “the process by which a source defines the essential 
problem underlying a particular social or political issue and outlines a set of considerations purportedly 
relevant to that issue”. In other words, “framing is the process by which a communication source [...] 
defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy."
commercial broadcasting, (e.g. Dahlgren, 1995) The deteriorating quality o f public 
communication was also blamed on the “médiatisation" of politics and political 
communication, and particularly the increasingly US-style communication patterns 
which put the emphasis on style and image. This, as theorists argued, led to an increased 
fragmentation of the political discourse, the personalisation of the political sphere, and 
the rise o f “media compatible" politicians (the so called “winnowing" effect). Even 
though little empirical support has been found for the videomalaise theory in Europe,9 
many theorists argued that Western Europe is undergoing a “crisis o f civic 
communication”.
At the same time, many aspects of the media-political relationship have been 
studied, among them the typology of journalist and audience roles within the political 
communication system. Jay G. Blunder & Michael Gurevitch identified trends where 
political governance has become more difficult, public expectations higher, and mass 
communications more vital. They argued that the relationship between political and 
media systems are such that they do not contribute to improving the quality of civic 
communications and the public sphere. The core problem, they argued, lies in the 
degree of animosity that has developed between politicians and journalists. In their 
struggle to control the news agenda, political parties have increasingly tailored their 
messages to journalistic formats, news values and predilections, but at the same time 
journalists are placing overwhelming emphasis on their watchdog role, producing 
increasingly negative coverage of politicians. (Blunder & Gurevitch, 1995:45-58)
Media power. The news media were found to have a high potential to generate 
centrifugal effects within society by creating unsustainable and/or irreversible divisions. 
At the same time, along the lines of the Marxist argumentation, several influential books 
discussed the issue of “media power" (Paletz & Entman 1981, Graber 1984, Altheide 
1985) offering imperative insights about the way political messages are constructed and 
manipulated. An increasing number of ideologically-detached scholars have argued that 
there is a visible trend in the direction of greater media influence, particularly in relation 
to the political system. Nicolas Gamham, for instance, wrote that the institutions and 
processes o f public communication should, in fact, be considered a central part of the 
political structure and process. (1986: 37-38) Further, he argued that changes in media 
structure and media policy are hardcore political questions, and their importance is as 
high as basic questions such as proportional representation, subsidies to political parties 
or relations between national and local governments.
Another important contributor to the debate was Marshall McLuhan, who 
considered that theoretical discussions on the role of the media were too narrowly 
focused on media content and meaning, i.e. on the media's message carrier function. He 
argued that the media should be seen as technologies which extend a particular human 
sense or faculty. The real message o f any medium or technology should be thought of as 
“the change of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces into human affairs.” Through 
his celebrated argument “the medium is the message”, he depicted the development of 
global communications networks, which he claimed would be the ultimate “extension of 
man". (McLuhan, 1964: 7-22) The British scholar Raymond Williams (who once 
famously said that “we have never as a society acted so much or watched so many
9 Norris, P. (2000: Conclusion, pp. 5)
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others acting”10) provided an in-depth exploration of the institution of television, with 
the intention of refuting McLuhan’s arguments of technological determinism. Williams 
(1974) situated television and its effects within a critical sociology of society as a 
totality, and emphasised the problematic nature of generating accurate results o f media 
output. Meanwhile, Jean Baudrillard described the mass media as a “speech without 
response” and argued that they “fabricate non-communication” (1988: 207).
Media and free markets. In parallel to the partial liberalisation o f Europe’s 
broadcast markets in the past three decades, critics across the US and Europe argued 
that competitive economic markets do not automatically supply “public goods” such as 
an informed citizenry, and they do not lead to more democratic participation (Keane 
1991, Tunstall & Palmer 1991). In their criticism of the libertarian model, John Keane 
and James Curran argued that the free market compromises rather than guarantees 
editorial integrity, and that the libertarian ideology, based on the freedom of individual 
choice, is a “justification of the privileging of corporate speech and of giving more 
choice to investors than to citizens”. (Keane 1991b: 89, Curran, 1991a: 87) Curran 
suggested that the media have become a “battleground between contending forces” 
(Curran 1991(b): 29) and the balance between social and political forces is dependent 
on the mode in which the media mediates conflict. Meanwhile, many other scholars 
joined this debate, stressing the dangers arising from media concentration and under­
regulation both in the Western world (e.g. Chomsky 1988, Boggs 1997, Murdock & 
Golding 1995) and in the post-communist context (see for instance the writings of 
Galik).
These discussions provided an early warning for post-communist policy-makers (' 
that there seems to be no correlation between the level of liberalisation and the quality 
of public communication, which makes the adoption of a comprehensive 
démocratisation policy unavoidable. It has been argued that in countries with weak 
oppositions and weak civil societies, a liberalisation-only policy would lead to an elite 
monopoly over the public and policy spheres, which -  in terms of its effects on society 
-  could be as negative as the Soviet or authoritarian models. The Council of Europe has 
established in many of its recommendations that liberalisation alone is not a solution to 
achieving media freedom, while Downing, argued that media liberalisation without a 
degree of démocratisation in the social and economic spheres is a “recipe for disaster” 
as the reform processes lead to the emergence of chauvinistic social movements, 
continued elite control and ethnic confrontations. (Downing, 1995: 18)
The continuing “public sphere” debate. Following the 1989 translation of 
Habermas’ seminal work to English, there was a new wave of scholarly efforts to 
propose ways of democratising the public sphere, and its central instrument, the media.
In this debate, scholars emphasised the public sphere’s potential to contribute to the 
consolidation of democracy, and established that the structure and operation of the 
public sphere, and thus the media system, directly impact on the society’s character and , 
are thus most visible indicators of the level of démocratisation, (e.g. Gamham 1986, 
Calhoun 1992, Price, 1995, Benhabib, 1996, Cohen & Arato, 1998, Dahlgren 1995, 
2001, Gross 2001) Most public sphere theorists shared Habermas’ conclusion that the 1 
media have gradually ceased to be agencies of empowerment, and despite the
10 Raymond Williams’s inaugural lecture as professor of drama (1974)
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technological advancement, publics continue to be marginalized. They also asserted that 
modern patterns of communication generate a key conceptual contradiction that forever 
maintains the imperfection of a democratic system, and agreed that the creation of an 
ideal public sphere is, in fact, one o f the ultimate challenges of democracy. The theorists 
argued that free distribution of information (independent of both political and economic 
pressures) was critical to the quality o f democracy.
Scholars also launched a debate on the public sphere’s structure and 
organisation,11 proposing that the more democratic the media structures (and the more 
those fit the conception of democracy in a particular country) the more it will allow for 
societal participation and representation in the political process, thereby improving the 
overall quality of democracy, (e.g. Gurevitch & Blunder 1990: 270, Keane 1991a, 
1991b, Curran 1996) There was also renewed discussion on how the public sphere can 
be defined best. Calhoun wrote that the importance of the public sphere lies in its 
potential as a mode of social integration, and that the contemporary public discourse -  
and what Habermas later and more generally calls “communicative action” -  is a 
possible mode of coordination of human life (as are state power and market economies). 
(Calhoun, 1992: 1-51) Bennett & Entman understood the public sphere as “any and all 
locations where ideas and feelings relevant to politics are transmitted and exchanged 
openly” (2001: 3), while Habermas himself also redefined the concept and calls it a 
“myriad of distinct, but also overlapping, interweaving communicative spaces.” 12
The above discussions slightly adjusted the debate over the media, transferring 
the focus from identifying the negative functions to finding ways of how the 
fundamental communication values could be met under late 20th and early 21st century 
conditions. Public sphere theorists argued that mediated deliberation may resolve some 
basic dysfunctions of democracy, and the media-provided communication space offers a 
way to address problems which have occurred as a result of the ambitious ideals and 
promises o f participatory democracy. They do not claim that the democratic use of this 
space is without challenge but they are optimistic that “participation” and 
“representation” values are not obsolete, or impossible democracy ideals after all. The 
terms “information society” and “knowledge society”, which have entered the public 
discourse in recent years, indicate the presence of these concepts even in governmental 
thinking. This is something we have to internalise within this research project, as 
according to the different interpretations of the “public interest”, these concepts may be 
defined differently.
While advocating the need for a “radical democratic media theory”, Keane and 
Curran argued that the media system should be thought of as an agency of 
empowerment, and its most important role should be to represent all significant interests 
in society. (Curran, 1991b: 29) As an agency of representation, the media was defined 
as an institution which assists the “equitable negotiation or arbitration of competing
11 For example, one important point of debate around the “ideal” modern public sphere has been whether 
societies should strive for one unifying, or several multiple spheres. Garnham (1992) and Sparks (2001) 
argue in favour o f an overarching, unifying space which creates a communicative forum that is, at least in 
principle, all inclusive. Meanwhile, Dahlgren (2001), Fraser (1992) and Verstraeten (1996) insist that the 
existence of several alternative public spheres and sub-spheres should be acknowledged. Gitlin claims 
(1998) that the global tendency is a moving away from coherent public spheres, and toward increasingly 
isolated and fragmented “public sphericules”.
12 Habermas, J.: Between Facts and norms, 1996, MIT Press
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interests through democratic processes” as well as “the realisation of the common 
objectives of society through agreement or compromise between conflicting interests.” 
(Curran, 1991a: 103-104) They conceptualised the media as a “complex articulation of 
vertical, horizontal and diagonal channels of communication between individuals, 
groups and power structures” (Curran 1991(b): 29-31), and suggested that the central 
role of the media should be the facilitation of the two key communication values. They 
pointed to the fact that the “watchdog function” as defined by classic liberalism is no 
longer appropriate, arguing that this conceptualisation derived from a period where the 
media were highly politicised and where societal interests and communication channels 
were less sophisticated.
The “fourth estate”. This also advanced the conceptual clarification of the 
"fourth estate” terminology. The term is reputed to have been coined by Edmund Burke 
in late 18th century England to refer to the political power possessed by the press, along 
with the three other estates of power in Britain -  the Lords, the Church and the 
Commons. (McQuail, 2000: 147). In the libertarian tradition, it was used with the 
underlying assumption that the media was a constructive influence on societal 
developments, without the potential to effect harm. In the US, the media’s fourth estate 
function grew out of a 19th century perception that the media are a fully representative 
institution, equally as powerful as the judiciary, executive or legislative branch of the 
state. Through the 20,h century, this premise gradually acquired a commercial meaning: 
media freedom is now thought to be guaranteed by full private ownership, and the 
media system has become a primary institution of consumerism, i.e. the representative 
of the buying public. Meanwhile, in the European tradition, the “fourth estate” concept 
has remained a social-political concept, and is used to refer to the media’s function to 
represent societal interests. It incorporates the idea of the fundamental communication 
values -  participation and representation -  as advocated by Habermas and other 
theorists of the Marxist tradition.
2 . R e s e a r c h  M e t h o d o l o g y
2.1 . National media systems as units of analysis
The primary aim of this thesis is to gather and organise empirical material in a 
structured manner, in order to contribute to the media démocratisation debate with 
comprehensive country studies. The case studies were chosen for their potential to 
demonstrate the complexity of the media reform challenge, and to illustrate the 
qualitative diversity in the process of post-communist media reform. The countries have 
been picked according to the logic of the “most different systems” theory (Przeworski & 
Teune, 1970 [2001: 34-39]). While the thesis was not designed with comparative 
methodology in mind, it is hoped that while examining the results of the media reform 
process in three very different countries, any commonality found may reasonably be 
assumed to hold generally for the whole region.
Studies involving more than one post-communist country have already been 
performed. Some of them are separate country studies (Price, Rozumilowicz & 
Verhulst, 2002) and a recent study commissioned by the South East European Network 
for Professionalisation of the Media (entitled “Media ownership and its impact on
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media independence and pluralism”, Peace Institute, Ljubljana, 2004) also provides 
national case studies, each with a different focus. Meanwhile other studies have aimed 
to be integrative and comparative. Downing (1995) for instance conducts what he calls a 
“triangular analysis” (assessing the linkage between political-economic and cultural- 
mediatic change, the adequacy of applying existing media theories on post-communist 
media research, as well as the relevant debates within political science) studying the 
media reform process in Russia, Poland and Hungary. His study compares the three 
countries according to themes, such as the role of culture and communication in the 
communist system, the political and economic dimensions of transition, and the post­
system change media structures.
At the outset, therefore, the question did emerge about whether these case 
studies should be performed in a comparative manner. A comparative study could take 
the form o f a longitudinal study examining previous historical periods or levels o f 
development, or of binary assessments aiming to underscore similarities and differences 
at the structural level of compatibility. Irrespective of whether it applies a “most 
similar” or “most different systems” design (Przeworski & Teune, 1970 [2001]: 34-39), 
a comparative study in this field could work with empirical data that can be weighted 
for assessment and comparison. M ost comparative researchers in this field work with 
existing data from the World Bank, UNESCO, OECD, and Freedom House, which they 
weigh to assess concepts such as the state of “media access” and “press freedom”. 
Norris, for instance weighted these data against the backdrop of good governance and 
human development indicators. (Norris, 2000,2004)
However, if the research were to apply this strategy, the scope of the study 
would have to be restricted to a small number of dimensions in order to achieve 
“comparative sufficiency”. (Gurevitch & Blunder, 2004: 333). Given that the aim of the 
thesis is to provide as wide a picture as possible about the media reform process, this 
requirement has discouraged the application of a fully comparative framework. It was 
also considered that a comparative approach in such vastly different units o f analysis 
would make it very difficult to illustrate the cultural complexity and richness in detail 
which characterises this field of study. Instead it was accepted that this research serves a 
different academic purpose altogether, and its main goal is to contribute to the literature 
on single case studies. At the same time, it was hoped that the results which emerge 
from these case studies could in the future feed into other studies, whether empirical or 
theoretical.
The decision to perform single case studies was also encouraged by the position 
advocated by Blunder & Gurevich, according to which “comparative research will 
never replace and could never substitute for in-depth studies of the communication 
systems o f single societies” (1995: 81). What also encouraged this choice was the 
current gap in comprehensive descriptive assessments of the structural and cultural 
conditions o f post-communist media change (especially in relation to Ukraine and 
Kosovo). In addition, it was also inspired by the mushrooming of issue-based, in-depth 
country studies by international think tanks and institutions, which are used by Western 
democracy assistants to decide on cooperation initiatives and funding.
Depending on the perspective, the post-communist region can be divided into 
several broad categories -  for example on the basis of démocratisation and 
modernisation results, or on the basis of the history of societal and ethnic conflict. In the
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past, different categorisations have been drawn up by several theorists (e.g. 
Balcerowicz, 1995, Gati, 1996, Schneider, 2002) as well as think tanks such as 
Transparency International and Freedom House. For the purposes of this research, I 
have divided these 27 countries into three categories, depending on the typology of the 
transition, and the roles the media have been accorded in the post-1990 period. The 
following is, naturally, only a rough guide, but it aptly demonstrates why the choice of 
Hungary, Ukraine and Kosovo is appropriate.
Table 1. The post-communist region & 
the state o f the media démocratisation process
Strong states in advanced state of transition -  Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
W eak states in early stage o f transition -  Albania, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, 
Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia13, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic
Countries with a history o f armed conflict o r strong repression -  Armenia, 
Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia
The first category lists the region’s most advanced countries, which happen to 
coincide with the 2004 entrants into the European Union. These countries have 
produced relatively good media démocratisation results. In this category, the most 
widely discussed problem is the organisation and funding of public service 
broadcasters. Despite its success in building institutions, Hungary has produced the 
worst relative media démocratisation results in the group. Based on data from the 
Freedom House Press Freedom index,14 Hungary has scored worse than the average of 
its group in the last ten years. The second category includes countries that have not 
experienced severe armed conflict but the economic hardships and/ or political 
authoritarianism have kept the media under repression. The main media démocratisation
13 Despite Russia’s serious armed conflict with Chechnya, it has not been placed into the third group 
because the conflict has not spread so much across the country that it would have changed the media and 
political landscape irreversibly.
4 Even though far from scientific, Freedom House’s press freedom index provides an opportunity to 
compare media systems worldwide. The annual “Press freedom survey” (PFS) is a universal index, 
examining most aspects of the media environment -  such as media-relevant laws and regulations, the 
government’s attitude, the legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression, the potentially 
negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code and other criminal statutes, penalties for libel and 
defamation, as well as registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists. The PFS also 
evaluates the degree of political control over media content, i.e. access to information and sources, 
editorial independence, official censorship and self-censorship, the ability of the media to operate freely 
and without harassment, and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors. Finally, the survey 
examines economic pressures on the media, which include the structure of media ownership, the costs of 
establishing media outlets as well as of production and distribution, the selective withholding of state 
advertising or subsidies, official bias in licensing, and the impact of corruption and bribery on content.
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problems here include freedom of expression, journalistic safety and the extensive 
censorship and corruption. Ukraine’s press freedom -  as documented by Freedom 
House -  showed a worsening trend between 1994 and 2002. The third category includes 
conflict-ridden societies and countries where government repression has been strong 
and civil societies have been unable to strengthen. Having undergone the most radical 
Western-assisted media démocratisation process in the whole world, the experience in 
Kosovo is the most extreme of all cases in the group. The media played a crucial role in 
the liberation fight, and the state of the media is equally as sensitive in the currently 
ongoing nation-building process.
These three countries genuinely differ in their initial conditions. They belong to 
different historical-cultural regions of the post-communist world, and experienced 
system-change in a starkly different manner. In Hungary, there was a negotiated 
revolution, in Ukraine, system-change was a result of the Soviet Union’s collapse, while 
the Kosovars fought an armed revolution for their independence cause. The transition 
paths have been equally as diverse -  while the Hungarian economic and societal climate 
has been relatively conducive for democratic transition, the political transformation in 
Ukraine and Kosovo has been challenged by linguistic, ethnic, and cultural 
heterogeneity, as well as weak economic performance. Only a limited amount of 
comparative data can be found for the three cases, but this well illustrates the 
differences in terms of overall press freedom and public access to the media.
Table 1. Communication index for Hungary, Ukraine and Kosovo (Yugoslavia)
Hungary Ukraine Kosovo
(Yugoslavia)
1. Freedom House Press Freedom 
Index (2000)
70 40 19
2. Newspaper penetration (per 1000 
inhabitants) (1996)
186 54 107
3. Radios per 1000 inhabitants 
(1997)
689 884 297
4. TV sets per 1000 inhabitants 
(1999)
448 413 273
5. Internet access as % of population 
(2000)
4.96 .29 .94
Media access aggregate (2-5) 27 29 13
Communication index (1-5) 
weighted
100.7 58.3 21.5
Source: Norris, P. (2004): Global political communication: Good governance, human 
development and mass communication, pp. 136-144 (The higher the communication index, the
more democratic the media system.)
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On a more general level, the countries starting conditions can be illustrated 
according to the following indexes.15
Table 2. Political, economic and social conditions
Political, economic and social conditions in the surveyed
countries
G e r m a n y ,  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ,  H u n g a r y ,  U k r a in e  a n d  Y u g o s la v ia
♦  Economic freedom ■ Foreign investment Gender equity
X Government effectiveness X  Knowledge •  National wealth
+  Political stability -  Social situation
In all three countries, the media have had an important historical role -  they 
were key instruments of national independence movements by providing an institution 
around which political and national identities could be imagined. Hungarians, 
Ukrainians and Kosovar Albanians could not have achieved the sovereignty they have 
today without exploiting the nation-building power of mediated communication: 
Hungary’s independence from the Habsburg empire, Kosovo’s move towards 
independence in Tito’s and Milosevic’ Yugoslavia, and Ukraine’s campaign for
15 The following indexes have been used to create this graph: 1) the Economic Freedom Index (Heritage 
Foundation and Wall Street Journal); 2) the Foreign Investment Index (Heritage Foundation and Wall 
Street Journal); 3) the Gender Equity Index (Robert Prescott-Alien: The wellbeing of nations -  A country- 
by-country index of quality of life and environment., 2001); 4) the Government Effectiveness Index 
(Source of this description: Kaufmann & Kraay & Zoido-Lobatón (2002). Policy Research Working 
Paper 2772, The World Bank Development Research Group and World Bank Institute Governance, 
Regulation and Finance Division; 5) the Knowledge Index (Robert Prescott-Allen: The wellbeing of 
nations -  A country-by-country index of quality of life and environment., 2001), the National Wealth 
Index (Robert Prescott-Alien: The wellbeing of nations -  A country-by-country index of quality of life 
and environment., 2001); 6) the Political Stability Index (Kaufmann & Kraay & Zoido-Lobatón (2002). 
Policy Research Working Paper 2772, The World Bank Development Research Group and World Bank 
Institute Governance, Regulation and Finance Division; and finally 7) the Social Index (The World Travel 
& Tourism Council (WTTC). To make them comparable, the indexes have been transformed to 1-100 
point scales.
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independence after the fall of the Soviet Union were all closely linked to the 
performance of their national media. At the same time, due to the differences in their 
respective 20th century political history, the three countries exhibited very different 
institutional legacies with regard to the quality and structure of their media systems at 
the outset o f system-change. In addition, media démocratisation had been supported by 
the existence of some form of alternative, second societies in Hungary and Kosovo, 
while this is less characteristic of Ukraine.
But another commonality that these countries undoubtedly share is that during 
the communist era, the media functioned largely according to the communist media 
theory, as described by Siebert et al (1956: 105-147). The idea of public service 
broadcasting was widely promoted under the communist rule (i.e. “state” or “national” 
broadcasting), but existed only in a distorted form. The heavy dumping of information 
and cultural programming was only a façade over the hidden and overt political 
manipulation by the government. The state channels were a mouthpiece of the 
communist state, manipulating the public through continuous propaganda. Censorship 
and self-censorship were the order of the day, and journalism was carried out in 
accordance with the functional needs and methodologies of the communist party and its 
ideology. Mobilisation, indoctrination and persuasion were all basic functions under the 
centralised and hierarchic communist media policy.
The main drawback of this approach is that it does not provide an opportunity to 
thoroughly compare the three cases. (However, I discuss later on why a comparative 
research design was not chosen.) At the same time, a key positive is that by treating the 
national media systems as separate units of analysis, we will be able to take brief 
detours when necessary to explore particular themes. In the case of Hungary, we can 
spend more time on the disputed concept of the “media equilibrium”, in Ukraine, on the 
Gongadze case and evasive corruption, and in Kosovo, on the impact of inter-ethnic 
tension on the emerging democratic media system.
2 .2 . Tow ard a theoretical framework
Choosing the most suitable theory for such case studies has not been easy as 
theories offered by political communication research or transitology would have either 
restricted the scope of the research or would have limited the flexibility of the 
researcher. The relatively narrow choice of possibly applicable theories is due to 
different “problems” within the two disciplines.
For its part, mass communication research has experienced major problems as 
regards theory testing and theory development. In a systematic content analysis, Bryant 
& Miron concluded (2004) that in the latter half of the 20th century, only every third 
research in mass communication contains theory, and as many as 48% of these studies 
use theories only as references. In addition almost half of all theories have been 
borrowed from other, non-communication disciplines. (Bryant & Miron, 2004: 664- 
666) In particular, the output of the Frankfurt School, the Vienna Circle, British 
Cultural Studies, and the Chicago School have been found to be rarely integrated into 
academic research projects as the subjects of critique or support, and even less so as an 
overall theoretical framework. (Bryant & Miron, 2004: 671)
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The problems in the theoretical evolution of mass communication research are 
thought to be connected to the changes in the processes, effects, systems and institutions 
which are in the focus of investigation. These include among others the new forms and 
styles of media, the changing ownership patterns, as well as the altering consumption 
habits. Writing about the narrower field of political communication research, Gurevitch 
& Blunder argued along the same lines when they contended that conceptual 
frameworks in this strand of research are “almost never critically discussed after 
publication”. (2004: 339-340) These show that any research in the field of post- 
communist communication will most likely be handicapped with regard to its 
theoretical perspective.
Meanwhile, in the area of democratic theory and transitology, the researcher 
faces another, although slightly different problem. Given that the field of media and 
communication has not traditionally been a focus of this field, it is difficult to identify 
theories which might be applicable in this context. The “Third-wave” transitology 
research has offered a wide array of approaches and conclusions with regard to the post­
communist transition process (e.g. Di Palma, 1990; O’Donnell, Schmitter, & 
Whitehead, 1986; Przeworski, 1991, 1995; Schmitter & Karl, 1994), but nearly all 
influential works on démocratisation between the 1970s and the early 1990s were 
preoccupied with discussions on political institutional perspectives,16 and failed to deal 
with policy-making in the sphere of the media.
This occurred despite the fact that the media had been directly or indirectly 
referenced within “minimalist” democracy definitions, and the fact that most prominent 
authors have made references to the media in some form. As early as in 1942, 
Schumpeter wrote that “a considerable amount of freedom of the press” must exist for 
the democratic electoral _process -  or what he calls “the democratic method” -  to 
work.17 Meanwhile, Sartori (1987: 98, 110) asserted that “an autonomous public 
opinion [...] and a polycentric structuring of the media and their competitive interplay” 
are necessary conditions for democracy. Huntington (1991: 7) stated that democracy 
“implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, 
and organise which are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral 
campaigns” .
Meanwhile, Dahl’s “polyarchy” (1971: 3, and 1989: 221), one of the most 
widely accepted minimalist definitions, also directly lists “freedom of expression” and 
“alternative sources of information” as necessary conditions for democracy. His seven 
requirements represent a set of institutional arrangements which permit public 
opposition and establish the right to participate in politics. Although not directly, his 
work also suggests that a political system can be labelled polyarchy only if an enabling 
environment exists for citizens to practice their right to freedom of expression and their 
right to alternative sources of information. His mentioning of “free and fair elections”
16 The long list of influential volumes includes: O'Donnell, G, & Schmitter, P. & Whitehead, L. (1986): 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 4 vols., Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, Linz, J. & 
Stepan A.(1996): South America and Post-communist Europe, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Di Palma, G.(1990): To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions, Berkeley UC 
Press. More recent volumes such as Dawisha & Parrott (eds.) (1997): The consolidation of Democracy in 
East Central Europe do not provide such analysis either.
17 Schumpeter; J. (1942): Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York: Harper, 1975, pp. 271
27
BffHWWBWWWBWHHWMWMJtflMMHMIUMiuuillHIIMMllwil iiilllu nu.iiii.ii.jinii.. I
also implies the need for a democratic media environment. References to the institution 
of free and democratic media have also been incorporated into some civil society 
theories (Linz & Stepan, 1996, Lipset 1993, Arato & Cohen, 1992).
Let us now explore the potential of a "consolidation of democracy” framework. 
Democratic / consolidation has been generally perceived to require a wide-scale 
consensus about the basic norms of a multi-party parliamentary democracy, where no 
significant social groups challenge the system, and where the political elites and the 
citizenry are committed to the basic norms of democracy. Scholars perceive a 
democratic regime as “sufficiently consolidated” when it is able to “survive and remain 
stable in the face of such serious challenges as major economic and international 
crises.” (Gunther et al 1995: 8). O ’Donnell defined democratic consolidation as a stage 
when all seven elements of Dahl’s polyarchy have been institutionalised, and are thus 
likely to endure. (1996: 37)
The consolidation phase, according to Schmitter & Browuer (1999), occurs is in 
the latter phase of “democracy protection”, which follows a period of “democracy 
promotion”. The concept has also been understood as the process completing regime 
change by stabilising the “behavioural” and “attitudinal” foundations of democracy 
(Linz & Stepan, 1996). Linz & Stepan also argue that consolidation does not contain 
within itself a promise of irreversibility when they posit that consolidation means that 
such a breakdown would not be related to the weaknesses or problems specific to the 
historic process of democratic consolidation per se, but to a “new dynamic in which 
democratic regime cannot solve a set of problems (1996: 6)
While initially the consolidation approach seemed like a fruitful possibility, the 
scholarly debate over the basic definitions and conceptualisations has made the 
researcher cautious about the application of this perspective. The weakening of the 
“transition paradigm” (Carothers, 2002) for the democracy promotion work by Western 
governments has rendered it more difficult to evaluate the post-communist media 
reform around a set of quantitative or qualitative indicators adopted from 
democratisation research. But despite this assessment, several such studies have been 
concluded in the past, and have provided valuable results particularly in single country 
case studies. Many authors have remained close to the work of transitologists and 
designed a framework embedded in the terminology and conceptual design of 
democratic consolidation studies.
For example, Price & Krug (2000) and Bajomi-Lazar (2003) designated a series 
of benchmarks to measure the consolidation o f democratic media systems. Other 
authors operationalised the process of media reform by designing stages within which 
the reform process can be imagined and assessed. Jakubowicz (1999) used Brzezinksi’s 
three-staged model of post-communist societal transformation to draw up the 
corresponding stages in the overall media reform process.18 Meanwhile, Rozumilowicz
18 Stage 1 would include media de-monopolisation and decentralisation, and the internationalisation of 
television content; Stage 2 would include new media legislation, continued commercialisation and 
decentralisation, the emergence of early signs of journalistic professionalisation, while Stage 3 would 
involve the development and consolidation of legal frameworks, and the emergence of challenges arising 
from technological changes, globalisation and media concentration. Source: Jakubowicz ( 1999)
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(2002) designed four stages of transition, closely mapping the stages of democratic 
transition proposed by O’Donnell et al (1986) or Linz & Stepan (1996).19
For a framework to assess the consolidation of media freedom, one could also 
turn to the so-called five “major arenas of democracy” put forward by Linz & Stepan 
(1996). These are a flourishing civil society, political society, the rule of law, a strong 
state apparatus, and a strong stable economic society. One could also imagine a 
“consolidation” framework through the operationalisation of the three basic 
communication values, such as freedom, justice/equality and order/solidarity (McQuail, 
1992), or perhaps through taking into account some proposals on how to ensure these 
values (Keane 1991,1993; Murdock & Golding, 1989)
One can also study consolidation by assessing the development o f media 
equality on the basis of “access”, “diversity”, and “objectivity”, as recommended by 
McQuail. (2000: 166-170) In addition, the researcher may refer to the concepts of media 
access, recognition and responsiveness (Bennett et al, 2004), or use the “enabling 
environment” framework, as suggested by" Price & Krug (2000). This could be 
particularly useful as it designs a “structure neutral” series of benchmarks, founded on 
universally recognised principles (and mostly feeding from the output of the Council of 
Europe and the European Court of Human Rights), which should be satisfied in all 
countries to achieve the basic level of media freedom.
These indicators could be used to create a comprehensive framework to study 
the media reform process in transition, or even -  if operationalised well -  as framework 
for comparative analysis. However, these framework might be more adequate for a 
“most similar systems” analysis. In case of the three single case studies that are 
proposed here, the above frameworks either do not contain explicit guidelines for an 
adequate operationalisation (i.e. access”, “diversity”, and “objectivity” approach), or 
would stretch the length and the scope of the research beyond its assigned limits (i.e. 
five “major arenas of democracy” approach).
What further complicates matters is that -  in the context of this thesis -  the term I 
consolidation might be too mature and optimistic a perspective for two out of the three 
cases. Using a “consolidation of media freedom” or “consolidation of democracy” 
perspective is rendered difficult by the fact that a) it would designate the research an 
assumption that democratisation in the overall political process is irreversible, and b) it 
would automatically establish the need to differentiate between subtypes/ or degrees for 
the concept of democracy (to avoid conceptual stretching). Placing the process of 
“media reform” into the focus of research however, avoids these pitfalls as it only 
designates a process which moves a country toward a more democratic setup, without 
suggesting what the end result might be.
Thus it was concluded that these frameworks offer considerable merit but fail to 
guarantee the flexibility that is considered necessary. Also, they do not see the need to 
offer a more realistic conceptualisation of the relationship between political elites and 
the media, and usually do not consider the perspective of balancing out political 
interference between different segments of the media system. And finally, the above
19 Her four stages are as follows: pre-transition stage, primary transition, secondary stage, late or mature 
stage. Rozumilowicz (2002:17-23)
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frameworks do not automatically provide for a transitional period, the importance of 
which is seriously considered in this discussion.
This choice is supported by the fact that several consolidation perspectives have 
been found to restrict the potential of analysis when it comes to deviations from the 
assumed transition sequence. Carothers argued that “the options are all cast in terms of 
the speed and direction with which countries move on the path, not in terms of 
movement that does not conform with the path at all.” (Carothers, 2002) Schedler 
asserted that behavioral evidence overshadows both altitudinal and structural factors 
(2001), and argued that establishing empirical degrees of democratic consolidation “is 
not just a matter of observation, but of prospective reasoning. (2001: 67) Let us now 
move onto a completely different dimension -  the possibility of using a Western 
benchmark as part of a comparative analytical framework.
The “Western media system” as a benchmark. Any attempt to find a comparative 
reference point in Western Europe, as part of the theoretical framework, is complicated 
by the fact that Western media systems are extremely diverse. In Western Europe, the 
1960s and 1970s witnessed the erosion of partisan media support for political elites, as 
traditionally party-oriented newspapers gradually distanced themselves from political 
elites and developed closer links with the public. At the same time, Western European 
broadcast media systems were designed as dual, public-commercial systems, largely 
according to “social responsibility” theory (Siebert et al, 1956). Compared to the US 
system, external and internal pluralism is provided for in the following manner in 
Europe:
External pluralism Internal pluralism
European practice 
(social democratic/ 
liberal)
Main reasoning behind 
liberalisation of market
Its assurance is the mandate of 
PSBs, but only small number of 
independent newspapers offer 
pluralism of political ideas
US practice (libertarian/ 
liberal)
Expected to be created by 
free market, and found in 
overall market
Principle of balanced reporting 
within newspapers (fairness 
doctrine for broadcasters was 
abandoned in the 1980s)
Some aspects (e.g. the legal status and remit of the public service broadcasters) 
are remarkably similar in different member states of the European Union, but this is 
where similarities end. By today, significant discrepancies have developed with regard 
to most areas of media policy, as well as patterns of media consumption.
First o f all, there are wide disparities between national regulatory models and 
methodological frameworks depending on the nature of media policy goals and public 
definitions o f the media. There are also significant differences in the methods used for 
assessing and monitoring PSB performance, in the approaches to programme regulation, 
and the systems of categorizing programmes into genre specific classifications. Some 
countries have left the commercial sector unregulated in terms of public service
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requirements, while some countries stipulate obligations to provide a minimum service 
in various programmes (e.g. UK, Norway, Denmark, France).20 There are also 
differences between media concentration patterns, management board appointment 
systems, and subsidizing trends.
Another characteristic of the European media landscape is that the European 
institution of public service broadcasting, and through that an important part o f the 
démocratisation element, has been seriously challenged in the past two decades by 
technological changes, increasing liberalisation, as well as globalisation trends. Public 
broadcasters in Europe are in a difficult situation: not only that there is fierce 
competition from commercial channels but there are also severe problems of funding. 
Heavy pressure is being exerted on public broadcasting organisations by governments, 
political parties and the general public to reduce costs and increase efficiency. These 
have drastically altered the structure and basic conceptual foundation of PSBs. Stations 
that had a 100% market share a few decades ago today achieve market shares in the 20 
to 40% range,21 and the efforts to solve the crisis have led to a curtailed legitimacy.
Depending on the country, the governments and PSBs are finding different 
solutions to the difficulties. In larger countries -  in particular in the UK and in Germany 
-  the PSBs are active in developing strategies for digital television and the internet. 
Their modernisation efforts are paralleled by a strong need to realise higher efficiency 
and lower costs. In other countries, these initiatives are restricted in scope and ambition. 
In a third group (comprising particularly smaller and relatively poorer nations) the 
broadcasters are still at the beginning of a process of reorientation.22 23
Overall, Western European national media legislations show different ambitions 
and trends with regard to the regulation of the relationship between the PSB and the 
political establishment. The region can thus be divided into four broad clusters:
(a) Countries with loose media legislation, due primarily to a strong democratic 
tradition (e.g. UK, Norway, and Sweden);
(b) Countries where despite the complicated interconnections between the media 
and political realms, the rules of the game are clear and respected (e.g. Germany 
and France);
(c) Countries where both media regulation and its interpretation are flexible (e.g. 
Portugal and Spain);
(d) Countries where the mass media are largely under the control of political and/ or 
economic elites (e.g. Italy and Greece.) 3
There are also significant differences as to the size and ambition of the public 
service operation -  in most countries, there are 2 or 3 public channels, in some there is 
only one (Luxemburg), while in Germany, there are 14. The same applies for the their 
funding arrangements (i.e. the proportional breakdown o f license fees, public funds, 
advertising and other funds). While in some countries the main income of the PSBs is
20 “A Comparative Analysts of Television Programming Regulation in Seven European Countries: A 
Benchmark Study”, Report by the European Institute for the Media, 2002
* Ibid.
22 European Institute for the Media, “Perspectives of public service broadcasting in Europe”, 1998 report
23 Cseh G. & Siikdsd M. in Media Law and Media Politics in Hungary. Volume I. pp. 46-47
through license fees (Sweden, Greece, Finland, Germany, UK), in others it is public 
funds (Netherlands, Portugal, Spain)* While most countries apply a mixed system of 
financing, some practically do not allow the application of license fees (Netherlands), 
some do not allocate direct public funds (Ireland, Denmark), and some ban advertising 
altogether (Sweden).24
Consequently, there is also a wide gap between the quality of programming and 
the overall broadcast profile of the various national PSBs. A report on public service 
broadcasting prepared for the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly in 2004 
argued that PSBs can be differentiated in terms of their organisational structures to 
possess:
a) “integrated” structures where the PSBs controls every area of audiovisual 
activity, e.g. UK, Spain, Italy;
b) “federated” structures by region, in which the integrated model but has been 
decentralised to reflect the country’s political organisations, e.. Germany;
c) “fragmented” structures, in which the different elements of the PSB is controlled 
by one or more separate public operator.
Politically speaking, the report differentiates PSBs according to their 
institutionalised relationship with governing elites (formally autonomous systems, 
politics-in-broadcasting, politics-over-broadcasting). It also cites the conceptualisation 
put forward by the French Audiovisual Council which separates PSBs into “Anglo- 
Saxon” (Uk, Germany) and “Latin” (France, Italy, Spain) types, according to their 
method of funding and degree of independence. Finally, a McKinsey & Co. study on 
public service broadcasting (1999) divided PSBs into three groups based on their 
programme profiles, tuned either to increase market share, or focus on providing 
distinctive programming. (It is this classification that we will use in this thesis.)
F IR ST  C LU ST ER  -  Focus on distinctiveness over market share, (e.g. the American 
PBS and ABC) These PSBs have only a limited audience share, and therefore little 
impact on political discussion in general.
SECOND C LU STER  -  Focus on market share over distinctiveness, (e.g. the Italian 
RAI and the Spanish RTVE) These PSBs have the potential to reach large audiences, 
but given that their operations are market-based, the quality of programming is similar 
to that o f commercially funded operators.
TH IR D  CLU STER — The third cluster tries to reach some form  o f equilibrium between 
these two. (e.g. Sweden’s SVT and Germany’s ARD) These PSBs have a significant 
audience share while maintaining a distinctive approach and fulfilling their public 
service remit.
24 ‘The European TV broadcasting market”, EUROSTAT publications, Statistics in Focus is series, 
Theme 4 -  24/ 2002.
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Most European PSBs are in the second cluster, and only few countries can 
afford to have an efficient, third cluster public service broadcaster. Thus few are fully 
compatible with the Council of Europe’s recommendation, which asserts that public 
service broadcasting should avoid direct competition for higher audience ratings to the 
detriment of programme quality.25 As a result of the combined effect of different 
cultural settings and regulatory frameworks, audience structures look very different. In 
some countries, audiences have a clear preference for the PSB (Denmark, Ireland, UK), 
while in others, the PSB is hardly watched (Greece). The societies also seem to be 
different in terms of their interest in print media material. Newspaper penetration 
figures suggest wide discrepancies between reader numbers in different EU countries.
The Scandinavian countries have on average five times higher per capita circulation 
figures than Portugal, Greece or Italy.26 , . j
In light of the historical, cultural and institutional differences between Western 
European media systems, it is not surprising that post-communist governments have 
been somewhat confused about the “best European practice”. This was coupled with the - 
fact that the European Union, which is the most important strategic partner to post­
communist countries, has remained fairly vague about its media-related conditionality 
criteria. No guidance was provided about questions of systemic substance, and the EU’s 
position on media issues was limited by the usage of the terms “freedom of the press” 
and “freedom of expression”, without concrete definitions. Until 2002, the EU’s annual 
progress reports for candidate countries (including Hungary) treated media issues under 
two headings -  i) Human rights and the protection of minorities/ Civil and political 
rights; and ii) Culture and audio-visual policy. The sole existing EU-Ukraine 
contractual framework document -  the Ukraine-EU Action Plan, adopted in early 2005 
-  uses similarly vague language. While the document calls for “ensuring respect for the 
freedom of the media and freedom of expression”, no details are provided on how this is 
expected to be achieved -  except for the request to follow relevant Council of Europe 
recommendations.
This has been primarily due to the fact that the European Union has only limited 
competence in the area of audiovisual policy, therefore few common positions exist 
between the member states. As a result, democratising countries received little direct 
support regarding systemic issues of media reform. The European Union did (and does) 
officially require the adoption of standards laid down or developed within the Council 
of Europe framework, however this has carried with it the complication that several 
older EU member states are often referenced as countries not fulfilling the criteria, (e.g. 
PACE Recommendation 1641 (2004) on public service broadcasting or PACE 
Recommendation 1506 (2001) on freedom o f expression and information in the media in 
Europe), which somewhat weakens the credibility of this policy.
The most comprehensive reference point remains the corpus of 
recommendations adopted by the Council of Europe. These set out a catalogue of
25 See for instance PACE Recommendation 1147 (1991) on the parliamentary responsibility of the 
democratic reform of broadcasting
26 Source: Siune, K: Changing media and changing society, in McQuail (1998: 7), figures are based on 
EuroMedia Research Group findings, 1995
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principles and measures which member states are invited to consider in their national 
law and practice. Among others, the Council has established the parliaments’ 
responsibility for the democratic reform of broadcasting, and that “unbridled 
privatisation and complete liberalisation” could lead to “ruinous competition” .27 It also 
prescribed that European public service broadcasting be protected through the rule of 
law and has asserted the importance of “the existence of a multiplicity of autonomous 
and independent media outlets at the national, regional, and local levels”. It has also 
maintained that “political and cultural diversity of media types and contents is central to 
media pluralism,” and affirmed that “pluralism and diversity are essential for the 
functioning of a democratic society.
Several recommendations propose that to safeguard individual and societal 
needs, a broader perspective is necessary in the designing of communications policy.28 
The recommendations have established a set of basic principles along the lines of the 
highest European standards that have been achieved through the implementation of the 
social democratic model. According to these, the democratic relationship between 
political and media systems is founded on the following basic principles:
•  Political elites carry great responsibility for the advancement o f media reform 
(e.g. PACE Recommendation 1147 (1991) on the parliamentary responsibility o f  
the democratic reform o f broadcasting, or PACE Recommendation 1407 (1999) 
on media and democratic culture);
•  Public service broadcasting is essential for the functioning of a democratic state, 
and public service broadcasters must be editorially/politically and financially 
independent of political and business interests (e.g. Recommendation (1996) 10 
on the guarantee o f the independence o f public service broadcasting, or 
Recommendation (2000) 23 on the independence and functions o f regulatory 
authorities fo r  the broadcasting sector);
•  States should eliminate oligopolism, and develop a media policy in line with 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (e.g. PACE 
Recommendation 1506 (2001) on freedom o f expression and information in the 
media in Europe);
•  A political and cultural diversity of media types and contents is central to media 
pluralism (e.g. Recommendation (1999) 1 on measures to promote media 
pluralism) and transparency in the media system is a basic value (e.g. 
Recommendation (1994) 13 on measures to promote media transparency)
21 PACE Recommendation 1147 (1991) on the parliamentary responsibility of the democratic reform of 
broadcasting
28 These include the Appendix to the Recommendation (2000) 23 of the Council of Europe Committee of 
Ministers to Member States on the Independence and Functions of Regulatory Authorities for the 
Broadcasting Sector (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 20 December 2000 at the 735 th meeting 
of the Ministers’ Deputies) The Council of Europe Recommendation on access to official documents 
which for the first time established a regional standard in Europe on access to information contained in 
documents held by public authorities. (Adopted on 21 February, 2002, the Committee of Ministers) 3) 
Recommendation (99) 1 by the Committee of Ministers, which stressed that states should promote 
political and cultural pluralism by developing their media policy in line with Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
• The state’s system of punishing media outlets for defamation, insult or other 
breaches of applicable law should be proportional to the violations (e.g. 
Declaration on the freedom o f  political debate in the media, February 2004), 
and any supervision or monitoring of the activities of broadcasters should take 
place a posteriori (e.g. Recommendation (2000) 23 on the independence and 
functions o f regulatory authorities fo r  the broadcasting sector);
The Council of Europe recognises the different nature of print and broadcast 
media and often recommends different measures for the two sectors. It acknowledges 
that the print media is often characterised by “external pluralism” and it states that the 
print media should be allowed to have a “distinct political leaning”. It also states that 
“regulatory frameworks on media coverage of elections should not interfere with the 
editorial independence of newspapers or magazines nor with their right to express any 
political preference.” It prescribes a control system only in the case that a media outlet 
is owned by a public authority. “Since such media are controlled by public authorities, it 
seems logical that they should be under the obligation o f offering a broad perspective 
representing the whole range of political views.” (Recommendation no. 1999/15)
In general, the Council of Europe benchmarks cover most problem areas of 
media reform, and they are complementary to each other, meaning -  if used in a 
theoretical framework as a reference point -  they should be used in as much their 
entirely as possible. This is due to the fact that while the majority of the 
recommendations are comprehensive, many of them cross-reference each other, and . r 
must be seen in the context of previously established principles. With regard to the ' 
future of this discipline, it is very likely that Council of Europe benchmarks will be 
increasingly referenced and integrated in political science-embedded media research.
The reason why Council of Europe criteria have not been chosen as an integral part of 
the theoretical framework is that the most important benchmarks were developed 
simultaneously with this research project, during the later half of the 1990s and early 
2000s.
To conclude this section, it is also worth mentioning in parentheses that post- 
communist governments endorsed a wide variety of further principles, through adhering 
to a series of international treaties, and through their membership in human rights 
organisations. During the period under review, all three countries adopted a body of 
media-related legislation, and ratified the most relevant international agreements. The 
Hungarian, Ukrainian and Kosovar (UN) authorities have signed up to safeguard basic 
principles in the realm of press freedom through their constitutions, through 
membership in organisations such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE, and through 
relevant national legislation. Given that these actions symbolise the declared goals and 
designated benchmarks that political elites supposedly strive for, the media 
démocratisation process -  if operationalised well -  could be viewed against their spirit.
The prominent legal texts which enshrine individual civil rights in the form of 
declarations or conventions on “freedom of expression” and “freedom of information” 
include the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(Council of Europe, 1950), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 
1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations, 1966),
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) as well as the 
European Convention on Transfrontier Television (Council of Europe, 1989). Since its 
foundation in 1975, several CSCE/OSCE declarations between its participating states 
also mentioned or reaffirmed those rights.29
Some international texts have gone beyond stipulating guarantees for individual 
rights, and have enshrined the free and independent media’s importance for societal 
development and democracy. In all its declarations since 199130, the OSCE has included 
explicit references to societal needs. Its Moscow declaration (1991) stated that the 
participating states “recognize that independent media are essential to a free and open 
society and accountable systems o f government and are o f particular importance in 
safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms.”31 Its Lisbon declaration (1996) 
stated that “freedom of the press and media are among the basic prerequisites for truly 
democratic and civil societies.” In the Istanbul Charter (1999), the participating states 
“reaffirm the importance of independent media and the free flow of information as well 
as the public’s access to information! And commit themselves to taking “all necessary 
steps to ensure the basic conditions for free and independent media and unimpeded 
transborder and intra-State flow o f information, which we consider to be an essential 
component of any democratic, free and open society.”
2.3. A  “Four theories of the press” approach
In the previous section, we reviewed several options which could have provided 
the backbone of a theoretical framework, but we decided that neither of them proved to 
be appropriate, directly applicable or flexible enough for our purposes. Let us therefore 
continue with the final section, in which we will hypothesise that macro-theories of 
media systems could provide an efficient and flexible framework for the proposed case 
studies.
Siebert et aV s “Four theories” -  the libertarian, social responsibility, 
authoritarian and Soviet theories — have been widely criticised for being linked to 
political ideologies, and for drawing on outdated and far too theoretical concepts, 
without a proper empirical analysis of the actual relationship between the various 
political systems and their media. The models were created based on the experience of 
three countries only, the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and therefore have 
offered a limited possibility for application elsewhere in Western Europe. Many
29 Helsinki Final Act (1975), Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting (1983), Copenhagen Meeting 
of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (June 1990), Charter of Paris for a New Europe 
(CSCE Summit, November 1990), Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the 
CSCE (October 1991), The Challenges of Change, CSCE Summit, Helsinki (1992), Decisions of the 
Rome Council Meeting (1993), Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era, CSCE Summit, Budapest 
(1994), OSCE Summit, Lisbon (1996), Mandate of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media 
(Decision No. 193 of the Permanent Council of 5 November 1997), OSCE Istanbul Summit (1999)
30 Decisions of the Rome Council Meeting (1993), Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era, CSCE 
Summit, Budapest (1994), OSCE Summit, Lisbon (1996), Mandate of the OSCE Representative on 
Freedom of the Media (Decision No. 193 of the Permanent Council of 5 November 1997) OSCE Istanbul 
Summit (1999). Source: ‘"Freedom and expression, free flow of information, freedom of media”, CSCE/ 
OSCE Main provisions 1975-2001
31 Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (October 1991)
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scholars have suggested the abandonment of the Four theories framework and attempted 
to replace the theories with new models which are more in line with the social-political 
realities, the growing media diversity, as well as with the changing technology and 
audience demands.
For instance, McQuail provided conceptualisations for political systems that 
were absent from Siebert et al's work (by expanding the list with the “development 
media theory”32 and the “democratic-participant theory” (1983: 94-98). In addition, 
several transitional theories emerged for countries in development or transition from 
authoritarian rule33 but overall, none of the media theories developed since the 1950s 
offer a clear theoretical foundation for the directional development of media systems, 
and conceptualisations tend to integrate a range of prescriptive (or normative) concepts 
as well as descriptive (or reflective) concepts. This has brought about a confusion 
between “the actual working principles of a given media system; the theoretical ideals 
of the system; and the dominant ideology of the society”. (McQuail, 1992: 66) Overall, 
it is believed that no all-encompassing macro-media theory has been endorsed to has 
replaced the “Four theories”.
This might be changing as we speak, as a recent work by Hallin & Mancini, ( 
entitled “Comparing media systems” (2004) may hold the answer to this challenge. The  ^
authors provide a key contribution to the debate through a “most similar systems” study 
of eighteen Western democracies. They present a framework for the comparative 
analysis of the relationship between media and political systems, and identify the 
principal dimensions of variation in media systems. They present three major models of 
media systems -  the “polarized pluralist”, the “democratic corporatist”, and the “liberal” 
models. Through these models, they explain the complex relationship between media 
and politics, and explore the forces of change that are currently transforming them. 
Instead of coining models which represent a common philosophy, like Siebert et al did, 
they seek to describe interrelated systems, which are in constant change within the 
underlying systemic relationships. (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 12)
The liberal model, which the authors claim prevails across the UK, Ireland and 
North America, is characterised by relative dominance of market mechanisms and of 
commercial media. The democratic corporatist model, which has been identified in 
northern continental Europe, can be recognised by a historical co-existence of 
commercial and media tied to social and political groups, and by a relatively active but 
legally limited role for the state. Meanwhile the third, the polarised pluralist model is 
been associated with Southern Europe, where media institutions are closely integrated 
with party politics while there is a weaker historical development of commercial media 
and a strong role for the state.
The work proposes four variables, through which the media reform process 
could be studied in a path dependence perspective. These are 1) the development of 
media markets, and especially the development of mass circulation press, 2) political
32 The roots of this theory are in a 1980s report by the UNESCO International Commission for the study 
of Communication Problems, and UNESCO tacitly supported the original McQuail theory.
33 See Jakubowicz (1998) and Ognianova (1996) for a comprehensive overview of the possibly applicable 
developmental theories put forward by McLeod & Blumler, Merril & Lowenstein, Picard, Hachten, 
McQuail and Splichal.
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parallelism, 3) the development of journalistic professionalism, and 4) the degree and 
nature of state intervention in the media system. In theory, this is closer to the central 
aims of this thesis and could therefore provide a more conducive framework for the 
analysis of post-communist systems. However, even Hallin & Mancini admit that this 
framework may not be easily transferred to other countries, and particularly not to post­
communist transitions. (2004: 305-306)
This is understandable as the “Three theories” were designed after a careful 
examination o f the characteristics of existing Western media landscapes -  thereby 
developed in a descriptive, rather than a prescriptive manner. In post-communist 
countries, the discussion about the direction of media policy is usually conceived on the 
basis of philosophical foundations (if at all) as opposed to concrete preferences (such as 
“let's create a public service broadcaster along the lines o f the Italian model” etc.). 
Therefore the assessment of the policy debate is probably better without references to 
theories which are closely associated to concrete cases. Nevertheless, what is interesting 
about Hallin & Mancini's approach is that they perceive the transitional nature and the 
heterogeneity of media systems as a basic property of their research. Their work implies 
that it could be worthwhile to deconstruct the evolving, transitional media systems into 
their various elements.
Even though the more prescriptive “Four theories” have been labelled a 
“completely useless” reference point for post-communist transitions (Sparks, 1998: 
179), it is argued here that we may reinterpret the analytical function of these macro- 
theories, and imagine them as useful foundations of research. Instead of viewing Siebert 
" el aVs “Four theories” as the main philosophical foundations o f overall media systems, 
it is posited here that a transitioning media system should be deconstructed into as many 
elements as convenient, as this would allow for the identification of the theories as 
embodiments o f fundamental guiding principles in certain sub-sections of the media 
system. As models representing different co-existing organisational and structural 
realities, the theories would thereby be transformed into useful, flexible tools for 
research on media reform.
This approach is supported by the observation made by scholars that the 
different models are increasingly mixed and simultaneously present in Western media 
systems. (E.g. McQuail 1994, Hallin & Mancini, 2004) McQuail wrote that national 
media systems are not organised along the lines of a single philosophy but are 
constructed through “separate, overlapping and often inconsistent elements, with 
appropriate differences of normative expectation and actual regulation.” (1994: 133) 
This position was already put forward by Siebert et al as well, who argued that while 
the “Four theories” represent national media systems in case of some countries, they 
often emerge in an inconsistent structure and mixture in others. The argument was also 
made by theorists, such as Williams (1969), who represented a more radical position on 
this question, and claimed that there is no such thing as a “pure” media model and every 
country’s media system possesses both degrees of freedom and control.34 Finally, Hallin 
& Mancini’s empirical research also proves that advanced democracies apply several, or 
a mix o f two o f the proposed three macro-theories at the same time, including France 
and the UK. O r in another example, while Italian and Spanish journalists express
34 Providing an in-depth look at the British media system, Williams asserted that the range of different 
press concepts can be classified into authoritarian, paternal, commercial, and democratic. (1969: 19)
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allegiance to the liberal model of neutrality, their actual practice of journalism is deeply 
rooted in partisan advocacy traditions. (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 14)
As is well known, while the press follows a largely libertarian model almost 
everywhere in the Western world, deep divides have grown between the regulation of 
broadcast media in the US and Europe. While the US broadcasting market is fully 
liberalised, the European system was designed upon social responsibility, or social 
democratic principles, with strong public service broadcasters (PSBs) at its centre. Since 
the late 1960s, these differences have become even more apparent. A good example is 
the colourful media landscape and regulatory system within the European Union, which 
developed despite the shared cultural-historical heritage, and the similarities in 
technological development and economic conditions. The US also provides a good 
example: similarly to Schumpeter’s prediction that capitalism would be destroyed by its 
own success (1942), the US libertarian media model has generated powerful critics from 
within, calling for increased démocratisation. Some of the most ambitious democratic 
ideas in societal communication, such as Jay Rosen’s public journalism (1996), and 
Etzioni’s (1998) communitarian media system, were all bom out of the American 
context.
V
Therefore this research assumes that it can be expected that a post-communist 
country develops a media system which includes several inconsistent elements, and 
consequently, the more it moves away from the system controlled by the Soviet theory, 
the more different macro-theoretical principles it may develop simultaneously. (In fact, 
several scholars have touched upon the issue o f possible clashes between different 
macro-theories in the post-communist context (including Jakubowicz 1998, and 
McQuail, 2000: 180). It could therefore be considered that the identification of these 
models (or lack thereof) could help the researcher in understanding and normatively 
treating the different developments. In this logic, it seems to be a justified approach to 
analyse the conduct of post-communist political elites in relation to the different models 
that they are promoting.
It is thus hypothesised here that the post-communist media transition process 
can be competently analysed in the framework of Siebert's macro-models. In the context 
of post-communist media research, the open models not only represent different 
political and philosophical approaches to reform, but also stand for the two broad 
dimensions of media démocratisation i.e. the previously discussed liberalisation and 
démocratisation. The “libertarian approach” is chiefly concerned with achieving 
openness, and safeguarding individual rights through liberalisation, while what I will 
call the “social democratic” approach (as opposed to Siebert el al’s social responsibility) 
wishes to maximise the benefits for the society-at-large, and allows state intervention 
when necessary. The “Soviet model” is no longer valid, but the “authoritarian model” 
can be reserved to describe undemocratic trends in the implementation or interpretation 
of various laws and policies.
Finally, I am proposing to also apply a so-called “development assistance 
model” which can embody a solution for political party representation in the media. The 
development assistance model holds many similarities to McQuail’s development media 
theory (1983: 94), and Hallin & Mancini’s polarised pluralist model (2004). This 
scheme defines the media as an institution that should serve collective ends, rather than 
individual freedoms, but the media are partially subordinated to political, economic,
social and cultural needs, so much so that various media freedoms may be restricted 
according to the development needs o f society. The media system is partially liberalised 
but one of its central mandates is to provide a platform for political parties to debate 
issues of transition and development. In theory, given that civil societies are weak, 
political parties are considered by voters credible representatives of society, and several 
media outlets’ role to hold them accountable is secondary to their function of political 
party representation.
This model is similar to the arrangements on the European newspaper market in 
the first few decades after the Second World War, during which period the print media 
landscape was divided up between political parties, and the leading newspapers were 
financed by political parties. In Scandinavian countries, for instance, newspapers with 
party-political content represented more than 80% of the total newspaper content.35 The 
model promotes a clear identification o f political affiliations (inch independence), and it 
largely promotes an external pluralism within the media system segment that it is 
applied in. By designing this model, we have addressed the theoretical dilemma 
regarding how to conceptually integrate the evident need to have politically parallel 
structures in the media system, which has been expressed by both political elites and 
journalists in many post-communist countries.
Throughout this work, these prescriptive, normative theories will be understood 
in the following manner.
1. Authoritarian m odel
In this model, the media are subordinated to the political establishment. 
Media outlets are both in private and government ownership, and the market is 
controlled by business and political elites who see the media as the extension of 
their political and business powers. The media neither question the political 
authority nor criticise the prevailing political values. They do not hold the elites 
accountable and do not represent the civil society. Media elites are politically 
motivated, while the professional “advancement” o f journalists is dependent on 
their loyalties as opposed to their professionalism. The theory advocates a 
zealous obedience to the hierarchical superior and reliance on threat and 
punishment to those who did not follow the censorship rules or did not respect 
authority. The censorship of the press is justified on the ground that the state 
always takes precedence over the individual’s right to freedom of expression.
2. Libertarian model
In contrast to the authoritarian theory, the libertarian model rests on the 
idea that the individual should be free to express and publish anything it wishes 
to as long as that does not infringe on the freedom of others. A fully established 
libertarian system encourages the press to challenge official government
These figures are for the Norwegian and Swedish press. Op. cit. De Bens & Ostbye (1998). Chapter II, 
action: “Subsidizing the press”
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Jpolicies, and media professionals have full autonomy within the media 
organisation. As Siebert et al summarise, the press is “a partner in the search for 
truth”. (Siebert et al, 1956: 3)
The media’s fundamental mission here is to safeguard individual liberties 
and civil rights, and to protect these rights from abuse by the state. Also referred 
to as the “free marketplace of ideas,”36 the media in this model is organised 
according to an essentially commercial logic. Structure-wise, the media are 
conceived simplistically as “vertical channels of communication between private 
citizens and government” (Curran 1991(b): 31), as opposed to complex 
representative systems of political and social power. Government intervention is 
limited and market forces are expected to settle all disputes. The theory holds 
that media freedom can only be ensured through privately owned print and 
broadcast media, with as little state intervention, or intervening regulation as 
possible.
3. Social democratic model
First and foremost, this model creates a media system that has an 
obligation toward the society as whole. The media are expected to be truthful, 
accurate, fair and objective (to the extent that objectivity is attainable), and 
independent of political interference of all kinds. Philosophically, the social 
democratic theory has a less optimistic view of human behaviour than does 
libertarianism, and was developed upon the realisation that freedom of 
expression of the individual does not automatically guarantee press freedom.
In this model, both central communication values -  representation and 
participation -  are guaranteed. The media are considered to be different than 
other businesses on the market -  they are institutions which carry out an 
essential task through serving collective needs, especially in relation to cultural 
and political life. The theory opposes the idea that the media are a “free 
marketplace of ideas”, and thus their uncontrolled commercialisation. It holds 
that liberalisation and démocratisation of any media system are equally 
important, simultaneous tasks, and that any liberalisation effort must always be 
performed for the sake of society, and not for market reasons. (This of course, 
presupposes adequate financial resources by the state.)
Not only has the state the right to intervene in media issues but has an 
obligation to do so in the name of the public interest. To ensure that the “public 
interest” argument is not manipulated by political elites, the model also 
encourages the media to be critical towards the government, like in the 
libertarian theory. When operationalised, this theory would encourage state 
intervention through the financing of public service operations, the 
establishment of direct or indirect subsidies, as well as regulatory work which 
extends from hate speech regulation to assigning public service functions to 
commercial broadcasters.
36 This term has been widely attributed to John Milton, but it was, in fact, coined by US Supreme Court 
judge Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1919.
c4. Development assistance model
Based broadly on McQuaiTs development media theory (1983: 94) and 
Halim & Mancini’s polarised pluralist model (2004: 89-142), this scheme also 
defines the media as an institution that should serve collective ends, rather than 
individual freedoms. In fact, here, the media are partially subordinated to 
political, economic, social and cultural needs, so much so that various media 
freedoms may be restricted according to the development needs of society. The 
media system is partially liberalised but one of its central focuses is to provide a 
platform for political parties to debate issues o f transition and development. 
Given that civil societies are weak, political parties are considered by voters 
credible representatives of society, and several media oulets’ role to hold them 
accountable is secondary to their function of political party representation.
In the initial stages o f development, there is a consensus between 
political and societal elites that parts of the media system should be 
representative of all political and social forces. This model thus offers a degree 
of power-sharing between the political and media elites, where the media and 
the political institutions share the challenges of nation building, of providing 
political information and of shaping cultural identities. Financial links between 
political parties and media outlets are common, and control over the most 
important national media outlets is with various political parties. As a result, 
there is also a degree of integration between political and media elites. In a 
different manner, this also contributes to increasing societal participation and 
representation.
These macro-theories seek to illustrate the main underlying philosophies which 
set the structure of relationship between the various stakeholders, and can be best 
defined in a similar fashion to McQuail & Windahl’s definition of mass communication 
models, i.e. as models that are “consciously simplified descriptions in graphic form of a 
piece of reality”. (1993: 2) The main characteristics o f media systems designed 
according to these theories are listed in the following table.
Social democratic A uthoritarian Development
assistance
To enable 
democratic public 
communication
To promote 
governing elites
To provide a 
platform for a 
plurality of 
political parties
Limited Justified To a degree 
justified
Important Important Important
Partial
liberalisation
Partial
liberalisation
Partial
liberalisation
j j s i i i t j t r : , »
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Instead of the media’s positive and negative effects, which are difficult to 
measure under such conditions of radical change, this type of analysis can focus on the [ 
different theoretical roles attributed to the media by the most vocal and powerful actors 
of transition. The research can help to identify and categorise the various reform  ^
measures, and investigate the incompatible views and the societal conflicts which have 
emerged during the reform discourse. By assisting in the categorisation of policy . 
choices, the models would serve the same heuristic function as most mass 
communication models, which as McQuail & Windahl argued, have i) an organising 
function by ordering and relating systems to each other, have ii) an explanatory function 
through providing in a simplified way information which would otherwise be 
complicated or unclear, and iii) they make it possible to predict certain outcomes or the 
course of events. (1993: 2) To summarise, this approach will not offer a new theory of 
media démocratisation, it will only offer an approach for the analysis of the media 
reform aspect of democratic transition.
All four of these models include elements of liberalisation, but they have 
different concepts about the method and degree of démocratisation, as well as the role 
of the state in regulation and market ownership. They thus also imply different theories 
as to what constitutes the “public interest”. Of the above listed media system models, 
the libertarian and social democratic models incorporate a significant degree of need for 
inclusive, internally diverse segments to represent the public interest. Meanwhile, the 
development assistant model advocates external pluralism in the name of the public 
interest, and the authoritarian model restricts pluralism.
McQuail broadly differentiates between two main schools of public interest 
argumentation -  the market-based and the community-based, or in his words the 
“preponderance view” and the “common interest” view. He argues (1992) that the term 
“public interest” arises out of the “medieval social theory” notion of economic justice, 
in which some businesses were granted privileges (such as property rights, trading 
rights and monopoly status) in return for certain obligations to the community (such as 
fair pricing, universal access and the assurance of an adequate quality of goods and 
services). The term has been with us for a long time, for instance, the US broadcasting 
system has historically been regulated in light of the “public interest, convenience and 
necessity,” a phrase incorporated in the Communications Act o f 1934.
McQuail notes that despite the obsoleteness o f the original concept, regulation in 
the public interest has retained a significant position in public policy debates, despite , 
arguments in favour of market-based approaches. The reason why the idea of the public 
interest persists in modem societies is in fact due largely to the “failure of the hidden 
hand” o f the marketplace to provide adequately for the welfare of societies-at-large 
(1992: 21). There is disagreement, however, regarding the criteria to be used in 
determining public interest obligations in the media sector. In the “preponderance 
view”, public interest is defined as the interests of the majority, typically determined by 
the consumer marketplace, following the logic that the market represents the most 
democratic way of distributing scarce resources. Regulation designed according to this 
view typically seeks to correct the harshness of the market while leaving the 
fundamental structure of the marketplace intact. In this individualistic view of the public 
interest, the “sum of individual interests is held to be paramount.” (1992: 22)
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Meanwhile, policies that favour a “common interest” view tend to seek direct 
changes in the structure of communication industries, rather than seek remedies for 
performance inadequacies after they appear. This perspective holds that the public 
interest is not simply the sum of individual interests, but rather the advancement of a 
healthy and well-functioning community, one where the pursuit of private interests is 
balanced with the pursuit of collective interests. It is argued here that in the post- 
r“ communist context, the “common interest” perspective is more applicable as the 
, individual is defined not merely a consumer in a marketplace satisfying private desires, 
I but as a citizen of a new political order, founded on principles of democracy. The 
individual in this perspective should actively contribute to the debate about matters of 
public concern, and should be perceived as willing to sacrifice self-interest for the 
public interest.
I am inclined to assume that it is not necessary -  under these conditions -  to 
create a normative scale for the open models, as all three open models might be justified 
to exist in certain subsections of the media system and work toward the benefit of media 
démocratisation and the overall improvement of public dialogue or interest 
representation. I would however argue that a high degree o f institutional independence, 
and thus the central conditions fo r  the development o f the basic communication values 
may only be achieved i f  the social democratic model becomes a dominant aspect o f the 
media system. In addition, it is most probable that it is the relative balance between 
these models that determines whether post-communist media systems become open or 
remain closed systems.
Naturally, there are many limitations of our Four theories approach. These 
include the possibility that it might prove to be more useful in some countries more than 
in others. Another limitation might be that it will not be possible to identify and 
categorise every policy measure according to these four theories. Another self-imposed 
restriction is that the issues discussed in the various case studies are drawn from the 
basis of public discussions on media reform, and are collected from local media sources, 
thus making it impossible to cover comprehensively all possibly relevant areas. While 
an attempt is made to cover and analyse issues which are not discussed publicly, it is 
possible that some themes are missed or are not given the attention they deserve. In this 
context, space limitations have also prevented the researcher from entering into a 
detailed discussion about the legal, economic and historical aspects of media reform.
3 . A s s u m p t i o n  a n d  H y p o t h e s e s
Each discipline discussed in the previous section offers some directly applicable 
concepts and basic propositions which are relevant for this research. Public sphere 
theory suggests that it is a good starting point to think about the new media structures as 
agencies of representation, and that public participation and political representation 
must be ensured not only through political institutional methods but also through the 
new media structures. It also warns o f the high stakes of media reform, and implies that 
the state of the media should be considered as a key variable in studies of democratic 
consolidation. The debates and empirical findings in mass communication research 
suggest that we need to pay attention to the media’s conducive and possibly destructive 
influences with regard to political and societal developments.
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The relationship between the news media and social-political change has been 
studied mainly in societies that are not undergoing such radical change as post­
communist transition. In past mass communication research, depending on whether the 
study subscribed to the media- or socio-centric theory, the media has been 
conceptualised as either having an independent power over politics, or the other way
countered by research exploring the media’s impact on other social institutions. Hallin
media system in some periods, while in other periods the media system is more 
independent (or more determined by economic forces) and may exercise greater 
autonomous influence on the political world.” (2004: 47)
As mentioned earlier, transitology research has paid little attention to the 
communication dimension, and media system change has not been analysed with the 
same thoroughness as other variables. Given that theoretical uncertainties have slowed 
down the growth of comparative academic research into Western media systems and 
political communication patterns, the cumulative impact, according to Hallin &
media systems and how those changes are related to the wider historical process.” 
(2004b: 32-33). Therefore even some of the basic dynamics in the media-political 
relationship will have to be defined for the purposes of this study.
In preparing the set of assumptions and hypotheses for this research, the starting 
proposition will be that citizens are more dependent on their media during periods when 
the societal and political environment is undergoing change. (McQuail & Windahl, 
1993: 111-115) Generally speaking, this theory also claims that the more there is ( 
change or uncertainty in the general political and social conditions, the more there is a 
need for “information, orientation, definitions, value reassertions, or new value < 
expressions, which stimulate information-giving and receiving”. (McQuail & Windahl, 
1993: 112) To extend this logic to the specific condition of post-communist transition, 
which includes radical changes within the media system itself, we can argue that 
societies are heavily dependent on the media system, irrespective of the media system’s 
stage of development or quality of output. It is acknowledged that the stakes are high in 
all reform areas under post-communist transition, however -  on the basis of this theory 
-  it can be argued that the outcome of the changing relationship between the political 
and media systems is of particular importance as the quality of this relationship can 
have a direct influence on the agendas and style of political communication, and 
indirectly on the general political direction the country is taking.
In the following section, I will discuss some key ideas and concepts which are 
imperative to determine the basic assumptions regarding the media-political elite 
relationship.
L  News media - a dependent or independent variable? Many scholars o f post­
communist transition have studied the dilemma of whether a free and democratic media 
system is the cause or effect of a functioning democratic political system, (e.g. Price et 
al, 2002) but few have found a satisfactory resolution. Jakubowicz has argued that “the 
issue of whether mass media lead or follow change, whether they mirror or mould
around. Siebert et al considered the media to be a dependent variable in relation to what 
they called the “system of social control which it reflects” but this has later been
& Mancini argued that “the relative influence of the media system on political 
institutions and vice versa may vary historically, with political forces dominating the
Mancini, has been the emergence of “ambiguities about what exactly has changed in
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society, and whether they should be conceptualised as agents of social change or of 
status quo are yet to be resolved.” (2002) Once in a while, empirical studies identify a 
direct causal relationship between media and démocratisation (e.g. Voltmer & Schmitt- 
Beck, 2002)37 but overall, there is no theoretical consensus on this issue. So the question 
remains open for the case of Central and Eastern European transitions, and it seems that 
both perspectives may provide advantages to the researcher.
For the research to have a clear analytical perspective, however, it is crucial to 
define how we view the relationship between the political and media systems. Ball- 
Rokeach has argued that the news m edia’s dependency on elites creates the condition 
for “structural relations of control over information resources that generate power to 
create social realities and, in so doing, to negotiate social conflict and social change” 
(1998: 29). H e has defined media system dependency as a structure conceived as 
“relations of production that gives rise to text, including relations that bound and 
influence text reconstruction.” (1998: 15) and argued that macro relations within the 
media system dependency structure have direct effect on the media’s output and 
functioning (1998: 22). This view, as well as the US-rooted “indexing” theory (Bennett, 
1990)38 suggests that during post-communist political change, the news media are more 
likely to be dependent on elites than the other way around.
What also supports the validity of this assumption is the argument that media 
institutions are at the centre o f overlapping “pulls and pushes” from economics, politics 
'* and technology. (McQuail, 2000: 192) More concretely, the running of news media 
organisations requires the management of a complex web of relationships, ranging from 
pressure groups, sources, owners, investors, audiences and advertisers, to the 
institutions of law, and the political establishment. (McQuail and Windahl, 1993: 161) 
Thus, the position of a media outlet within this matrix is constantly changing, and could 
be regularly redefined as a result of the different conflicts and pressures. If, for instance, 
the quality of the relationship between a media outlet and its investor changes (in the 
event of an ownership change for instance), it could lead to a redefinition o f its 
relationship with both its audience, its other pressure groups, its advertisers and even the 
government. O r if the relationship with the government becomes more intimate in an 
environment where this in not tolerated, it could lead to the departure of advertisers and 
audiences.
If we were to consider all aspects of the relationship between political and media 
systems -  such as legal, political, economic, cultural, organisational, institutional etc. -  
the relationship would be most aptly conceptualised as a co-evolution, which is 
determined by a circularity. However, following our earlier statement that the political
37 Voltmer & Schmitt-Beck (2002) gathered data from six “Third-wave” democracies, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Chile, Uruguay, Greece and Spain, and proved that the relationship between media and democracy is 
particularly strong in the early stages of the transformation process, implying that the media has an 
overall stronger role in the démocratisation process within the first decade.
38 The “indexing” hypothesis, suggests that virtually all aspects of news reporting and commentary are 
indexed to reflect “the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic.” 
(Bennett, 1990: 106). While this theory was born out of the American “balanced reporting doctrine” 
context, it also has some relevance for the European media, especially in those countries which no longer 
have the tradition o f opinion journalism. Bennett wrote that “indexing constitutes a quick and ready guide 
for editors and reporters to use in deciding how to cover a story. It is a rule o f thumb that can be defended 
against questions from uneasy corporate managers and concerned citizens alike.” (1990,107-108).
ft! j; 5 ■ ~!| »1 ? f l y  W BW W IffilUJUUUU
46
dites carry the ultimate responsibility for media reform, the media system will be 
treated as a dependent variable regarding its relationship with the political system. If the 
media system is perceived rather dependent on the political sphere, this has direct 
implications for the structure and presentation of the analysis.
We will separate the collected empirical evidence into two interrelated 
dimensions, which simultaneously influence the direction and degree of journalistic 
professionalisation. The first such dimension would be, naturally, the macro 
environment, i.e. the structural conditions of the new media system, with a special 
emphasis on the development of media policy and traces of political parallelism within 
the media. The second perspective concerns the micro-environment of the media 
landscape, and includes more cultural points of interaction with the political elites.
Broadly, we will call these two parts of every case study:
• the external dimension (i.e. the media policy decisions taken by political elites 
within both the print and the broadcast sector, regulatory and legal frameworks, 
organisational structures etc.), and
• the internal dimension (i.e. the internal growth patterns of the media, 
professionalism, safety, journalistic associations, solidarity etc).
As Barbara Pfesch has described it, the structural conditions of the media- 
political relationship have a crucial influence on the expectations and assessment of 
media responsibilities on the part of the political establishment, and vice versa, on the 
political mechanisms and on opportunities for exerting influence on the media. The 
structural conditions also have an impact on how media organisations position 
themselves against other outlets, on the norms of professional orientations and the 
actors’ behaviour, as well as on the content and style of reporting about politics. (2004: 
356)
By studying the external and internal aspects, we will thus also get an insight 
into the emerging political communication culture, which Pfesch defines as the 
“empirically observable orientations o f actors in the system of production of political 
messages toward specific objects o f political communication, which determine the 
manner in which political actors and media actors communicate to their common 
political public.” (2004: 348) In addition, through the external dimension (primary 
aspect) we will gain insight into the conflict between the different theoretical 
approaches, applied by the political and media elites, while through the internal 
dimension (secondary aspect), we will evaluate the internal growth potential of the 
media, and the sustainability of its internal structure and organisation.
2. Political parallelism and advocacy journalism. If we accept that the indexing 
hypothesis is valid in relation to the news media in post-communist countries, we also 
have to take into consideration the pressure that is placed on politicians who are 
featured in news reporting. As mentioned earlier, with increasing commercialisation, the 
media in post-communist Europe swiftly joined their Western counterparts in engaging 
in the practice of rather negative reporting on political elites. This was not coupled with 
a swift professionalisation, meaning that many journalists obtained power without 
having internalised the basic ethics and rules of responsible journalism. We may assume
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that the combination of these two aspects generates a high degree of tension between 
media and political elites, tension which -  if it could be measured -  would probably 
rank higher in case of the countries where the relationship is still being negotiated 
between political and media systems. In an effort to retain or assert some functional 
control of the media by the political elites, the method and style of establishing 
politically parallelism in the news media structures thus might emerge as a crucial 
question in these countries.
For these reasons, it is understandable that politicians want representation in the 
media system to be able to protect themselves from the emerging power of the media, 
and to be able to control this most direct communication channel with their constituents. 
The “ideal” or “acceptable” political elite involvement is hard to establish theoretically 
as the transitional nature of the process creates a particular environment and 
expectations, while at the same time, there is no relevant best practice in Western media 
systems. In fact, there is a strong consensus that political elites should not be direct 
stake-holders of the media system in any way (as enshrined in many Council of Europe 
recommendations as well). At the same time, as covered earlier, Western European 
media systems do have a significant degree of political parallelism, as a residual o f their 
historical and political traditions.
The system of political party-financed press in most of Western Europe has been 
replaced by a system of shared political-ideological agendas, which means that most 
serious newspapers identify themselves with a political platform, and are often as 
recognised outlets as the independent press. However, in Southern Europe, this 
relationship continues to be much stronger than in the UK or Scandinavian countries, 
and political elites are thought to have a strong say in editorial policy, especially in 
political sensitive cases. Nevertheless, politically aligned newspapers are considered 
“useful”, as the newspapers are thought to assist the publics by providing interpretations 
and not just facts about social and political realities. National newspapers in Germany 
and Sweden are relatively evenly balanced in their distribution, and in both countries 
there are several major news organisations on each side of the political spectrum. 
(Donsbach & Patterson, 2004: 256) But regarding the balance between the different 
political orientations, there are more newspapers on the political right than on the left in 
Great Britain. Voltmer’s analysis of Western European press systems (2000), has found 
some form of imbalance in Ireland, Italy and Greece as well, suggesting that the 
emergence of an imbalance is a viable scenario in countries of transition.
Europe-wide newspaper penetration figures reveal that in those countries where 
the newspaper landscape is more politically integrated, the readership figures are much 
lower than in those countries where papers are more commercially based. While this 
does not necessarily indicate causality, it is an interesting observation to keep in mind 
for any later discussion on the usefulness of parallel structures during democratic 
transition. In addition, newspaper penetration figures also seem to be connected to 
general economic development, as well as with the dominant philosophy around which 
the media is organised. Political parallelism can also be found in broadcasting 
structures, in which control over public broadcasting is divided among parliamentary 
parties by a system of proportional representation. This is known in Italy as lotizazzione, 
and in Germany as the very different proporz principle. It is difficult to interpret these 
differing cultural-historical patterns in the context of developmental stages, but if we
aTH lHWI1
48
p
look at comprehensive surveys about media freedom (such as those produced by 
Freedom House, Newspapers of the World and others), the countries which apply strong 
parallelism exhibit worst results that those which do not. In countries following a more 
social democratic model, newspaper readership figures are much higher than in 
countries which do not.39
Given that media institutions cannot function without reliance on sources of 
political or economic power during transition (e.g. Price et al 2002: 255), instead o f 
assessing our three countries against the highest theoretical benchmarks, it might be 
more appropriate to accept that some form of political parallelism is bound to develop -  
especially in print media -  and what we should focus on is how we integrate such 
developments into our conceptual frameworks, and how it can the possible damages of 
this interference can kept at the minimum. We have done this already by coining the 
development assistance model, which develops the philosophical rationale behind such 
linkages.
We can expand on this by seeking to differentiate between stronger, rather 
financial or institutionalised links (i.e. “strong” political parallelism), or informal 
partisanship linkage (i.e. “partial” political parallelism) between political parties and 
media outlets. Differentiating between the two is a first step toward understanding the 
degree of integration between these two spheres, and would also allow the 
understanding of whether these phenomena are a result o f unwarranted political 
interference or a genuine cause, supported by the media community from below.
In post-communist transitions, the question often arises that even if media 
outlets become financially independent of governments, there can never be sufficient 
guarantee that they do not informally or secretly support political elites for economic 
benefit. Empirical evidence suggests that foreign ownership (which has been considered 
in the past as a guarantee of political independence) does not necessarily alleviate 
political dependence, and editorial offices are asked to perform favours to the 
incumbent governments. The dilemma is clear and present -  can privately-owned media 
outlets be trusted to provide full independence from governments in countries where 
system change has been managed by close networks of political and civil society elites?
One positive about some form of political parallelism may be that it could 
enhance the external pluralism in a media system, and correct the failures of the market. 
Perhaps, for this exact reason, empirical evidence about post-communist transitions 
suggests that political parallelism has been advocated not only by political elites but 
also by some parts of the journalistic community.
When we expect to find a significant degree of political parallelism, we can 
establish both a cultural/ traditional and a developmental explanation. The cultural 
explanation may be that in the European tradition, journalists have seen themselves as 
the interpreters of social and political realities, and considered that objectivity could 
hinder the very purpose of journalistic work. (Donsbach & Patterson, 2004: 261). On 
top of this, the Central and Eastern European journalistic experience is rooted in an even 
stronger advocacy environment, where journalists were not simply fighting for a social 
or political cause, but were forced to represent certain ideological positions. Meanwhile
39 Source: Newspaper penetration figures obtained from www.unesco.org. reference year 2001-2002
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the developmental explanation is rooted in the Western European experience, which 
tells us that political parallelism is gradually eased and replaced by solely ideological 
partisanship connections between parties and newspapers (and no longer organisational, 
financial, or any other). Along with this development, the number of fully independent 
newspapers grows and their position on the market strengthens. This path of course is 
strongly dependent on the political structure that a given country develops, and on the 
basis of Hallin & Mancini’s research, it is primarily dependent on whether a 
majoritarian or consensus governance structure develops.
Political parallelism is very important to pay attention to in light of the fact that 
that political elites largely abuse their power in relation to media démocratisation 
f (Johnson, 1993, Downing 1996, Sparks and Reading, 1998, Jakubowicz 1999, Gross 
2001, Milton 2000,) and that common characteristics have been found between the style 
and the organisational structure of the Italian and Central and Eastern European media 
systems, in terms of the level of state control, the degree of media partisanship, the 
integration between political elites and the media as well as the low level of professional 
ethics. It is therefore important to follow the development of parallelism in the new 
media structures, as this characteristic will have a crucial long-term impact not only on 
the development of the media as a political institution but also on the media’s ability to 
serve the various constructive roles which are attributed to is in a democracy. It will be 
crucial whether pluralism becomes constituted through a multiplicity of politically 
independent, ideologically aligned, or political party-financed newspapers, and if this 
occurs in a combination -  which is most likely the case in all countries -  which type 
prevails. If ideologically aligned newspapers or political party-financed newspapers are 
common, it is important to see to what extent there is a balance between the different 
political spectrums.
3 The role o f  news media during transition. In order to illustrate the extent of 
the political elites’ responsibility in media reform, we need to find an appropriate 
conceptualisation regarding the media’s role during this sensitive political period. 
Beyond their integration with the political and economic societies, an even more crucial 
characteristic (in fact a responsibility) of the new media systems is their integration with 
the civil society, and their capacity to represent a plurality of voices. While the above 
discussion implied that a certain degree of integration with political elites should not be 
considered problematic automatically, this needs to be implemented with a view to 
maximising the media’s development toward becoming an independent social 
institution.
Various theoretical discussions, including the public sphere discussion, tell us 
that the most fundamental goal of media démocratisation should be the transformation 
of the media system into a system which enables societal participation and 
representation. We will thus adopt the European definition of the “fourth estate” which 
incorporates both these goals. In addition, to place the media into a wider context, we 
will define it here as the central institution o f the mediated public sphere i.e. the “policy 
sphere”. Borrowed from Bennett & Entman',(2001: 3-5), this concept has facilitated 
research on media reform as it excludes all informal social relationships and non- 
mediated spheres, which the otherwise useful “public sphere” concept covers.
The potential of the news media to impact negatively on political developments has 
generated many enemies of the new market-based media systems, and some critical
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theorists have argued that media elites in this region are more powerful actors than 
political elites themselves. (Pokol, 1995: 83) According to this argument, the media are 
not only more powerful than the government, but have a secret political agenda. It also 
implies that the new media institutions have an exclusively negative impact on the 
overall démocratisation process. While these views are not shared here, they provide a 
warning about the possible negative effects of media output. On a more operation level, 
the public interest regarding media reform will thus be understood to be aimed at 
creating a media system, in which the constructive functions outweigh the negative 
functions. In light of the previous discussion, therefore, this thesis will consider the 
following functions as the most essential democratic functions of post-communist 
media systems.
(a) A “Fourth estate” role -  by providing a central platform for all significant 
societal actors to participate in the democratic process and for interests to be 
represented (i.e. European definition);
(b) A watchdog function -  by serving to protect the public through monitoring the 
government and public officials, and other power elites;
(c) An information role -  by providing a plurality of views, news, data, and a 
diversity of interpretations on societal developments, it allows citizens to gather 
political and cultural information, and make informed political and lifestyle 
choices;
(d) An agenda-setting role -  by raising issues of common concern and move 
democratic dialogue forward;
(e) A constructive politicisation role -  by encouraging high quality public debates 
in an attempt to increase political participation;
(f) A social capital building role -  by strengthening the relationship between 
various societal groups, as well as society and government in general.
While this conceptualisation embodies a set of “ideal” roles, the findings by Pippa 
Norris suggest that aiming for such constructive roles is justified. In her study of 29 
OECD member states, Norris (2000) found that in the long run, the news media exert a 
positive influence on the quality of democracy, and thereby the process of political 
communications should be understood as a “virtuous circle”. In a subsequent study of 
135 countries around the world (2004), she found systematic evidence that the mass 
media can play a vital role in strengthening good governance and human development. 
She compared countries using -  among others -  the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators for “media access” and Freedom House’s Press Freedom Index for “press 
freedom”, and concluded that this positive influence can only emerge if the media are 
independent of established political and business interests and if public access is 
allowed to these outlets.
Before closing this chapter, let us clarify further the remaining conceptual tools 
that this thesis will work with. We have already elaborated the first methodological 
hypothesis (i.e. the usefulness of the “Four theories” as a conceptual framework) and a 
series of research questions and assumptions, so let turn now to the remaining 
assumptions and hypotheses.
Given the difficulty of the media démocratisation mandate, this research will 
hypothesise that a calculated negative interference by elites is inevitable in a transition 
to democracy, irrespective of the démocratisation method, the initial conditions, or the 
actors themselves. The work will suggest that the problem is inherent in the 
circumstance (the actual need to transform from one political system to another), and 
, will more specifically hypothesise that post-communist transition, by definition, brings 
\ about some destructive political interference in the media, irrespective o f the typology 
’ ; of transition or the method o f  media démocratisation.
Due to the very difficult starting conditions, the simultaneity of economic, 
societal and political change, the weakness of civil societies, political cultures, and 
initially the rule of law, it is crucial that the media reform process is conducted as part 
of a larger discussion on the public good, and future visions of society. It therefore 
needs to be inclusive and transparent. The process also requires patience and a gradual 
approach, and if political elites aim for an immediate transition to the “highest 
standards” or the “best European practices”, that might further impede the process. 
Following this logic, an additional hypothesis is that the more a process lacks strategy, 
the less chance there is fo r  media reform to unfold without major societal frictions. 
Strategy here refers to two things -  a systemic approach to allocating roles and 
functions to various media segments, and a consensus-seeking approach by political 
elites, where the interests of society are placed higher than direct political party or 
business interests. Closely associated with this is the concept of transparency, 
particularly with regard to upholding the rule of law, the clearness of the above 
mentioned strategy to all stakeholders, and the general openness about institutionalised 
links of political parallelism.
Finally, let me reiterate that the empirical evidence will be used to construct 
comprehensive case studies, and to serve as a basis for the identification o f various 
normative media theories that have emerged as integral elements of the reform process. 
Through the external dimension we will gain insight into the main structural 
developments on the respective media landscapes, while through the internal dimension, 
we will evaluate the internal growth potential of the media, and the sustainability of its 
internal structure and organisation. In terms of its style, the work will avoid making 
judgements based on anecdotal evidence, and its assertions and conclusions will be 
firmly rooted on an extensive review of existing empirical data. Now let us begin with 
the country analyses.
Chapter III.
Case Study Of Hungary
Frequent abbreviations
MDF -  Hungarian Democratic Forum 
S2DSZ -  Alliance of Free Democrats 
MSZP -  Hungarian Socialist Party 
Fidesz -  Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party 
PSB -  Public service broadcaster 
MTV -  Hungarian Television
Hungary’s post-communist democratic transition has been one of the most 
successful in the region. The government was quick to establish stable political 
institutions, to begin privatisation of the state sector, and to provide guarantees for 
ensuring the rule o f law. Following an austerity programme, which led to a stabilised 
economy, the government attracted a significant amount of foreign investment. All four 
post-communist elections have taken place in free and fair conditions, and the country 
was accepted into the Council of Europe in 1990, the Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development (OECD) in 1996, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) in 1999, and joined the European Union in May 2004.
Despite its very favourable initial conditions, Hungary has proved to be a 
controversial case when it comes to reforming the media system. Even though the 
consecutive governments reached swift results in institutional engineering, economic 
restructuring and social development, the country seems to have stayed behind other 
advanced countries of the region with regard to the success of media reform.1 This 
chapter will focus on the policy decisions adopted during the 1990-2002 period, and 
gather empirical evidence on the media system reform and its impact on societal 
developments. Wherever possible, it will categorise the various reform measures and/or 
developments according to the four proposed macro-theories.
1. I n it ia l  C o n d it io n s
All across Central Europe, the idea of press freedom was advocated since the 
beginning of the emergence of printed press markets in the 18th century. After the 
Second World War, the state media came to be organised according to the Soviet model, 
serving as a transmission belt of party ideology. Having been accorded a strong 
advocacy function by the communist government, the news media was not a fact-
1 This conclusion has been reached through the comparison of the results of the European Commission’s 
country reports on institutional, economic, legal and political reforms (in which Hungary was the leading 
candidate state for many years) and the annual Freedom House index on press freedom (in which 
Hungary’s results were inferior to the average of eight most advanced countries, in the organization’s 
classification (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia) between 1995 and 
2002.
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reporting but rather, a fact-creating industry -  where both the pro-government media and 
the samizdats~ of the 1980s were of highly opinionated nature. Devoid of participatory 
and deliberative spaces, Hungary’s political culture underwent serious deterioration, and 
the post-1989 journalistic community inherited a politicised notion of the media and a 
restricted access to the policy sphere.
Until the late 1950s, the Communist party held an ideological monopoly on the 
public sphere -  on television, in the press, in schools, and at work. The Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party’s media policy was laid down in a 1958 resolution, which 
made it clear that the “task” of the media was to follow and popularise the policy o f the 
central committee.2 3 The official policy sphere was thus the exact opposite in all its 
characteristics of the Habermasian ideal. The central communication values -  
participation and representation -  were denied from the publics and only existed in a 
manner filtered through the state propaganda offices. As Csepeli & Ôrkény argued 
(1992), public discussions gradually became “ritualised”.
The 1956 revolution swept away the Stalinist era in Hungary. From the late 
1960s onwards, Jânos Kadar’s benign rule generated a compromise of social and 
economic liberalisation in return for acquiescence to Soviet control. This led first to an 
“antipolitical”4 stance by intellectuals (Konrad 1984: 91-98), and later to the 
development of what Hankiss (1990: 82-107) has termed a “second society” on the 
fringes of the party state, where citizens engaged in individual economic and social 
interaction. By the 1980s, mass communications became less controlled, while overt 
mechanisms of censorship gave way to more informal means of control. Widespread 
was the idea of the “three t-s” -  a system of tiered censorship -  which relied less on 
direct party oversight than on self-censorship. Tamogatott, turt, tiltott were the three 
magic categories of editorial content, referring to “supported,” “tolerated” and 
“forbidden” material.
From the early 1970s, numerous intellectual and regional journals appeared (e.g. 
Tiszatâj, Jelenkor, Vaiôsâg) which broadened the scope of the debate among 
intellectuals, and embodied the desire to create organised opposition movements. But 
unlike the sizeable institutional opposition in Czechoslovakia (Charter 77) or Poland 
(Solidarity), Hungary’s opposition remained limited to various groups of dissidents 
centered around the underground literary, political and economic publications such as 
Beszélô (Speaker) Fordulat és Reform (Turn and Reform), Demokrata (The Democrat), 
Hirmondô (News source) and Medvetânc (Bear dance). The launch of Heti 
Vilâggazdasâg (Weekly World Economy, HVG) in 1979 provided for a sphere to debate 
the state of the country and, along with other literary and intellectual publications, 
brought colour and a suggestion of plurality into the policy sphere.
2 The term “samizdat” is said to have emerged in the late 1950s, when a Moscow poet described the 
bound, typewritten publication of his poems “Samsebyaizdat" i.e. publishing house for oneself,
3 The 1958 party resolution stated that “the press should be partisan, it should base itself without 
reservations on the dictatorship of the proletariat, and its position should always be a class position. Party 
control should be asserted in the entire press, because only in this way can the partisan position of the 
press be properly ensured and the assertion of views alien to Marxism-Leninism avoided.” Source: Jakab, 
Zoltán (ed.): Mass media in the documents of the MSZMP (1957-1980), 1987, Research Centre for Mass 
Communications, Budapest
4 The term, first introduced into the public discourse by Gyorgy Konrad (1984: 91-98), refers to the 
individual’s civic engagement without a wish to get involved in domestic political developments. The 
term was also used to describe attitudes in Poland, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.
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The ideas and analysis captured in these journals were regularly beamed to a 
wider audience through Radio Free Europe. The critical tone of these writings greatly 
influenced the journalists and editors of the official press and contributed to the birth of 
the Publicity Club in 1986, which held debates about public issues with dissidents and 
political figures. Some even believe that selected media outlets (such as the daily 
Magyar Nemzet, HVG  and the radio programme 168 Ora) had a greater influence in 
bringing down the communist system than the entire opposition movement. (Pokol, 
1995:14)
In the broadcast sphere, while some production activity occurred in regional 
studios, television broadcasting was centralized in Budapest during the 1970s and 
1980s. The two nationwide television channels were financed through the Ministry of 
Finance, and every financial detail, including the small advertising revenues, was 
handled by the ministry. The programming of the Hungarian State Television (MTV) 
was beamed to Hungarian speaking regions in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, the 
former-Yugoslavia, and the former USSR, primarily to spread positive propaganda 
about the country. In 1989, reports about the imminent collapse of the system were 
aired by the state television and radio -  fuelling, although not exclusively, the 
revolutionary events in Romania.
The socialist media policy was dramatically eased when the Department for 
Agitation and Propaganda was closed down in 1988, and when -  as a political 
concession to the emerging opposition forces -  the system of newspaper licensing was 
abolished in 1989. At this historic moment, there was no clear theory about media 
reform, so in an attempt to prevent political parties from acquiring broadcast channels, 
the reformist government called a moratorium on broadcast frequencies on the eve of 
the system-change. However, at the same time, the reforming elites also embarked on 
behind-the curtain deals, redistributing access to media power. A handful of cable 
channels were allowed to operate, and some of those (e.g. Nap TV) became powerful 
players covering and interpreting the social and political realities during the initial years 
of transition. The execution of non-transparent business deals was also characteristic 
within the print realm.
2 . T h e  E x t e r n a l  D im e n s io n  O f  M e d ia  R e f o r m
2 .1 .  E v o l u t io n  o f  t h e  P o s t -1 9 8 9  P r i n t m e d i a  M a r k e t
Parallel to the initial liberalisation measures, the reforming communist elites 
began a covert privatisation of the print market. In an attempt to ensure that no political 
rivals overtake the national and regional political newspaper market5 -  the communist 
elites sold most of the print media assets, including two publishing houses, to foreign 
investors. While in some cases (e.g. the dailies Népszabadsag and Magyar Hirlap) the 
ownership changes were negotiated by the editors themselves (without active 
involvement of party officials), in other cases the government was in the driving seat.
For instance, in case of most of the nineteen, communist party-owned regional 
papers, the government denied the journalists’ request to perform a management
5 Zoldi, L.: “Ideologies on the hanger. What type of politics is practiced by the regional press?” In Cseh & 
Enyedi & Soltenszky (1999: 319-332)
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buyout, which would have kept the papers in domestic hands.6 Instead, the papers were 
sold to foreigners, among them the German press magnate Axel Springer, and au lieu of 
actual payment, they were only asked to guarantee the papers’ future maintenance.7 The 
details of this “investor-friendly” deal, which also involved real estate transfers, are still 
disputed and continue to haunt the communists’ successor, the Hungarian Socialist 
Party. Even though the print segment represents only 9% o f the Hungarian policy 
sphere audience,8 because of the particular, intellectual section of society it caters for, 
its ownership structure and patterns o f political favouritism were crucial at this point. 
However, not only that the privatisation was conducted without consultation with the 
public, it was also done without a clear theoretical foundation for a wider media policy.
By the time the right-wing coalition, led by the Hungarian Democratic Forum 
(MDF), came into power in May 1990, the new rules of the game were largely drawn up 
-  a considerable part of the print media had been privatised, and 65% o f the entire 
market was taken over by foreign groups. While it cannot be said that the initial 
transformation of the print media market was conducted under the guidance o f the 
libertarian theory, it is true that the end results were close to a largely liberalised market, 
in a sense that the state retained only minimal influence. Liberalisation in this context 
mainly meant the admittance that there was no capital or know-how in the country to 
build a democratic print media system, and that the creation of a system independent of 
the state was urgently needed. Most libertarians argued that in a media environment that 
is increasingly global, the development o f “indigenous” media was not an essential 
prerequisite for the emergence of stable democratic institutions.9
The 1989-1990 developments came to determine the state of print media for 
years to come. On the one hand, the overwhelming foreign presence made a positive 
contribution to the development of the independent press. The regional newspapers, and 
the two main national political dailies — Nepszabadsag (People’s Freedom), the former 
communist party paper, and Magyar Htrlap (Hungarian Daily) the paper o f the 
government between 1968 and 1989 -  quickly became institutionally independent of 
political parties and developed significant distance from political elites. Given that these 
newspapers became politically partisan newspapers, a certain measure of political 
parallelism developed (partial political parallelism), but the strong financial link which 
characterised their former relationship with the political system disappeared. Meanwhile 
the political newspapers which stayed in Hungarian ownership (e.g. Nepszava and 
Magyar Nemzet) gradually developed closer political links (strong political 
parallelism).
Along with the privatisation of state-owned companies, thousands of new 
companies entered the newly liberalised market. The first five years witnessed a radical 
upsurge in titles, followed by a gradual consolidation of the market. As only natural, the
6 Source: Magyar Narancs, November 13, 2003
7 Lanczi & O ’Neil (1997: 86)
8 In 2001,74% of the Hungarian population get their news from television, while 9% from radio, 9% 
from daily newspapers and 3% from weeklies. The study was conducted by the Sonda Ipsos polling 
agency, based on a 1000-sample of adult population (over the age of 18), and commissioned by the Press 
Freedom Centre. Source: “Readers and television audiences on the Hungarian media”, Nepszabadsag, 
October 3,2001
9 See for instance Seres. Laszlo: Freedom of the public media in Hungary. A libertarian approach, in 
Bajomi-Lazar & Hegediis (2001:147-159)
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print media landscape saw a series of ownership changes through sell-offs, mergers and 
acquisitions. In the nation-wide newspaper sector, for example, all of the titles saw 
dramatic ownership changes at least twice during the 1990s. The number o f national 
daily newspapers (political, financial and tabloid) dropped from 14 in 1994 to 8 in 2003. 
O f this, nation-wide political dailies were 5 and 4, respectively. According to its number 
of dailies, Hungary looks similar to the Western European average, which suggests that 
there is a relatively diverse market of political news and opinion.10
Readership patterns dramatically changed, too. The number of those who 
regularly read both a daily and a weekly dropped from 62% to 41%, and by 1998, one- 
fifth of the population admitted to not reading any political newspaper.11 Partly as a 
result of financial difficulties and the growing availability of alternative sources of 
information (such as commercial and cable television), the circulation of national 
newspapers fell significantly,12 while the readership of tabloid media and internet-based 
public interest newspapers grew.13 The possible explanations also include the low level 
of trust in the political institutional system, as indicated by several empirical studies,14 
as well as worldwide cultural and communication trends.15 By 2002, the daily 
newspaper circulation figure in Hungary was 162 per 1000 inhabitants,16 which is on 
the lower end of the European scale, suggesting that the Hungarian policy sphere 
participation though the print media is relatively weak.17
In the early 1990s, the civil and penal codes contained jurisdiction regarding the 
operation of the press, while press freedom was guaranteed by the constitution. Thus, 
the political parties represented in the Parliament agreed that no new press law was 
necessary (on top of a 1986 law). This, again, did not emerge as a unique libertarian 
element in the overall print media reform process, but was rather the adoption of the 
common Western European practice. But while there seemed to be consensus regarding 
the regulatory needs, there was little agreement about which model would be most 
adequate for the general structure of the print media and the role of political parties 
therein. While most political parties and a significant part of the journalistic community 
came to favour partisanship (and thus the development assistance model), many civil
10 France has 8 nation-wide dailies, while Germany 5 and Italy 4. Source: 1998 findings by the Euromedia 
Research Group, McQuail and Siune (1998: 7-21)
11 Venczel, Timea: “Changing readership patterns between 1990 and 1998”, in Vdsdrhelyi & Halmai, 
(1998: 317-332)
12 Nepszabadsag's circulation (measured in sold copies) dropped from 294,000 in 1994 to 189,000 in 
2003. Magyar Htrlap's circulation dropped from 58,000 in 1994 to 35,000 in 2003. Nepszava decreased 
from 46,000 in 1999 to 29,000 in 2003. Source: MddiaAsz Polling Agency, 2003. The total circulation of 
political dailies fell from 921,000 in 1989 to 341,000 in 2001. Source: Galik & Bayer (2000)
13 The leading internet newspapers have exceeded the national dailies in readership. The average daily 
readership of Origo.hu is 372,000, that ofIndex.hu is 177,000, while that of Korridor.hu is 79,000 and 
growing. Source: www.webaudit.hu. December 2003
14 Including one by Mdria Vasarhelyi, entitled “On the prestige of the institutional system”, Jel-Kep, 
1995/2
15 The overall circulation of newspapers dropped by 12 percentage points in the early 1990s in the 
Western world. Source: Goldman Sachs investment bank, research carried out in 36 developed countries 
between 1989 and 1993. Cited by Gdlik (1998) Ibid.
16 UNESCO newspaper penetration figures for year 2001-2002, available in the “Country profiles” 
section of www.unesco.org
17 Within the EU, only the Italian (110), Greek (100) and Portugese (38) newspaper penetration figures 
are below the Hungarian. The average for the Scandinavian region is 520. Source for EU data: Euromedia 
Research Group findings, McQuail and Siune (1998: 11)
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society representatives and liberal politicians argued in favour of a libertarian model, 
rejecting the idea of any political party representation in the press.
Given that political parallelism was perceived by the general public as a 
development contradictory to the idea of démocratisation and media freedom, the 
political elites who did believe that party-press ties were important had to manage most 
of these relationships in an informal manner. Even though Népszabadsâg was 
privatised, a minority stake was held by a group of journalists who kept informal ties to 
the Socialist party. Népszava also remained close to the MSZP, but its ownership 
changed hands on average every two years and the real owners were rarely exposed. At 
the same time, foreign investors had majority or full ownership stakes in the main 
newspapers, Népszabadsâg and M agyar Hirlap, but sought to cherish good 
relationships with the Socialist-liberal political elites whose business connections were 
responsible for the financial survival o f these papers. Thus, it emerged fairly early on 
that while foreign ownership does introduce high production and journalistic standards, 
it does not automatically guarantee full political independence.
The first democratically-elected government failed to directly profit from the 
newspaper privatisation process, and thus launched a campaign of direct 
interventionism. Having obtained only a small majority in Parliament, the right-wing 
MDF-govemment tried to increase its political leverage by securing the support of 
media outlets. Much according to the development assistance theory, it argued that the 
media did not reflect the political power relations within the emerging democratic 
society, and concluded in an internal document in 1991 that the government would have 
to interfere on the media market to limit the “newspaper bias created by the socialist- 
liberal media“.18 In Agh’s words, “the new party leaders were intellectuals and they had 
an extreme sensitivity and vanity concerning the press [...] and the new parties were 
engaged in a cultural war among themselves because o f their vague and over- 
ideologized programmes and “tribal” sub-cultural political profiles.” (1998: 108) Kéri 
describes the paranoia that emerged in the ranks of the new political elites in the 
following way: “the opposition was driven by a deep fear that governing parties would 
take control over the media, while governing parties were distressed that they would 
have to fight not only the opposition but also the media”, (2000: 30)
Given the liberal bias on this issue, MDF’s argumentation and plans to use 
taxpayer funds to adjust the balance created outrage in both the media community and 
the political opposition. In order to improve the government’s communication potential, 
MDF invested public funds in several publishing houses, financially supported the daily 
Pesti Hirlap, and launched a failed attempt at creating a government-leaning daily 
newspaper, Ûj Magyarorszâg (New Hungary).19 In 1993, the government also 
renationalised Magyar Nemzet (which had been sold to the French Hersant Group) and 
began financing it through a state-owned bank. MDF was indeed in a difficult situation 
as traditionally the 1980s opinion journalism and underground samizdat world attracted
18 The initially secret internal party document was authored by leading MDF politician Imre Konya, and 
was leaked to the press in September 1991. Published in Magyar Hirlap, September 9, 1991
19 The daily was to reach a 300,000 daily circulation (i.e. number one position on the political daily 
market) in three years, but due to its unprofessional and politically overheated style, the highest 
circulation the paper could reach was 25,000 and, from 1995 onward, it was in a constant state of 
bankruptcy. In 1997, it was restarted under a different namt,N api Magyarorszdg (Daily Hungary) by 
groups close to Fidesz.
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liberal thinkers and in the early stages of transition, most journalists, editors and 
columnists were centrist liberals. Through the continuation of the 1980s opposition 
titles and the setting up of new media outlets, the new print media system came to 
represent a pluralism of views, but one which showed little interest in right-wing ideas. 
Despite the non-transparent ties between political parties and media owners, journalists 
were rarely driven by strong political affiliations,20 leading us to assume that the 
majority of journalists conceived the media as the watchdog of government and simply 
wanted to perform their work with the healthy antagonism and critical zeal.
However, MDF interpreted the new media-politics relationship as a direct attack 
on itself as a political entity, which was particularly clear in its aggressive broadcast 
policy (to be discussed later). In turn, the interventionist policies were widely 
interpreted by media professionals as calls to systemise themselves into groups of 
political journalists. Therefore, the attempts at controlling a segment of the print market 
failed to produce long term results, but injected a significant amount of politicisation 
into the media, strengthening political identifications within the journalistic community, 
and widening the gap between the two most powerful political ideologies of the era -  a 
unique version of liberalism and an even more unique version of conservatism.21
The next, Socialist-dominated government (a coalition of the Hungarian 
Socialist Party and the Alliance of Free Democrats) gradually privatised the remaining 
state interests in newspaper publishing, cut direct support for Oj Magyarorszag and 
Pesti Hirlap, and only continued to support a handful of publications through the state- 
owned PostaBank. Much according to Western European examples of print subsidy 
systems, the bank financed 15 different publications, catering to the needs of practically 
all political and cultural interest groups, including the conservative Magyar Nemzet. 
Having secured a majority in Parliament, this government did not feel directly 
threatened by the media, and considered it a legitimate aim to support a plurality of 
media outlets in an attempt to counter the negative impact of market-based 
development.
Initially, this seemed like a good idea as many critical niche publications, 
including Beszelo, and the political weekly Magyar Narartcs, were kept alive only 
through state funds. Local capital was scarce, and the Hungarian market was considered 
too small to sustain marginal publications. Many publishers also received funds from 
the Soros network and other foundations and charities. However, when the bank went 
bankrupt, ironically for performing too many favours to political elites, its media 
portfolio was dismantled by the next government, and it became clear that it was a 
mistake not to have designed a non-political system of press support which could work 
independent of all governments.
The battle for newspapers became more intense, and more openly talked about 
during the third, right-wing government’s tenure. In its 1998 election programme22, the
20 In 1992, most journalists said they were “democratic thinkers” (46%), or that they are “free thinkers” 
(31%). Few said they were leftists (9%), and few that they had “strong national feelings” (6%), or were 
“conservatives” (1%). Source: Vdsirhelyi (1999:137)
21 Briefly, conservative and right-wing parties would represent Christian ethics, anti-communism, the idea 
of the nation and rural attitudes, while the liberal forces and the Socialist party would stand for anti­
clerical, pro-urban, economically liberal attitudes.
22 “There is another choice -  a civic Hungary”, Fidesz political programme, 1998 general elections
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conservative Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party (hereinafter Fidesz) promised to prevent the 
concentration of media capital which it claimed had led to “an opinion monopoly”. It 
pledged to “create a balanced system of communication rights”, to guarantee the 
independence of the media from political and economic interest groups and thus protect 
the citizens’ right to “objective information”. Following up on its promise, between 
1998 and 2002, the Fidesz-govemment enacted an unprecedented amount of state 
intervention in the affairs of the media -  which even though once again rooted in the 
development assistance argument, has turned out to be much distorted, with a rather 
authoritarian flavour.
The controversial concept of “media equilibrium”, announced by Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban in September 1998,23 generated heated debates in intellectual, political 
and media circles -  leading to great divisions in society regarding the role of the media 
in a democratic transition. Fidesz said that equilibrium in the media can only be created 
through a positive discrimination for the right-wing press i.e. through the provision of 
financial support from taxpayer funds. Initially, this policy was announced as 
“temporary” (only one or two years)24 but, in fact, Fidesz began to create a long-term 
enabling environment for the dissemination of its own political messages. Given that 
this issue has made Hungary very different from other countries in the region, I will 
dedicate a detailed analysis to its study.
2 .2 . T h e  C o n c e p t  o f  “ M e d ia  E q u il ib r iu m ”  -  T h e  F a c t s
Fidesz argued that the “hegemony of the leftist-liberal press” had bred an 
opinion monopoly, leading to a structural inequality in political information 
distribution, and the news media in general.25 In an attempt to protect the “public 
interest”, Fidesz argued that correctional policies were necessary to reverse the negative 
trends which had resulted from the market liberalisation and the flawed privatisation of 
the 1990s, which favoured the old nomenclature and the left-wing journalistic elite. 
Fidesz adopted a definition of media responsibility in which the civil society should be 
represented according to parliamentary power relations. It argued that free competition 
among the various newspapers did not allow for this representation, and thus the power 
and presence of right-wing opinions needed to be strengthened. Fidesz also pointed to 
the constitution which stipulates that Hungary “promotes equality before the law by 
implementing measures that make up for the inequality of opportunity.”
As Istvdn Elek, media policy advisor to the prime minister, has put it “positive 
discrimination promoting the representation of right-wing values in the press is morally 
justified by the suppression of these values under socialism as well as their [negative] 
discrimination in the transformation years.” Further, Fidesz-Ieaning political theorists 
argued that all over the post-communist region, media power became concentrated in 
the hands of a small elite who negotiated the terms of transition between themselves, 
without participation from the society-at-large. (Pokol, 1995: 83). Pokol claimed that -  
with the help of selected financial groups -  the leftist media have developed a media
23 Nepszabadsdg, September 28, 1998
24 Magyar Hirtap, December 14, 1998
25 According to Fidesz leader Laszlo Kover, the leftist/ liberal media had a 9:1 majority against the 
conservative press when Fidesz took power.
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supremacy -  or in other words, a powerful and uncontrollable estate. (1999: 7) He 
argued that through monopolising communication and thought patterns, media elites 
came to dominate the policy sphere. He lists the following reasons that played an 
imperative role in the evolution of this media supremacy:
(a) the centralized structure of the mass media (all national newspapers and 
broadcast outlets are in the capital, leading to a system where nationwide 
political public opinion is predominantly created in the capital);
(b) the central place of the mass media and of intellectuals in the run-up to the 
system-change, as opposed to the importance of the masses in countries like the 
GDR, Czechoslovakia and Romania;
(c) the mass media’s potential to influence political party structures and internal 
party politics (both in the case of favoured and disliked party formations);
(d) the political homogeneity of the mass media (most of the media adheres to a 
liberal value system, and more particularly to the social-liberal fraction within 
the party of intellectuals, the Alliance of Free Democrats);
(e) the media’s excessive potential in influencing political preferences in a country 
where the number of undecided voters is high, and stable political preferences 
are rare;
(f) the mass media’s monopoly on forming public opinion, in view of the low 
political participation by citizens at live political events.26
Arising from this logic, the Fidesz government introduced the concept of “loyal 
journalism.” According to this theory, the entire media system should be subordinated 
to the government in office on the grounds that a majority vote equals the government’s 
empowerment to represent the society in both the political process and the mediated 
communication space. One right-wing journalist argued that the government is “entitled 
to limit the power of the press (which power is not derived from general elections), and 
to create opportunities to have its voice heard and get the public know its policies and 
objectives (through the public service media). The loyal journalist accepts this principle 
and meets the function of gatekeeper while keeping an eye on the government’s 
interests; he or she reports on events from the government’s perspective, and protects 
the government’s position.”27
Fidesz resorted to a wide array of economic and legal methods to create the 
desired balance, which I will first detail objectively, with the sole purpose of providing 
the facts. Economic ways included the selective dismantling o f the existing state- 
supported media portfolio, the redirection of state-sponsored advertising from the 
largest circulation newspapers to government-leaning outlets, while legal means varied 
from attempts to criminalize defamation laws to screening journalists.
I. Economic means
The first controversial event was the handling of the bankrupt 
PostaBank’s media empire which had provided badly needed funding for a
26 Pokol (1995: 32) This essay was originally published in July 1994.
27 Varga, D. Gy.: The last always come first. The metamorphosis of the Hungarian media [Elsokbol 
lesznek az utolsok] 2001, pp. 205
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number of niche publications. When in 1998 it became clear that the portfolio 
needed to be sold, as the state could no longer afford to finance it, Fidesz chose a 
selective strategy. While the government decided to put up most papers for sale, 
the loss-making Magyar Nemzet28 was kept in state hands on the grounds that it 
is a “national treasure“28 9 and is “part of the common cultural heritage”.30 At the 
same time, the government froze funds for all “leftist-liberal” magazines, 
without putting them up for privatisation.31 As a result, the critical Kurir was 
closed down, while the liberal Magyar Narancs had to restart publication under 
a different name. While the bank’s media portfolio managers cited financial 
reasons for the clean-up, many in the journalistic community, including leading 
figures, were convinced it was clearly a political decision to cut funding to these 
two papers.32
Fidesz wanted to make Magyar Nemzet an equal competitor to the 
country’s largest circulation daily, Nepszabadsag, and restore the paper’s 1990 
glory when it had a circulation of 200,000. In an attempt to clear the potential 
competition, the government merged the paper with the MDF-founded -  but 
since then reshaped and renamed -  right-wing daily Napi Magyarorszdg under 
the name Magyar Nemzet,33 and added a popular sports paper as its supplement. 
As a result of significant financial assistance from the Fidesz-led conservative 
government, the paper managed to reduce its subscription price below market 
rates, and its circulation grew to a record 100,000 by 2002, nearly half the 
combined readership (267,000) of the three other dailies.
The government also launched a weekly entitled Heti Valasz (Weekly 
Response)34 using taxpayer funds, and allocated support from the government- 
administered National Cultural Fund (which has been a low-profile state effort to 
fund filmmakers, writers and apolitical literary magazines from a pool of funds 
collected from newspapers on sales and advertising income) to the extreme 
right-wing, often anti-Semitic political weekly Magyar Demokrata (Hungarian 
Democrat).35 There were also reports about the channelling of secret funds to the 
Smallholder-leaning publication Kis Ujsdg from both the Ministry of Defence 
and the Ministry of Environment.36 In some cases, the government arranged for 
financial support extending beyond the tenure of the government.37
28 Magyar Nemzet was in foreign hands from 1990 but was making losses throughout its existence. In 
1994, the government consolidated the paper and bought it back. The paper remained in state hands 
throughout the MSZP-SZDSZ government’s tenure but kept its conservative orientation.
29 Heti Vildggazdasag, August 29, 1998
30 Political state secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office, Laszlo Bogar, quoted in Budapest Business 
Journal, October 26, 1998
31 Many argued that this decision made little financial sense as PostaBank could have reduced its losses 
through selling these papers.
32 Budapest Business Journal, October 5» 1998, Magyar Narancs, October 8, 1998
33 The move was even criticised by Fidesz ally MDF which said the government was eliminating MDF’s 
channel to the public. Source: Budapest Business Journal, March 6,2000
34 Magyar Narancs, 2000, October 19; Elet es Irodalom, 2000, October 27
35 Nepszabadsag, 2000, October 30
36 Nepszava, 2000, November 23 and 30
37 Nagyvildg, a literary periodical publishing the works of senior government officers and advisors, was 
granted aid totalling HUF 110 million (USD 400,000) over a period of six years from the resources of the 
Ministry of National Cultural Heritage. Source: Magyar Narancs, September 23,1999
In 1998, the government also attempted to eliminate the liberal Magyar 
Hirlap, the newspaper associated with Fidesz’ greatest political ally, the 
Alliance of Free Democrats, through purchasing it from its Swiss owner Jürg 
Marquard. According to insider information, the government was going to 
immediately close down the liberal paper by merging it with conservative 
papers.38 Liberal intellectuals, as well as media elites and representative 
organisations, strongly criticised the government’s such efforts, and Marquard, 
who did not agree with Fidesz’ interventionist policies, rejected the business 
offer.
Beyond direct state funds for loyal newspapers, the government also 
redirected all advertising from state-controlled companies and government 
institutions to the low-circulation right wing press.39 The practice went against 
market sense and was widely considered a political move, criticised even by 
foreign media owners.40 Despite the fact that print media outlets were to pay 
0,5% of their profits to the National Cultural Fund, the Fidesz-government 
considered introducing a temporary tax on successful newspapers to support 
rival publications with dwindling circulation and advertisement revenue, arguing 
that the entire advertising market had been formed under political pressure.41 
Also, in order to help the papers publish information-rich content, government 
politicians consolidated the admitted practice of tipping off the conservative 
press on government news.42 Senior politicians from the coalition parties 
ensured that the bulk of information on public matters was reserved exclusively 
for these loyal outlets.
2. Legal methods
In order to maximize the results of the media equilibrium policy, the 
government attempted to extend interventionism to the legal domain. Taking 
advantage of the fact that Western right to reply principles usually do not enter 
into details regarding their applicability (i.e. details about whether they cover 
fact-based news items, opinion items, or other types of media mentions), a 1999 
a proposal nicknamed Lex Pokol would have provided those offended by either 
news or opinion articles expressing “socially detrimental opinions” with a right 
to reply through the same media outlet. Fidesz was initially reluctant to support 
the suggestion by the media theorist of its coalition partner, the Independent 
Smallholders Party, but came to endorse the version according to which “any 
negative opinion, evaluation or judgement” should be followed by an 
opportunity to respond.43 In September 2000, another bill would have
38 Juhasz, G.: The market of Hungarian quality daily newspapers, Mediakutatd, 2003 spring
39 Budapest Business Journal* December 7, 1998, and “Advertisers in daily newspapers 1998-2002. 
Money that makes politics. I-II.” Survey commissioned by Fidesz, conducted by Fidesz firm, VdlaszOK 
Media Consulting, 2003. Available at www.fidesz.hu
40 See for instance an interview with Jiirg Marquard, Magyar Hirlap* December 16, 1998
41 Budapest Business Journal, December 14, 1998
42 Budapest Business Journal* December 7,1998
43 Magyar Hirlap, October 23, 1998
criminalized defamation with a prison sentence.44 As a result of societal pressure 
and parliamentary opposition, however, the government did not manage to pass 
these bills.
Yet, in May 2001, the government did manage to push Lex Repassy 
through the Parliament, which would give those whose “private rights are 
offended” by an “opinion” article the right to reply in the same media. 
Publications transgressing the law would have been required to pay a penalty, of 
an unspecified amount, to the state. After protests from the opposition and 
journalists associations, and the direct intervention of the president, the 
Constitutional Court declared the law unconstitutional45 and it was never 
implemented. Severely criticised by local and foreign advocacy groups, the 
ruling avoided addressing the core problem with the bill, and thus kept a slot for 
a slightly modified version o f the law to be passed in future.
In May 2000, the government also pushed through an amendment to the 
law, extending lustration to leading journalists and editors of the print press, the 
public, and the private media, as well as on-line magazines.46 This was widely 
seen as a direct attack on the journalistic community, not necessarily due to the 
possible findings, but because it was sending a critical message about the 
journalistic community that they were unreliable and unprofessional servants of 
a corrupt state.
The government also used journalist intimidation as a method to 
pressurize the leftist media. Magyar Nemzet ran an article listing the names and 
publications of foreign journalists accusing them of “worsening the country’s 
international image through biased, negative reporting.”47
Not surprisingly, these interventionist policies generated a wave of counter­
arguments on the libertarian side. Vasarhelyi argued that the strategy interferes with the 
self-controlling, self-correcting mechanisms of the market, and ultimately translates to 
the restriction of critical voices against the government.48 She also said that such 
interference makes a “mockery o f journalism” and that Fidesz purposefully blurred the 
dividing lines between party and societal interest. Others suggested49 that in order to 
create a balance in the media, the government’s task is to eliminate all types of state 
intervention, while only the non-political cultural press should be supported. Haraszti 
compared Fidesz’ right to reply efforts to the communist media policy, where 
authorities obligated editors to run something that is against their taste. “By obligating
44 This bill said that “those who [...] publicly spread unreal facts or real facts in an unrealistic way that 
may provoke worry or disorder among a great number of people, commit a crime and are punishable with 
up to three years of imprisonment.” ¡68 Ora, December 7, 2000
45 Interestingly, the court’s only problem with the law was that the extent of the reply and the fine were 
not defined.
46 The modification was initiated by Laszlo Csucs, a senior politician of the Independent Smallholders 
Party (FKgP), and vice-president of Hungarian Radio during the media war of the early 1990s. Source: 
Nepszava, May 25, 2000
47 Magyar Nemzet, January 9, 2002
43 Elet es Irodalom, December 18, 1998
49 E.g. the 1994 election manifesto of the Alliance o f Free Democrats (SZDSZ)
64
the individual media outlets to act in a pluralistic manner, they eliminate the 
independence of editors and thus the very idea of pluralism,” he wrote.50
Libertarian media elites stressed that serving the government or working for 
state-supported media is the unnatural situation within the media, and all media outlets 
should be critical of all governments at all times.51 Meanwhile, several protest 
movements emerged in response to the government’s media policy, including one street 
demonstration in the spring of 2000 involving 15,000 people. In addition, international 
journalists’ organizations and representatives of the US and European Union 
governments voiced their concern about Hungary’s democratic regression. Hundreds of 
newspaper articles and dozens of caricatures were published on the subject. j
2 .3 . A n a l y s is  o f  t h e  “ M e d ia  E q u il ib r iu m ”  P o l ic y
Let us now briefly analyse the Fidesz strategy point by point. First of all, while i
Fidesz was right in criticizing the classical liberal view that the market will regulate j
itself justly, it failed at placing its policy in a more systemic, perhaps even theoretical 
framework. Given that it defined the media as an institution which should represent !
society as it appears in the last election results, Fidesz’ strategy promoted a lj
development assistance model for the entire media system. In the print segment, the ;
necessity of Fidesz’ correctional policies could be considered justified given that the 1
redistribution of media power after the 1989 system-change favoured the mostly left- 
wing, system-changing elites, and these media outlets never managed to divorce 
themselves entirely from political parties. However, the implementation strategy and the 
argumentation put forward to support these policies were rather flawed, rendering most 
supporting arguments redundant. j|  i
To counter the impression that Fidesz considers Hungary a “developing” country I
which needs a state-assisted media system (much as in the development assistance 
model), Fidesz used selected existing Western European examples of direct subsidies as !
comparisons, to generate support for its policy. The government mentioned the j
Scandinavian and French systems of print media subsidies, where the state grants |
support to low circulation newspapers, as examples to follow. However, these i
references were not compatible with Fidesz’ problématisation of the state of the 
Hungarian media system. The mentioned Scandinavian and French funds are not j
allocated on a political basis, and do not aim to fill the gap to improve the representation j j
o f certain mainstream political ideas. The function of direct state intervention in these I !
countries is to give a voice to marginal views such as environmentalists, feminists j
groups, as well as to ethnic and religious communities. These two countries are part of a j j
larger group within Europe (also including Belgium, Netherlands and Austria) which 
have set up press funds to support the local media, in an effort to prevent the ! \
establishment of local monopolies and fight concentration trends.52 j
50 Népszabadsàg, September 21, 1998
51 Interview with Àkos Mester, editor of 168 Óra, Magyar Hirlap, May 22, 1999
52 It is common that if regional markets cannot sustain more than one newspaper, a second title would be 
subsidized by the state, regardless of its political orientation.
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As a result of such measures, there is no indication in these countries that the 
supported media have become less critical of their reporting on the government,53 and 
where well administered (e.g. Scandinavian countries), the subsidies have significantly 
contributed to policy sphere participation. These redistribution mechanisms were not 
designed to provide equal opportunities for views that are already represented in 
political institutions, but rather to bring about a plurality o f opinion regarding all 
matters of public interest, including those that are so marginal that might not even be 
taken up by political organisations. Therefore, the raison d ’être and application 
mechanism of state subsidies is entirely different from the Hungarian case. It is also 
worth pointing out that Fidesz carefully avoided mentioning the problems which plague 
selected Western systems of print media subsidies.54
As mentioned previously, vocal supporters of the state intervention policy argue 
that the 1989 “communist-liberal consensus” gave undeserved advantage to the leftist 
groups in the media, and directly connected media structures to those elites. They claim 
that when the reforming elites divided up business interests, they also created support 
structures for the media, which can be identified through both financial connections and 
informal ties which are undetectable for the average reader.55 They usually point to the 
overwhelming private advertising which supports leftist media due to the allegedly 
intertwined political and business interests, and allege that these are managed by media 
elites who were helped into power positions by politicians at the outset of the system- 
change, and who promised long-term loyalty for the political parties. According to 
figures cited by Gâlik, non-transparent political party spending was an estimated 8-10% 
of the overall market in 2002,56 which is an important part of the overall market but it 
does not support the case of dominant financial links between political parties and the 
news media. Also, this estimate includes all main political parties (including Fidesz of 
course) which does reduce the share of the “leftist-liberal” media.
All in all, Fidesz seems to have missed the opportunity to present its case in a 
more conceptually sound manner, and to discuss the problems o f media reform in a new 
light, in which the responsibilities of the different segments are conceptualised 
differently, and as a result, their respective problems are addressed in different ways. 
Their arguments do have merit, but the cause seems to have been twisted to create a 
platform for self-victimisation, which conveniently suits the long-term interest of Fidesz 
as a political entity. The media equilibrium debate was complicated by the fact that 
from early 1990s, the libertarian argument seems to have dominated the discussion on 
press ownership, which seems to have made it difficult to even theoretically consider 
the potentially constructive effects of open political parallelism in the print segment.
By 2000, the idea that right-wing political ideas are underrepresented became 
shared by many intellectuals and journalists who are traditionally left-wing voters. It is 
now accepted as a fact that while right-wing groups have lacked the financial means to
53 De Bens, E. & Ostbye, H.: The European newspaper market, in McQuail & Siune (1998), Chapter II, 
section: “Subsidizing the press”
54 For a detailed discussion, see Media Subsidies, 1999, a publication by Article 19 (www.anicle 19.org)
55 This has been confirmed in the author’s interview with Tamas Kocsis, Deputy Head of Hungarian State 
Treasure (Fidesz), 2004
56 Galik, M.: Hungary chapter, in “Media Markets in Southeast Europe and EU Accession Countries: 
Mapping Patterns of Media Ownership and Their Effects on Media Freedom and Pluralism,” research by 
www.seenpm.org
m
66
invest in the media market, interest groups with communist/ socialist ties have retained 
economic involvement in the press, and grew to dominate it through their influence.57 58
This is further confirmed by every (although very rarely occurring) sensitive case, when 
Népszabadsdg violates its independent pledge by adjusting its editorial policy in order 
to directly support the Socialist party or party-leaning business interests. However, the 
Fidesz argument that Magyar Hirlap, Népszabadsdg and independent weeklies (like 
HVG  and Figyelo) all permanently and directly serve the interest of the leftist political, 
intellectual and business circles remains an unjustified line of reasoning.
Fidesz has accused the print segment of a “strong political parallelism” but 
failed to provide hard evidence to prove it. In fact, the claim is easy to disprove. First of 
all, the Socialist and Free Democrat political partnership is more a “marriage of 
convenience” than a solid ideological alliance. The two parties have starkly different 
support bases in society, and as various political elite studies have shown, their 
representatives come from different reformist circles -  late-Kadarian technocrats in case 
o f the Socialists, and the democratic intellectual opposition in case of SZDSZ (Szalai, 
1998: 20-37). Also, their political platforms have little in common. True, the two 
parties’ former or current supporters do dominate the economic and cultural spheres, but 
at the same time, the parties do not have overlapping business or ideological interests, a 
solid internal unity, or even the organisational prowess or structures, (Lakner, 2003) 
which would allow them to run a systematic, institutionalised media empire, as Fidesz 
alleges.
Secondly, only a small portion of private advertising is controlled by business 
groups which are connected to the Socialists, while most of them are either independent 
multinationals59 or belong to various companies which conduct lobbying operations 
with all incumbent governments -  rendering the argument that these papers are financed 
through business empires weak. And last but not least, the editorials in Népszabadsdg 
and Magyar Hirlap do have a marked political stance in opinion columns, but overall, 
the papers strive to provide objective coverage of events, and are critical of every 
political establishment.
The political affiliation claim can also be destroyed by a random analysis of the 
overall newspaper output. A study of the three main national dailies shows that while 
Magyar Nemzet largely refrained from criticising the government during Fidesz’s 
governance, both Népszabadsdg and Magyar Hirlap allocated space to a wide variety of 
news articles and opinions, including ones that are critical of the government. During 
the Socialist-Liberal government’s tenure (2002-), 8% of the coverage of domestic 
politics presented the views of the opposition, or was outright critical in Népszabadsdg, 
while 12% in Magyar Hirlap. Meanwhile, Magyar Nemzet would publish as little as 1% 
negative content regarding the Fidesz government between 1998 and 2002.60
57 Cseh, G. & Hnyedi Nagy, M. & Soltenszky, T. (eds.) (1998): MediaBook Hungary, (MediaKonyv), pp. 
501
58 See for instance the coverage of the Teller Ede-letter story in 2003.
59 The largest chunk of Nepszabadsdg's ad revenue is from multinational companies, and only 10% 
originates from state administration and state-controlled companies. Source: Budapest Business Journal, 
December?, 1998
60 These figures are a result of a random analysis conducted for the months of October 1999, March 2001, 
October 2002, March 2003 in the Library of the Hungarian Parliament. Only articles in the “Opinion” and
67
Also indicative is the fact that while there is no legal requirement to provide 
balanced coverage during elections, to varying degrees, both Népszabadsag and Magyar 
Hirlap do. Election surveys by OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR) confirm this -  while these two papers were relatively balanced in the 
last two elections, Magyar Nemzet was found clearly biased toward Fidesz both times.61 
Also, while Magyar Nemzet dedicates its entire space to articles serving the Fidesz 
government’s needs, few articles in the other papers put a political spin on articles, 
providing a more balanced overall information service to readers. The relative 
independence of these papers, but especially Népszabadsag, is also underlined by its 
success with undecided and floating voters. All in all, it seems that while “partial 
political parallelism” (in which the ideological partnership is more dominant than the 
financial) could be a more appropriate way to describe the relationship between these 
papers and the political system, the temptation to merge these two concepts is real, and 
partisan newspapers can be extremely vulnerable to criticism.
While there is little factual evidence that would suggest that the print landscape 
was “divided up” between political parties, Fidesz defined Hungarian society solely 
according to supposed allegiances to political parties. Its theorists drew up societal 
profiles particularly in the framework of the two biggest parties, and assumed a 
permanent, and deep societal division along political lines. This way Fidesz was 
promoting a political party system development which was going toward a majoritarian 
political system, in which only two parties compete. This was unjustified in 1998 as 
Hungarian voters were not committed voters, party allegiances were weak, while strong 
political beliefs and identifications were random. There were constant changes in 
political party platforms, and the many ad hoc alliances provided little limited 
permanence in the ideology that post-communist parties represented. In light of this, we 
can assume that the interventionist policies were not created to further the public 
interest. Instead, the media equilibrium policy seems to have been designed exclusively 
to advance Fidesz party interests -  it has been a foundation o f Fidesz’ self-conserving 
solution through the difficult process of party systems formation and consolidation.
Another problem was that Fidesz failed to explain its position in positive terms. 
Fidesz based the whole strategy on a negative campaign, attacking the “leftist-liberal” 
press for manipulating society and failing to provide balanced reporting. It applied a 
harshly negative, inquisitive and often very colloquial political communication style, 
which appealed only to a very limited group, prone to radicalisation. In an attempt to 
demonise the leftist media, Fidesz politicians used the terms “liar”, “incompetent”, 
“cooperative with criminals”, “serving the interest of liberals”, “the interest of Jews”, 
“foreigners”, “communists”, “foreign capital” , or various combinations of these.62 They
"Domestic politics” sections were reviewed, and were analysed according to OSCE media monitoring 
methodology.
61 Nepszava was also found to be supporting the Socialist party in 2002. Source: Final reports by ODIHR, 
1998 and 2002
62 While these had been alleged by radical right-wing leaders throughout the 1990s, the views were 
endorsed by moderate politicians as well. President o f Fidesz-MPP Laszlo Kover argued that the leftist 
media was still under the influence of “old Bolshevik editors”. According to Smallholder leader Jozsef 
Torgyan journalists used “the methods of Goebbels* propaganda” while investigating his swelling wealth. 
Interior Minister Sandor Pinter was quoted as saying that the media and organized crime “were likely to 
have close connections”. When asked to detail his suspicions, he refused to give concrete examples.
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have denounced the whole institution of the media as one that lacks objectivity and one 
that does not serve the public interest. They also successfully implanted positive 
identification through the overwhelming use of the word “polgâr” (citoyen) which, in 
their definition, embraced Fidesz voters only, excluding all others.
While Fidesz identified many of the unique problems of the Hungarian media 
démocratisation process correctly, it failed to come up with a solution which would 
make the overall media system more independent of politics. Fidesz’ handling of the 
“leftist-liberal threat” only made it a self-fulfilling prophecy. The policy mobilised 
much of the journalistic community, civil society, the socialist and liberal opposition 
against the government’s efforts. These groups, as well as the readers of critical 
newspapers, were all brought to a common platform in contesting the policy. Also, 
Fidesz’ arrogant problem-solving technique, based on attacking these intellectuals and 
journalists, practically made it impossible to have a civilised debate about the shared 
concerns regarding media freedom in Hungary.63
Also, as a result of the radicalisation of political communication patterns, both 
the Hungarian society and the media became increasingly politicised. After four years in 
governance, Fidesz’ attempts at creating a right-wing media empire (including dailies, 
weeklies, a radio and a news television station) re-strengthened political ties between 
political elites and the media on both sides, and thus have consolidated the societal 
perception that all major politically influential media outlets are manipulated due to 
their subordination to political party interests.64 This argument is supported by trends in 
advertising markets, according to which private businesses have purposefully avoided 
Fidesz’ media empire despite its growing readership and audience figures.65
All in all, many of these policies have been reminiscent of authoritarian 
interventions aimed at countering press freedom, rather than policies assisting the media 
démocratisation process. While some ideas resembling the development assistance 
model are justified, the idea of “loyal journalism” sounds like it has been lifted from the 
outdated Soviet, or authoritarian theories of the press. The concept suggests that some 
elements of the government’s policy are beyond public scrutiny, and that the media 
should not act as government watchdogs. In other words, it implies that the boundaries 
of the policy sphere should be designated by the government. It is also problematic 
because it suggests that citizens should be passive observers and not active participants 
in the overall democratic transition process. Fidesz was aiming to create an “enabling 
environment” for itself, as a political party, which -  under the given conditions -  only 
would have been accepted if the party built its media empire from its own financial 
resources.
Meanwhile, Laszlo Kovir stated publicly that the mafia was supported by some “media stars”. Sources: 
Various newspaper articles, August-November 2000
63 For example, Fidesz has entirely confused the term liberal -  by accusing the leftist-liberal press of 
being supportive of its political rivals, it eliminated the original meaning of liberal i.e. a media outlet 
which prints a pluralism of views (representing various minorities, interest groups as well as political 
parties), with the exception of extreme views.
64 According to an independent survey, 50% of Hungarians do not trust journalists. Source: Readers and 
television audiences on the Hungarian media, Nepszabadsdg, October 3,2001
65 “Advertisers in daily newspapers 1998-2002. Money that makes politics. I-II.” Survey commissioned 
by Fidesz, conducted by Fidesz firm, ValaszOK Media Consulting. Available at www.fidesz.hu
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Lost in an aggressive yet idle debate about who does and who does not have 
media representation, the Hungarian governments (irrespective of their make-up) have 
failed to pay attention to media démocratisation policy options which have proved to be 
working in Western Europe. First, they could have followed the examples of apolitical 
Western initiatives such as press funds, or indirect, universal subsidies such as low 
postal and telecommunications rates, interest-free loans and a reduction o f or an 
exemption from VAT. These subsidies have been widely approved because all 
newspapers are involved, therefore they do not have a preferential feature. Instead, in 
2004, the Socialist-dominated government raised the 12% VAT on print media to 15%, 
going against the EU ’s proposal and current practice. (The EU proposal was to lower it 
to 6%, while in 11 EU countries the VAT rate is between 0 and 4%.)
At the same time, no government found it important to fight the negative 
consequences o f market concentration. By 2001, all of the leading titles in both national 
and regional newspapers66 were owned by five foreign investor groups, creating a high 
degree of concentration -  so much so that Hungarian competitors have proved unable to 
introduce a sustainable second title in some regions. Looking at market concentration, 
based on circulation figures, it is obvious that the level of concentration is very high 
both in the sub-markets and in national aggregate.67
Overall, it can be concluded from this section that the governments have 
sporadically realised that there is a problem with print media development but have not 
managed to turn the lingering political pressure into a transparent and constructive 
element of print media properties. Having studied the spending priorities of various 
governments, it can be stated with determination that the reasons for this are rather 
political. The problems which emerged on the surface -  such as the failure to arrive at a 
consensus regarding the definition o f the public interest, and the media’s central 
function etc. -  seem  to have been based on a more systemic problem i.e. the fact there 
was no discussion on the ideal overall structure of the media system, the possible 
distribution of roles and functions between various segments. The initiated discussions 
on a possible “transitional model” were not fruitful, as the libertarian position on full 
independence from  politics made this almost impossible. The pressure on the print 
media resulted in obvious ramifications for the broadcast sector, where the situation 
became even worse.
2 .4 . D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  B r o a d c a s t  M e d i a  P o l ic y
It has been argued that media laws are “analogous to mini-constitutions” for they 
reflect the state o f  play in the political power struggle as well as the “birth pains” o f a 
new governing system.68 This has been particularly true in Hungary as the establishment 
of the foundations o f a democratic media policy has proved drawn-out and particularly
66 The regional titles once edited by the local party offices preserved their leading positions. Some of 
them were sold to foreign investors in the aforementioned privatisation process. The rest were sold in the 
second half of 1990 via open tenders. Even though the second round was a more regulated process, it did 
not reverse the ownership trends and let to a domination of foreign investors on this market as well (over 
70%).
67 Gdlik, Mihaly & Bayer, Jozsef: Building Markets in Newspaper and Magazine Publishing in Hungary 
in the 1990s: the Case o f Axel Springer-Budapest Ltd. and Axel Springer-Magyarorszag Ltd.
68 Jakubowicz, K.: Media legislation as a mirror of democracy, Transition, October 18, 1996
70
contentious. Given the broadcast segment’s crucial impact on the governments’ field o f 
manoeuvre, broadcast media reforms were initially even more problematic than that o f 
the print media, and it took Hungary six years to arrive at a broadcast media law.
The delay in passing the media law meant that the communist structures o f 
broadcasting remained intact for several years after the system-change. According to 
these, the national broadcasting system consisted of two overstaffed and inefficient 
television and three radio channels, all financed through the state budget. In 1990, the 
president-appointed new chairmen -  Elemer Hankiss and Csaba Gombar -  initiated 
profound changes in the internal structure of the organisations. In television, as part o f a 
process of decentralization, the old, highly stratified and centralized programming and 
production structure was replaced by autonomous production units, and the system o f 
“in-house only” production was replaced by a system of commissioned production, 
involving a high number of independent companies.
The new chairmen, both apolitical intellectuals, began major reorganisation and 
wanted to create a politically independent public service broadcaster. Their efforts to 
create objective, professional organisations were supported by the leftist-liberal parties 
which shared the view that these steps are prerogatives for the creation of broadcasters 
which serve the public interest through the principles of the social democratic media 
model. However, right-wing government elites wanted to see a “political cleanup” in the 
state institutions, and considered the reforms “too autonomous”, and incompatible with 
the government’s ideology. The MDF government held a strong line on television at 
this point, arguing that the PSB should represent the views held by the elected 
government. Due to the uncertain political conditions and the promise by the Parliament 
for an imminent media law, the presidents considered their positions temporary and thus 
did not begin a reorganisation of staff69 -  a move which was seen by the right wing as 
an attempt to consolidate power by the “leftist-liberal elements” within the PSB.
As a result, just like in the print media, MDF argued that a “liberal conspiracy” 
had begun in the PSBs, and the new chairmen were not doing enough to “preserve 
democratic values and national culture”. Soon enough, the dispute manifested in the 
incompatible styles of political communication -  with the media promoting a 
rationalist-European discourse, and the conservative elites wishing to dominate the 
discursive space with a nationalist-populist and religious discourse.70 (Among others, 
some more radical MDF officials advocated that the community feeling should be 
strengthened by the exclusion of certain social groups.) Following the system-change, 
Hungarian political parties attracted few new party members71 -  a development which 
conditioned their existence even stronger on the media. MDF considered that a 
mediated platform would be essential for it to form a solid supporter base.
The government was unwilling to give up the comfortable, manual direction o f 
the PSBs, and proclaimed war on the “conspiratory liberals” primarily by attacking 
them for their lack of “national, Christian spirit.” In 1992, Prime Minister Jdzsef Antall 
tried to remove the chairmen, but his efforts were foiled by the veto of the President of
69 Beszelo, 2000 February
70 Agh (1992b: 7)
71 Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) 37,000; Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) 25,000; Alliance o f 
Free Democrats (SZDSZ) 32,000; Independent Smallholders Party (FKGP) 60,000; Fidesz-Hungarian 
Civic Party 15,000; Christian Democratic Party 27.000. Data from 1996.
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the Republic. To counter the reform measures of the chairmen, Antall later appointed 
vice chairmen to the PSBs, reclassified the PSBs from “independent” to “budgetary” 
institutions, and withdrew significant amounts of committed financing. The government 
even launched a parliamentary inquiry against the two men -  Hankiss was accused of 
financial mismanagement, but there was no evidence to prove the government’s 
allegations. The political tug-of-war quickly entered the collective conscience known as 
the “media war”, and by others as a modem-day “Kulturkampf.”72
Initially, the opposition Free Democrats campaigned along libertarian lines, 
arguing for minimised state involvement (i.e. one public channel only), in an attempt to 
decrease financial and thus political dependence on the government. However, most 
other parties in Parliament wanted to see a more ambitious state broadcaster, one that 
matches Hungary’s presumed political and economic weight in the region. The main 
conflict among political elites revolved around the assignment of the ultimate authority 
to control the budget, and to appoint PSB directors as well as members of the 
supervisory board. The MDF-govemment saw the public service media mandated to 
support the government and its guiding philosophy. In the opposition’s view, the public 
interest could only be served properly if all six parliamentary parties have a say in the 
choice of management. (In fact, it was this political definition of the public interest, and 
“politics-neutral constructivism” which later caused the failure of the media law.)
Instead o f giving in to opposition demands, the government made matters worse 
by establishing a new television station -  the satellite Duna television. Duna was 
communicated as “the answer to the Hungarian minority question” i.e. a channel that 
would serve as the common voice for the “ 15 million Hungarians” around the world. 
Watched mainly by the 3-million-strong minority community across the borders, the 
channel became a mouthpiece for conservative ideology, and added to the financial 
chaos that public service broadcasting was already in. The debate over media freedom 
spilled onto the streets. In September 1992, 15,000 pro-government supporters 
demanded Hankiss’ resignation while a counter- demonstration of 60,000 people 
expressed solidarity. After repealing the 1974 resolution on government control of 
Hungarian Radio and Television, the Constitutional Court in June 1992 instructed the 
government to pass legislation on the matter by 30 November of that year. However, in 
December 1992, the Parliament rejected the first draft media law due to disagreements 
over how to ensure the media’s independence from politics, and over the share of 
foreign investment in the broadcast media.
As a result, the presidents resigned in January 1993 -  sweeping the way for the 
government to stage-manage the PSB’s affairs through daily political interference, 
financial blackmail, the long-desired purges, as well as the intimidation of journalists 
and editors. The interventionism generated bitter conceptual and legal debates about the 
media within Parliament, spilling even more over to the journalistic community and the 
society-at-large. The government assumed that -  despite the controversies -  the 
interference with the media was helping to strengthen their support base. But it 
generated just the opposite effects. The MDF era has gone into the history books as the 
most troubled period of the post-communist media war in Hungary -  leading to a fall in 
MDF’s popularity, and the government’s eventual defeat in 1994.
72 The first two years o f this “media war” are documented in detail by Hankiss (1994).
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The new Socialist-liberal government pledged to deliver a media bill as soon as 
possible, and thereby put an end to the Parliament’s permanent violation of the 
Constitutional Court ruling. However, it first used this vacuum to purge the PSBs from 
the right-wing editors and journalists,73 and appointed new presidents. It also launched a 
major reorganisation of the institutions without seeking the opinion of the opposition. 
The policy of the leftist-liberal government which behaved as the watchdog of the 
emerging democracy in the previous four years, was similarly as self-serving and 
interventionist as that of the conservative government.
By 1995, the most important factor leading to agreement on the new bill was 
probably that the drawn-out media war started to have a negative impact on all political 
parties, and it was widely recognised that it was better to have an imperfect law than 
continue in a legislative vacuum. After 16 months of debate and over 800 modification 
suggestions to the draft, the six parliamentary parties finally arrived at a consensus in 
late 1995. The Law On Television and Radio tried to satisfy the demands of all the 
parties, and drew initial praise from all sides. Entering into force in 1996, it provided for 
the liberalisation of the national broadcast market, and thus lifted the government’s 
monopoly off news production and dissemination. Given its length and attention to 
detail, it turned out to be the longest, and one of the most comprehensive in the post­
communist region.74 The law provided elaborate rules about the functioning of the 
broadcast market and created a regulatory authority (ORTT), which had an independent 
status (although was appointed by parliamentary parties). It banned the establishment of 
broadcast outlets which would “support a political party or movement, or its views”. It 
also stipulated that in their news or information programmes, broadcast journalists 
“cannot attach opinions or personal assessments to news of political nature, except for 
news assessment.”75
However, it soon emerged that the legislation had some major flaws. First of all, 
it created a public broadcasting system which was financially unviable76 for the 
condition of the state budget in 1996, which had been restricted under a difficult 
stabilisation programme. The media law drew up a “mixed funding system” of license 
fees, advertising and state aid. In theory, this was supposed to reduce the risk of 
dependence on one particular source, however, the size and ambition of the 
broadcasting operation kept the PSBs’ functioning entirely dependent on the Parliament 
and the government. In 1996, the overall PSB budget was HUF 53 billion (DEM 560 
million)77 but only one-tenth of this was stable state funding, the rest had to be secured 
through advertising and licence fees (approx. 34 euro/ year/ television set).
Both financially and technically, MTV was ill-prepared for the liberalisation of 
the broadcast market, and stood little chance at keeping its monopoly once the 
commercial channels began operation. Just as observers predicted, MTV lost most of its 
advertising revenues quickly after the commercial channels started up (in 1997), and at
73 These are documented among others by a report entitled “Cleansing the undesirables from public 
service television", issued by the Community of Hungarian Journalists. July, 1994
74 Nations in Transit, Freedom House publication, 1998
75 Law On Television and Radio, 1996
76 Finance Minister Lajos Bokros, Uj Magyarorszag, December 15, 1995
77 This compares to 10.9 billion DEM in Germany (ARD, ZDF), 4,4 billion DEM in the UK, 1.9 billion 
DEM in Austria, 1 billion DEM in Spain, and 665 DEM million in Poland. Source: Public service 
broadcasters around the world, survey by McKinsey 1999
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the same time, the funds collected through the licence fees were also plummeting due to 
the broadcaster’s low-quality output, and permanent politicisation. The debt-ridden 
broadcast institution was never consolidated financially78 and even after 1996, no 
comprehensive downsizing or rationalising o f operations was performed for years.
In addition, the law failed to offer a convincing conceptualisation of “public 
service” ,79 and thus did not cater for a democratic system of governance and of 
delegation. It also disappointed when it came to new, clear rules of accountability, and 
left the PSBs’ financial survival dependent on the government. The law created three 
boards of trustees (one for the two national public television networks, one for Duna 
Television, and one for the national public radio), which were to be presided over by a 
presidium consisting of at least eight MPs. This not only provided direct representation 
for parliamentary political parties but also conserved the 1994-1998 parliamentary 
power-structure by stipulating that four board members must be delegated by the 
opposition, while four by the governing parties. This philosophy was rooted in the 
absurdity that there would be a quasi equality between government and opposition for 
decades to come.
The problem became apparent immediately after the 1998 elections when power 
relations no longer represented the 50%-50% breakdown, and the appointments of the 
boards became a bone of contention. Between 1998 and 2002, the Fidesz government 
only had a slight majority of seats (55%) in Parliament but its power was extended by 
an extreme right-wing party80 which voted with the government on crucial issues. As 
this party was de jure  in opposition it was supposed to share the four seats with the 
Socialist-liberal opposition parties. The three opposition parties could not agree on how 
to divide the four seats between each other and demanded a modification to the 
delegation rules. Supported by the Constitutional Court,81 the Fidesz-Ied government 
declined to support the amendment suggestions, and as a result, the boards functioned 
solely with government delegates82 for four years.83
The conflict prompted the Chief prosecutor84 to issue a position paper in which 
he challenged that Constitutional Court’s relevant ruling by saying that the boards were 
“illegal” and the government’s actions unlawful.85 According to him, the boards and the
78 MTV swallowed HUF 190 billion (Euro 724 million) of taxpayer money between 1998 and 2003 to 
keep it afloat. Source: Budapest Business Journal, June 24,2003
79 Adam Horvdth, a former head of Hungarian Television described the new situation as follows: “It is not 
only that this law does not deal with public service, but it is the presidents of the three PSBs that are 
entitled to define their own set of rules regarding public service for their own supervisory boards, in three 
different ways, with three varying contents.” Horvath, Ad3m: Supervisory boards and public service, 
J/VG, April 10,1999
80 This is the Hungarian Life and Justice Party, led by writer Istvdn Csurka. The party was often referred 
to as the extra-governmental government party at this time.
81 In 1999, the Constitutional Court handed down a fairly ambiguous ruling on the matter, interpreted as a 
victory by both sides. The Court found, among others, that the operation o f the four-member board was 
constitutional. (Constitutional Court Decision 22/1999 (VI. 30.) AB) It reasoned that Article 61.1 of the 
Constitution, which ensures free speech, guarantees a right to continuous public broadcasting, and the 
absence o f a board of trustees would impose an unconstitutional limit on that right.
82 The television board was incomplete between 1998 and 2002, while the radio and Duna television 
boards between 2000 and 2002.
83 A similar incident happened in Bulgaria when the former communists refused to participate in the vote.
84 The Chief prosecutor was Kalmdn Gyorgyi at the time.
85 Magyar Hirlap, 4 February, 2000
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National Radio and Television Body “can be formed exclusively from the candidates of 
one side, only if the other side fails to nominate candidates.” However, his advice was 
ignored by the governing parties for allegedly “lacking legal force”, which prompted the 
Chief Prosecutor to resign.86 The political impasse generated many critics,87 and raised 
a number of important questions regarding the very purpose of the PSBs, the concept of 
the public interest -  and ultimately who the PSBs are supposed to serve. Consensus was 
out of reach, and the scandals not only highlighted the over-politicisation of PSBs, but 
contributed to their demise.88
The delegation deadlock occurred in tandem with the PSBs’ continuing financial 
turmoil, and had repercussions on management decisions as the Fidesz government -  
following the previous two governments’ practice -  appointed its own trustees to key 
editorial positions.89 As the opposition tied its support to the resolution of the deadlock, 
the passage of some important, EU-required modifications to the media law had to be 
postponed (until 2002). The stalemate also generated a loss of prestige for the Fidesz 
government, as the crisis of the public service broadcasting received extensive 
international criticism, including from the EU Embassy in Hungary and the Office of 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. A harsh report by the International 
Federation of Journalists90 criticized the government’s undemocratic conduct, 
concluding among others, that the PSB “has been weakened to the point of destruction 
because of political manipulation and wilful neglect by authorities.” The IFJ even said 
that Hungary’s EU negotiations might be jeopardized and called on the European 
Commission as well as the Council of Europe to investigate the situation.91
Moving onto another central flaw of the media law, we have to mention the 
establishment of the politically-appointed National Radio and Television Body (ORTT), 
which assigns frequencies, supervises the operation of both public and commercial 
broadcasting stations (including monitoring changes in ownership structure, monitoring 
for compliance with licensing conditions, and setting fines), and allocates state funds to 
local and under-funded broadcasters. The political nature of this body extended the 
possibility of political interference to the commercial market as well. One often cited 
example is the very first case ORTT had i.e. the allocation of nation-wide television
86 Various newspapers, 6 March, 2000
87 Beyond domestic critics, both Peter Tufo, the US ambassador to Hungary, and Michael Lake, the EU 
ambassador to Hungary, expressed concern over these events, warning that Hungary’s reputation could be 
impaired if the government ignored the opposition’s demands. Prime Minister Viktor Orban dismissed 
their criticism, saying that “he would not take lessons” on the Hungarian Constitution from foreigners.
88 In 1999, an open letter entitled “For the honour of public service broadcasting” was published in 
Magyar Hirlap, on March 18,1999, signed by 55 leading television editors, and was addressed to the 
Ombudsman for data protection, the Ombudsman for civil rights, the State Audit Office, the Chief 
Prosecutor, the PSB boards, as well as the PSB supervisory authority.
89 Magyar Narancs, August 26, 1999 and September 23, 1999
90 Report entitled “Television on the Brink: the political and professional crisis of public broadcasting in 
Hungary” was released on March 26, 2001 and is available at www.ifj.org/publications.
91 As a counteract, the British Helsinki Human Rights Group (at www.bhhrg.orgk a London-based 
conservative NGO also published its report on Hungary, supporting the government’s policy, and arguing 
that state interference is justified as long as it is limited. What is intriguing about BHHRG’s intervention 
is that it reveals a deep rift even among advocacy groups regarding media policy issues. In this theses, 
IFJ’s efforts to understand the situation -  which has included talking to all involved parties and 
representatives organizations -  is considered more credible than BHHRG’s essay, which had been 
complied without references or sources.
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Ifrequencies in 1997. According to insider sources (e.g. Seres 2001: 149, Bajomi 2001: 
77) the Socialist party and Fidesz reached a secret pact regarding the winning 
commercial channels (TV2 and RTL Klub), thus excluding the liberal-leaning bidder, 
Iris Television.92 This deal violated not only market sense (as Iris’ bid was 50% higher 
than the bid of the other two) but also the frequency allocation procedure -  as the parties 
decided to ignore the fact that the existing media portfolio of RTL’s owner should have 
disqualified it from the competition.
After its humiliation, Iris acquired a share in the commercial satellite station, 
TV3 (reaching 40% of the population) and ran high-quality, distinctive programming. 
Iris’ majority owner, the American CME, successfully challenged the frequency 
allocation decision, and achieved a Supreme Court verdict, according to which ORTT 
should invalidate its contract with RTL.93 94However, the ruling was never enforced by 
ORTT, and as a final absurdity in this chain of events, TV3 was taken over by TV2 in 
1999 -  thereby eliminating a commercial competitor, and the threat that RTL might 
have to compete for its frequency with TV3. This move not only erased a significant 
private, public service provider from the market, but it made the political elites’ 
commitment to creating a responsible, and independent broadcast market questionable. 
As part of the consensus between political and media elites, RTL retained its licence (by 
possibly accepting future political pressure or calls of servitude), and the head of Iris 
was later appointed as a presenter at one of the state-run channels.
During Fidesz’ tenure, there were other policy sphere-related issues which made 
headlines. On several occasions, the government attempted to limit journalistic power 
through the manipulation of access to information laws. One of the first moves of the 
Fidesz government in 1998 was to lift existing regulations about recording the content 
of government sessions. It ruled that no written or audio-visual records would be made 
in the future, except a summary containing the names of participants and the agenda. In 
a well-publicized statement in July 1999, even Laszlo Majtenyi, the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, voiced concerns about 
this practice. Nevertheless, the government refused to revise its reporting practices. 
Also, more generally, journalists increasingly complained about the lack of adequate 
access to public information95 and about the growing number o f libel suits.
92 US Ambassador to Hungary, Mark Palmer, also accused the ORTT of corruption and cronyism, 
Nepszabadsdg, February 24,1999
93 Budapest Business Journal, March 1, 1999
94 According to Article 61 of the Hungarian Constitution, “everyone has the right to freely express his 
opinion and furthermore to access and distribute information of public interest.” The Civil Code provides 
for “protection of reputation" by granting a right of rectification to someone who is damaged by an untrue 
fact or by a true fact used in a distorted or negative light. The Criminal Code prohibits insulting 
statements. In 1994, the Constitutional Court ruled that Article 232 of the Criminal Code -  on libel -  is 
unconstitutional because the public’s right to criticise government officials or other politicians must be 
protected to a greater extent than its right to criticise private citizens. (Decision no. 36/1994, Article
VI.24.)
95 Article 19 of Act no. 63/1992 on the Protection of Personal Data and Disclosure of Data of Public 
Interest grants access to public information. The authorities must decide on whether to grant access within 
15 days of an application, and in the event of a rejection, they must notify the applicant of the reasons 
within eight days. The authorities may charge expenses to communicating data of public interest. 
Applicants may apply to the courts if an application is refused.
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Government politicians also often abused state secrecy laws96 by claiming that 
documents were classified even when they were not. Gallup’s research among 
journalists in 1999 found that, “too large a number of documents are classified” and 
that, “individual, business and state secrets are overprotected.” In addition, the law does 
not clearly state who is obliged to keep a secret, leading to difficulties in interpreting the 
law when, for example, a journalist prints a “secret” which was originally leaked by a 
government official. Several widely publicised cases confirm the seriousness of the 
problem.97 In addition, during the Fidesz-era, more cases of journalistic intimidation 
were publicised than normal.98 All of the above added to the tension within the media 
and political communities, and increased the number of Fidesz critics.
The media wars have impacted negatively on the quality of content in all 
television channels. The competitive advantage on cultural programming which the PSB 
has traditionally had through its archives and expertise, has been totally eliminated. 
Programming on the three PSB channels still contains 73,4% public service 
programming99 but because of the packaging of the programmes, and the politicisation 
of the stations, the stations attract only under 10% of the overall population, mainly the 
elderly. (This in itself is a very negative trend, especially given that the large majority of 
European Union PSBs are still market leaders in terms of audience share.100) The PSB 
has lost its most important audience throughout the years -  a well-educated societal 
segment, which consumes high culture and is most likely to actively participate in 
debates over matters of public concern.
In terms of its classification, the Hungarian public service broadcaster would 
today belong to the most disputed McKinsey category -  the second cluster, where 
market share is given more priority over distinctive programming. Although this trend is
96 The law provides for secrets to be classified as such through a procedure according to Act no. 65/1995 
on State Secrets and Official Secrets. The classifier can mark data as secret if it belongs to a list of 
categories contained in the annex of the Act and if the classifier can establish that publication (before the 
expiry of validity and unauthorised acquisition or use) would without doubt damage or jeopardise the 
interests of the Hungarian state.
97 One of these is the story of Ldszld Juszt, a prominent journalist, who in June 1999 was charged with 
revealing state secrets in his weekly newspaper, Krimindlis. The paper had published documents that 
disputed claims made by Fidesz that the previous government had engaged in illegal spying on Fidesz 
party members when the party was in opposition. The published documents contained information that 
there was no proof of such a claim. The outraged government sent the police to search the journalist’s 
home and office, had his computers confiscated and had him arrested for seven hours. The case appeared 
on the desks of the Budapest Chief Prosecutor, the Deputy Chief Prosecutor and even the Minister 
without Portfolio for Secret Services. The investigation dragged on for months and was finally closed 
down by the Chief Prosecutor who dropped the charges. (Source: Magyar Hirlap, February 5, 2000) The 
journalist however lost his contract with Hungarian television and saw his image tarnished.
98 For instance, a hand grenade exploded in the yard of a downtown building which houses the offices of 
the government-critical literary and political weekly Elet ¿s Irodalom. (Various newspapers, December 
28, 1999) The paper had carried a series of articles on the selling of a part of real estate by Fidesz when in 
opposition, and alleged that with the intervention of companies belonging to the party, some money found 
its way to the mining company owned by the father of Prime Minister Viktor Orb£n.
99 These figures represent 2001 averages for three public service stations (MTV1, MTV2, Duna) and two 
commercial channels (TV2, RTL). They have been calculated on the basis of a detailed ORTT survey 
regarding programme structure on Hungarian television, 2001
100 Only in Greece and Portugal is the PSB behind commercial channels -  in the fifth and second position 
respectively. Source: Picard, Robert G.: The audience economics of EU public service broadcasters. 
Assessing performance in competitive markets. Discussion paper, 2001, Turku School of Economics
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shared by countries like the Czech Republic and Poland, it is particularly regretful given 
the broadcaster’s previous focus on high-quality cultural and educational 
programming.101 102The dramatic change of direction suggests that political elites failed to 
recognise that the main indicator of success should not be the PSB’s audience share but 
its niche programming. Public service programming is also provided by commercial 
channels (28.7% of total programming),1 2 but its style is often on the verge of 
infotainment (or tabloid news), while distinctive programming is limited to less 
competitive, off-peak slots.103
The media law stipulates that all national broadcast stations have a legal 
obligation to be objective in their news programmes at all times, and that they cannot 
serve political party interests. (The law fails to provide for clear rules regarding election 
coverage, there is only an ORTT recommendation that channels stay objective.) 
However, Fidesz claimed that the two commercial channels, TV2 and RTL, support 
their political rivals and cannot be trusted to perform any public service functions. 
Similarly to the informal links in the press, it is widely believed that there are close ties 
between station leaders and high political circles, and it is alleged by insiders that both 
channels prefer to see the Ieft-wing/liberal coalition in power (although mainly due to 
its less confrontational media policy).
However, survey data suggests that these informal ties do not compromise the 
channels’ independence. According to ORTT’s monthly surveys of news programmes, 
both TV2 and RTL allocate a significant amount of airtime to the incumbent 
government, irrespective of its composition.104 At the same time, both TV2 and RTL 
provide balanced coverage during both elections,105 in fact, in 2002 they gave more 
coverage overall to the Fidesz government than to the opposition that they allegedly 
support. However, it has been argued (e.g. Seres, 2001) that this is mainly due to their 
conflict-avoiding strategy. This is also underscored by the low amount of critical, 
investigative stories, and their decision to not run political ads in the 1998 campaign, 
arguing that it would give the richest party an unfair advantage.106 107 (While this 
highlighted the stations’ wish to stay objective, it did not survive as a permanent feature 
-  in 2002, RTL abandoned the practice/07)
Within a few years, TV2 and RTL had the highest audience figures in terms of 
their evening news programs (37,7% and 37% respectively -  as opposed to M T V l’s
101 The author’s analysis comparing the hours of distinctive, cultural programming in 1986, 1996, and 
2002 shows that Hungarian television had drastically reduced the amount of cultural programming it aired 
in the 1980s. (Analysis done from weekly television programme guides.)
102 These figures represent 2001 averages for three public service stations (MTV1, MTV2, Duna) and two 
commercial channels (TV2, RTL). They have been calculated on the basis of a detailed ORTT survey 
regarding programme structure on Hungarian television, 2001
103 Peak time (evening slot) public service broadcasts have been reduced from 66,8% in 1992 to 48,4% in 
2001 on the overall television market. Source: ORTT survey regarding programme structure on 
Hungarian television, 2001
104 Longitudinal study o f ORTT data gathered in 1999, 2000,2001 and 2003. A series of reports entitled 
“Analysis of the coverage of news programmes”, available at www.om.hu
105 Analysis of election campaign coverage, 1998 and 2002. ORTT
106 Budapest Business Journal, March 16, 1998, and ODIHR Final election report, Hungary, 1998
107 However, this was not immediately financially successful. Both political blocs focused their 
advertising campaign for within the two public channels. As a result, the PSBs ran four times as much 
political advertising as RTL Klub. Source: ORTT survey on the comparison of political advertisement in 
1998 and 2002.
17,1%), and given their success and power, Fidesz decided to further extend its “media 
equilibrium policy” . Prior to the 2002 elections, it made an offer to acquire TV2 
through an associated company (Vegyepszer), but the deal never went through.108 In a 
second attempt, following the 2002 election, which Fidesz lost, leader Viktor Orban 
suggested that the media law be amended to allow the division of the Hungarian MTV 1 
and MTV2 channels into two political channels -  one for each power group.109 This 
controversial idea (resembling once again the development assistance model) is rooted 
in the widely-criticised Italian practice of lotizazzione, i.e. the carving up the broadcast 
media according to the balance of political forces in parliament.
This was also an integral part of the strategy on behalf o f Fidesz to conserve 
power relations between the two currently two biggest parties. However, the idea was 
never endorsed by the Socialist-Free Democrat government, which prompted Fidesz 
leaders to turn to the last resort and set up their own television station. Managed by a 
former Fidesz spokesperson, Hir TV (News TV), was launched on cable in December 
2002, with a declared goal of “representing civic and national values”.110
Unlike other institutional legislations, the drafting of the media law was not 
carried out in consultations with any Western institutional or financial adviser -  which 
most likely had an impact on the pace of events. International financial institutions, such 
as the World Bank and the IMF, did not provide loans and expertise for media reforms -  
even though they did in most areas of the state administration reform. At the same time, 
as mentioned in the Theory chapter, neither did the European Union have a coherent 
model of public media to export to the candidate region, nor did it provide institutional 
assistance in this field. Looking back on the process, it is unlikely though that an 
extensive Western assistance scheme would have speeded up the process. Any type of 
foreign intervention would have been perceived, by both political elites and publics, as 
an overwhelming meddling in domestic cultural affairs. A good indicator here is the fact 
that the first PSB chairmen turned down US advisors who advocated the creation of a 
minimal public service system,111 and the fact that despite widespread rhetorical support 
for the implementation of BBC practices,112 no such reforms were carried through. 
Having said that, the financial considerations should have been taken much more 
seriously, and the political elites possibly should have strived for a less ambitious PSB 
system, which provides high quality cultural programming, and does not wish to 
compete with commercial channels.
All in all, the 1996 media law failed to eliminate the political and economic 
interference in broadcasting, and did not show enough dedication on behalf of political 
elites to create a public service institution that is based on social democratic 
foundations. The media law remained a constant discussion topic, and several attempts 
were made at amending it, thus far without success. In 2003, the Prime Minister’s 
Office released a discussion paper113 proposing a more libertarian conception of the 
broadcast media. Inspired partly by the financing structure o f Channel Four in the
108 Népszabadsâg, January 15, 2002
109 Magyar Nemzet, September 1, 2002
1,0 This channel is funded by business entrepreneurs close to the Fidesz government (1998-2002).
111 Interview with Elemér Hankiss, October 1999
112 Mungiu-Pippidi (1999)
113 “Egy üj médiatorvény alapjai” by Gâlik M., Horvât J., Szente P. (The foundations of a new media 
law). Published on the website of the Prime Minister’s Office, June 2003
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UK,114 this advocates a brand new “transitional” media law which would introduce a 
complete ban on PSB advertising. If the government allowed a comprehensive 
reorganisation of the institutions and provided for a stable cash flow, this would in 
theory push the PSB toward a first cluster position.
However, there are some weaknesses in the plan. The proposal wishes to 
compensate the PSB for the lost advertising revenues through the levying of an 
additional tax on the profit of rival commercial channels. (Commercial broadcasters are 
already obligated to pay a certain percentage of the advertising revenue into the ORTT- 
administered “Broadcast Fund” which, among others, supports the PSB.) The proposal 
claims that this tax would be justified given that the commercial channels will have a 
larger advertising market to work with. But this idea is misguided given that the PSB 
currently possesses only a very limited market share, thus the levied tax and the gained 
market share for commercial channels might not be proportionate.115
What is worse is that such an amendment would allow commercial channels to 
abandon all mandatory public service programmes (except for the evening news 
programmes). Therefore, it would naturally be supported by the profit-seeking channels, 
which have long called for a more libertarian media law, arguing that the current licence 
fee and the strict programming regulations are disproportionate. These channels have 
wanted to see less regulation and more opportunity to air entertainment programming, 
and are pleased to see the abolishment of all public service obligations. Such an 
arrangement however could significantly lower the quality of commercial broadcasting.
From the very beginning, TV2 and RTL have injected a highly commercial 
element into the policy sphere, finding the lowest common denominator for a large 
segment of society. These channels follow the tabloidisation strategy, where politics is 
more scandalized, and the news are priorities according their “human interest” value, or 
their level of violence and controversy. Political events are mostly presented in the 
context of moral scandals and conflicts.116 The combined effect of these two regulatory 
changes would therefore speed up the marginalisation of quality broadcasting -  moving 
the broadcast sector further away from safeguarding societal values.
In a positive development, the discussion paper proposes a reform of the 
regulatory authority ORTT, as well as the management boards, and calls for a stable 
PSB financing solution for years ahead. However, regarding the latter, it leaves the PSB 
financially dependent on the state budget. On the long run, the additional fee on 
commercial channels might arrange more indirect advertising funds for the PSB than it 
can secure now, but it will make PSB funds dependent on market trends in advertising. 
Lastly, another problem with the discussion paper is that it does not deal with the
114 Conversation with Miklôs Haraszti, who participated in drawing up the proposal. July, 2004
115 The station’s ad revenue plummeted from Ft 17.6 billion in 1997 to just Ft 1.9 billion in 2002. Source: 
Budapest Business Journal, June 16,2003.
116 According to Peter Csigo’s research data, 60% of all political information in the evening news 
programs is presented in such a way. Source: The construction of public affairs in different organs, in 
Communication Culture in Transition, ed. by Schleicher, N. (2000: 103-117)
regulation of internet content despite the fact that some internet newspapers have larger 
readerships than traditional newspapers.117
4 . T h e  I n t e r n a l  D im e n s io n  o f  M e d ia  R e f o r m
The tensions which emerged between political elites, and between the elites and 
the media over questions of representation had a remarkable impact on the internal 
growth potential of the media, and the professionalisation of journalists.
Before 1989, journalists worked under tight political control and institutional 
censorship. Professional training for journalists did not exist, hindering the media 
sector’s professional advancement. After the system-change, specialized mass 
communication schools emerged, and the level of qualification became an important 
factor in the media recruitment process. The number of qualified journalists increased 
and the ratio of those holding a college or university degree grew from 46% in 1968 to 
84% in 1997.118 At the same time, political preferences remained an important 
determinant for journalists in choosing media outlets. As a result, the work 
environments taught journalists different types of ethics and practice.
While news and commentary have been separated in all respected political 
media outlets, because of the politicised nature of the print media and the public service 
broadcasters, the overall media landscape cannot be described as having reached a high 
degree of objectivity. Instead, the democratic requirement of pluralism is widely 
interpreted by the journalistic community in the external sense i.e. that the overall media 
landscape should be responsible to provide a pluralism of views, rather than it emerging 
within every single media outlet. Based on that conviction, there have been few 
attempts at accommodating right-wing opinion articles in the leftist press, and vice 
versa}19
The first decade of transition witnessed a growth in the number of investigative 
stories, but investigative journalism is still not as widely practiced as at Western, e.g. 
UK or American newspapers. A survey of articles in daily papers shows that many 
journalists work with the government in an “embedded manner” (i.e. follow them to 
official trips and report from the scene), and many have become accommodated to 
working on the basis of press releases. The only exceptions are lower circulation 
weeklies such as ES, HVG  and Figyelo, and perhaps the financial daily Vilaggazdasag, 
which publish revelatory and original pieces regularly.120
117 The 2002 “National Media Survey” by Sonda Ipsos and GfK research institutes indicates that the 
political and general interest website www.origo.hu outperformed the weekly HVG, and all three national 
dailies, except Nepszabadsdg. Source: Budapest Business Journal, October 21, 2002
1.8 Vasarhelyi (1999: 28)
1.9 And when there were, they failed. One well-known case is when the editors’ of the liberal paper 
Magyar Hirlap brought in a right-wing columnist (Istvdn Elek), both its readers and its traditional 
columnists resisted the idea. In the end, the editor-in-chief decided to abandon the idea. July 13, 2000, 
Magyar Hirlap, However, the English-language paper Budapest Business Journal successfully altered the 
publication of left-wing and right-wing opinion columnists between 1998 and 2002,
120 Random survey performed by the author. October of years 1998, 2000 and 2002. Parliamentary 
library, Budapest
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This is confirmed by a focus group survey by Gallup, according to which 
journalists say that owners have no interest in investigating about potential or existing 
advertising clients, and editors are not willing to devote the resources needed to support 
investigative journalism.121 This survey also reveals that journalists consider the publics 
and even the journalistic community at large indifferent to stories of journalistic 
intimidation or harassment. They also believe that, if accused by journalists, public 
officials generally refuse to assume responsibility for wrong-doing as long as they are 
not forced to do so by “real” i.e. legal m eans.122
Further, journalists also fear being threatened by criminal groups -  in 1997, 67% 
of Hungarian journalists felt that there are taboo issues which cannot be written or even 
spoken about,123 and most of them named organise crime as one. According to Gallup, 
they also testify that they would risk their positions if they revealed controversial 
evidence regarding political parties. At the same time, it was pointed out that when they 
publish incriminating material or evidence, there is a chronic lack of follow-up by 
courts and district attorneys. In my view, this is partly due to the oversupply of 
sensationalist reports which has occurred as a result of the fierce competition between 
newspapers and commercial televisions after 1997. Due to the accumulative effect, the 
relative weight of revelatory reports have come to yield a weaker influence on political 
elites. For all the above reasons, the agendas in the largest circulation political media 
outlets are largely set by the political and business elites.
The general level of journalistic skills and ethical culture is also low -  which 
manifests itself in the growing number of lawsuits against newspapers, the frequent use 
of anonymous sources, as well as widespread practice of submitting interviews for 
“approval” before publication. When asked about the general state of media freedom, 
journalists gave Hungary a worse rating than Freedom House itself. The responses to 
the question: “In your view, is the press completely free, partly free or not free at all?” 
have changed in the following manner between 1992 and 1997:
Table 1. Views the state o f media freedom  in  Hungary  
(in percentage) Source: Vasarhelyl (1998a)
1992 1997
Completely free 45 27
Partly free 51 69
Not free 4 4
Journalists believe that the contractual arrangements under the new market- 
based structures have increased the vulnerability of all media workers. Because of the 
arrangements provided in the tax regulation, employers and media workers are both 
better off financially if journalists are hired as individual entrepreneurs as opposed to 
permanent staff. As a result, around 75% of all journalists are now working as
121 Qualitative survey regarding the corruption phenomena, 1999 and 2000, Gallup Institute, Hungary
122 Ibid.
123 Vasarhelyi (1999: 126)
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freelancers or on fixed-term contracts.124 The employment arrangements -  which 
consider cost-cutting a higher preference than providing job security for journalists -  
thus undermine the professional status of journalists, and create a precarious 
employment relationship.
Due to the low average salaries -  monthly net HUF 100,000 (or 400 euro)125 -  
many journalists have been seduced by the financial advantages of camouflaged 
advertising and PR articles. The first investigative report which exposed this practice 
with regard to the print media was published by the Budapest Business Journal, an 
English-language business weekly.126 In 1996, the paper found that six out of the (then) 
seven top dailies regularly accepted money for publishing promotional articles without 
identifying the articles as such. It was revealed that Nepszabadsdg, Nepszava, Magyar 
Nemzet, Uj Magyarorszdg, Napi Gazdasag, and Vilaggazdasdg would publish -  and in 
some cases write -  favourable articles in exchange for HUF 100,000 to 300,000 (USD 
690 to USD 2070). Only Magyar Hirlap proved an exception. According to the charges, 
some Hungarian companies received five to six threats a year from newspapers that say 
they are preparing to publish negative stories about them. The papers’ representatives 
then propose that the companies write their own versions -  for a price.
Many observers considered the publication of paid-for stories an “everyday 
practice”, saying Hungary could not sustain this many national dailies otherwise. The 
revenues resulting from the publication of camouflaged advertising are estimated to 
constitute up to 10% of a newspaper’s total income. The wide implementation of this 
practice suggests that morals have sunk low in the Hungarian media, and economic 
survival has been given more priority than integrity. But strangely enough, the findings 
did not stir much controversy and were given little publicity in the Hungarian-language 
media -  which even further added to the credibility of revelations. Only one paper, the 
liberal weekly Magyar Narancs, acknowledged the English-language weekly’s 
investigation by reprinting excerpts in Hungarian.
This non-transparent practice has led to an undesired integration between large 
segments of the media system and the economic society, and has also generated a 
significant amount of self-censorship, particularly about advertisers. I would argue that 
aiming for a maximization of editorial independence from business groups and 
advertisers could have been a feasible option for both large circulation papers like 
Nepszabadsdg, and smaller ones like Magyar Hirlap. The example of the small 
circulation Budapest Business Journal shows that it is possible to survive on a 
developing market with wholly separated editorial and advertising offices. Also, this is 
the only paper in the country which has secured the respect of its readers and its sources 
(both political and business elites) despite its consistent practice of not allowing a 
review of articles before publication. It is attracting advertisers and producing profits 
despite its critical stance against all market players.127
On a positive note, however, the appearance of commercial channels brought 
about a growth in the autonomy of television journalists, and the overall 
commercialisation of the media market strengthened the identification of journalists as
124 Op. Cit. Television on the brink: IFJ report. 1999
125 This data is valid for 2003.
126 Budapest Business Journal, July 29, 1996
127 This information is based on the author’s work experience at the paper in the 1997-1998 period.
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public watchdogs. Liberalisation destroyed state monopoly on the airwaves, and 
commercial channels have quickly became the primary source for political news and 
information. By 1998, television viewing hours grew to 4 hours on average per 
inhabitant, the double of the 1988 figure128 -  increasing the society’s intake of news on 
issues of public concern, and strengthening perceptions about the importance of the 
journalistic profession.
The conceptual differences between the opponent political groups manifested in 
the polarisation of the journalistic community into groups of politically partisan and 
independent/ critical journalists. By 2002, both political camps had secured the direct 
support of some print media -  the Hungarian Social Party was supported by Nepszava, 
while Fidesz by Magyar Nemzet. The majority of journalists, however, managed to 
preserve their independence from political parties, and even those working for the 
partially parallel Nepszabadsag and Magyar Hirlap considered themselves to be in the 
independent category. The disputes regarding the different styles and quality of 
journalism have polarised the entire journalistic community and hindered the 
advancement of collective professionalisation.
Fidesz’ open questioning of the moral and professional integrity of all political 
journalists was perceived as a generic stigmatisation o f the journalistic community, 
especially on the liberal side. This led to growing antagonism toward the right-wing 
government within the critical press. (The Fidesz campaign also had an influence on 
audiences, and in 2001, only 3-6% of the population thought that reports on television 
and in the daily papers are completely truthful, and only 4%  of the adult population 
trusted journalists completely.) The disputes also brought about divisions in 
representative organisations. In 1992, six hundred conservative journalists split from the 
6,000-member Hungarian National Journalist Association (MUOSZ), and created their 
own organisation under the name Community of Hungarian Journalists (MUK). In 
1994, the even smaller, leftist Hungarian Press Union was created. Today, MUOSZ 
continues to be the biggest association, but its efforts to create a nation-wide code of 
ethics have so far failed.
Ironically, the unsatisfactory levels of professionalism have contributed to the 
successful implementation of the media equilibrium policy and the application of 
political pressure in general. According to a 1998 study, political manipulation attempts 
were regular in all types of media.129 Of all surveyed media workers, those working in 
MTV gave journalistic autonomy the worst rating.130 Journalists claim that the level of 
interference in their daily work has become unbearably high, and many refused to 
participate in a 2003 survey by the OSCE on media concentration, citing fear or the 
uselessness o f such exercises.131 The following tables show that television has the 
highest political interference results and it also suggests that attempts at manipulation 
by business groups are particularly high in the case of print media.
128 The exact figures are as follows: 1988: 15 hours/week, 1997: 28 hours/ week, per inhabitant. Data by 
AGB agency. Media Book, 1998
129 Vaslrhelyi & Halmai (1998b: 303-317)
130 53% of PSB television journalists rated the level of autonomy high, while at the radio, as many as 
72%. Source: Vasarhelyi & Halmai (1998b: 303-317)
,:>l “The impact of media concentration on professional journalism,” OSCE survey, December 2003
Table 2. Ratio o f successful attempts by political groups (1997) 
(in percentage) Source: Vasarhelyi (1998b)
Attempts to  interfere with 
program ming content
PSB
television
PSB radio Average print 
media
In most cases 13 0 11
In few cases 58 60 40.75
Never 17 40 38.75
Other answer 12 0 ^9.5
Table 3. Ratio of successful attempts by business groups (1997) 
(in percentage) Source: Vasarhelyi (1998b)
Attem pts to  interfere with 
program ming content
PSB
television
PSB radio Average print 
media
In most cases 4 0 13.5
In few cases 64 42 48.5
Never 16 16 28
Other answer 16 16 10
With regard to television, two-third of journalists thought that the media law 
further institutionalised the influence of political parties over the PSBs, rather than 
liberating broadcasters from under political control. More than half of them thought that 
the situation within the PSBs was generally worse than before the media law.132 In 
interviews with the author, senior Hungarian journalists said that both the spirit and the 
wording of the media law is flawed -  instead of protecting and strengthening public 
service, it has encouraged its demise. Irrespective of who was in government, the laid- 
off staff at MTV constantly complained that their work was controlled by the Prime 
Minister’s Office and that self-censorship was rife in the face of political influence. 
Journalists have also raised concern regarding the lack of transparency in the provision 
of PSB contracts, and of discrimination in commissioning work. Overall, they testified 
to a lack of competence in the management and a politically-driven process that 
victimised the workforce and undermined public service values.
Amidst the controversies within and around the media sphere, it is important to 
look at the spill-over effects as well. As argued in the previous chapter, the development 
o f political culture and institutions can be considered intertwined, which therefore 
makes it difficult for us to establish an order of development. But there are certain 
dynamics in society that can be clearly identified when assessing the media reform’s 
impact on the political culture. There is indication that the fragmentation within the 
media sector led to the weakening of many post-communist democratic ideals, and to 
serious cleavages within society. At the same time, citizen alienation was on the
132 Vasarhelyi & Halmai (1998b: 303-317)
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increase, and support for traditional political procedures, institutions and organisations 
declined. While in 1998, there was no guarantee that the “two-party system” is a final 
destination for Hungary’s democratic transition, as a result of the Fidesz’s overall 
engagement, a division into a bipolar political power structure is now imaginable.
Fidesz’ symbolic politics, or divisional (and often exclusionary) identity politics 
played on some existing paranoia about corrupt elites, communists and certain minority 
groups, as well as on the hardships generated by the system-change. As Bozoki argued 
(2002), the “us versus them” dichotomy induced critical societal tensions at a time when 
the overall aim should have been democratic consolidation. The government’s use of 
the rhetoric of “a second revolution”, a political language driven by a fear of the return 
of communists was labelled as one o f “deconsolidation”. As Bozdki wrote “the tension 
that was created by the clash between the revived symbolic politics and the 
consolidation tasks of the government undercut the sincerity o f the government’s actual 
commitment to democratic consolidation”. Orban’s identity politics divided the nation 
and created two clear, separate paths for the development of political cultures. (Boz6ki, 
2002)
This can be understood even better if we place citizens into three categories of 
political consciousness, as suggested by Orkeny and Csepeli (1992). Citizens at the 
“pre-conventional stage” are a silent, politically anonymous majority, who are mainly 
influenced by emotive slogans, political symbols and popular leaders who resort to 
demagoguery. Citizens at the “conventional level” are usually the conformists, the 
unhesitant advocates of the prevailing system of law and order. The highest level of 
political consciousness, and the ideal according to the authors, is exhibited by the so 
called “post-conventional” citizen. In essence, the post-conventional political behaviour 
supplies society with the capacity for political and ideological innovation and 
adaptation, and makes it impossible for radical political ideologies to be accepted. The 
successful operation of a democratic society depends mostly on the relative balance of 
these types.
In my view, the media reform process has led to a strengthening of the first and 
the third groups -  the first gathering most right-wing supporters together, and the third 
gathering the more liberal minded voters who are sensitive to the excesses of the state. It 
is along these lines too, that public opinion became polarised -  leading to the total 
eradication of any chance for a consensus-seeking public discourse. It also led to a 
realisation among intellectual elites that the quality of the political culture does not 
make it possible to conduct high-quality discussion.133 The heated public disputes led to 
an increase of extremist voices in the policy sphere, and mounted to such a powerful 
scale that it left a deep scar in the public conscience.
All in all, the post-1989 policy sphere has been abundant in symbolic action, and 
the emphasis placed on easily identifiable symbols grew out of proportion.134 As a 
result, the media reform process in Hungary has led to the emergence of an 
ideologically divided, excessively politicised and fragmented societal realm. The 
rational-critical debate has become outweighed by loud, populist discourse, so much so 
that the different styles of political communication became incompatible, and
133 This prompted the majority of intellectual politicians to gradually leave political life altogether.
134 Bozoki (1998) collected a number of key words of the system-change to illustrate the divergence in 
political rhetoric between political forces.
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untranslatable to the language of the other, which made it difficult for various political 
formations not only to reach consensus but to articulate clashing political ideas. 5
4 . C o n c l u s io n
The above analysis has shown that the Hungarian media sector has undergone a 
major transformation, it has been extensively liberalised and deregulated, and several 
aspects of démocratisation have been achieved. The political rivalry between parties has 
generated highly interventionist forms of media management, in which elites on both 
sides of the political spectrum aimed to find covert ways of continued control. The 
social democratic and development assistance models were the topic of the day, but the 
lack of a systemic approach by the political elites has led to the persistence of some 
authoritarian elements.
Every attempt to provide state support to the media was blown out of proportion 
by political rivals -  largely annihilating the potential of any consensus-seeking debate 
on a non-politically managed system of media support. The Hungarian intellectual and 
academic community is extremely divided over the raison d'etre  of the right wing’s 
interventionist policies, and any attempted analysis is often quickly dismissed as 
“liberal” or “conservative” propaganda. The application of the four theories perspective 
has allowed us to assess the “media equilibrium” policy in an objective and independent 
manner, and avoid the trap of calling it “anti-democratic” just because it does not easily 
fit into the traditional social democratic or libertarian frameworks.
With regard to theory, the biggest problem in Hungary seems to have been that 
there was no intelligent discussion, let alone consensus, on some form of transitional 
model for the post-communist media system. Intellectual elites predominantly argued 
for the application of a social democratic model in the broadcast segment, and the 
libertarian in print, and expected media démocratisation to happen without a substantial 
transitional period. However, the implementation of these ideal models has been 
protracted and largely failed. Today, the Hungarian public service broadcasting system 
does not perform its intended social and cultural functions. The 1996 media law failed 
to eliminate political and economic interference, thereby impacting negatively on the 
overall transformation process.
In terms of the print sector, the first explicit attempt to reform the media system 
according to the more specific needs of a transitional society was carried out by Fidesz. 
In their “media equilibrium policy”, Fidesz argued -  to a degree justly -  that throughout 
the 1990s the redistribution of media power favoured mostly the leftist system-changing 
elites, and that these media outlets never managed to divorce themselves entirely from 
political parties. However, the main problem with the Fidesz’ strategy was that it 
promoted a development assistance model for the entire media system, and their 
suggestions for implementation, and their argumentation in light of their semi­
authoritarian actions failed to come across convincing. While Fidesz indirectly 
promoted a return to a system of state-controlled media, what it essentially aimed at 
strengthening was its position as a political party. 13
133 This observation was first made Âgh (1992a: 2) but is even more valid now.
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The case study illustrated how the “media equilibrium“ debate was complicated 
by the fact that from early 1990s, the libertarian argument seems to have dominated the 
discussion on press ownership. Consequently, not only that a significant degree o f non- 
transparency developed regarding political party influence on newspapers, but the 
combined effect of this, and the prevalence of the democratic “ideals”, have made it 
difficult to even theoretically consider the potentially constructive effects of an open 
political parallelism. Overall, the findings of this research suggest that constructive 
policies may only emerge in a more mature stage of democratic development, following 
years of political negotiations and societal debate on issues of media démocratisation.
Until this occurs, some temporary solutions should be found, among which the 
most important one would be the setting up of an elaborate and ambitious, non- 
politically managed press fund. This is called for especially in light of the trends that the 
informal political funding of the media sector is estimated to be higher than the official 
support offered through the currently operating public funds. The problems encountered 
in this analysis also tempt the researcher to craft some kind of theoretical “transitional 
media model” which could generally guide policy reform. Most probably some kind of 
combination of the four applied theories could provide an ideal model, against which 
the media démocratisation process could be designed and executed, at least in 
democratic transitions in which the elites have a commitment to reform and where the 
economic conditions are favourable. Such a model could serve as a point of reference 
for all societal and political actors in the debate regarding media reform, and could be a 
useful guidance for international democracy assistance i.e. donor funding and 
development projects (if and when applicable).
Given the relative weakness o f political and societal representation structures 
and the existence of legitimate political party needs to communicate ideas, we could 
argue that the development assistance model can be and should be considered a 
legitimate aspect of emerging democratic media systems (even if only minor). However, 
for it to prove conducive for democratic development, this model needs to be in an 
appropriate balance with the social democratic model, i.e. the latter should clearly 
dominate the overall media system.
Translating that to explicit operational conclusions, we could argue that as long 
as the broadcast systems are reformed to accommodate both commercial competition 
and a truly independent public service broadcaster (i.e. funding, appointments, 
supervision etc.), the political elites can make a legitimate argument for a more 
dominant application of the development assistance model in the print media realm. 
While allowing for market-based competition -  and thus the emergence of independent 
publications according to the needs of society -  this model would concentrate power 
stmggles between political parties in a print space which is not as dominant and 
controlling as television, and would create a system which is transparent and pluralistic 
in terms of political party representation.
While this of course might be criticized for preserving some form of political 
control over many of a given country’s key daily newspapers, it is more important that 
this arrangement would restrict the political competition within the communication 
space to the print sphere only. Given the potential contribution of an independent PSB 
to the development of a democratic policy sphere, this balanced media model would 
gradually ease the political tension within the media system, and chart the path for an
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eventual transition from strong to partial political parallelism, and further independence 
in the print segment. Such an arrangement within the new media structures would 
provide a clear framework for a new system of societal participation and representation 
in the new policy sphere.
Given that this is a retrospectively-applicable theoretical proposition it is 
difficult to imagine it today, but I would argue that such a system would have indeed 
produced some positive results in relation to the quality of the democratic dialogue. 
First of all, it would have introduced full (or at least more) transparency into the system, 
allowing citizens to make more informed choices about what they consume. It also 
would have created a closer relationship between political institutions and society, 
allowing political parties to better express and define themselves. For example, the 
quality and style of the respective openly politically-aligned newspapers would have 
said a lot of about how the various parties communicate and prioritise, it could have 
encouraged parties to target starkly different segments of society and thus might have 
even limited the development of populist, catch-all parties. It could have created virtual 
communities and increased debate on matters of public concern -  as a consequence of 
which it might have encouraged more political participation and engagement by society.
In the print sector, this model might have been a better guarantee to create a 
pluralism of political voices in the external sense, instead of trying to create 
independent, internally pluralistic outlets. This of course is not to say that the ultimate 
aim of media reform is not the reaching of full political and economic independence in 
all segments of the media system. However, as this study has shown this does not seem 
to be a realistic aim in the initial decades of democratic transition. Therefore, it may be 
more conducive to aim at creating transparency and maintaining a high quality of output 
as opposed to aiming for a swift transit solution to independence through the 
privatisation of media outlets to foreign owners. This could provide a way to maximise 
the central communication values -  societal participation and representation -  while, by 
placing the society-political party relationship on a different footing, it could also 
contribute to improving this often delicate relationship.
The idea of this transitional model is based on the specific Hungarian 
experience, therefore it remains a highly hypothetical and theoretical proposition. While 
it is impossible to test whether it would have worked, further theoretical elaboration 
would be necessary to see whether it could be applicable in other transitions.
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Chapter IV.
Case Study of Ukraine
As in the case of Hungary, the reform of the media system in Ukraine has been 
tightly linked to the development patterns of the post-communist transformation 
process. Similarly to the previous discussion, the following chapter is an attempt to 
present the core characteristics of the post-1991 media reform process, in order to 
understand the key aspects of the Ukrainian media experience, and to find analogies and 
differences with the other countries under scrutiny. This section will review 
developments up to the most recent presidential elections in October-November 2004, 
in which political corruption and the state of the media freedom featured as important 
themes.
After declaring independence in 1991,1 the Ukrainian government faced multiple 
challenges -  in addition to the need to democratise and build a market economy, 
successive governments were burdened with the challenge of nation-building and state­
building. The authorities confirmed their intention to develop a civil society, guarantee 
freedom of speech and other universal human rights in the 1996 constitution, and in the 
commitments they took up after joining the OSCE (1992) and the Council of Europe 
(1995). They also pledged their wish to join the European Union and NATO, and 
ratified all relevant international laws in the area of media freedom.
However, Ukraine’s post-Soviet transition has been plagued by the lack of an 
efficient transformation strategy, and the unwillingness of its political elites to develop 
democratic forms of governance. Ukraine is aptly described by Carothers to have thus 
been stuck in the “grey zone” of post-communist political system, alternating between 
“feckless pluralism” and “dominant-power politics”. (2002: 10-11) The post-Soviet 
elites (mainly President Leonid Kuchma and his associates) have adopted the basic 
institutional forms of democracy but have manipulated the political process to ensure 
that their political and financial power positions remain intact. This semi-authoritarian 
form of governance has significantly narrowed the space for media démocratisation to 
occur, and limited the growth potential of both a democratic civil society and an 
opposition political force. The political opposition has been fragmented but 
strengthening since Kuchma’s re-election as president in 1999, and the dire situation in 
the media sector is increasingly being put on the domestic and international political 
agenda.
Post-Soviet Ukraine is a multi-ethnic society, still struggling to define its 
identity against the backdrop of strong Russian influence. Historically, the Ukrainian 
national identity was oppressed through ethnic cleansing and discriminative policies by
1 Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on August 24, 1991. The text is available at 
http://www.ukrweeklv.com/Archive/1991/359i 01.shtml. The proclamation was confirmed in a 
referendum in December 1991. On the same day, Leonid Kravchuk was elected president with 61.59% of 
the popular vote.
mmm
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the Russians throughout the 19th and 20th centuries,2 and in the post-1991 period, the 
renegotiation of the Ukrainian-Russian relationship has been the focus of much 
intellectual and policy debate. According to the latest census (2001), 77.8% of the 
country’s 49.5 million population are ethnic Ukrainians, 17.3% are ethnic Russians, 
while the rest belong to small minority groups.3 Language groups, however, do not 
correspond entirely to ethnic groups -  the majority of Ukraine’s citizens are bi-lingual, 
and only 66.3% consider Ukrainian their mother tongue, while as many as 31.3% -  
mostly in the country’s industrialised East -  are native Russian-speakers.4
Minority rights have been widely recognised by law, the 1992 statute On 
National Minorities, for instance, guarantees minority communities the right to cultural- 
national autonomy, including the use of their native language and ‘‘the satisfaction o f 
[their] needs in literature, art and the mass media” (Article 6). However, the constitution 
only recognises Ukrainian as the official state language, and -  with the support of the 
majority of political elites (except the Communist Party of Ukraine, which remained a 
significant political force in opposition) -  the government has been adopting 
“Ukrainianisation” policies in all areas, including in the media, as part of its nation 
building strategy. As a result, several laws have been enacted to restrict or even ban 
Russian as a language used by the media.
This was in line with the thinking of many powerful Ukrainian intellectuals who 
argued that the development of a Ukrainian identity should take precedent over the 
preservation of a Ukrainian-Russian multi-ethnic state (i.e. a so-called “Eastem-Slavic” 
identity). They rejected Western calls to accommodate the Russians as a constituting 
nation, and referred back to the unjust de-Ukrainianisation policies of the past, as well 
as to the process of nation building in the West to justify claims that affirmative action 
on Ukrainian culture and language does not necessarily contradict democratic values or 
aspirations (e.g. Kuzio, 1999: 6, Kuzio & D’Anieri 2002: 16).
However, the authorities’ official pro-Ukrainian policies in the media have not 
been applied consistently, partly due to the Russian community’s strong support for 
Kuchma, who has strong Russian family roots, and partly because of the lucrative 
profits that Russian-language media generate for the country’s powerful oligarchs. The 
status of Russian as a second official state language remained permanently on the 
agenda, but the debate was rooted less in the need for more elaborated minority rights 
but rather in Russia’s continuing influence in Ukraine’s domestic policies.
In transitional multi-ethnic societies, any discussion on the media reform would 
in theory have to include an analysis of the minority media policy. In the case of 
Ukraine, that would involve the examination of the kind of national culture and identity 
that political elites promote through the new media system. However, due to the fact 
that the post-Soviet Ukrainian governments failed to draw up a comprehensive strategy 
regarding the media representation of various ethnic, or language groups, there is no
2 The most radical of these include the Stalin-induced starvation in 1932-33, in which an estimated 6-7 
million Ukrainians vanished, and the annihilation of Ukrainian intellectuals and the 1930s and 1940s. 
Source: Kuzio & D’Anieri (2002: 16)
3 Data based on results of the 2001 nation-wide census. Russians do not constitute a majority in any 
region (or oblast) of Ukraine, except for Crimea, which has been granted political autonomy.
4 For a detailed analysis of the census results, see Kuzio, Taras: Census: Ukraine, more Ukrainian, Russia 
and E urasia  Review, February 4, 2003, or Wolowyna, Oleh: 2001 census results reveal information on 
nationalities and language in Ukraine, Ukrainian Weekly, January 12, 2003
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clear benchmark against which the minority media policy could be evaluated. 
Therefore, this chapter will focus primarily on the previously underdeveloped 
Ukrainian-language media, during the period of transformation between 1991 and 2004. 
Aspects of the Russian-language media will be discussed in the context of their 
relationship and impact on the Ukrainian-language media, as opposed to a minority 
media perspective.
Compared to Central Europe, the Balkans and Russia, Ukraine’s media reform 
has not been documented thoroughly, and only limited material is available in English. 
To date, no comprehensive account has been produced regarding the Ukrainian media 
reform process, but several authors (e.g. Pryluk 1993; Prizel 1997; Kuzio 1998, 1999, 
2002; Dyczok 1999; Zyla 1999) have provided useful starting points. International 
advocacy groups and policy journals have also contributed to the understanding of the 
complex interplay between media and politics. The most important contributors to this 
discussion are Reporters without Borders, the International Federation of Journalists, 
Article 19, Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, and the European Institute for the 
Media (EIM). Among the key publications and academic/ policy journals are the reports 
by Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (www.rferl.org). OM RI’s Transition and its 
successor Transitions Online (www.tol.cz). the Post-Soviet Media Law and Policy 
Newsletter, the Ukrainian Media Bulletin by EIM, English language websites such as 
The Ukrainian Weekly, and Ukraine’s English-language newspaper, the Kyiv Post.
1. I n i t ia l  C o n d it io n s
Compared to Hungary, Ukraine experienced a more coercive political and media 
environment before its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 -  an environment 
strongly shaped by the Soviet media theory. Perceived as the “engineer of the soul,”5 the 
media served as a transmission belt for Moscow’s ideology, and was seen by the Soviet 
leadership as an important tool in socialising and, when needed, mobilizing the 
population. Moscow and the local authorities jammed foreign radio waves, banned the 
import of all foreign printed material, and controlled people’s minds through overt and 
covert censorship in a system of centralised infrastructure, and strict licensing and 
accreditation procedures.
All broadcasting was under the control of the State Committee of Radio and 
Television Broadcasting (Gosteleradio) which was directly subordinated to the Council 
of Ministers in Moscow. There were no separate channels, only different editorial 
groups that produced material for each o f the four national programs. Created in 1972, 
the regional (or republican) station in Ukraine was considered the “branch office” of the 
central media structure, along with local television centres. This was neither allowed to 
make independent editorial decisions, nor afforded the amount of training or technical 
improvement as the flagship Moscow-based mass media.
For the territory of Ukraine, the centralized nature o f broadcasting meant that 
there was a well-developed infrastructure in place, which included satellite television 
and several regional re-transmitters. Also, due to the Soviet leadership’s mass 
production of television sets, by the early 1980s, television became the main source of 
news and information for Soviet citizens, and the nightly newscast Vremia (Time) was
5 S ta lin ’s expression to describe the role of the arts.
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watched by an estimated 80% of the adult population in all republics.6 Meanwhile, 
centrally produced newspapers -  such as the Communist Party’s Pravda, which was 
printed via satellite fax simultaneously across the Soviet Union’s 11 time zones -  were 
distributed across the country. In addition, there were many local publications in 
Ukraine, as well as smaller circulation periodicals and theme journals. Although these 
local publications were not as closely scrutinized as the national papers, they, too, were 
under the control of the Communist Party and the central power structure.
Compared to Poland, Hungary, and Russia, Ukraine only had a limited and 
temporary alternative society. The extent of the political repression in Ukraine made it 
difficult to run clandestine organisations, and samizdat publications failed to reach the 
masses. The Ukrainsky Visnyk (Ukrainian Herald) was published intermittently between 
1970 and 1980, and religious publications such as the Chronicle o f the Catholic Church 
in Ukraine were also released.7 Other documented samizdats include the sporadic 
publications by the Group Initiative for Defence of Rights of Believers and the Church, 
and the very temporary Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group. Several publications, 
with underground distribution in most parts of the empire, also reached Ukraine, among 
them the Chronicle o f  Current Events.8
These publications facilitated discussion among voices of dissent within 
Ukraine, and between Ukraine and Russia, but Ukraine’s parallel society and 
underground media system remained limited for intellectual discussion, with little 
impact on political life.9 10The Ukrainian media in general was of much lower quality 
than the Russian, while party control and censorship was stronger than in Moscow 
itself. (Krasnaboka & Brants, 2002: 8) As Skilling asserted (1989: 206), these 
embryonic human rights movements failed to engage in any “self-analysis” -  which was 
a crucial dimension enriching, and enabling the expansion of similar movements in 
Central Europe. In these circumstances, no identifiable parallel society, no organised 
dissent emerged, which would have used the media as its lifeline and sphere of 
existence.
Emanating from Moscow, the firm control on the Soviet mass media began to 
erode in the 1980s, and was officially abandoned through Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
“glasnost and perestroika” policy. The term glasnost denoted the drive to voice 
endemic problems and embarrassing issues out in the open, instead of the long-practiced 
policy of concealment. Gorbachev’s policies played an important part in changing the 
face of the media in major cities, but they failed to bring about noticeable changes 
outside urban centres. The opportunity offered by the glasnost policy, however, never 
spread further then Moscow, Leningrad and the Baltic republics, leaving the Ukrainian 
policy sphere under continued communist control. As a result, media criticism of the 
communist system was rare in regional and local publications and broadcasts.11 The
6 Mickiewicz, Ellen P. (1988): Split Signals: Television and Politics in the Soviet Union, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1988, pp. 8
7 Skilling, G. (1989): Samizdat and an independent society in Central and Eastern Europe. MacMillan 
Press, 1989, pp. 205
8 Ibid. pp. 205
9 In the entire Soviet Union, the human rights movement and the associated sa m izd a t  printing and 
distribution effort was only tolerated during the 1970s. In the early 1980s, most leading dissidents (mainly 
in Russia) were imprisoned. Op.cit. Skilling (1989:207)
10 Downing (1996: 79)
11 Richter, A. (2002): The partial transition. Ukraine’s post-communist media, pp. 134.
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Ukrainian political elites’ suppression of media activities continued throughout the 
1980s -  so much so that Gorbachev’s direct personal intervention was needed before the 
opposition movement Rukh was able to publish its draft program in Literatuma 
Ukraina, the official newspaper of the Ukrainian Writers’ Union.12
The independence that the journalistic community won through glasnost was 
codified in June 1990, when Moscow passed a mass media law, significantly altering 
the media landscape of the Soviet Union. The law guaranteed the “freedom of 
expression in journalism and the creative arts, broad rights of access to information and 
the means of its dissemination,” and specified the obligations of authorities in respect of 
these rights.13 It also outlined the rights and responsibilities of media workers, removed 
censorship, and extended the legal guarantees to ethnic minorities. In conjunction with a 
relaxation of the ban on private enterprise, it allowed for the creation of independent 
media outlets (newspapers, television and radio stations) and removed the media from 
under the supervision of the Communist Party. This law was approved as republican 
legislation by the Supreme Soviets in each of the fifteen republics. Most republics, 
including Ukraine, have since replaced this law with one more suited to their particular 
needs.
It seems as if the fact that no alternative society had developed by the 
proclamation of Ukraine’s historic independence later proved to be a crucial weakness 
in terms of the country’s media development path.
2 . T h e  E x t e r n a l  D im e n s io n  O f  M e d ia  R e f o r m
Upon pressure from various international organisations such as the UN, the 
Council of Europe, the OSCE, as well as the European Union, Ukrainian authorities 
established an extensive legal framework in the first few years of transition. The 
Ukrainian parliament adopted a comprehensive body of media legislation which 
included laws on information, on print media and on broadcasting.14 These laws were
u Ryabchuk, M. (2004): Perilious way to freedom. Independent mass media in the blackmail state. Yet 
unpublished article, on file with author, pp, 8
13 Statute on the Press and Other Mass Media, 1990
14 The Information Act (November 2, 1992) regulates collection, keeping, use and dissemination of 
information, types of information, the right to receive information and the principles of access to it, issues 
regarding ownership o f information and its protection, as well as the liability mechanism in cases of 
infringements of the information law; The Print Media Act (November 16, 1992) provides the legal basis 
for the operation of print media, the procedure for state registration of publications, the rights and 
obligations of the journalists as well as the relations between the media and the public and other 
organizations; The TV and Radio Act (December 21,1993) provides the legal basis for the operation of 
TV and Radio broadcasters on the territory of Ukraine, sets forth the procedure for their incorporation and 
licensing, broadcasting rules, providing airtime for pre-election campaigns and for broadcasting official 
announcements and provides for liability for infringements of the law. This Act established a National TV 
and Radio Broadcasting Council; The Act on the National TV and Radio Broadcasting Council of 
Ukraine. (September 23, 1997) establishes the powers and competence of the National Council; The 
Information Agencies Act (February 28, 1995) provides the legal basis for the operation of Ukrainian 
information agencies and establishes the conditions for dissemination of their information products; The 
Act on the Procedure for Media Coverage of the Activities of Government Bodies and Local Authorities 
in Ukraine (September 23, 1997) provides for compulsory media coverage of the activities of the 
authorities; The Act on Government Support for the Media and Social Protection of Journalists 
(September 23, 1997) provides the basis for legal and economic support by the government for the media 
as well as for social protection of journalists; The Advertising Act (July 3, 1996) establishes general
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agreed upon at a time when the government was concerned about its image as a newly 
independent state. None of the early bills were vetoed by the president, or challenged by 
the Constitutional Court.15
Endorsing the ideas and values represented by the libertarian and social 
democratic theories, Ukraine also ratified all relevant international conventions which 
lay out basic principles of freedom of speech and media -  in particular, the European 
Convention on Human Rights16 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.17 The 1996 constitution guarantees freedom of speech, expression of views, and 
collection, keeping, use and dissemination of information (Article 34),18 it bans 
censorship (Article 15), and collection, keeping, use and dissemination of confidential 
information regarding individuals without their consent, and guarantees legal protection 
and the right to refute untrue information (Article 32). Also, the constitution stipulates 
that international treaties ratified by Ukraine automatically become part of national law 
and overrule conflicting national provisions.19 Through its membership in the Council 
of Europe and the OSCE, the Ukrainian government also repeatedly made a political 
commitment to media démocratisation.20
provisions for advertising and restrictions for advertising of certain types of products and services in the 
media. The act does not cover political advertising; The Intellectual Property Act (December 23,1993) 
regulates and protects intellectual property rights; The State Secrets Act (1999) defines information that is 
considered a state secret; The Act on the Public Television and Radio Broadcasting System (July 18,
1997) regulates the operation of public broadcasting systems in the country; The Civil Code establishes 
the legal principles for protection of human rights, honour, dignity, and the business reputation of people 
and organizations, and the mechanisms for indemnification of damages; The Civil Procedure Code 
establishes the procedure for litigation for the purpose of protection of the honour, dignity and business 
reputation of citizens; The Criminal Code provides for liability for public calls for nationalistic, racial and 
religious hostility, disclosure of state secrets, slander, persecution of citizens for criticism, etc. The Anti­
censorship Law (April 3, 2003) defines and bans media censorship and makes it a criminal offence for 
officials to “deliberately intervene in the professional work of journalists." It also limits financial 
penalties against journalists for defamation claims. There are also additional decrees by the Cabinet of 
Ministers, by the President and by other government agencies that regulate the work of the media. Source: 
“Freedom and responsibility”, Yearbook 1999-2000, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, 
media law archives and RFE/RL reports.
15 Op. cit. Richter (2002:150)
16 Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms says: “1. 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article 
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television, or cinema enterprises.”
17 Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights says: “1. Everyone shall have the 
right to hold opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this 
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”
18 These rights may be restricted only “in the interest of national security, territorial integrity or public 
order, to prevent disturbances or crimes, to protect the health of the population, to protect the reputation 
and the rights of other people, to prevent the dissemination of confidential information, and to safeguard 
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary” (Article 34).
19 The full text of the constitution is available from the Ukrainian parliament’s website at 
http://www.rada.Kviv.ua/const/conengl.htm.
20 For instance, the OSCE’s Istanbul Security Charter holds that the States will “reaffirm the importance 
of independent media and the free flow of information as well as the public’s access to information. We 
commit ourselves to take all necessary steps to ensure the basic conditions for free and independent media 
and unimpeded transborder and intra-State flow of information, which we consider to be an essential 
component of any democratic, free and open society. ” Passed during the Istanbul summit. 1999
However, not only that the ambitious pledges were not implemented, but various 
in-depth studies -  e.g. by Jakubowicz (2001) -  identified significant inherent 
weaknesses in the texts, pointing to the lack of correlation between volume and quality, 
as well as theory and practice. According to 2004 estimates, there were as many as 240 
different pieces of legislation in place, which instead of complementing one another, 
created a contradictory and confusing legal environment, cultivating abuse. The text of 
the laws is often ambiguous and allows for political interventionism either through 
direct stipulations, or through various loopholes.
2.1. D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  P r i n t  M e d ia  L a n d s c a p e
Ukrainian independence generated growing demand for locally produced content 
dealing with news, analysis, entertainment, and various theme subjects. Because of the 
low distribution costs and the expected economic profit, a large number o f local, 
Ukrainian-language publications were started up. The total number of published titles in 
Ukraine grew to 3,463 by 1999.21 In order to encourage the establishment of Ukrainian 
media outlets, the government decided to restrict the distribution of Russian 
publications within Ukraine, which in 1992 represented 42% of all subscriptions.22 In 
response to Moscow’s decision in 1995 to begin subsidising Russian publications 
circulating in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Ukrainian authorities 
heavily taxed the import of Russian newspapers and magazines (these accounted for 
90% of the overall volume of newspaper imports), and in 1995, they excluded Russian 
papers from the circle of publications eligible for printing and distribution subsidies. 
The government also imposed a monthly tax of ECU 160 (208 USD) on every kiosk 
which sells “foreign” publications.
Within the first years, the media underwent a dramatic trial-and-error period, 
during which hundreds of newspapers and magazines appeared, survived for a couple of 
years and then vanished due to political influence, or the lack of financial resources. 
However, many old, established newspapers such as Pravda Ukrainy (Truth of Ukraine) 
-  the local version of the Moscow-based official Communist party newspaper -  and 
Nezavisimost (Independence) soon found new backers. At the same time, several new 
political party newspapers were started up -  of which the parliamentary Golos Ukrainy 
(Voice of Ukraine) and the government’s Uriadovyi Kurier (Government Courier), as 
well as the Communist Party’s Komunist are worth noting. Most major Russian 
publications also managed to stay on the market, as they escaped the aforementioned 
restrictions by registering themselves in Ukraine, and adding the word “Ukraine” to 
their titles.23
While a degree of media pluralism emerged, the “liberalised” market did not 
result in a more democratic policy sphere for Ukraine. The majority of the start-up 
publications were theme magazines, such as women’s monthlies, tabloid and other 
entertainment newspapers. The emergence of independent political newspapers was 
constrained by the refusal of the government to fully liberalise the supporting
21 The number of registered publications was 1787 in 1990 and 8500 in 2000, but less than half of these 
actually printed. Source: “Freedom and responsibility”, Yearbook 1999-2000, OSCE Representative on 
Freedom of the Media
22 Op. cit. Richter (2002:139)
23 Ibid. Richter (2002:139)
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infrastructure in the media. While there were initiatives to privatise related state and 
public property, all crucial elements such as relay transmission lines, printing and 
distribution facilities, the largest publishing houses, and major television and radio 
towers remained in state hands.24 Those publications which managed to stay afloat for a 
few years gradually disappeared due to the rising printing costs and the decreasing 
purchasing power.25
The financial conditions for the development of Ukraine-based media have been 
weak from the beginning. Due to the dramatic drop in living standards, market demand 
for newspapers shrunk and most people turned to the readily available television for 
news and entertainment. (Whereas in Soviet times it was usual for a Ukrainian family to 
subscribe to 3-4 publications, in 1997 there was an average of one subscription for five 
citizens.) Total newspaper and magazine circulation dropped ten-fold since 1991 -  
while in Soviet times, about 440 copies of printed press were sold per 1000 people (this 
serves as an estimate for Ukraine), today the same figure is 174.26 (In Hungary, this was 
162.) The weak advertising market, 80% of which is absorbed by television, is being 
divided up between a larger number of publications than the market can sustain.
After the election of Leonid Kuchma as president in 1994, the government 
implemented a “reverse wave” of démocratisation, and strengthened its grip on the non­
state media -  much according to the authoritarian theory. In March 1999, the 
government created a “subsidy system” (i.e. reduced postal rates and the abolishment of 
VAT on printing and distribution) for selected newspapers,27 and set up a financing 
scheme exclusively for state-run media outlets. In the form of relief from tax 
obligations, customs duties, tariffs and rent, the authorities allocated 160 million 
hryvnia (USD 39.6 million) for this cause in 1999.28 For example, the newspaper Golos 
Ukrainy is reported to have received USD 400,000 for “subscription support” in 2002.29 
Through the same decree, the government increased the salaries of the approximately 
8,000 journalists working for government publications, radio and television stations as 
well as news agencies. The decree also gave state media journalists a civil servant 
status, with similar promotion structures, pensions and other social security benefits.
Only few admittedly state-controlled publications remained in circulation, and 
the authorities are proud of their record of liberalisation. But during Kuchma’s two five- 
year tenures (1994-2004), the restructuring of the media sector was embedded in a
24 Ibid. Richter (2002:140)
25 One of the first such stories was that of the Kyiv-based paper Respublika. It was set up in 1993 by 
Ukraine’s leading independent journalists (many then worked as stringers for Western agencies), and 
became the first high-quality, independent national newspaper in the country. However, the paper had to 
close down due to the skyrocketing printing costs, which made them more dependent on their financial 
backers. Their “sponsors” attempted to increase their influence on the paper’s editorial policy and the 
journalists preferred to see the paper fold than lose its editorial independence. Source: Dyczok, Marta
( 1999): International assistance and the development of independent mass media in Ukraine. Paper 
prepared for the Columbia University Project on Evaluating Western NGO strategies for démocratisation 
and the reduction of ethnic conflict. November, 1999, pp. 7
26 Data from UNESCO, reference year is 2001-2002
27 Only those media outlets are eligible for this funding which have no more than 40% advertising in a 
single issue, broadcasters which do not run more than 15% commercials in their daily programming, 
outlets which do not carry more than 50% “foreign content”, which do not have foreign owners or 
investment, and which do not feature pornography.
28 “Freedom and responsibility”, Yearbook 1999-2000, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media
29 IREX, Media Sustainability Index, 2002
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cronyistic economic redistribution process which -  similarly to other post-Soviet states 
-  led to the concentration of power by a few mammoth business groups. The 
liberalisation of the media market has made political elites and business circles highly 
dependent on each other, to a degree where they are almost undistinguishable. The 
parliamentary majority supporting the government has developed into a group o f 
politicians who all represent different business, political and/or regional interests, and 
who are held together solely through their joint fear o f a more democratic opposition.
By 2003, an estimated 90% o f all local and national newspapers (including the 
highest circulation daily newspapers) became concentrated in the hands of Kuchma­
leaning political parties, local governments and oligarchs with important political 
connections.30 There are three main oligarchic groups -  the Dnipropetrovks, Donetsk 
and the Kyiv clans. President Kuchma belongs to the first group while his most recent 
prime minister Viktor Yanukovich (2002-2004) belongs to the second -  both 
representing business interested in the industrialised Eastern part of the country. 
Meanwhile, Viktor Medvechuk, who is head of the presidential administration, belongs 
to the Kyiv clan, and is one of the most important representatives of Russian business 
interests in Ukraine. In addition, Kuchma’s son-in-law, Viktor Pinchuk is alone as 
powerful as the others, and is often referred to as the “clan of one”.31
Thus liberalisation in Ukraine has meant that the media sector became 
subordinated to business groups associated with the ruling coalition parties, more 
specifically the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine United (SDPU-u) or the Labour 
Party. In the overall sector, the strong political parallelism that developed was thus 
predominantly favouring the incumbent presidential administration. This concentration 
occurred despite a 1997 law stipulating that no person or legal entity can be “founder”, 
“co-founder” or “in control o f ’ more than 5% of regional or national publications.32 It is 
estimated that the large majority of these papers (over 90%) would not be able to sustain 
operations under free market conditions and without the financial support o f their 
“sponsors”. Interestingly, however, the oligarchs’ acquisition of media outlets was not 
driven by political-ideological considerations, but rather by the desire to attain and 
sustain economic power. These groups exercise strong editorial control over the content 
of their media outlets, and are the main beneficiaries of the advertising revenues, which 
are registered to grow at a 40-60% each year.
Meanwhile, opposition and party-independent publications tend to be short-lived 
due to the immense political or oligarchic pressure. Many o f the critical newspapers 
have been forced to change their editorial line, have been sued out of business, or shut 
down for “administrative” reasons. Those publications which survived have had to 
compromise on quality, and cost-cutting measures have often led to the journalists and 
editors accepting payment for carrying hidden advertising, or publishing certain stories.
30 “Under assault: Ukraine’s news media and the 2004 presidential elections,” A Freedom House special 
report, October, 2003
31 During the 1990s, also powerful was former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko who was forced to resign 
when he announced rival political aspirations to Kuchma. In 1998, two newspapers associated with 
Lazarenko ceased operation: Pravda Ukrainy was banned for alleged registration irregularities while 
Vseukrainskie Vedomosti was forced to close down after it lost a libel case and was fined to 2.5 million 
USD (Markus, 1998).
33 However, data on media ownership is never made public. Owners never reveal their names in the 
newspapers they own. Most oligarch-controlled media outlets, for instance, claim to have been founded 
and to be owned by their editorial staff.
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As a result, Ukraine’s print media landscape has developed in an environment of strong 
political dependence and a financial uncertainty -  rendering the market vulnerable to 
buyouts by oligarchs and various clans.33 Due to the government’s attempts to 
marginalize the non-state press, only two of the five biggest newspapers are critical of 
the government (Silski Visti and Vechemie Vesti) but the primary focus of these papers 
is to serve opposition politicians as opposed to serving as party-independent sources of 
information. Because the landscape overly politicised, the system does not resemble the 
development assistance model, in which the media landscape also has a significant 
“independent” segment. In addition, the political newspapers do not seem to represent 
clear political platforms, but rather the interests of single politicians and oligarchs, 
which also makes it difficult to assess the print landscape in relation to this model.
The following table lists the basic characteristics of the most influential 
Ukrainian-language newspapers (December 2003).34 35
Name of publication Circulation 55 Affiliation/ ownership
Fakri ƒ Komentarii (daily) 850,000 OLIGARCHIC, D nipropetrovsk oligarch group (Pinchuk) “F o r 
U nited  Ukraine” electoral b lock / president Kuchma
Silski Vtsti (d a ily )36 548,000 NON-STATE, Socialist Party/ fo rm er Parliam ent speaker A. 
Tkachenko (form erly independent journalist, in  1999 presidential 
hopeful) Currently in  opposition to  K uchm a
Segodnya (daily) 650,000 OLIGARCHIC, D onetsk o ligarch  group
Vechemie Vesti (daily) 450,000 NON-STATE, politician Y ulia Tym oshenko (currently in 
opposition to Kuchma)
Colos Ukrainy (weekly) 150.000 STATE, Official parliam ent publication
Kyivskie Vedomosti (K yiv- 
based daily)
150,000 STATE, “Social D em ocratic P arty  o f  Ukraine -  United”
Uryadovii Kurier (w eekly) 120.000 STATE, Official governm ent publication
Ukraina Moloda (daily) 100.000 NON-STATE, “O ur U kraine” party  (opposition)
/Communist (weekly) 70,000 NON-STATE, “C om m unist P arty  o f  Ukraine” (opposition)
33 Oligarchs or “clans” are often tied to factions in the parliament, or to major industrial and banking 
concerns, or are united by loyalty to a particular politician. After obtaining their wealth through the 
privatisation process o f the 1990s, the large majority of these businessmen nurture ties with the 
incumbent president.
34 Data from Freedom House’s 2003 Nations in Transit report. European Journalism Centre, and OSCE
35 Note that declared circulation and actual readership are significantly different. These figures are based 
on “declared circulation” figures from Freedom House’s 2003 Nations in Transit report, and data 
produced by a Russian advertising sales company - www.reklama-aston.narod.ru/Aston E/ukraina.htm. 
These figures are inflated to increase advertiser confidence, and for the moment, no other figures are 
available, as no official attempt has been made to bring transparency into newspaper publishing, 
advertising and circulation data.
36 Silski Visti was ordered to close down in January, 2004, but at the time of the final drafting of this 
chapter, it is still publishing, pending a decision from an appeals court.
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Stolichye Novosti (daily) 70,000 O LIGA RCH IC, Vadym  Rabynovich
Den (daily) w w w .dav.K viv.ua 60,000 STATE, “Social D em ocratic Party of U kraine -  U n ited ” 
(Although previously governm ent critical)
Biznes (daily) 60,000 STATE, “Social D em ocratic Party of Ukraine -  U n ited ”
Halycki K o n tr a k t  monthly) 44,000 N ON -STA TE. Balanced
Korrespondent (monthly) 50,000 NON -STATE, B alanced, W estern-owned
Zerkalo Tyzhnia (daily) 43,000 N O N -STA TE, Some US investm ent
Zerkalo Nedeli (weekly) 31,000 N ON -STA TE, Independent, anti-Kuchma, w w w .m irror- 
weeklv.com
Kompartyon (monthly) 30,000 N O N -STA TE, Balanced
Kyiv P ost (weekly) 25,000 N ON -STA TE, U S-owned
Polityka I  Kuliura (monthly) 20,000 N O N -STA TE, Balanced
However, under fully free market conditions, the Kyiv-based and regional media 
would have a difficult time competing with Russia-based publications, which focus 
much of their content on news from Russia and the CIS. Thus far, the most popular 
Russian-language papers have been the Moskovskiy Komsomolets (410,000), the 
hvestiya-Ukraina (230,000), the Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine (130,000), the 
Argumenty i Fakty v Ukraine37 (140,000), and the Moskovskiy Komsomolets-Diorama 
Plus (100,000).38 These papers have attracted substantial advertising as they reach both 
language groups, and their readers are perceived to be better off. As a result, they have 
managed to produce higher quality content than the average Ukrainian language press.39
Despite the restrictions, Russian-language and bi-Iingual print media have 
flourished in the 1990s. In 1997, 40% o f  all publications circulated in Ukraine were bi­
lingual, while the ratio of Ukrainian-language publications on the overall market fell 
from 60% in 1992 to 36%. At the same time, the ratio of Russian-language publications 
increased from 6% to 24%.40 By 2002, Ukrainian became the second language on the 
overall newspaper market (16 million copies a day) after Russian (25 million copies a 
day).41 42In 2004, an estimated 20% of the press remains bilingual, and Ukrainian internet 
users spend the same amount of time on Ukrainian sites as on Russian sites (30% 
each).4
During his first tenure as president, Kuchma did not perceive Russian 
publications as a direct threat to his presidency as they focused mostly on domestic 
issues related to Russia. However, during his second term, when Western and 
opposition criticism against his rule intensified, the independence of Russian-language
37 The Russian version of this paper was a flagship of glasnost in the late 1980s.
38 Data from Freedom House, 2003 Nations in Transit report
39 Op. cit. Ryabchuk (2004: 29), and Op. cit. Richter (2002:151)
40 Ukraina: Informatsia (1997), quoted in Op. cit. Richter (2002:139)
41 Source: European Journalism Centre, www.eic.nl. European Media Landscape, Ukraine (data for 2002)
42 Op. cit. Ryabchuk (2004: 9)
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publications became more tangible and problematic for the Kuchma regime.43 In 2000, 
the parliament continued to implement measures in support of Ukrainian media, and 
passed a tax-cutting package for Ukrainian-language publications. Also, Kuchma issued 
a decree providing financial assistance to Ukrainian book publishing. Further, in the 
run-up to the 2004 presidential elections, the parliament passed a law stipulating that all 
advertising must be published in Ukrainian -  an attempt to put all Russian and foreign- 
language (e.g. the English-language Kyiv Post) out of business. As a result of strong 
international criticism, this was repealed before being implemented.
During Kuchma’s tenure, all independent and otherwise affiliated media outlets 
were under permanent scrutiny and control, and no opposition political movement 
succeeded in building up a media portfolio that would challenge the president’s 
authority. The most prevalent methods of silencing critical, Ukrainian-language media 
outlets included administrative harassment though repeated inspections by various state 
and city authorities (i.e. tax inspectors, fire department etc.), the invalidation of 
registration documents, and the cancellation of printing or distribution contracts. The 
tax authorities alone eliminated 843 media outlets (both print and broadcast) in 1999- 
2000.44
In addition, public officials have been joined by the business community in 
blocking the development of media freedom through the abuse of the vague libel 
legislation. None of the basic laws (the 1992 Law on Information, the 1994 Law on 
Television and Radio Broadcasting, and the 1996 Constitution) distinguish clearly 
between the right to privacy of ordinary individuals and politicians, and the Law on 
Libel foresees no maximum penalty for libel cases. As a result, politicians and 
businessmen regularly filed claims for the “protection o f honour and dignity,” 
demanding excessive payments. During this period, libel cases comprised an estimated 
99% of all legal claims involving the media. In 1993, there were 600 libel lawsuits,45 
but between 1995 and 1997 (three years) the number of cases grew to 3,279. Of this, 
53% was approved by the courts, obligating various media outlets to pay more than 2.3 
million hryvnia (USD 1.3 million) in damages.46 The courts regularly ruled against the 
newspapers, even if there was no supporting evidence of wrongdoing,47 and the 
Constitutional Court supported this practice by ruling that it is illegal to publish any 
information at all about the private life of public officials without their express consent. 
(At the same time, officials who were often at the origin of leaking false information to 
the media for their own interests, remained unpunished.)
Thus, a glaring gap developed between the Ukrainian authorities’ practice and 
some of the basic libertarian freedom of speech principles, and in 1999, the picture 
looked even more dramatic. Ukrainian media were sued 2,250 times for the total of 
almost three times as much as the government’s annual budget.48 That year, the “moral
43 Kuzio, T.: Status of Russian language again threatens Ukrainian-Russian relations, RFE/RL Newsline, 
January 10, 2001
44 Ivanov, Valery: Ukrainian media in crisis. Lecture at conference entitled “Proliferation without 
pluralism. The state of media in the CIS in the second decade of transition.” April 9-10,2003, Kyiv, 
Ukraine
45 Op. cit. Richter (2002:136)
46 Totals have been calculated on the basis of OSCE figures. Source: “Freedom and responsibility”. 
Yearbook 1999-2000, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media
47 “Freedom and responsibility”, Yearbook 1999-2000, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media
43 Council of Europe Opinion: Freedom of expression in Ukraine, January 21, 2001
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damages” that the media allegedly caused by publishing information about public 
officials and businessmen exceeded 90 billion hryvnia (USD 16.82 billion).49 Over 70% 
of these cases are estimated to be groundless.50 The 2001 décriminalisation of libel did 
not change the fact that hundreds of media outlets are being sued out of business every 
year.51 Arbitrary tax inspections also continue, and critical media outlets are closed 
down regularly for “irregular” or “illegal” activities. A large majority of outlets chose to 
deal with this by increasing the amount of positive coverage on the tax authorities and 
its management.52
Thus, instead of it supporting a democratic environment, the key use of the 
ambitious regulatory framework has proved to be its abuse, selected application, and 
amendment without consultation (or often even without prior warning).53 The 
opposition has repeatedly raised concern over the authoritarian policies. Socialist party 
leader Oleksandr Moroz has been quoted as saying that Ukrainians live in an 
“atmosphere of information terror”, and the only objective source of information is the 
foreign broadcast outlets such as RFE/RL, Deutsche Welle and the BBC.54 In 2001, 
Mykola Tomenko, another leading politician, was quoted as saying that the authorities 
have initiated a “systematic, organised policy of censorship” in every region,55 
Meanwhile, former deputy PM and opposition politician Julia Tymoshenko asserted that 
“the first and foremost reform that has to be implemented by democratic authorities is 
that of the media. The success of all other reforms is a consequence of that.”56
Kuchma and his associates usually stayed silent on the subject, but on rare 
occasions, Kuchma commented on the matter, and used the opportunity to blame the 
existence of oligarchs for the state-of the media. In 1996, he was quoted as saying: “One 
has to admit that we do not have an independent press. Everybody serves somebody.”57 
Meanwhile in 2000, he wrote the following in a friendly newspaper: “Ukraine needs an 
efficient, non-partisan, truly free press. So far, it has been difficult to create the national 
information space because [...] some media pursue the goal of satisfying the interests 
and ambitions o f the clans rather than informing the public. The peculiar sources of 
media financing often determine the biased, partisan character of their activity. Such 
media often act unscrupulously, ignoring legal and moral norms.”58
49 Op. cit. Richter (2002:136)
50 Ivanov, Valery, Deputy Director of the Institute o f Journalism has been quoted as saying. Source: 
Paradoxes o f Ukraine’s fourth estate, May 8, 2000. Policy paper retrieved from Policy Documentation 
Centre, Centre for Policy Studies, Central European University, Budapest. Accessible through 
http://www.ceu.hu/cps/
51 In a positive development, IREX-trained lawyers have reportedly convinced the Supreme Court to issue 
instructions to lower courts to not positively discriminate against public officials in libel cases. Source: 
IREX, Media Sustainability Index, 2002
52 IREX, Media Sustainability Index, 2003
53 For example, in June 1999 the government unexpectedly increased tenfold the annual charges for radio 
frequencies. Agency rules were also amended for obtaining permits for the use of transmitters. This led to 
several regional channels discontinuing broadcasting.
54 Quoted by FRE/RL Newsline, June 15, 1999, addressing a nationwide conference of regional and local 
media heads in Kyiv on May 31,1999
55 Mykola Tomenko, head of the Parliamentary Committee on Freedom of Speech. Source: Kuzio, Taras: 
Ukraine: Media monopoly unlikely to secure succession. Oxford Analytica, October 9,2002
56 RFE/RL Newsline, March 13,2001
57 September 7, 1996 in a meeting with journalists on UT-1.
58 Kuchma in F akty  i kom en tari, July 8, 2000. Translation by Ryabchuk (2004: 15)
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During the period under review, there was no united opposition or alternative 
society which could have assisted the media’s growth by endorsing its democratic 
mission. Alliances between independent newspapers and opposition politicians were 
short-lived, as the term “opposition” often turned out to hide different meanings. The 
high-quality opposition newspaper Den is a case in point. Established in 1996, Den was 
one of the largest, government-critical newspapers in Ukraine. During its first year, it 
attracted USD 3 million from various opposition investors. Regardless of its relatively 
low circulation (58,000), Den was a key newspaper, as its high-quality reporting 
secured it an influential readership, primarily made up of politicians, decision-makers 
and intellectuals. Having remained sufficiently objective, at the start of the 1998 
elections, Den openly supported the former prime minister and Kuchma rival, Evgeni 
Marchuk. After Marchuk was given a high political position (by becoming Secretary of 
the National Security and Defence Council), the paper’s editorial board was fired and 
the paper was forced to abandon its criticism of the authorities altogether.
In 1999, the parliamentary opposition appealed to several international 
organizations, including the OSCE and the Council of Europe, expressing concern with 
regard to the media situation. The parliament noted that “on the eve of the presidential 
elections, the executive structures established total control over the Ukrainian public 
sphere and gave advantage to the coverage of the campaign of one candidate only -  the 
incumbent president -  by means of subordinating the financially strapped media to 
influential owners.”59 Ukraine’s handling of its media affairs has also drawn strong 
criticism from Western think tanks and advocacy groups, and worsened Ukraine’s 
bilateral relationship with various governments. In 1999 and 2001, President Kuchma 
was pronounced to be one of the worst enemies of the press in the world.60 The 
international community raised concern with the Ukrainian government several times, 
and the OSCE’s Representative on Freedom of the Media intervened to help various 
newspapers and broadcast outlets.
Western investment could have raised the production and professional standards, 
and ensure independence from local power groups, but this was discouraged by the 
general investment climate in the country. At the same time, until the 2004 elections, 
there was only limited démocratisation assistance available within the media sector -  for 
instance only an average 2% of the overall démocratisation budget was destined for 
media development by USAID.61 Meanwhile the European Union, which is the largest 
“democracy assistant” to Ukraine had not developed a separate media budget. A few 
influential NGOs -  such as the Renaissance Foundation, the National Endowment for 
Democracy, the Eurasia Foundation, Freedom House and IREX -  did receive funding 
from governmental sources (USAID) and private funds (Soros Foundation)62 but they
59 June 15, 1999
60 By the Committee to Protect Journalists, www.cpi.org
61 USAID report entitled “Ukraine media assessment and program recommendations,” 2001, available at 
http://www.usaid.kiev.ua/arc.shtml. The total USAID funds dedicated for media development during the 
period 1993-2003 was 21 million USD. Data obtained from OSCE Project Coordinator for Ukraine.
62 These were seen by authorities as ways of supporting anti-presidential and anti-oligarchic groups. 
Political elites thus accused the US government of “interference in domestic affairs” and of plotting a 
coup against the democratically elected president. Source: Kuzio, Taras: The internet and media freedom 
in Ukraine, RFE/RL Russia and Eurasia Review, July 8, 2003
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remained quite isolated and were often described as badly administered and corrupt.63 
Overall, the combination of the low amount of investment and the limited availability of 
Western media démocratisation funding (for training courses, twinning etc.) failed to 
develop a critical mass, which would bring about noticeable changes on the Ukrainian 
media landscape, which continued to be plagued by a strong economic dependence on 
elites.
Overall, the government policy on print media development has shown 
numerous contradictions, and has had an authoritarian flavour throughout. The 
structural transformation of the media sector occurred in a way that elements o f no 
macro-media theory could be identified, other than the authoritarian. The media sector 
has been plagued by multi-faceted problems of corruption, incompetence and a lack of 
security -  themes which will be discussed in detail in the “Internal aspects” section of 
this chapter.
2 .2 . T h e  B r o a d c a s t  M e d ia  L a n d s c a p e
Just like in Hungary, the broadcasting landscape in Ukraine was much slower to 
show signs of substantial change. In fact, from the point of view of ordinary Ukrainians, 
very little changed initially. Of the four nation-wide channels, the two Russian channels 
-  Ostankino (later ORT) and RTR -  continued to broadcast directly from Moscow, and 
the “republican” channels also remained unreformed, despite being renamed “state” 
broadcasters.64 In 1992, ORT had a 60% audience share, which prompted Kuchma, in 
1995, to switch its signal from the prominent first channel to the less widely available 
second, thereby cutting 40% of its potential audience.65
The 1993 statute On Television and Radio Broadcasting stipulates that all “tele­
radio organisations o f Ukraine [must] recognise the principles of objectivity, reliability 
of information, competency, guaranteeing to each citizen a right of access to 
information, free expression of their view and opinions, securing ideological and 
political pluralism.” It also stipulates that broadcast outlets must observe “professional 
ethics and universal moral norms”. These fundamental principles are applicable to both 
state-run and private broadcast outlets in Ukraine, and are supposed to provide a 
guarantee that all media outlets are impartial and provide audiences with balanced and 
reliable information that supports the democratic process.
The above media law hands control over media policy to the parliament and the 
president. Confirming the reluctance of elites to do away with state broadcasting, the 
law makes implicit references to the continuation o f state broadcasting, and equips the 
authorities with great liberties to run these operations. It also gives state broadcasters a 
priority in using national transmission networks. The designers of the Ukrainian media 
legislation received criticism from advocacy groups, as well as the OSCE and the
63 Interview with Ivan Lozowy, Editor of Ukraine Insider, and director o f the Institute for Statehood and 
Democracy, an independent Ukrainian think tank, March, 2004
64 One often cited explanation for the delay in achieving broadcast independence from Moscow is that the 
newly-established State Radio and Television Company of Ukraine (DRTKU) could not legally take over 
the Moscow-developed infrastructure for years.
65 The decision led to public protests especially in the East and in Crimea. Source: Op. cit. Richter (2002: 
146)
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Council of Europe, for placing too much stress on the responsibilities and duties of 
broadcasters, editors and journalists, as opposed to their rights. Clauses referring to the 
protection of “a person’s honour and dignity” -  just like in the print legislation -  and the 
invocation of the State Secrets Act have restricted the guarantees of freedom of speech 
and expression.66
In 1998, the government also created mechanisms for frequency allocation, and 
established the central regulatory authority, the National Television and Radio 
Broadcasting Council of Ukraine. The council was put in charge of developing “quality 
television and radio broadcasting, as well as improving the professional, artistic and 
ethical level of programs and broadcasts of television and radio organizations.” 
However, it was instructed by law to coordinate its licensing decision with the General 
Radio Frequencies Department, an office directly controlled by the government.67 This 
duality has allowed for political favouritism at the highest levels, and created a licensing 
system highly susceptible to corruption.
Thus, similarly to the print media sphere, the institutional and legal processes 
have failed to bring about a democratic redistribution and liberalisation of the state 
monopoly. From the outset, the authorities have made a conscious effort to keep a 
tighter control on broadcast media as the majority of the population get their news and 
information from television. (75% of Ukrainians say television is their primary source 
of news and information.68) As of December 2003, 830 broadcasting licences have been 
issued to television and radio stations in Ukraine. While many of these only exist on 
paper, it is estimated that 95% of all functioning broadcast outlets have been 
concentrated in the hands of political parties, local governments and oligarchs.69 70
Beyond the strict licensing mechanism, the operation of non-state outlets has 
been complicated by the fact that -  depending on the ownership profile -  the authorities 
have applied clear double standards. While state broadcasters pay only USD 200 for a 
license, private broadcasters are required to pay approximately USD 2,000. 
International programming is also discouraged -  according to the regulation, if a 
broadcaster applies with a programme package that includes over 20% international 
programming, it is obliged to pay USD 4000 (for the license) and if it exceeds 35%, the 
expected payment is USD 10,000.7° Just like in print media, this policy has led to 
instability on the market, and prevented the appearance of profitable commercial 
broadcasters.
Another problem has been that commercial television and radio stations have 
had to rely on state-owned facilities, which has meant that they can be denied access to 
frequencies, but also that a significant proportion of their budget goes towards paying 
for transmission, which leaves less money for vital technical and staff improvements. 
(As the government requires all broadcasters to have a licence for both a transmitter and 
a frequency, over time, it has become common practise that several different companies 
share the same frequency or channel.) Due to a lack of funds and technical skills, the
66 See Jakubowicz, K. (2001): Review and analysis of laws of Ukraine, for an extensive analysis.
67 Law on the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine, September 23, 1997, 
Article 28
68 Final election report, by OSCE/ ODIHR, 2002
69 “Under assault: Ukraine’s news media and the 2004 presidential elections,” A Freedom House special 
report, October, 2003
70 Op. cit. Richter (2002: 143)
quality of television quickly deteriorated on both the Ukraine-wide and local channels. 
The large majority of commercial channels only managed to provide imported (often 
pirated), badly dubbed “popular entertainment” of the lowest quality.
The 1993 law prohibits foreign legal entities or individuals from setting up 
television and radio stations, and from owning more than 30% of the authorised capital 
stock. (Article 13) As a result o f all the above restrictions -  not to mention the financial 
risks -  Western investment has been insignificant. The Central European Media 
Enterprises (CME) is the last significant international player in the country, but 
corruption accusations by rival clans have rendered its operation unstable. The story 
even made international headlines when it was reported that the company was under 
investigation in the US for potential violation o f the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, for 
allegedly having paid USD 1 million in bribes to Ukrainian officials to obtain the 
broadcasting license.71
In a fairly consolidated broadcast landscape, the three stations with largest 
coverage are UT-1, Studio 7+7, and the Russian-language Inter. These stations account 
for nearly 90% of television advertising profits, while the remaining 10% is divided 
among the other 827 stations. While the two privately-owned channels Studio 1+1 and 
Inter are popular with audiences (27% and 26.7% audience share respectively), the 
blatant political propaganda coming from UT-I only interests a meagre 4.6%.72 O f these 
channels, Studio 1+1 has a 95% coverage over Ukrainian territory, while Inter 62% and 
UT-1 over 98%. Whether private or state-owned, all three channels are controlled from 
the presidential headquarters. The list below collates the most important details about 
the three key television channels.
•  Studio 7+7 is a joint venture o f Central European M edia Enterprises73 (CM E), the 
Russian com pany Media M ost (owned by the Russian oligarch Vladim ir Gussinski) and 
several leading SPDU(u) politicians m aintain a financial interest. It won the right to  be 
the only private company to broadcast on Ukraine’s second terrestrial channel ( UT-2) 
after a controversial restructuring in 1997 which cleaned the station of critical voices.
• Inter replaced the Russian ORT channel, and is run by a Russian-Ukrainian television 
corporation and during the general elections it was a vocal supporter o f  the SDPU(u). 
In ter is ow ned by SDPU(u) figure O leksandr Zinchenko, w hile Viktor M edvedchuk, 
w ho is head o f  the Presidential Adm inistration also m aintains financial com m itm ents 
and influence.
•  M eanw hile, UT-1 broadcasts program m es o f the president-controlled National 
Television Company and several conform  private com panies {Era, Gravis, Alternativa, 
Studia Plus, Media Show etc.). During the 1999 presidential elections, UT-1 was the 
m ost important mouthpiece for the president, and the prim ary space to discredit other 
presidential candidates.
Regional stations enjoy a much smaller market share and largely broadcast 
programs relevant to local interests. The three biggest channels reach an estimated 25%
71 N ew  York T im es, J u n e  12, 2001
72 AGB television audience research company. Data collated between July and September 2002.
73 CME is a Bahamas-based, US-financed company, headed by cosmetics heir Ronald Lauder.
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of the Ukranian territory. Novyy Kanal has a 8.3% audience share, 1CTV a 5.8%, and 
STB a 5% share in the overall Ukrainian media market.74 ICTV was set up as an 
American-Ukrainian joint venture, but is today controlled by leading oligarch Oleksandr 
Volkov, who is also an adviser to the president. Novyy Kanal and STB are controlled by 
one of the wealthiest oligarchs -  Viktor Pinchuk. He also maintains heavy investment in 
ICTV, as well as the Dnipropetrovsk Channel I I , Ukraine’s largest daily newspaper, 
Fakty i komentariU and the Ukrainian News news service. Russian channels such as 
ORT, RTR, jV7V, and TV-6 air via cable and satellite and some programs are 
retransmitted on Inter and other regional companies.
While the bigger regional channels offer a relatively more diverse news 
coverage than the nationwide channels, no opposition television channel has existed 
until the 2003 establishment of Kanal 5. The license for this station was secured by a 
leading opposition deputy75 in an attempt to fight the saturation coverage for Kuchma 
and his sympathisers. For the moment, no exact figures are available regarding Kanal 
5’s audience share, but according to 2004 estimates it could be anywhere between 1% to 
9% of the population.
The Ukrainian language is somewhat stronger on the broadcast market, its ratio 
being estimated at 60:40 against Russian transmissions.76 This is partly due to the 1993 
statute On Television and Radio Broadcasting, which stipulates that all broadcasting 
must be in Ukrainian. The authorities however did not crack down on Russian language 
broadcasts for several reasons. First, the 1993 law does include a vague formulation that 
“broadcasts in certain regions may also be in the language o f national minorities densely 
inhabiting those areas”, and second, the Law on Minorities (1992), mentioned earlier, 
also provides guarantees for the use of minority languages. In addition, due to his 
dependence for political support on the communist left, Kuchma came into power on the 
promise that Russian would be elevated into an official language. However, he never 
lived up to this promise, and his language policies with regard to broadcast media have 
been as inconsistent as in the case of print media.
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The underlying “real” reasons have been partly different than in the case of print 
media. Given that the Russian-language channels came under the control of Ukraine’s 
new political elites, the “uncontrollable” nature of Moscow-based editorial offices has 
not been an issue. Instead, Russian was widely allowed to be used due to the business 
potential of the public demand for continued Russian broadcasts by both the Russian 
speaking and bilingual communities of Ukraine. Beyond the business considerations, it 
has been held important not to alienate the large Russian-speaking segment of the 
society. In the words of a Ukrainian journalist, the authorities have been “conducting a 
policy of appeasing everybody concerned”.77 78The prominence of this policy was highly 
evident during the 1996 privatisation of the ORT frequency, which -  even under its new 
identity “Inter” -  continued to use Russian as its principal broadcasting language. As a 
result, while state broadcasting gradually became dominated by Ukrainian language
stations, commercial stations have come to feature predominantly Russian.78
74 AGB television audience research company. Data collated between July and September 2002.
75 Petro Poroshenko is a parliamentary deputy within Viktor Yuschenko’s opposition bloc Our Ukraine.
76 .Op. cit. Richter (2002: 146)
77 Interview with Jan Maksymiuk, senior journalist with RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, August 2004
78 Op. cit. Richter (2002: 146)
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As the 2004 presidential elections approached, several public institutions 
expressed determination to strengthen the official, “Ukrainian-only” policy. For 
instance, in early 2004, the National Television and Radio Council adopted a resolution 
obliging all broadcasters to use Ukrainian as the only language of broadcasting and 
advertising. According to the text, the use of Russian would only be allowed in areas 
with significant Russian minorities.79 The decision also served to officially endorse 
Kuchma’s 2004 campaign “policy”, forcing all foreign broadcasts such as BBC, 
Deutsche Welle, Voice of America and Radio Free Europe off the air.80 In a market 
used to an “arbitrary rule of law”, this decision generated much controversy, and even 
though Kuchma is said to have ordered the implementation of the formal language 
policy,81 he subsequently denounced it, calling in “unconstitutional”.82
In the last few years, the authorities have consolidated their grip on the m edia by 
the use of so-called temniki, or secret memoranda, which are sent anonymously from the 
presidential administration to major media outlets. The word derives from the Russian 
phrase “temi n e d e ir  meaning “themes of the week”.83 These weekly memoranda 
provide clear instructions about which topics should be covered and how they should be 
presented in news broadcasts. They were first distributed to a limited number of pro- 
presidential media outlets in the autumn of 2001, but by August 2002, editors, 
journalists, and media analysts reported that the instructions were being sent to all 
existing television stations, as well as a few major newspapers.84 As a result, 87% o f all 
political coverage on the six major television channels are presented in a one-sided 
manner, i.e. only an average of 13% of all news programming contains references to 
actors other than the presidential administration and its supporting parties.85
The standard temnik is an 8 -10-page Russian-language document, which 
contains detailed instructions related to the week’s political events. The temnik format 
consists of several subheadings, which include “Theme of the week”, “Fundamental 
themes of the week”, “Ongoing themes”, “Controversy”, “Additional themes”, and 
“Potential themes” .86 The “Additional themes” section reportedly includes information 
on topics that should be covered or ignored on specific days of the week. The temniki 
also instruct editors to portray the president and the SDPU(u) favorably, and to avoid 
discussion of events that question his credibility. If a potentially controversial news item 
is deemed acceptable for inclusion in news broadcasts, the directives typically include 
instructions to avoid implicating the president. The instructions also often place a
79 RFE/RL Newsline, April 22,2004
80 February and March 2004. The programming of these stations were rebroadcast on two stations. Radio 
Dovira and Radio Kontynent. Both stations were forcefully closed down.
81 “National Council for Television and Radio surprised at Kuchma’s statement on “unconstitutionality” 
of air Ukrainianisation,” www.foreignpolicv.org.ua. April 23, 2004
82 “Kuchma decries Ukrainianisation of TV as “unconstitutional,” www.foreignpolicv.org.ua. April 22, 
2004
83 The existence of temniki was revealed by Mykola Tomenko, the chairman of the parliamentary 
Committee for the Freedom of Expression and Information, in September 2002. He directly connected the 
activation of the “temniki policy” with the appointment in June 2002 of Viktor Medvechuk as the head of 
the presidential staff. The temniki story was later brought to the world’s attention by a Human Rights 
Watch report on December 3, 2002
84 Human Rights Watch report, December 3,2002
85 Survey conducted between October 2003-May 2004, by the Academy of the Ukrainian Press and the 
Institute of Sociology at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Zerkalo Nedeli, June 26-JuIy 2, 2004
86 Op.cit. Human Rights Watch report (2002)
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“request to ignore” under topics related to the opposition, or they frequently call for a 
distortion in the presentation of the opposition to emphasize controversy and 
corruption.87
Despite foreign calls to abandon the policy, the authorities used the temniki up 
until the late 2004 elections, enforcing compliance through the intimidation of editors. 8 
The latter say that if they fail to respect the top-down editorial dictates, a host of 
unofficial sanctions are used against them, including arbitrary tax raids, defamation 
suits and sudden license withdrawals.89 At times, the government openly intervenes. For 
example, in 2002, several television stations that violated the temniki by choosing to 
cover an opposition protest that drew thousands in Kyiv were taken off the air 
simultaneously for several hours.90 One journalist has aptly said that the media-political 
situation has brought about the emergence of a “virtual reality” in news coverage in the 
place of real socio-political events.91 Meanwhile, another journalist described the 
situation as follows:
“In actual fact, television news coverage in Ukraine is made in a remote-control mode. 
Someone else, not journalists, edits news programs, shoots and disseminates videos, 
writes texts, and selects comments by politicians, which are subsequently sent to all 
channels. [..] Instead o f news coverage, Ukraine gets lies. Because every half-truth is a 
lie, and there should be no illusions about that.“92
Two Human Rights Watch reports93 dealt with the issue in great detail, but 
despite their revelation of implicating evidence, the authorities denied the existence of 
political pressure. The opposition initiated several parliamentary hearings and 
investigations into the case, and other questions relating to freedom of expression,94 but 
neither of these yielded tangible results. Meanwhile, resistance and organised action by 
journalists remained limited and narrow. In 2002, several hundred journalists signed the 
so called “Manifesto of Ukrainian Journalists Against Political Censorship,” threatening 
a nationwide journalists’ strike.95 96However, nothing ever came of the planned industrial 
action, and the great optimism which this induced9 was probably premature. Because of 
the fragmented nature of the journalistic community, little solidarity has emerged, and
87 Ibid.
88 “Lytvyn accuses UT-1 of temniks,” Ukrainska Pravda, October 3, 2003
89 Human Rights Watch report, December 3, 2002
90 RFE/RL Newsline, September 17,2002
91 Andrij Tychyna, a journalist with the Studio 1+1 Television (controlled by Viktor Medvedchuk) 
Source: Zerkalo nedeli, September 28,2002
92 Andriy Shevchenko, the Kyiv leader of Ukraine’s Independent Trade Union of Journalists, Source: 
RFE/RL Newsline, December 5, 2002
93 The December 2002 and March 2003 reports paint a detailed picture about the temniki policy.
94 For example, in December 2002 the Parliament gathered for a hearing “Society, Media, Authorities: 
The Freedom of Expression and Censorship in Ukraine”. More than 50 representatives from the 
government, parliament, and the media asked to speak at the conference. Source: RFE/RL Newsline, 
December 4,2002
95 RFE/RL Newsline, October 3, 2002
96 See for instance Stapenko, V.: Journalists stand against political censorship. RFE/ RL Newsline, 
October 11,2002
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apart from a few low-intensity protests97 -  no organised movement was on the horizon 
prior to the 2004 elections.98
The lack of commitment to democratise the media is also indicated by the fact 
that there has not been a proper attempt to transform state television into a public 
broadcaster. The parliament in 1997 passed a law On the System of Public Television 
and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine, establishing a legal entity with the status of a 
nation-wide non-profit, public service broadcaster. Based on the values represented by 
the social democratic media model, this system would be financed through a 
combination of license fees, advertising and state funds, with commercial revenues 
scheduled to be phased out over time. Comprising of a national television and one radio 
channel, the PSB has been designed to provide highly distinctive programming (third 
cluster in the McKinsey chart).
The parliament subsequently passed a bill on the creation of the PSB, making 
clear that it should be created in place of the state broadcaster, but the president vetoed 
the bill.99 Kuchma’s office also refused to provide funds and a frequency license, while 
at the same time sabotaged the establishment of the various councils designed to 
oversee the PSB’s work. Thus far, the law has not been implemented, and despite the 
Council of Europe’s offer of legal and financial assistance on the issue,100 not much has 
come of the cooperation. Except for the year 2001, the societal and political debate has 
been limited on the issue, according to several interlocutors.101 A search in the English 
language, 1999-2003 archive of the independent Zerkalo Nedeli newspaper gave zero 
results for the terms “public service broadcasting”, “public broadcaster” or “public 
media”.102
In addition to the above, a 2003 government decision to cancel limits on 
advertising revenues in the broadcast media directly contributed to the increase of 
oligarchic profits against the backdrop of deteriorating content quality -  further pushing 
the Ukrainian media landscape away from the possibility of public service broadcasting. 
Just like with the print media, instances of abuse and manipulation of the overall legal 
framework (including international legal commitments and national legislation) 
dramatically increase in the run-up to elections, confirming claims by the opposition 
and conclusions by international monitoring bodies, such as the OSCE and the Council
57 One of the first such protests -  the Wave of Freedom protest -  began in April 2000, after the local 
newspaper in Lvyv was obligated to pay a hefty compensation for moral damages for a 12-line note. In 
May the protest moved to Kyiv. 198 newspapers, 19 TV stations, 36 radio channels and prominent 
members of the Union of Journalists, and of the Parliamentary Committee on Freedom of Expression and 
Information, supported the demands for amendments to the legislation so as to specify an upper limit of 
compensation for moral damages and to introduce criminal liability of civil servants for deliberately 
preventing journalists from performing their duties.
98 Interview with Jan Maksymiuk, senior journalist with RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, August 2004
99 Jakubowicz, K. (2001): Review and analysis of laws of Ukraine, Analysis commissioned by the 
Council of Europe and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, pp. 33
100 Council of Europe, Action Plan for the Media in Ukraine, April 2001
101 Including Ivan Lozowy, Editor of Ukraine Insider, and director of the Institute for Statehood and 
Democracy, an independent Ukrainian think tank, interviewed in March, 2004
102 However, this could also be due to the unavailability of texts in English.
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of Europe, that the elections are not free and/or fair.103 In 1998 and 1999, the OSCE 
described the media’s performance “as one of the most important shortcomings”.
Upon significant Western pressure,104 the authorities in 2001 amended the 
Election Law to oblige the state-run media to provide “equal access to the media” for 
political entities during the campaign.105 This law obligated state-run broadcasters (the 
national UT-1 and local stations) as well as state-run newspapers (such as Uryadoviy 
Kurier and Golos Ukrainy) to grant equal access -  and allocate free time and space -  to 
all political contestants, and to prohibit state media to campaign for or against 
candidates. A  Central Election Commission (CEC) was set up to ensure the media’s full 
compliance with all media-related regulations. However, this exercise was not 
successful as the commission was not equipped to hold a large-scale, comprehensive 
media monitoring exercise,106 and decided to manage its mandate on a complaint-by­
complaint basis. The admitted “strong political parallelism” was indicated by the fact 
that CEC issued warnings not to media outlets but to political parties (primarily the 
Socialist Party, SDPU(u) and the Natalia Vitrenko block). At the same time, the 
commission refused to cooperate with international monitors, such as the OSCE, and 
declined to hand over copies of the media-related complaints, arguing they contain 
personal information and were subject to appeals.107
According to the OSCE’s media monitoring data,108 109the political campaign in the 
media somewhat improved over the 1998-99 performance but overall, the campaign was 
still biased and unprofessional. While more political information was available to voters 
through a diversified range of programming, most media outlets failed to provide an 
impartial and fair coverage of the campaign. Overall, the broadcasters did not provide 
the electorate with sufficiently balanced information about all political contestants, 
allowing voters to make a fully informed choice on election day.1 The performance of 
the broadcast media was described as highly biased, raising serious concerns 
internationally of a system which lacks both a rule of law and an independent judiciary.
The European Institute for the Media (EIM), a Diisseldorf-based NGO which 
also monitored the election, said that Ukrainian voters were “not well served” by the 
media, in terms of having access to impartial and balanced information about all 
political entities, and there were “clear and substantial violations” of the provisions of 
the Ukrainian Election Law, as well as the constitution.110 Media coverage on all three 
national channels -  UT-1, Inter, and Studio 1+1 -  as well as on ICTV, was found to be
103 Final reports by the OSCE/ODIHR are available at www.osce.org/odihr/documents/reports. while 
those by the Council of Europe are at www.coe.int
104 Even the United States Congress passed a resolution urging the Ukrainian government to ensure 
transparency and endorse the idea of “equal media access for all election participants”. The text of the 
resolution can be found at http://www.gop.gov/committeecentral/docs/bills/107/l/bill.asp?bi11=hres339
105 This, amended Election Law was passed by Parliament on October 18,2001, after five vetoes by the 
president.
106 A presidential decree, supplementing the Election Law, provided for the creation of an independent 
civic board -  composed of prominent and independent public figures -  tasked to monitor the media 
coverage of the campaign. In February, however, the president rescinded this provision.
107 Final election report, by OSCE/ ODIHR, 2002
108 Between 9 February and 29 March, the OSCE monitored seven television stations and 10 newspapers, 
using a qualitative and quantitative analysis methodology. From early March, the main news broadcasts 
of six regional stations were also monitored.
109 Final election report, by OSCE/ ODIHR, 2002
1,0 EIM, Final report, Ukraine elections 2002
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biased in favour of the “parties o f power” (United Ukraine and the SDPU(u)), and 
against the opposition parties. The print media also tended to be partisan and failed to 
distinguish between editorial opinion and news coverage.111
Another general complaint about the media, echoed by almost every opposition 
political party and block, was that negative and/or unverified information was 
overwhelming. The extent of the mudslinging campaign in the state media highlighted 
the fact that elections in Ukraine are more of a struggle between individuals than a 
competition between political platforms. One of the most frequent political party 
complaints (with the exception of Kuchma’s “For a United Ukraine” party) was that 
“administrative resources” -  i.e. state funds allocated to assist in acquiring political 
advertising -  were used in a undemocratic, unjust manner. Indeed, some argued that 
administrative interference in the media was far more severe -  one seasoned politician 
called it “brutal” ’-  in this campaign than in previous elections in Ukraine.112
2 .3 . T h e  C o n t r o v e r s ia l  E l e c t i o n  o f  2 0 0 4
By the presidential election in the autumn of 2004, popular dissatisfaction with 
the government’s conduct, societal inequalities and low living standards became 
tangible and loud, and the opposition mobilised large segments of society against the 
Kuchma leadership, particularly in the Western, Ukrainian-speaking part of the country. 
The election campaign proved to be very dramatic for media outlets and the level of 
media harassment was the highest of all post-communist elections.
Following an assassination attempt on the life of the main opposition rival, 
Viktor Yuschenko (who chose corruption as his central election theme), societal 
tensions raised and 64% of the voters expected the election to be rigged.113 After the 
second round of the election, in which the ruling authorities declared victory, the mass 
street protests by the opposition achieved a declaration by the Ukrainian Constitutional 
Court that the results were falsified. The so called “Orange revolution” , for which the 
opposition received assistance from both the US government and the former Serbian 
and Georgian opposition, continued amidst much controversy and international media 
attention, until the repeat elections in December.
In the run-up to this election, the opposition media became visibly more 
powerful. The news content offered by opposition websites significantly strengthened, 
the coverage of mass protests was available for millions through Kanal 5. Journalist 
strikes were regular amidst the campaign to annihilate critical media. In particular, over 
250 staff members at Kanal 5 went on hunger strike to protest the authorities’ attempts 
to revoke the station’s license and freeze its bank account. Even journalists working for 
the most rigidly controlled media boycotted the orders from above (notably Inter, UT-1 
and Studio 1+1), and many joined the mass protests, supporting an opposition *1
1,1 No national provision obligates the editorial line of private newspapers to respect the principle of 
objectivity. The only relevant mention in the Law on Print media is under “journalists’ obligation”, 
stating that individual journalists must “submit for publication objective and truthful information”.
Source: Law of Ukraine on Printed Mass Media, 1992, available at
http://www.articlel9.org.ua/indexe.html
1 u EIM, Final report, Ukraine elections 2002
m  Data by the Razumkov Center for Economic and Political Studies, October 2004
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victory.114 At C/7VZ, Kuchma’s strongest weapon, two-thirds of the news staff (14 
journalists) went on strike.115
3 . T h e  I n t e r n a l  D im e n s io n  O f  M e d ia  R e f o r m
The most imminent question that follows from the above discussion is to what 
extent the society and the journalistic community are capable of pushing for democratic 
changes from below. Unfortunately, the situation on the ground did not look promising 
during the period under review. As opposed to countries of the Central Europe (such as 
Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic) which had “liberal” publics, the Ukrainians were 
found to exhibit a strongly “statist” attitude in a 1995 survey, suggesting that people 
were more inclined to back government control than to support, and consume, 
independently produced media content.116 As a result of the undemocratic state policies 
in the post-Soviet period, the public’s relationship with the media failed to show 
tangible signs of improvement over the Soviet system. However, surveys show that the 
society gradually became increasingly informed, and by 2004, a large segment of 
society could pinpoint the exact source of their frustration with the media.
While in 1995, the Ukrainian public was not convinced that there is a need for 
an independent media system at all, by 2002, the majority of Ukrainians gradually 
developed an ability to “read between the lines,” 117 and instead of trusting the locally- 
produced content, many turned to radio for objective news. In 2000, the UK-aired BBC 
radio and the US-sponsored Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) were 
identified as the broadcast outlets with the highest credibility rating among all Ukrainian 
media.118 According to data from the European Institute for the Media, in 2002, 41% of 
the public expressed distrust in the media, and 65% were convinced that political 
censorship exists. The overwhelming majority (73.8%) believed that the media could 
not criticise criminal clans, the president or political institutions without retribution 
from the political elites. In addition, 71% of the public seemed to be aware of the 
existence of hidden advertising, and other corrupt media practices.119 120
While the public’s perception of the journalistic profession remained low, * 
concerns among journalists about safety issues protracted their professionalisation. 
According to Western watchdogs, Ukraine lost nine journalists between 1992 and 2002 
in work-related deaths.121 However, local officials put the estimate much higher.
114 See press release by International Federation of Journalists, November 23,2004
1.5 See press release by International Federation of Journalists, November 24, 2004
1.6 In the “statist” group of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, Ukraine scored the highest when publics were 
asked whether the government should have direct control over the media. According to the poll, 36 
percent of the respondents “agreed strongly”. Source: “Differing views on government control,” by 
Connors, S., Rhodes, M., and Warshaw, M. in Transition, October 6,1995
117IREX, Media Sustainability Index, 2002
118 March 2000 survey by the Gfk-USM company
119 European Institute for the Media (2002): Media report from the CIS, June 2002
120 The low level of societal appreciation for the media community has also been indicated by the fact that 
while over a hundred journalists ran for political office in 2002, only one was elected. Source: Ivanov, 
Valery: Ukrainian media in crisis. Lecture at conference entitled “Proliferation without pluralism. The 
state of media in the CIS in the second decade of transition.” April 9-10, 2003, Kyiv, Ukraine
121 This has been calculated from data in the archives of the Committee to Protect Journalists -  
www.cpj.org
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According to Ukraine’s ombudsperson, 36 journalists have been killed since 1993, 
mostly after investigating corruption within high-level political groups.122 The list 
includes Vladimir Ivanov, the editor-in-chief of Sava Sevastopol (1995), Petro 
Shevchenko, a journalist for the Kyivskiye Vedomosti (1997), freelance journalist Igor 
Hrushetsky (1997), Borys Derevyanko, the editor-in-chief of Vechenyaya Odessa 
(1997), Yuly Mazur, the editor o f the Russian-Ukrainian daily Yug (2000) and the 
victim of the most publicized murder -  internetjournalist Georgy Gongadze (2000).
None of the above journalist deaths have been resolved fully to date,123 and 
hundreds of media workers have been physically attacked and assaulted over the years. 
In most cases, the police decline to investigate what they call “make-believe” reports. 
This is not surprising for a country where many high-ranking officials have perished in 
countless “accidental” deaths.124 However, the intimidation and assault of journalists 
has reached unprecedented heights, and in particular, the disappearance of Gongadze 
widely exposed the extent of corruption, incompetence and criminality inside the 
Kuchma administration. The issue has become a major stumbling block on Ukraine’s 
road toward joining European security and political structures, and strained the 
country’s bilateral relations with several Western organisations and nations, it therefore 
deserves a detailed discussion.
3 .1 . T h e  G o n g a d z e  C a s e
Georgy Gongadze, an outspoken critic of the regime during his tenure at various 
radio and television programmes, disappeared in September 2000 after publishing 
several investigative reports on the manipulation of the April 2000 referendum to 
increase Kuchma’s powers.125 An accomplished journalist, he regularly published 
government-critical content in the first internet-only newspaper, Ukrainska Pravda 
(Ukranian Truth)126 despite several threats on his life. When his headless corpse was 
found in November 2000, a major cover-up operation began, which included the 
manipulation of forensic evidence, and even the murder of a crown witness.
A few weeks after the discovery, Socialist party leader Oleksandr Moroz 
announced in parliament that he possessed original recordings directly implicating 
Kuchma in the journalist’s murder. The 300 hours of secret recordings which were 
made by a former presidential Protection Service official contained an estimated 15-20 
minutes of conversations between Kuchma and senior officials (such as the Parliament 
speaker, the Interior Minister and the head of the Secret Services) discussing
122 Annual report by Ukraine’s Ombudsman, Nina Karpachova. April 18,2003.
123IREX, Media Sustainability Index, 2003
124 “If you think, don’t drive,” Economist, March 28, 2002
125 The April 2000 referendum sought a vote of no-confidence in the parliament, and constitutional 
amendments to reduce the number of deputies (from 450 to 300), to create an upper chamber in order to 
increase presidential powers to dissolve the parliament, and to abolish the deputies’ immunity from 
prosecution. Such changes would significantly increase the President’s powers over the parliament. After 
the Constitutional Court ruled against the posing of two other questions in the referendum, it was duly 
held and the result declared overwhelmingly in favour of President Kuchma’s objectives. It is uncertain, 
however, how quickly the “will of the people” will secure law through adoption of its recommendation by 
the parliament.
126 The launch of the internet publication www.pravda.com.ua was triggered by the switch in editorial 
policy on the daily Den (Day). See earlier explanation, in the print media section.
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Gongadze’s activities and plans to “do something about him”. The official who 
recorded the conversations fled Ukraine, and took the tapes to Harvard University 
where they are currently being analysed.127 Foreign forensic analysis has proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the remains were Gongadze’s, yet the body still has not been 
buried. Four years after the breakout of the “tape-scandal” or “Kuchma-gate” affair, the 
case remains unresolved.
The authorities’ obstruction of the long-running investigation intensified the 
political crisis, and created an international dimension to the affair. Several pressure 
groups -  including the International Federation of Journalists, Reporters Without 
Borders, and the International Press Institute -  called for an international independent 
investigation into the case.128 Some major reports voiced concern over the government’s 
handling of the investigation, including ones by the OSCE, the World Bank Institute, 
and the Committee to Protect Journalists. Ukraine’s already rocky relations with the 
Council of Europe, which had been considering its suspension from the organisation 
since 1998, also further deteriorated.129 On the insistence of the US ambassador, a team 
of FBI experts were allowed to advise the investigators in 2002. Those experts were 
sent home shortly afterward, having been denied access to any evidence in the case by 
the Prosecutor General’s Office.130
Political manipulation of the investigation was evidenced by the fact that -  
depending on who ordered the autopsy -  there were contrasting forensic results. It took 
almost three years, over twenty autopsies and three DNA tests before the authorities 
accepted that the headless body belonged to the journalist.131 132 As the case moved 
forward, harassment and intimidation grew against those involved. Gongadze’s family, 
and several medical experts and lawyers had to flee the country, following the fate of 
the security officer who made the tape recordings.
Despite evidence that the tapes implicating Kuchma are genuine, * Kuchma and 
his associates denied their authenticity. However, after several MPs came forward
127 The official site of the project is at httn://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/academv/melnvchenko/
128 See for instance the report entitled “Unity for justice: The Challenge of change for journalism in 
Ukraine. Inquiry into the social and professional conditions of journalists” by the International Federation 
of Journalists (IFJ). Published on April 3, 2003, the report is the work of IFJ general secretary Aidan 
White and John Barsby, the President of the National Union of Journalists of Great Britain and Ireland,
129 Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) Doc. 8666 from 14 March 2000 “Reform of the 
Institutions in Ukraine”. This followed PACE’s Resolution 1179 (January 1999) in which it expressed 
deep concern about the pace at which Ukraine is fulfilling its remaining obligations and commitments as 
a member of the Council of Europe. In particular, they made reference to the failure of adopting Protocol 
6 of the European Convention of Human Rights on abolishing the death penalty, the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages, as well as a new criminal code, a new civil code, a new law on political 
parties, and legal frameworks on the policy for the protection of human rights and on legal and judicial 
reforms. In June 1999, in its Resolution 1194, the PACE decided it would be start procedures aiming at 
suspending some of the rights of the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation. Since then, the Ukrainian 
parliament has adopted a new law on political parties, and ratified the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages. In February 2000, it also voted to abolish the death penalty from the criminal code, 
thus resolving one of the key issues threatening Ukraine’s membership in the Assembly.
130 A full chronology of events can be found in the Council of Europe report entitled “The case of Mr. 
Gongadze”, released on July 2, 2003
131 RFE/RL Newsline, March 12, 2003
132 They were pronounced genuine by the Dutch Institute of Applied Research before their release by 
opposition politician Oleksandr Moroz. Source: Investigating corruption in Ukraine. A case study of the 
internet journalist Georgy Gongadze, World Bank Institute, 2002
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testifying that their conversations on the tape were authentic, the case slipped out of 
Kuchma’s hands and generated even more societal upheaval. Eventually, Kuchma 
admitted mistakes in the handling of the case -  and fired several security officials as 
well as Yuri Kravchenko, the Interior Minister at the time. Meanwhile, however, the 
crackdown on the media continued and several other high-profile journalists were 
murdered. Mykhaylo Kolomiyets, the head of the news agency Ukrayinski novyny 
(Ukrainian News) was found hanged in Belarus in 2002,133 Oleksandr Kryvenko, the 
director of a station called Public Radio died in a suspicious car crash,134 and Igor 
Oleksandrov, director of the TOR Television (in Slaviansk, Donetsk region), was 
ordered killed by a businessman involved in organised crim e.135 In December 2003, 
Volodymyr Karachevtsev, chairman of the Independent Regional Union of Journalists, 
and acting editor-in-chief of the Kyrier newspaper, died under suspicious circumstances 
(Melitopol, Zaporizhzhya region).136 Most of these murders are thought to be ordered by 
businessmen or local politicians whose corruption affairs the journalists were 
investigating.
The developments revealed for many in the disillusioned society the scale of 
manipulation and political corruption, and the intense smear campaign between 
government and opposition generated a chain of conspiracy theories. According to one 
theory, Gongadze was killed by a “death squad” which had been set up by Kuchma to 
annihilate political rivals and other enemies.137 Kuchma’s counter-theory was that the 
murder, in fact, was organized by the opposition to undermine his presidency.138 Others 
believed that the affair was a US plot to replace Kuchma with then-Prime Minister 
Viktor Yushchenko -  a theory first put forward by advisers close to Russian President 
Vladimir Putin.139 In 2002, the new Prosecutor General general called Gongadze’s 
tragedy a “contracted, politically-motivated” murder140 and the Kyiv Court of Appeals 
opened a criminal case against Kuchma following charges by opposition MPs that he 
violated 11 articles o f the Criminal Code, including murder.141
Throughout the years, the Gongadze case became the most widely publicised 
CIS murder, leading to significant protest movements in Ukraine. According to a 2001 
survey, the more people were informed about the Kuchma-gate, the more they believed 
in the authenticity of secret recordings.142 The voters’ opposition to Ukrainian high
133 Reported missing RFE/RL Newsline, October 29,2002; found dead RFE/RL Newsline, 19 November, 
2002
134 RFE/RL Newsline, April 9, 2003
135 “Rybak ordered killing of Oleksandrov,” Ukrainska Pravda, September 26, 2003
136 OSCE press release, December 18, 2003
137 The existence o f “death squads” was confirmed by Ukrainian prosecutor-general, Svyatoslav Piskun, 
and Interior Ministry State Secretary Oleksandr Gapon in the newspaper Segodnya, August 1, 2002.
Gapon said the death squad includes the former head of Kyiv’s Interior Ministry directorate for the 
struggle against organized crime, another Interior Ministry colonel as well as several well-known 
criminals. Source: Kuzio, T.: Did political death squads commit political murders? RFE/RL Newsline, 
August 22, 2002.
138 RFE/RL Newsline, November, 2002
139 Kuzio T.: Is Ukraine any nearer the truth on Gongadze’s killing? RFE/RL Newsline, February 28,
2003
140 R F E /R L  N e w s l in e , S e p te m b e r  18, 2 0 0 2
141 R F E /R L  N e w s l in e ,  O c to b e r  15, 2 0 0 2
142 T h e  su rv e y  w a s  c o n d u c te d  on a  r e p re s e n ta t iv e  s a m p le  o f  1 ,8 0 0  r e s p o n d e n ts  by  the  N a tio n a l A c a d e m y  
o f  S c ie n c e s ’ In s ti tu te  o f  S o c io lo g y  in  M a rc h  2 0 0 1 . S o u rce : R F E /R L  P o la n d , B e la ru s , a n d  U k ra in e  R e p o r t,
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politics was represented by the one million “against all” votes in the 2002 elections and 
the high number of recent émigrés abroad (also one million).143 Kuchma’s “For a United 
Ukraine” party came only third in the March 2002 elections, receiving only 12% of the 
popular vote on national lists. It was only through the somewhat suspicious single 
mandate constituency votes,144 and their coalition with the SPDU, that they managed to 
stay the dominant force in parliament.
To improve their image, the government said they would solve the problem of 
journalist safety with the provision of weapons for journalists who report on politics, 
crime and corruption. By this controversial move, the authorities tried to heighten the 
perception that the negative developments in the media sphere are, in fact, outside their 
control. They attempted to blame the institution of organized crime, implying that direct 
responsibility eludes the state. The unorthodox solution to the complex problem was 
condemned by several advocacy groups, who called it a completely misguided and 
dangerous invitation -  an idea that would increase risks to the entire journalistic 
community. One group rightly said that journalism cannot be allowed to “become an 
armed struggle for the right to report.” 145 It was also suggested that Ukrainian 
journalists should have access to risk-awareness training, and that special security 
provisions, including armed guards if necessary, should be provided for media offices 
and targeted correspondents who request them.146
A review of the empirical evidence suggests that only few local journalists dare 
to stand up and loudly oppose political pressure and discuss issues which could be 
compromising for Kuchma and his associates. One of the most controversial stories in 
2004 -  the trial of former prime minister Pavlo Lazarenko147 in the US -  was only 
covered by two media outlets, a radio station re-broadcasting RFE/RL and the internet 
newspaper Ukrainska Pravda.148 But at the same time, the “yet silent” societal base for 
an opposition movement was substantial and growing. In February 2002, the biography 
of one of Kuchma’s fiercest critics, former Deputy Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, 
sold in 900,000 copies. “Unfulfilled Orders,” published by Taki Spravy, was one of the 
most successful books printed since Ukrainian independence.149
At the time of finalising this chapter, the Gongadze case was far from resolved. 
In June 2004, leaked confidential documents proved that senior government officials 
have obstructed the investigation, and that the cover-up even involved the killing of a
September 24, 2001. It also revealed a clear correlation between the level of respondents’ knowledge of 
Kuchma-gate and their readiness to take part in the “For the Truth” protest campaign of 2001.
143 “Stumbling along,” Economist, April 4, 2002
144 Ibid.
145 Press release by International Federation of Journalists, December 14, 2001
146 Ibid.
147 Lazarenko was prime minister in 1996-1997 and resigned under the specter of a government 
investigation into his wealth. During his tenure as PM, he was in charge of restructuring Ukraine’s gas 
industry which brought him over a hundred million dollars in private profit. Shortly after he declared his 
intention to run in the 1999 elections, he was indicted on corruption charges pertaining to the 
embezzlement of state funds, and was later extradited from the country. Upon his arrival in the US, he 
was put to federal custody, and has been in prison ever since. His trial is still ongoing. For more details, 
see Kane, J,: Lazarenko: The laundry bill, Transitions Online, June 11, 2004
148 Kane, J.: Lazarenko: The laundry bill, Transitions Online, June 11,2004
149 Krushelnycky, A.: Ukrainian publisher accuses Kuchma government of censorship, harassment. RFE/ 
RL Ukraine report, December 13, 2002
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key witness.150 The opposition registered a motion to impeach the president, and in 
response, the Prosecutor General swiftly announced that the assassin had been 
identified, and it was a convicted killer serving a prison term for multiple murders.151 152
Despite the apparent peak in this story, there seems to be a Western fatigue and a 
general uneasiness in continuing with investigations. Gongadze’s family continued to 
push Western governments, the International Federation of Journalists, and the OSCE 
Representative on Freedom of the Media to launch a new investigation into the case, but 
while the former do not wish to engage in bilateral action against the Ukrainian 
government ahead of the elections in October 2004, the OSCE and the IFJ do not have1 Othe financial means.
3 .2 . S u s t a i n a b i l it y  o f  t h e  M e d ia  L a n d s c a p e
According to IREX’s 2003 Media Sustainability Index, which measured five 
indicators,153 154 Ukraine’s media system is an “unsustainable, mixed system”. The 
country’s estimated 20,000 journalists constitute only a meagre 0.04% of the 
population. (The same figure for the UK is 70,000,154 or 0.11% of the population.)155 
The large majority of journalists started working without any journalism education, and 
those who have gone to university, have studied the Soviet-era curricula, which focuses 
on theory and ignores practical knowledge. The professional development of journalists 
was not encouraged by the quality of the workplace environment either, as journalists 
have not been given either the opportunity to master fact-based reporting skills or the 
chance to work in ethical, professional environments.
Currently, the large majority of Ukraine’s newspaper output comprises of under- 
sourced stories, mostly opinion or sensationalist pieces, which makes journalism a less 
dry, but equally as unprofessional and non-prestigious vocation as during the Soviet-era. 
There is also a tendency to make up stories and quotes, and even to publish biased 
public opinion polls that various political groupings had “ordered” in an effort to 
disorient the electorate.156 One of the pronounced goals of the new-era journalism has 
been to publish entertaining stories which are designed to titillate rather than inform, 
and it seems that there has been only limited interest in learning news skills.
Overall, the cumulative result of the intimidation, economic dependence and the 
inconsistent state policies has been an environment of excessive self-censorship. Over
150 “Pressure piles on Ukrainian leader after leaks reveal attempts to cover up killing,” The Independent, 
June 19, 2004
151 ‘K ille r  a d m i ts ’ G o n g a d z e  m u rd e r , J u n e  2 2 , 2 0 0 4 , w w w .p ra v d a .c o .u a
152 Conversation with Carlos Pascual, former US ambassador to Ukraine, Miklos Haraszti, OSCE 
Representative on Freedom of the Media, and IFJ representative Simon Pirani, July 2004
153 IREX’s annual “Media sustainability index” analyses freedom of speech issues, media pluralism, 
journalistic standards, financial sustainability and the efficacy of institutions that support the independent 
media system. The country-by-country analysis and rankings of these factors enable the MSI to uniquely 
compare independent media sectors in vastly different countries. Source: IREX, Media Sustainability 
Index, 2003, released in June 2004
154 http://www.holdthefrompage.co.uk/behind/analvsis/021205figu.shtml
t5S No reliable data is available for Hungary and Kosovo at the moment.
156 “Under assault: Ukraine’s news media and the 2004 presidential elections,” A Freedom House special 
report, October, 2003
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60% of the journalists admit to practicing it regularly.157 Media outlets are also 
opinionated and rarely separate news from opinion. With these patterns in mind, it is 
hard to estimate to what extent Ukrainian journalists have an understanding of the ideas 
that lie behind Western-style, fact-based, or even investigative journalism. The fact is 
that there is only limited investigative reporting and the so-called beat reporting practice 
(where every journalists specialises in 3-4 subjects) is practically non-existent. The 
practice of questioning is hardly known, and even during election campaigns, journalists 
tend to accept the materials they are given by politicians without seeking to challenge 
them, or to find their own sources of news.158
Due to the lack of training, as well as the political and economic pressure, there 
is little genuine initiative among journalists to work in a principled manner, promoting 
democratic values. But these difficulties in the development of professionalism should 
not be surprising. Ukrainian GDP has declined by 60% since 1991, living standards 
significantly worsened and the labour market situation has been described as 
“desperate” by the International Labour Organisation. Unemployment is estimated at 
20%159 and most unemployed do not receive unemployment benefits. Those who do, 
receive an extremely low amount of support.160 All this entails that leaving a relatively 
safe journalism job, even if it compromises one’s views or values, is a difficult decision 
to make. But in defence of the emerging and struggling independent outlets, it has to be 
underlined that for most of the 1990s, there was no solid political opposition which 
would have helped the media in achieving these goals. Without politicians or opposition 
public sphere elites, who would give their names to stories, it has been difficult to 
produce material that could be characterised as investigative or fact-based. It was only 
with the approach of the 2004 elections that a strong opposition seemed to surface in the 
media.161
Corruption within the media sector itself has also been high. As base salaries are 
low, most journalists stay in the industry for financial reasons, and not for intellectual or 
moral considerations. The pay system used at most newspapers supplements the base 
salary by a small payment for every story printed, and often an under-the-table, untaxed 
sum larger than the official pay. Even though that gives many in the industry enough 
money to live on, it keeps them financially dependent on the editorial preferences of the 
owner. While state journalists receive higher, stable salaries, journalists in privately- 
owned media make about USD 300 a month.162 As a result of this, hidden advertising is 
also nurtured by editors and journalists and is not considered scandalous by Ukrainian 
readers. (A worthy comparison here is the 1996 Hungarian investigative report 
mentioned in the previous section, which uncovered wrongdoing and generated a major 
scandal, hurting the reputation of all newspapers involved.)
137 Survey conducted in November 2002 by the Oleksandr Razumkov Center for Political and Economic 
Studies among 727 Ukrainian journalists. Source: Zerkalo Nedeli, December 7-13,2002
158 Final report by European Institute for the Media, 2002
159 With the official rate being 4% (source: Economist, Economic data on Ukraine) and the society’s 
perception being 40% {International Labour Organisation press release, August 23,2001).
160 International Labour Organisation press release, August 23, 2001
161 The website of Zerkalo Nedeli carries enlightening articles by opposition politicians and scholars 
regarding Ukraine’s political elites, http://www.mirror-weeklv.com/ie/elita/
162IREX, Media Sustainability Index, 2002
The existing trade unions are too weak to combat the chaotic working scene. 
Little or nothing is done to improve salaries and conditions in the workplace, and there 
appears to be no effective negotiating machinery. The National Union of Journalists, for 
instance, has lobbied for improvement in pension rights but there are no collective 
agreements and no industrial relations structure that provides for enterprise-level 
negotiations or agreements that will bring about urgent and needy changes in 
employment. Foreign journalists and observers living in Ukraine have stressed the need 
for improved education for young journalists, complemented by opportunities for 
training and internships in foreign venues.163
The various political loyalties, commitments and the competition for under-the- 
table revenues have created an environment where no professional solidarity has 
emerged. Observers claim that journalists have not developed neither a shared, healthy 
antagonism toward political elites, nor a democratic journalistic identity -  which would 
be the foundation of such a solidarity. Instead, various journalist “groupings” are 
settling scores between each other in a world where allegiances to politicians or 
business owners come first.164 As a result, the existing associations -  e.g. the Ukrainian 
Association of Television and Radio Broadcasters (an estimated 100 member outlets), 
and the Ukrainian National Press Association (90 member outlets), and the Union of 
Journalists, do not manage to get much done in reality. For example, they have not yet 
arrived at a widely-endorsed Code of Ethics. In 2002, there was a praiseworthy attempt 
by a group of well-known and well-respected journalists to create such a code, but the 
idea did not resonate well with the majority. Only 400 journalists ended up signing it.165 
Several international pressure groups have called for the creation of a professional 
journalists’ association that would function as a trade union.166
Also problematic has been the authorities denial of access to public information. 
A 1997 Law on Information obligates authorities and public offices to disclose all 
public information but, in reality, journalists are rarely granted access. Information 
management is weak, and public offices rarely store such data in an easily accessible 
manner.167 But when authorities are asked to provide information, they do so only to 
“friendly” outlets, while opposition newspapers are sometimes even denied access to 
press conferences.168 A 2001 survey into the availability of public information 
concluded that the authorities’ attitude is “disrespectful”.169 Denial of cooperation was 
particularly apparent when journalists requested information regarding illegal actions by 
law-enforcement agents. Reportedly, public information is not only protected from the
163 Kyiv Post, August 14, 2003
164 Mykola Tomenko, Director of the Institute of Politics, in Oligarchic solidarity vs. journalistic 
professionalism. In Den, September, 1999
165 Ivanov, Valery: Ukrainian media in crisis. Lecture at conference entitled “Proliferation without 
pluralism. The state o f media in the CIS in the second decade of transition.” April 9-10,2003, Kyiv, 
Ukraine
166 “Unity for justice: The Challenge of change for journalism in Ukraine. Inquiry into the social and 
professional conditions of journalists” by the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), April 3, 2003
167IREX, Media Sustainability Index, 2002
168 IREX, Media Sustainability Index, 2003
169 Conducted by the Kharkiv Group for Human Rights Protection, the survey collated information dated 
1998-2001 from central and local authorities on a large number of topics, e.g., on mortality and its causes, 
on the number of suicides, pensions and wages in various industries, on unemployment, on environmental 
pollution in Ukraine, on mortality and desertion in the armed forces, on the number of people infected 
with TB and HIV/AIDS, on the number of legal and illegal immigrants etc.
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electorate, but also due to the authorities’ fear of information manipulation by political 
rivals and oligarchs. The Soviet-era mindset to fear the society seems to have 
transformed into a fear of the rest o f the political elites.
During the 2002 general elections, monitoring groups have registered a slight 
improvement in election coverage, but that was mainly due to the existence of internet 
sites, and some Western-assisted projects i.e. the IREX-sponsored voters’ guides, which 
were ran a week before the election in nearly 30 newspapers.170 The print media gave 
more exposure to the programmes o f a wider range o f political parties than in the 
past,171 but the campaign continued to be reported in a passive manner by the majority 
of the newspapers, with limited or no theme-based and investigative reporting at all. 
Observers, however, also reported that the broadcast media provided a much wider 
range of material for voters than in any election before.172 In particular, the televised 
debates did represent a genuine step forward -  despite the complaints that the debates 
were “fake” or that opposition parties received less than fair treatment.173 Television 
stations were also encouraged to hold Western-style debates between candidates, on 
funds accorded by the International Renaissance Foundation.174
Due the scale of intimidation, the critical journalistic community is still a 
minority in Ukraine. Most of them work for Ukraine’s estimated 500 news journals that 
are published on the internet. Of these, several political journals are dedicated to critical 
analysis of the authorities’ activities, and to the provision of a platform for various 
factions of the opposition. Political online newspapers use professional journalistic 
techniques, i.e. more balanced structures in terms of sources and articles types (such as 
general political stories, interviews, analysis etc.). While traditional newspapers, such as 
Fdkty I  Komentarii focus mainly on officials and associated political events, online 
media outlets, such as Ukrainska Pravda, Korrespondent.net, mostly explore themes.175
The number of internet providers grew from 103 to 260 in five years (between 
1997 and 2002). However, the internet is not yet developed enough to maximise the 
potential impact of investigative reports. There are starkly different estimates as to the 
number of internet users -  with one survey alleging that about 1,25% of the population 
has access to internet (600,000 people),176 another claiming that 6,4% of the population 
(3.1 million people) are regular users,177 while some estimate that the figure is as high 
as 8% (3.8 million people).178 Either or, these are still relatively low figures to make a 
social-political impact on society. Service fees continue to stay relatively high (up to
0.70 USD per hour), computers are scarce, and the technical prerequisites (telephone
170IREX, Media Sustainability Index, 2002
171 Final report by European Institute for the Media, 2002
172 Ibid.
173 These complaints have been registered by observers such as the OSCE and the EIM.
174 The International Renaissance Foundation is a Kyiv-based charity, part of the Soros network. Together 
with the UNDP it operates a Civic Space Portal fwww.civicua.org) - an information resource toolkit that 
provides civil society organisations with an online platform for networking and information exchange.
175 See Krasnaboka & Brants (2002: 13) for results of the content analysis
176 “The internet under surveillance,” Reporters Without Borders, annual report, 2003
177 GfK-USM survey, quoted by Kuzio, T.: The internet and media freedom in Ukraine, RFE/RL Russia 
and Eurasia Review, July 8,2003
178 IREX, Media Sustainability Index, 2003
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lines, computers) are slow to spread. Ukraine received the 70th place on a list of 82 
countries, surveyed for “network readiness” in 2003.'79
Authorities, however, have considered the internet as a “threat to national 
security”, arguing that it carries a large volume of anonymous, unverified, and 
compromising material.179 80 To fight that threat, the authorities have stepped up their 
surveillance activity. Even though the first attempt failed (when Kuchma wanted to 
make the allocation of internet service provider licenses conditional on the installation 
of transmission tracing equipment181), the government set up an Internet department 
within parliament’s State Information Committee with the aim of “monitoring false 
news about Ukraine.” 182 A month later, a government decree put the department under 
the control of the secret police (SBU). From then onwards, the website and national 
domain administrator company has been controlled by the SBU. Authorities also started 
administering a database of “media criticism” against Kuchma, and have pushed plans 
that internet providers maintain information about site traffic (i.e. visitors) and condition 
their contracts on the users’ registration with the authorities.183
Several prominent websites have been closed down, but later restarted with 
foreign (mainly US) funding, and moved to servers outside of Ukraine.184 Despite the 
country’s twilight conditions for media freedom, there is evidence of an emerging 
opposition journalism movement on the internet. Several independent internet media 
outlets have become influential -  including Ukrainska Pravda, Korrespondent.net, and 
Part.org.ua. Some of these are so popular that many government officials are reported 
to begin their day by scanning their contents.185 At the same time, a study by Semetko & 
Krasnoboka (2003) indicates that sites of online-only Ukrainian newspapers are more 
popular than online versions of traditional newspapers. Another positive note is that, 
based on the number of hits, political party and politician websites are of least 
importance to users.
In the run-up to the 2004 elections, the authorities further tightened their grip on 
the internet. A new Telecommunication Law, passed by parliament in November 2003, 
gave the government unrestricted and uncontrolled rights to eavesdrop on internet 
traffic, through monitoring the activities of any Ukraine-based internet user.186 The new 
law foresees the creation of new supervisory bodies, including a “State 
Telecommunications Inspectorate” which would have the right to enter the premises of
179 According to the “Global Information Technology Report 2002-2003,” Finland was in first place, 
followed by the United States and Singapore. Among other Central and Eastern European countries, the 
Czech Republic ranked 28th, Hungary 30th, Slovenia 33rd, Latvia 38th, Poland 39th, Slovakia 40th, and 
Lithuania 46th. The Network Readiness Index (NRI) measures the degree of preparation of a nation or 
community to participate in and benefit from internet communication technology (ICT) developments, 
The NRI is composed of three component indexes which assess: the environment for ICT offered by a 
given country or community; the readiness o f the community’s key stakeholders (individuals, businesses 
and governments); and the usage o f ICT among these stakeholders. Source: www.weforum.org/gitr
180 Kuzio, Taras: The internet: Ukraine’s new samizdat, RFE/RL Newsline, January 4, 2002
181 The decree “On Licensing for Several Types of Business Activity,” was signed by Kuchma on June
27, 1999
182
183
184
The department called “State Centre for Information Security” was set up in January 2001.
“The internet under surveillance,” Reporters Without Borders, annual report, 2003
Kuzio, Taras: The internet and media freedom in Ukraine, RFE/RL Russia and Eurasia Review, July 8,
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internet service providers, and get its hands on all “necessary information.” In addition, 
a new law (awaiting passage in July 2004 when this chapter is being finalised on the 
Activities in the Area of Information Technology would obligate both Internet service 
providers and users to transmit only “true, complete and timely information.” Website 
owners would be forbidden from publishing information that “may impugn the honour, 
dignity, and professional reputation of individuals”; from “interfering in the private 
lives of citizens” ; or distributing “incorrect or distorted information.” Last but not least, 
the owners of websites would be liable for all damages caused by information located 
on their sites.187
The authorities, however, did not have enough capacity to enforce these 
measures, as shown by the dramatic growth of internet-based campaigning and 
reporting during the 2004 elections. As mentioned earlier, a great number of high- 
quality internet publications appeared (or were revamped to provide higher quality and 
English- language reporting) during the year -  mainly financed through US assistance -  
among them www.ukrnow.com. www.news.org.ua and www.elections-ua.org. These 
publications had a decisive impact on the way the Ukrainian election was covered 
internationally, and thus contributed to the emergence of a political obligation on behalf 
of Western governments to intervene in the falsified elections.
3 .3 . M e d ia  a n d  C o r r u p t io n
The combination of widespread cronyism, excessive state controls and a weak 
economic climate have resulted in an authoritarian-style media system which is unable 
and in most cases unwilling to hold authorities accountable to the publics. The degree of 
state capture by oligarchs and the widespread corruption in Ukraine has prevented the 
media from performing their basic democratic functions, and their role has been limited 
to being a passive platform for corruption trials between rival political and business 
groupings. This section will examine the state of corruption in Ukraine, in an attempt to 
reveal a further layer of complication protracting the media’s démocratisation.
For the past decade, Ukraine has been ranked within the top five most corrupt 
countries in the developed world.188 Despite the fact that a real increase in corruption in 
the post-1991 is impossible to measure, both administrative corruption and state capture 
are considered endemic by a number of perceptions surveys. The highest profile 
corruption cases included the alleged diversion of USD 613 million IMF funds to 
speculative government bonds by Kuchma and his associates (1997), and former Prime 
Minister Pavlo Lazarenko’s transferring of USD 114 million of public funds to US 
banks and brokerages (1996-1997).
According to the World Bank, Ukraine’s flourishing underground economy is 
estimated to be about the same size as the official economy, and the annual sum of total 
bribes equals the country’s trade turnover for a two-month period. In a 2000 poll, over 
60% of private individuals confessed that they had bribed officials to receive services to 
which they are entitled by law.189 Meanwhile, conducted jointly by the World Bank and
187 Ibid.
188 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2003 www.transparencv.org
189 Conducted in March 2000 by the Ukrainian Centre of Economic and Political Studies
EBRD, another survey revealed that 32% of Ukrainian businesses regularly pay bribes 
to influence public policy and public institutions.190
The roots of Ukrainian corruption are similar to those of other post-communist 
countries i.e. that wealth has grown concentrated in the hands of a narrow elite, and the 
phenomena has become an outgrowth of the struggle for control over key economic 
sectors. One o f the direct reasons for the proliferation of corruption in Ukraine has been 
the “over-regulation” of the economic and social spheres, which was purposefully 
designed to serve the political and business elites, and their manipulative conduct. The 
laws are non-transparent, often contradictory, and were created to confuse, rather than 
provide a ground for cooperation with the Ukrainian people and businesses.191 
Meanwhile, judicial review is weak, and salaries for public officials are low .192
In response to the pervasive levels of corruption, the leadership designed 
numerous pieces of legislation, and has launched several anti-corruption initiatives. By 
October 2000, there were 52 legal acts devoted to fighting corruption, including a 1995 
foundation law .193 The second major piece of legislation was introduced by Kuchma as 
a decree in 1997. 194 Designed to tackle corruption by strengthening institutional 
capacity (the court system and enforcement agencies), increasing legal capacity (urging 
passage of new anti-corruption legislation), and improving statistics about corruption, 
the decree heavily depended upon enforcement organs, such as the Office of the 
Prosecutor General, the Security Services (SBU), the Justice Ministry as well as the 
Interior Ministry. The authorities failed to recognize that corruption must be treated as 
an integral element of a systemic economic reform, and not a security and law 
enforcement matter.
Yet, this did not prove to be the most important flaw of the anti-corruption 
legislation. The common feature of all the above pieces of legislation has been that -  
similarly to the media-related legislation — they have not been implemented. The key 
stipulations have not been observed, and investigations into corruption by top officials 
that are undertaken by special parliamentary commissions, investigative journalists, or 
even the Audit Chamber tend to go nowhere. Like many freedom of expression and 
media-related pieces of legislation, the fight against corruption seemed to be part of the 
double-faced foreign policy by the Kuchma regime. The government was inactive in 
implementing programs which might have had a profound effect in curbing corruption,
190 247 businesses were surveyed in this joint report.
191 To start an enterprise, an entrepreneur must obtain 15 permits and official notifications from various 
authorities. In 1998, the number of laws and by-laws regulating taxation exceeded 600, while foreign 
investment is regulated by more than 130 normative acts. Moreover, more than 100 local and state 
authorities have the right to inspect enterprises and other legal entities (including NGOs). Sixty different 
authorities have the right to seize bank accounts, revoke licenses, or impose similar punitive actions. 
Source: “Nations in transit” report, 2001, Freedom House
592 “Nations in transit” report, 2001, Freedom House
193 According to the 1995 Law On Fighting Corruption, civil servants may not engage in profit-generating 
activities. However, the law does not provide an enforcement mechanism and contains loopholes that 
allow civil servants to engage in “creative activities” like research, consulting, and, lecturing. While top 
government officials formally resign their positions as heads of companies, they often continue to 
promote their interests through honorary positions. Source: “Nations in transit” report, 2001, Freedom 
House
194 Dubbed “Operation Clean Hands,” the decree was introduced on April 10,1997.
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such as tax, administrative and judicial reform, civil society development, and public 
awareness-raising.195
Over the years, corruption has become a state-sponsored phenomenon, used to 
control society through the surveillance and blackmail of political and business elites. 
Just like in the media realm, anti-corruption laws have been abused for purposes of 
political and business rivalry. In the absence of a rule of law, the efforts to strengthen 
the state in order to eradicate corruption have only heightened the selective enforcement 
effect of the laws. As Darden asserted (2003) the “intertwined trinity of pervasive 
corruption, state surveillance and systematic blackmail have become powerful levers of 
state control -  leading to a situation in which the law and the formal trappings of 
democracy serve merely as a facade behind a potent, and hierarchical state command 
structure.”
Over the years, Darden’s analysis and assessment of the corruption patterns in 
Ukraine have become widely valued and quoted. Among others, he has argued that after 
1991, corruption and illegality among the elite continued to stay accepted and even 
encouraged by the top leadership, resulting in a general atmosphere of impunity. Added 
to this came an extensive state surveillance by offices directly under the control of the 
president, including the tax authority, the interior ministry, and the secret police. These 
accumulated files and criminal cases that document wrongdoing on the part of 
officeholders or private actors, are used whenever compliance with certain state 
directives is required. Any non-complying member of the political or business elite is 
presented with a file containing compromising materials (called kompromat) or 
evidence of wrongdoing, with the implicit or explicit threat that a sudden decision to 
enforce the law would lead to the imprisonment of the individual in question.
If blackmail is insufficient, individuals or groups that openly oppose the policies 
of the state suddenly find that the veil of impunity has been lifted and the blackmailing 
powers use the media to emphasise that point. The kompromat files are made public, 
and non-compliant individuals and their organizations immediately find themselves 
under close scrutiny or prosecution by the tax inspector, the law enforcement bodies, or 
other state institutions. But as long as consistent compliance with state directives is 
maintained, the state’s role amounts to no more than surveillance, blackmail, and, in 
some cases, a cut of the proceeds. The mere threat of exposure and prosecution serves to 
keep the elite firmly under control.
The secret recordings of the Kuchma-gate scandal provide ample evidence of the 
existence of this system. Several recordings suggest that individuals were allowed, if not 
encouraged, to steal from the state bodies and enterprises under their control, and the 
state even intervened to assist the perpetrators in covering their tracks. Such protection 
would be withdrawn in the event that an individual became a political threat. The long 
list of examples of such incidents includes the high profile case of Pavlo Lazarenko and 
Yuliya Tymoshenko.196
195 “Review of the Progress in Combating Corruption in Ukraine,” an independent report by the Ukrainian 
Integrity Program, Ukrainian Legal Foundation, Kyiv, August, 1998
196 Tymoshenko replaced Lazarenko as the head of Unified Energy Systems (UES), Ukraine’s principal 
energy importer, and later became a deputy prime minister under Prime Minister Yushchenko. Her 
personal wealth is estimated at 1 billion USD, and she was imprisoned for a month on charges of fraud
The use of blackmail as a tool for securing compliance was not limited to 
powerful individuals. In the 1999 presidential elections, lower-level officials throughout 
the country were blackmailed and threatened with the selective enforcement o f the law 
by the state authorities to secure Kuchma’s victory. According to the OSCE, 
“interference in the election campaign by state officials, public institutions and their 
workforce was widespread, systematic, and coordinated.” 97 The use of blackmail to 
force lower-level officials to work on Kuchma’s behalf appears to have been 
remarkably successful. Kuchma won the election after beginning with an approval 
rating in the single digits.
All in all, the authorities have created a system characterised by a “rule through 
law” (borrowing a term from Stephen Holmes), and while all political elites and 
business oligarchs are interested in keeping a status quo of this systematic corruption, 
with the media and its mobilising and awareness raising powers disabled, the only 
potential critics of the system could be the representatives of civil society. However, 
Ukraine’s civil society is still relatively dysfunctional, and the broader population is 
fragmented, uninformed and untrusting of most politicians.197 98 These mostly apolitical 
masses have few non-political representatives that are willing to fight the all-powerful 
political elites. The only leaders who could bring about change are also power-seeking 
politicians, but at least those have realised that Ukraine cannot sustain the international 
isolation much longer, and some form of démocratisation is the only alternative.
Gongadze’s murder suggests that Kuchma and his government reached a state of 
paranoia, fearing that the “political balance” they had created might be upset by a few 
investigative reports. Kuchma has been described as a man who “fears journalists who 
criticize him,” a man who “personally fights people.” 199 More broadly, the scandal has 
exposed the glaring gap between the official and real communication patterns of the 
political elites -  a culture of virtual politics where a public world of gesture masks an 
alternative reality of private intrigue and complicity. It has confirmed that 
démocratisation in Ukraine exists only on the surface, and behind the official historical, 
cultural and targeted political connection to Europe, there is a backward, Soviet-style 
political culture.
With reference to the media’s role in reporting and curbing corruption, it has 
been pointed out that the media’s attempts at uncovering corruption scandals have 
added to the societal perception of the extent of the problem. (Zyla, 1999: 249) This 
might be true, given that more transparency generates more public knowledge and more 
negative perception of wrong-doing, but it is even more important to look at the 
authorities attempts to suppress the media’s coverage of such affairs. Most newspaper 
and broadcast outlets which have revealed corruption stories involving pubic officials, 
local municipality wrong-doing or dirty affairs by businessmen, have been harassed,
and embezzlement in 2001. The alleged mismanagement occurred during her tenure as head of UES, and 
involved cooperation with Lazarenko.
197 OSCE/ ODIHR final election report entitled “Ukraine Presidential Elections, October 31 and 
November 14, 1999”. www.osce.org/reports
198 According to a 2002 poll, 92% of Ukrainians feel that they have no influence over the authorities. The 
same number believe human rights are routinely infringed upon and 80% feel their standard of living has 
worsened since 1990, while 72% want Kuchma to resign and 52% would support his impeachment. Data 
by Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies.
199 RFE/RL Ukrainian Service interview with Mykola Melnychenko, aired in Ukrainian, December 29, 
2001
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their editorial boards forcefully changed, or shut down. Every investigative report 
published in the media has met with aggressive antagonism from the world of politics 
and business.
Since 1998, Ukraine had been criticised by the Council of Europe for its lack of 
respect for civil liberties and human rights and for failing to meet its obligations to the 
organisation, such as the abolishment of the death penalty. Following the disgraceful 
presidential election of 1999 and alarmed by the pending, unconstitutional referendum, 
there was a formal initiative within the Council in 2000 (before Gongadze’s murder) for 
Ukraine’s membership to be suspended. A year later, stung by the Ukrainian executive’s 
“repeated aggression against and continuing intimidation of journalists, members of 
parliament, and opposition politicians” and the lingering failure to reform the civil and 
criminal codes, the same committee recommended Ukraine’s expulsion from the
organisation -  a sanction unprecedented in the Council of Europe’s fifty-year. „ 200 ex istence.
In a scathing report, published shortly before the Kuchma-gate revelations, a 
Council of Europe committee wrote that “geopolitics will no longer be perceived as a 
reason for patience if Ukraine does not rapidly introduce a new style of politics and 
serious reforms.” But instead of suspending Ukraine’s membership, the Council 
approved an “Action Plan” to urge Ukraine to implement its legal framework for the 
media and to promote substantial changes in the media culture of its officials and 
journalists,20 01 Concerned over the extent of censorship, the Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) launched a monitoring project, studying broadcast 
coverage and the implementation o f media policy.202 The EU also released several 
statements on the media situation in Ukraine and called on the authorities to implement 
media legislation in accordance with OSCE and Council o f Europe standards. It also 
called on authorities to refrain from any action that amounts to undue influence on 
journalists and owners of media outlets or to restrictions of journalists’ professional 
rights and freedoms.203
But these diplomatic calls did not have much resonance in Ukraine and the 
Council of Europe’s investigation received much criticism by both domestic and 
international observers. The final report, which seemed to take the side of the Ukrainian 
authorities and concluded that there was not enough evidence to implicate Kuchm a,204 
was attacked among others by the UK National Union of Journalists who called it a 
“shameful failure” and “pitifully inadequate”.205 Meanwhile, Reporters Without Borders 
described the report as “a mere whitewash of the errors of the former Prosecutor 
General [Mykhaylo Potebenko] and an unjustified statement of confidence in his
200 “Honouring of obligations and commitments by Ukraine”, Report by the Committee on honouring of 
obligations and commitments by member states of the Council of Europe, Doc. 9030, April 9,2001, 
available from www.coe.int
201 “Action Plan for Ukraine,” Council of Europe, 2001, available from www.coe.int
202 A n n o u n c e d  in  O c to b e r  2002 . “P A C E ’s S e v e r in se n  to  lo o k  in to  s i tu a t io n  in  U k ra in e” , a rt ic le  a v a ila b le  
a t  w w w .fo re ig n p o lic v .o rg .u a
203 European Union statement. Permanent Council, No. 420, November 14, 2002
204 Report by Hans Christian Krueger for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, entitled 
“The case of Mr. Gongadze”, released on July 2, 2003
205 “NUJ Slams Council of Europe over Ukraine Report,” August 15, 2003, article available at 
www.foreignDolicv.org.ua
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successor [Svyatoslav Piskun]”.206 In the aftermath of the report’s release, Transitions 
Online described the Council as a “watchdog with few teeth” and an organisation that is 
“half-blind, weak, and outsized.207 208 While these might be exaggerated, they aptly 
illustrate the degree of emotions which have been generated by the Gongazde scandal in 
both Ukraine and the West.
Ukraine’s early admission was a conscious policy to encourage democratic 
development, but the above analysis suggests that the benevolent measure could have 
backfired. The Council’s own admission of this has been indicated through the various 
recommendations issued regarding Ukraine. The issue of lowering human rights 
standards for the admission of new states has been a long-standing dispute within the 
ranks of the Council of Europe, and even led to the resignation of the institution’s 
secretary general (Peter Leuprecht) in 1997.
4. C o n c l u s i o n
The media sector in Ukraine has undergone tremendous transformation between 
1991 and 2004, both in terms of its structure, organisation, legal and financial 
environment. Formal censorship was abolished at the end of the Soviet era, and 
independence brought with it a measure of media pluralism, and an ambitious legal 
framework to support liberalisation and media démocratisation.
However, to date, few constructive policies have been implemented. While in 
most countries of Central Europe, privatisation and liberalisation have proved effective 
ways to ease coercive control, in Ukraine this has produced the opposite effects -  during 
his presidency between 1994 and 2004, President Kuchma built up a regime in which a 
handful of government-leaning financial and political groups have acquired an 
estimated 95% of all media outlets. Western investment was limited, and the 
development o f the new political party system and more generally the redistribution of 
power and wealth went side by side with the establishment of new media empires. As a 
result strong political parallelism developed on both the print and broadcast segments.
There is widespread evidence that the media sector has been manipulated to 
serve solely presidential and oligarchic interests while ignoring or stifling the voices of 
the fragmented political opposition or the needs of the society. The administration of 
president Kuchma has been criticised for explicit violations of press freedom by issuing 
instructions on how the media, in particular, television, may cover news. Although 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression are in place, in practice, the exercise 
of journalism takes place in poor and unprofessional conditions, where editorial and 
journalistic pluralism has never fully developed. As a result, the media have become so 
dependent on the elites for their survival that the media landscape has become 
integrated with the political and economic sphere, rather than civil society. Its structure 
has developed in a way that it not only fails to represent civil society, but shows limited
206 “Reporters Without Borders Condemns PACE Report on Gongadze Case,” August 21,2003, article 
available at www.foreignpolicv.org.ua
207 Transitions Online: Editorial: The dead, the bad and the ugly. August 25, 2003
208 PACE Recommendation 1451 (2000) on the Reform of the Institutions in Ukraine; Council of Europe 
Resolution 1239 (2001 ) on the “Freedom of Expression and the Functioning of the Parliamentary 
Democracy in Ukraine” ; PACE Recommendation 1497 (2001 ); Council of Europe Resolution 1262 
(2001); PACE Recommendation 1538 (2001).
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capacity to develop such potential any time soon. The media system remained a 
hierarchical, bureaucratic establishment, in which elaborate procedures have been 
developed to block the emergence of independent initiatives.
Numerous press freedom violations have been documented over the years -  
among them newspaper and broadcast office closures, assault on hundreds of media 
staff, as well as the murdering of a number of journalists investigating allegations of 
corruption. There have also been a massive number of libel suits against media 
organisations and individual journalists, claiming unrealistic amounts of compensation, 
threatening the survival of independent media enterprises. There is also a profound lack 
of transparency and openness in government, despite promises to guarantee the right of 
access to official information. The power struggle for and within the media has been 
much more open and aggressive than in the case of Hungary -  leading to a growth in 
cynicism, disenchantment and confusion in the public.
Up until the dramatic election of 2004, which witnessed the long-awaited victory 
of a more democratic-minded politician and the departure of Kuchma from the political 
scene, the myriad questions surrounding media freedom served as a Litmus test 
regarding the political elites’ commitment to democratic values and the overall 
transition process. At this point of change, the media system is no longer structured 
along the Soviet model but only very few members of the political and business elite 
have developed a commitment to the démocratisation of the media sphere. Despite 
public pronouncements and legislation, the real driving force behind media policy 
seems to have been the desire to exercise control and -  ultimately -  to attain power and 
personal gain. One possible and often-cited explanation for this blatant failure is that 
Ukraine has virtually no experience of being an independent or democratic state, and 
that until very recently, it lacked a viable democratic political force. As the Hungarian 
case showed, both a united democratic opposition and a bold civil society are essential 
ingredients in generating a critical mass that would drive democratic change, including 
media reform, from below.
Our methodological “Four theories” hypothesis seems to have failed in this 
context as neither the libertarian nor the social democratic models could be identified in 
policy measures or debates. Given that financial interests proved more important than 
political loyalties in determining the relationship between political elites and the media, 
the same applies for the development assistance model. Instead, Ukraine’s post-Soviet 
media system has been a unique version of the authoritarian model where state 
interference and financial dependence on a few powerful individuals have entirely 
subordinated the media to the ruling class. Between 1990 and 2004, a new form of 
repressive regime was in the making, based neither on ideological nor a military force, 
but on the power secured partly through the media system.
The changes that occurred in the media landscape during this period therefore 
should not be classified as “media démocratisation”, but rather as a renegotiation o f the 
media power relations between the political and business elites, with the exclusion of 
civil society. At the same time, Ukraine’s declared interest in integrating with the West, 
and its high dependence on foreign assistance and investment, have created a strong 
negotiating position for the West to encourage media reforms. Several human rights 
groups and independent analysts have argued that Western governments and 
organisations should have done more to “blackmail” the Kuchma regime into softening
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its authoritarian policies. Overall, more liberalisation, with simultaneous emphasis on 
principles of the social democratic model, would be key to achieving a more free and 
democratic media landscape.
Given the solidity of the structural arrangements that have developed due to the 
oligarchic ownership patterns, I would argue that even a more democratic-minded 
government will find it difficult to launch genuine démocratisation. In theory, there 
would be two fundamental avenues to proceed on. One could be described as a 
“domestic” aspect, involving the bottom-up creation of an enabling environment which 
is more supportive of media démocratisation. This would require the development of 
elite support for the rule of law, the restructuring of the state portfolio (including the 
creation of a public service broadcaster), and the allocation of public funds to support 
quality media outlets. Yuschenko’s governance will undoubtedly bring positive change 
and advance the democratic development of the media, but correcting the current 
structural problems will only be possible if there is stable democratic commitment on 
behalf of the majority of political elites. This might change if the 2006 parliamentary 
elections are also won by democratic-minded politicians.
However, there is little evidence that such a stable commitment could fully 
develop in Ukraine any time in the foreseeable future. The domestic aspect would also 
involve a push by journalists for an enhanced status, and for improved working 
conditions, as well as a campaign for a comprehensive media reform, including the 
clarification and consistent implementation of the legal framework. There is also a need 
for a new media ethics commission, and the strengthening of journalist trade unions. 
These democratic initiatives will have to be performed by the local political and 
journalistic community. Thus, the future shape of the Ukrainian media depends not only 
upon Yuschenko’s willingness and ability to reform but on the existence of a society­
wide consensus.
Meanwhile, a second avenue to advance media démocratisation would be an 
external aspect. In this context, foreign ownership would be fundamental to import 
high-level production standards and journalistic values, and to lift the direct political 
pressure that is currently exercised by oligarchs. This external aspect would also involve 
more pressure, and conditioned financial assistance on behalf of Western governments 
and international organisations. A combined increase in Western investment and well- 
administered aid could help to reach the desired critical mass quicker, and thus facilitate 
the beginning of a real media démocratisation process.
The idea of increased foreign assistance of course raises multiple questions 
about whether certain values of media freedom may be imposed from the outside. This 
deserves a closer examination, especially in cases where such support is excessive. In 
the following chapter, I will examine the Kosovo experience, the largest international 
media démocratisation effort yet, in the hope of finding an answer to the often raised 
question about whether extensive international involvement in media reform is 
conducive for a country in transition.
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Chapter V.
Case Study Of Kosovo
Frequent abbreviations
IMC Independent Media Commission
IREX International Research and Exchanges Board
LDK Democratic League of Kosovo
PDK Democratic Party of Kosovo
AAK Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
RTK Radio Television Kosovo
SRSG Special Representative of the UN Secretary General
TMC Temporary Media Commissioner
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
This chapter continues the detailed discussion regarding the issues confronting 
the media reform process, in both the external and internal dimensions. It will cover 
media-related developments both prior to, and after the 1999 military intervention, but 
will focus on the policy decisions adopted during the first five years of the U N ’s 
authority (1999-2004). Kosovo is possibly the best case study among the three, as 
various stakeholders often openly clashed over the applicability of different media 
theories. Beyond analysing the background and application of the various media 
theories, the discussion in this chapter will be widened to include an evaluation o f the 
emerging media landscape’s compatibility with the new political power-sharing system.
Since 1999, the International Community has been trying to create a democratic 
political system which matches Kosovo’s multi-ethnic make-upr and Western standards 
of political representation. Similarly to the neighbouring, ethnically divided societies of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, the assumption in Kosovo has been that the 
principle of majority rule might harbour the danger that minorities are overruled or 
disadvantaged. To prevent the occurrence of such developments, political institutions 
have been designed in a way that they assure a parity of esteem on all levels of the 
political system. Kosovo’s power-sharing arrangement was designed to empower all 
ethnic groups and to encourage the development of a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual state, in 
which all citizens have the right to education, media, health-care and public services in 
their own languages. Yet, in reality, the societal interaction between different ethnic 
groups remained limited during the period of review, and only those parts o f the 
arrangement seemed functional which apply to public employees (parliamentary 1
1 Of the estimated 2 million inhabitants, 1,8 million are Albanians, 130,000 are Serbs, 35,000 are Turks, 
40,000 are Bosniaks, 15,000 are Goranis, while 35.000 are Romas, Ashkalies and Egyptians. Over one- 
third of the Serbian community live in the north of Kosovo where Serbs are a majority, while under two- 
thirds live in Albanian-dominated part of the province, scattered around in enclaves. Sources: OSCE 
report of the “Status of minority media in Kosovo“, May 2002, and European Stability Initiative: ‘The 
Lausanne Principle. Mulliethnicity, territory and the future of Kosovo’s Serbs,“ June 7, 2004, 
www.esiweb.org.
procedures, public service institutions etc.), but not those which seek to extend the 
concept of multi-ethnicity and inclusiveness to the wider society, (i.e. education, health 
care, policing etc.)
Societal perceptions are crucial for the long-term success of any power-sharing 
arrangement, and in this context, the emerging media system provides a useful angle on 
the perceptions, realities and the societal endorsement of a structure that was imposed 
by the international community. A democratic, representative media system would 
undoubtedly contribute to the success of political power-sharing structures, and its 
development path is symbolic of the willingness of the ethnic groups to participate in 
the creation of a joint state. Alternatively, it could also signal major structural problems 
within a vulnerable democracy.
Throughout South Eastern Europe, the overall democracy assistance project has 
been complicated by conceptual divisions regarding the definition of an effective civil 
society, good governance and an independent media system, between both various 
donor countries, and donor countries and locals themselves. This conflict has created 
considerable confusion and undermined the effectiveness of aid programs aimed at 
strengthening these fragile democracies.2 In addition, the methodologies and priorities 
of media démocratisation were not carefully elaborated, and only limited assessment of 
such projects was performed, making it difficult for various democratising actors to 
share information within one recipient country, or to transfer know-how and “lessons 
learnt’* to other countries.
In addition, Kosovo’s media reform was complicated by the legacy of the 
coercive structures imposed by the Milosevic regime in the 1990s, as well as the 
trauma3 of 15-month ethno-political conflict.4 These experiences initially led many 
media outlets toward adopting a mandate which campaigns for Albanian independence 
and serves as a primary platform for actions of inter-ethnic revenge. The uncertainties 
accompanying the post-conflict reconstruction and démocratisation effort also added a 
further layer of complication -  embedding the media reform in an environment without 
a functioning local government or a working economy, not to mention law enforcement 
mechanisms, such as a professional judiciary or a police service.
Daily information on Kosovo’s political developments has been available 
through the local media monitoring reports of the regional UN and OSCE offices, as 
well as from Radio Free Europe. Some of the empirical information used is this chapter 
has been gathered from internal UN/OSCE documents, relating to monitoring data and 
election coverage, as well as various surveys and databases, originally produced for
2 This is dealt in more detail by “Future directions for US assistance in Southeastern Europe” a report by 
the German Marshall Fund of the United States, February 2001
3 The conflict, which led to the biggest population displacement in Europe since the end of World War II, 
took a heavy mental toll on many Kosovar Albanians. An American-conducted survey found that 43% 
percent showed signs of psychiatric illness, two thirds had found themselves in a combat situation or 
close to death, and a quarter said they had had friends or family murdered, or had witnessed the murder of 
a stranger. Meanwhile, every fifth Albanian person displayed symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Source: AFP, August 1, 1999 quoting a survey published in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association. (The survey data was based on interviews with 1360 people.)
4 The conflict has been widely documented internationally, among others by the International Crisis 
Group reports “Kosovo’s long hot summer: Briefing on military, humanitarian and political 
developments”, September 2, 1998, and “War in the Balkans: Consequences of the Kosovo conflict and 
future options for Kosovo and the region”, April 19,1999
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internal use. Direct, media democratisation-related information has proved to be 
difficult to attain, as the information management has been relatively weak with the 
international authorities, which is indicated by the lack of useful databases, the lack of 
continuity in publishing annual reports5 or making information open to the public.6 
Thus, the collection of the majority of the data required for this chapter would not have 
been possible without spending a year working with the OSCE in Kosovo, as well as 
conducting focused field research and a number of interviews.
The chapter is limited to the discussion of media-related developments, and does 
not attempt to address either the legitimacy of the military intervention of 1999, or other 
areas of concern for the International Community.
1. I n it ia l  C o n d it io n s
Kosovo is an area of less than 11,000 square kms in the south of the Republic of 
Serbia bordering the Republic of Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, and Albania. The province is inhabited by approx. 2 million people, 90% of 
which are ethnic Albanians. Historically, Kosovo was part of the medieval Serbian 
Kingdom, and for several centuries, it also belonged to the Ottoman Empire, the 
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as well as the Yugoslav Kingdom. During 
World War II, it was united with other Albanian territories to form a Greater Albania, 
and later became part of socialist Yugoslavia’s Republic of Serbia.
The number of Serbs shrunk from one-third of Kosovo’s population in 1961 to 
less than one-tenth in the 1990s. This relative decrease was partly due to the low living 
standards in Kosovo, which resulted in an exodus of Serbs to more dynamic parts of 
Yugoslavia, as well as the high birth rate among Albanians. In addition, the Serbian 
perception of the post-1974 period in Kosovo has been shaped by the experience of the 
“national key” policy -  an affirmative action style employment policy which ensured 
proportional representation of ethnic groups in the public sector (i.e. almost all sectors 
of the job market). Consequently, the Serbs saw themselves as increasingly 
disadvantaged in Kosovo, and chose to emigrate in significant numbers.7 Despite this 
integrative policy, the two communities lived in a segregated manner, and unlike in 
other parts of Yugoslavia, they rarely mixed and never intermarried.
The 1974 Yugoslav constitution decentralised power from Belgrade and 
transformed Kosovo into a self-governing entity of Serbia. The regional autonomy gave 
the growing Albanian community significant liberties in setting up independent 
political, judicial and cultural institutions. For the first time, the local, Albanian- 
language media began to expand -  Radio Television Prishtina grew to be one of the 
most professional stations in the Balkans employing 1,800 people, and the daily 
Rilindja saw its circulation increase to its highest (80,000) since it began publishing in 
1945. The Rilindja publishing house was producing ten different magazines and
5 Annual reports of the Temporary Media Commissioner were only released in 2001 and 2002, during the 
tenure of Anna Di Lellio.
6 The Office of the TMC does not have a website.
7 As early as 1993, there have, however, also been reports by independent human rights organisations that 
Serbs were subjected to intense ethnic discrimination and intimidation on the part of Albanians in 
Kosovo. Source: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights: “From Autonomy to Colonisation: 
Human Rights in Kosovo, 1989-1993” (Helsinki: IHFHR. 1993)
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newspapers, ranging from women’s monthlies (e.g. Kosvarja) to various industry papers 
(e.g. the agricultural monthly Bujku). They also published an average of 200 book titles 
a year.8
These developments were encouraged under Yugoslavia’s unique communist 
system which, generally speaking, produced the most sophisticated and liberal media 
system (often referred to as a “public information system” under Tito) in the communist 
region. At the same time, this was also the first time in “Kosovar history” that the 
Albanian cause could be freely expressed in the media, without fear of reprisals. The 
Kosovo Albanian (hereinafter K-Albanian) community, which throughout the 20th 
century defined its national identity through language and culture (and not through 
religion9), consciously began to use the media’s power for the purposes of nation 
building.
After Tito’s death, however, the news media across Yugoslavia became a central 
tool in the struggle for power between the republican elites. They used the state-owned 
media to recruit support for the respective agendas and rapidly replaced the rhetoric of 
communism with that of nationalism.10 In Kosovo, this meant an increasingly 
radicalising Serbian and Albanian policy and public sphere. This was worsened when in 
the early 1980s, the general disillusionment with the sluggish economy and widespread 
unemployment led to protests and street riots, prompting media elites to call for 
Kosovo’s recognition as a republic.11
As a result, both the Albanian and the Serbian media became the political elites’ 
partner in the discursive construction of the enemy, and the Kosovo media came to 
resemble the long list of regional media outlets which, during the 1990s, contributed to 
inciting ethnic hatred and aggression between the peoples of former Yugoslavia.12 As a 
result of the media’s irresponsible accommodation of dehumanising racial slurs (e.g. 
Serbian “terrorists” and Albanian “rapists” and “baby factories”), the media’s distorting 
effects significantly increased. On both sides, the masses were led to hysteria and 
unforgiving antagonism by stories which were later proved false. While both ethnic 
media tried to demonise the other community, from an analysis provided by Mertus 
(1999), it seems that it was particularly the Serb media which based stories on 
misunderstandings or calculated misinterpretations, with the sole purpose of worsening
8 Data from OSCE Media Department “Media database” 2001
9 Despite widespread perception that Kosovo’s ethnic groups had been divided along religious lines, 
religion in Kosovo was never a determining factor, neither in everyday life nor in generating conflict. 
Instead, the conflict between the two communities has been rooted in their opposing view on which 
community has a historic right to occupy the province of Kosovo. For a detailed discussion on religion, 
see the International Crisis Group report entitled “Religion in Kosovo”, January 31, 2001
10 “Independent media in former Yugoslavia and the role of international donors” Report by 
www. pres snow, org. 1999
“ Moore, P.: The “Albanian question” in the former Yugoslavia, RFE/RL Research Report, April 3, 1992
12 For an analysis on other counties, see Buric, Ahmed: The media war and peace in Bosnia, Institute of 
War and Peace Reporting, Analytical report, July 1, 2001. IWPR (2001) and Price & Thompson (2002) 
also deal with these issues in detail. Meanwhile, the international dimension of the Kosovo conflict- 
related propaganda war has been analysed among others by Popovic, Radmila (2001), and in Goff, Peter 
(ed.): The Kosovo News and Propaganda War, International Press Institute, 1999
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the relations between the two communities, and sometimes providing an outright casus 
belli.13 (The evidence in this analysis, however, is not conclusive.)
1 .1 . C r a c k d o w n  o n  t h e  A l b a n ia n -L a n g u a g e  M e d ia
In the late 1980s, upon consolidating his power, the Serbian president Slobodan 
Milosevic began to carve away the Kosovar autonomy by subjugating Kosovo to 
Serbian authority.14 Supported by the Serbian legislature, the series of moves ranged 
from the abolishment in 1990 of the provincial government, legislature, and local 
judiciary, through to the annihilation of the Kosovar education and media systems. At 
the same time, Belgrade fired all Albanian police officers, increased the number o f the 
Serbian police force to 60,000 (which is six times the standard in Western democracies) 
and equipped Kosovar Serbs with guns. They also dismissed Albanian public sector 
workers, tore down Albanian monuments, removed Albanian streetsigns, and abolished 
the Albanian curriculum in schools, including at Prishtina University.
Simultaneously, the authorities made efforts to silence the Albanian-language 
media. In July 1990, the Albanian employees of Radio Television Prishtina (RTP) were 
dismissed, and the independent Albanian-language broadcasts were replaced with 
Serbian broadcasts edited from Belgrade. However, the Albanian community did not 
perceive the Albanian-language news (only 45 minutes per day) credible or 
informative.15 The Serbian authorities took over the building that housed the state- 
owned Rilindija publishing company, which printed and distributed the Albanian- 
language press. Even though Milosevic initially did not see the need to entirely ban the 
print media -  and the newspaper Rilindja was allowed to continue publishing at a lower 
circulation rate (8,000) -  journalists worked under a constant threat of prosecution, 
often risking arbitrary imprisonment, beatings and even murder.16
The closure of media outlets was a clear indication of a Balkan-style apartheid 
system in the making, generating a feeling of radical exclusion among the Albanians. 
The Albanian leaders denied the legality of the Serb moves, and their democratically
13 One of the well known stories is that in 1987, Serbian newspapers published a photograph taken by a 
Belgrade reporter in Prekale, Kosovo, showing a Serbian woman working in the field, surrounded by her 
children and with a hunting gun resting on her shoulder. The implication was that “The Mother from 
Prekale,” as the caption read, needed the gun to protect herself and her children from ethnic Albanian 
“terrorists”, who were supposedly torturing and killing Serbs and raping their wives, mothers, daughters, 
and sisters. At the time, as Slobodan Milosevic started to rally people behind the notion of a Greater 
Serbia, this photo served as an initial capsule to incite nationwide terror and hatred of all Albanians. A 
few years later, however, the shot was revealed to be a fake. Source: Babic, Dusan: “Combating vigilante 
journalism”, Transitions Online, August 1, 2000. See also the “Martinovic case” of 1985, the “Paracin 
massacre” of 1987, or the “mass poisoning of Albanian children” in 1990 in Mertus (1999)
14 For a detailed legal analysis, see Stavileci, E.: Constitutional changes and the abolition of the 
autonomy, in The Kosova issue -  A historic and current problem. (Papers from the symposium, Tirana, 
April, 1993) Tirana, 1996
15 Sullivan, Stacy (2000: 2): Kosovo, in Price E., Monroe (ed.): Restructuring the media in post-conflict 
societies: Four perspectives. The experience if intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, A 
Background Paper for the UNESCO World Press Day Conference in Geneva, May 2000
16 Human Rights Watch (1998): Report on humanitarian law violations in Kosovo, 1998, and Thompson, 
Mark (2000): Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia (FYROM) and Kosovo 
International Assistance to Media, A report for the OSCE High Representative for the Media. 2000, pp.
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elected political bodies went underground. Similarly to the other breakaway Yugoslav 
nations, they began working on achieving independence for Kosovo. In September 
1990, the Kosovar legislators approved a constitution which gave Kosovo a republican 
status within the Yugoslav federation.17 In a 1991 referendum, 98% of Kosovo 
Albanians turned out to endorse the constitution (with a result of 99,7% in favour), and 
on October 19, 1991, the legislature declared Kosovo a “sovereign and independent 
state”.18 19
While the independence efforts of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Macedonia were endorsed internationally, the Kosovo cause was not supported by 
the International Community. This position was based on the argument that Kosovo’s 
constitutional status in Yugoslavia was different from the above mentioned republics, 
and thus its claim to independence had no clear legal basis. While Serbia, Montenegro, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia and Croatia were constituting republics 
of Yugoslavia, Kosovo was never a republic, and Kosovo Albanians were never 
considered a “nation” under Tito’s rule. Along with the Hungarians of Vojvodina, 
they were defined as a “nationality” i.e. belonging to a “nation whose native countries 
border on Yugoslavia”. The European Community’s recognition policy20 was developed 
in reaction to the secession of the republics, and due to the intensifying political 
tensions, there was a need for a consistent practice.21 2
The Kosovar cause, however, was encouraged by the developments in Albania 
where multi-party elections in 1992 and 1996 resulted in Sali Berisha’s Democratic 
Party winning overwhelming victories. As early as 1990, this party had re-introduced 
the idea of a “Greater Albania”, and in particular that o f a union with Kosovo, into the 
emerging democratic political process in Albania. Among the first practical steps in this 
respect, Berisha’s government, in 1992, confirmed a 1991 decision of the Albanian 
parliament to recognise Kosovo’s independence, and remodelled the concept of 
Albanian citizenship along ju s  sanguinis lines to include all ethnic Albanians regardless 
of their country of residence.2“ Official support for Kosovo’s independence from the 
Albanian government, however, did not extend far beyond domestic declarations, and 
even these stopped after the government recognized the existing Yugoslav borders in 
the wake of the escalating war in 1994.
Despite that, the K-Albanian underground government continued to argue that 
Kosovo should be accorded the right to self-determination. In May 1992, the Albanians
17 For a detailed analysis, see Omari, L.: The proclamation o f the Republic of Kosova and its constitution, 
in The Kosova issue -  A historic and current problem (Papers from the symposium, Tirana, April, 1993) 
Tirana, 1996
18 Moore, P.: The “Albanian question” in the former Yugoslavia, RFE/RL Research Report, April 3,1992
19 The constitution made a distinction between the ‘nations’ of Yugoslavia and the ‘republics’ of 
Yugoslavia. The Croats, Macedonians, Serbs and Slovenes qualified as nations (Muslims were added 
later), while the republics were six geographically separate units without any consistent ethnic 
connection.
20 See “Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition o f the New States in Eastern Europe and in the 
Soviet Union”, and the accompanying “Declaration on Yugoslavia,” December 16, 1991
21 In theory, the “nations” of Yugoslavia would have had a stronger position to get recognition, as they 
were empowered by the 1974 constitution o f “the right to self-determination, including the right of 
secession”.
22 International Crisis Group report entitled: The View from Tirana: The Albanian Dimension of the
Kosovo Crisis, 1998
organized their own parliamentary elections and elected Ibrahim Rugova as their 
president. As opposed to a Western-style political party, Rugova’s Democratic League 
of Kosovo (LDK) was then essentially an intellectual movement of national unity and 
political coordination, which campaigned for peaceful dialogue. Led exclusively by 
intellectuals, the LDK claimed to have 900,000 members,23 which equals the entire 
adult population.
The parties which ran in the 1992 elections had an unwritten rule among 
themselves, according to which national solidarity is more important than building a 
functioning modem democracy,24 a principle which most intellectuals and leading 
journalists stayed true to during the first five years of the démocratisation process. 
Albanian unity was overwhelming: in 1993, not a single Albanian student signed up for 
the 18,000 places that the Serbian authorities had reserved for them for the academic 
year. Instead, students attended the underground, Albanian university, which had 
arranged for classes to be taught by over a thousand volunteer professors, in private 
homes across Kosovo.25 As the employment, civil rights and security environment 
gradually worsened in the province, hundreds of thousands of Albanians headed to the 
West to find work and re-channel funds for Kosovo’s growing, Albanian-run parallel 
education and health sector.
In 1993, the Serbian government further cracked down on the media. All 
Albanian-language political publications were banned, prompting the émigré 
community to begin publishing Rilindja and later Bota Sot (1995) in Switzerland.26 
Some of these papers were smuggled into Kosovo, and some of their content was 
regularly inserted into the locally published agricultural monthly Bujku. Gradually, all 
three papers became the official voice of the parallel system run by the LDK and 
Rugova. 7 However, this arrangement failed to meet information needs within Kosovo, 
where the mediated public sphere was dominated by the Serbian-language media, 
including the state television, state radio and newspapers such as the daily Politika, Glas 
Javnosti, Blic, Danas, Vecemi Novosti and the locally-produced Serb daily, Jedinstvo. 
The Serb media echoed Belgrade’s uncompromising stance on Kosovo, and its anti- 
Albanian propaganda contributed to fostering fear and hostility in the province.28 29To 
escape the “state of emergency” language of the Serbian media, the Albanians turned to 
the extra-territorial, Albanian state television for information, which was broadcast on
29satellite for two hours daily from autumn 1993.
The mid-1990s, support from the Soros network enabled the underground 
publishing of two new weeklies, Koha and Zeri. These newspapers joined their Swiss 
counterparts in denouncing Serb repression and advocating the province’s independence
23 Schmidt, F.: Kosovo: The time bomb that has not gone off, RFE/RL Research Report, October 1, 1993
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 These publications systematically exaggerated Rugova’s international importance and the degree of 
support for Kosovar independence by the International Community, thereby giving false hope to 
Kosovars. They also exaggerated the abuses that the Serbian regime committed against the K-Albanians. 
(Op. cit. Sullivan, 2000:2-3)
28 Annual report by the Temporary Media Commissioner, 200!
29 In 1999, approximately 55% of Kosovar households had a dish, which grew to 81% by 2001. Source: 
Gallup survey 1999, IREX/ Index Kosova audience survey 2001
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from Belgrade.30 However, Koha and Zeri challenged the optimistic views presented by 
the “Swiss papers” regarding international support for the K-Albanian cause, and 
appealed to a younger, more educated and more cynical audience.31 By using a more 
objective, and more professional journalistic method to inform the public, they provided 
an alternative platform to discuss Kosovo’s fate. Their editors distanced themselves 
from Rugova and — for the first time in Kosovo’s media history -  attempted to separate 
facts from opinion.32 In the late 1990s, Koha was recreated as a daily (1997) with help 
from IREX and the Soros network, and because of its fresh political line and 
professional style, its circulation swelled from 7,000 to 27,000. In 1998, the daily 
Kosova Sot appeared on the market as the second locally-produced political daily.
In the spring of 1998, frequent assaults on journalists and the arbitrary 
imprisonment of intellectuals indicated the escalation of the ethnic conflict and the 
unsustainable nature of the segregated cohabitation. During the year, Belgrade 
authorities denied television licences to Radio Koha and Radio 21, and closed down the 
first private, multi-ethnic radio station, Radio Kontakt, after only ten days in 
operation.33 In October, Milosevic strengthened his grip on the print and the broadcast 
media in all territories of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.34 The Serbian parliament 
passed a highly restrictive Information Law, prohibiting the redistribution of foreign 
news reports, and enabling the authorities to prosecute, indict, convict, fine or close 
down any media organization in the country if they spread “fear and defeatism or lies 
against the Serbian state”. In the countdown to the international intervention, the law 
resulted in the marginalisation or closure of all independent media outlets in Serbia, and 
the closure o f all newspapers in Kosovo.35
In October 1998, the OSCE’s Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was 
deployed in Kosovo, and as NATO prepared to intervene in the growing inter-ethnic 
conflict, the International Community attempted to push through a peace deal. 
Underscoring the politicised nature o f the K-Albanian media, as well as the journalists’ 
prominence in Kosovar society, Veton Surroi {Koha Ditore) and Blerim Shala {Zeri), 
were included in the Albanian Rambouillet delegation as independent members. After 
the talks collapsed on the International Community’s proposal entitled “Interim 
Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo”, the OSCE mission withdrew to 
neighbouring Macedonia, and NATO’s 78-day bombing campaign began.
During the conflict, the Kosovar media structures significantly suffered. Radio 
and television transmitters were destroyed, and the printing establishments of Koha 
Ditore and Kosova Sot were looted and demolished by Serb military forces.36 Most of 
the existing newspapers and radio stations moved to Macedonia -  Koha Ditore and 
Kosova Sot were occasionally published and distributed for free in the refugee camps.
30 Annual report by the Temporary Media Commissioner, 2001
3‘ Op. cit. Sullivan (2000:3)
32 Annual report by the Temporary Media Commissioner, 2001
33 Human Rights Watch, 1998, report available at http://www.hrw.oTg/reports98/kosovo/Kos9810-09.htm
34 For a detailed discussion on this, see Matic, Verán: The rump Yugoslavia and the new Balkan “Black 
hole”, Transition, Media issue, October 6, 1995
35 At this point, the dailies Kosova Sot, Koha Ditore and Rilindja were being published, as well as the 
biweekly Gazeta Shiptare. In the case of Koha Ditore, a 35,000 USD fine was levied for allegedly 
violating the Information Law by inciting ethnic hatred and intolerance. The paper was threatened with 
closure unless the fine was paid within 24 hours.
36 Annual report by the Temporary Media Commissioner, 2001
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Meanwhile the internet site of Radio 21 (the management of which later set up a 
commercial television channel) informed the world about development during the crisis: 
the website claims to have attracted 2.3 million visitors during those three months.37
After the Serbian government signed the peace treaty, the UN mandate for 
Kosovo was established by the UN Security Council resolution 1244 in June 1999. 
Legally, Kosovo remained part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (and later Serbia 
and Montenegro), and its “final status” can only be resolved through the UN. According 
to Resolution 1244, the UN mission holds ultimate legislative and executive authority in 
Kosovo; it is the effective government of the province, until it gradually transfers power 
to elected Kosovar institutions. Its mandate was to “organise and oversee the 
development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self- 
government pending a political settlement.” The mission was created to include four 
sectors or ‘pillars’, each led by a different international organisation. The United 
Nations itself was responsible for civil administration, UNHCR led the humanitarian 
assistance projects, while economic development was given to the European Union, and 
the OSCE was charged with institution building and démocratisation. The fifth 
unofficial pillar was security, provided by KFOR comprising 45,000 NATO-led troops.
While in the mid-1990s, during the initial stages of their involvement in Balkan 
post-war reconstruction, the internationals were reluctant to reform media structures, it 
was soon realised that they could not achieve their primary objectives, including their 
so-called “exit conditions”, without resolving the acute problems of the underdeveloped 
Balkan media.38 Thus, by the time negotiations began on details of the Kosovo 
démocratisation mission, the OSCE was committed to secure a wide-ranging media 
development mandate.39 Neither 1244 nor the “interim agreement” provided for a clear 
media mandate, but there was a recognition that the creation of functional media laws, 
and a set of formal rules and procedures was unavoidable in a post-conflict 
environment. Regulation was deemed essential in order to achieve the basic 
démocratisation benchmarks (i.e. pluralism of media outlets, supporting legal 
frameworks, political and financial independence, professionalism etc.), and to ensure 
that the new democratic media system assists the process of ethnic reconciliation.
The OSCE looked to the post-conflict experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
determine what path the media démocratisation process should take. There, the NATO 
peacekeeping and stabilisation force failed to secure a media mandate in the beginning, 
which led to the growth of hate speech broadcasts in the Muslim, Croat and Serb media 
-  significantly undermining the peace process. This called for a correction in the media 
policy and the setting up of a regulatory authority which had been widely perceived by 
the locals as a suppression of freedom of speech rights. A strong media mandate was 
also important for Kosovo because of the deeper-seated ethnic intolerance which had 
been partly the result of a decade of conflict within the media sphere. While in Bosnia, 
the media engaged in hate speech mostly in the run-up to, and during the armed conflict, 
the “media war” in Kosovo was waged permanently for a decade before the war.
The establishment of the UN authority (United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo, hereinafter UNMIK) was slightly complicated by the governing
37 Press release by www.advocacvnet.org. August 28,2000
38 O p . c it .  T h o m p so n  (2 0 0 0 : 77)
39 O p. c it . T h o m p so n  (2 0 0 0 : 63 )
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crisis within Kosovo in the summer of 1999. While Rugova was considered president 
by many, having been elected both in 1992 and 1998, the underground parliament and 
parallel government had long lost the ability to perform their functions. At the same 
time, there was a provisional government agreed by the main Albanian partners at 
Rambouillet, including Rugova, and now established under the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) political leader Hashim Thaci with a multi-party membership, but 
boycotted by Rugova and his allies. 40 In this period, many broadcast outlets were 
established on foreign aid, and gave their support to the Thaci government. This later 
needed careful “undoing” by the international media regulator.
1 .2 . A  C o n c e p t u a l  F r a m e w o r k  f o r  M e d ia  D e v e l o p m e n t
Just like in Bosnia, the starting point o f the International Community’s media 
strategy was that media outlets were partly responsible for the ethnic violence, and the 
long-term goal was to prevent them from generating further conflict. In theory, the 
mandate had two essential dimensions -  the first task was to establish a strong 
Albanian-language media system, and the second, to create an overall media system 
which effectively represents all ethnic communities and interests.
To assess the quality and feasibility of the media development strategy, we first 
need to briefly discuss the slightly confusing general framework of démocratisation, and 
institution building, which was based upon the core concept of “power-sharing” 
between ethnic groups. During the entire period under review, the official UNMIK 
policy was to encourage Serb returns, and to establish a multi-ethnic state. On paper, the 
internationals promoted a political power-sharing arrangement which sought to achieve 
ethnic reconciliation by creating a “grand coalition” between the ethnic communities -  
by giving a veto to the Serbs on issues of “vital interests” (as prescribed in Lijphart’s 
consociational model of democracy, 1977). But at the same time, they allowed parallel 
structures from Serbia proper to function in the north of Kosovo, sending the message 
that an eventual partition of the province was possible. Under these conditions, the Serb 
community’s willingness to participate in the power-sharing arrangement was limited 
during these five years.
Given these starting conditions, we have to first consider how Kosovo’s 
consociational power-sharing arrangement can be translated into the context of media 
structures. According to the framework of Lijphart’s model (which requires the creation 
of an autonomy for the minority), the new media structure would be based on two 
separate media systems -  one for each community. It would include two public service 
channels (either as PSBs or commercial channels with strong public service remits) -  
which would adequately represent the two main ethnic groups and their interests, and 
make sure that the new democratic dialogue is not left up to an unregulated commercial 
media market. Based on a proportionately sized mono-lingual media system for each 
community, this dual media system would support a direct, vertical information flow 
between the ethnic communities and their political representatives. In the long run, this 
could form the basis of an integrated media system, once the two communities are ready 
to work together.
40 Who is who in Kosovo, report by the International Crisis Group, August 31, 1999
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This model would be in direct opposition with a more ambitious and more 
optimistic model, designed along the lines of Horowitz’s theory of power-sharing 
(Horowitz 1985, Sisk 1996). Horowitz’s integrative model would create a system where 
the ethnic groups break out of their traditional separation, and create multi-ethnic media 
outlets which generate an internal prowess to sustain the imposed political power­
sharing system. One central multi-ethnic public service broadcaster would be the 
backbone of such a system, which -  along with a plurality of private, multi-ethnic 
outlets -  would essentially lead toward the gradual development of a truly integrated 
multi-ethnic society, where ethnicity is secondary to citizenship. The current economic 
conditions and the mixed demographics in Kosovo would suggest that this solution 
might be more cost-effective and sustainable, but the high level of ethnic intolerance has 
shown that this would be slightly ambitious, to say the least.
Choosing the right strategy and the right power-sharing concept for the media 
was therefore critical from the very beginning, particularly, because regional patterns 
suggested that -  irrespective of the methodology -  the media démocratisation process 
would likely face serious obstacles.
1. In all war-tom parts of the Western Balkans region, the news media have been 
plagued by a lack of financial sustainability; a strong political pressure aiming to 
curb the media’s information role regarding corruption, government 
mismanagement, and war-crimes; as well as continuing pressure to work along 
ethnic lines. According to an IREX survey in Bosnia, the pressures on 
journalists from the dominant nationalist political parties are meant to keep alive 
the old journalistic habit of self-censorship, in order for the political parties to 
strengthen their support bases.41
2. Even after years of foreign-assisted media démocratisation, hardly any Bosnian 
print or electronic media outlet developed editorial policies that transcend ethnic 
boundaries, and most Bosnian media, including the PSBs, are confined to the 
ethnically-controlled territory from which they originate.42 A 2003 poll reveals 
that there is no shared media experience between the three ethnic communities, 
as they all watch different television stations and read different newspapers.43
3. In Bosnia, intimidation of journalists is widespread and assault is regular.44 
However, journalists safety is not considered important, and public faith in the 
media’s work is very low. Over 65% of Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens admit 
to “not fully trusting” the media.45
41 IREX report entitled: “At risk: Political intimidation of journalists and their media in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, October 29, 2000
42 Freedom House: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nations in Transit, 2001
43 Public opinion poll in Bosnia and Herzegovina, USAID/ Partner Marketing Consulting Agency, 
November 2003
44 A 2000 survey of 50 Bosnian media outlets showed that 62% had personally experienced intimidation 
and interference in their work, including direct and indirect pressure applied by both political parties and 
elected or appointed officials. Source: US State Department: BH Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices, 2000
45 Public opinion poll in Bosnia and Herzegovina, USAID/Partner Marketing Consulting Agency, 
November 2003
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4. Also, there had been little private investment in media organizations in Bosnia, 
making the media donor-dependent and vulnerable to influence and 
manipulation by political and business elites. International officials have argued 
that a considerable amount o f “hidden” financing of the Bosnian media had led 
to the development of close links between media outlets and public officials,46 
similarly to the situation in Ukraine. The saturated, unsustainable Bosnian media 
landscape is also plagued by the abuse of administrative measures, such as tax 
controls, or the banning of access to printing.
5. Lastly, conceptual divisions between the European-dominated OSCE and the 
US-funded IREX, which already caused tension in the course of broadcast 
reforms in other parts of the Western Balkans, forewarned about the possible 
difficulties of media démocratisation in Kosovo. The two institutions have had 
different methodological solutions to ensuring media freedom and pluralism -  
with the OSCE representing a social democratic model and IREX representing a 
US-style libertarian approach with as limited regulation and state-control as 
possible.47
The 2001 “Constitutional framework”48 (hereinafter “constitution”) included a 
wide variety o f international legal references -  thereby creating elaborate benchmarks, 
which similarly to the “best European practices” empower both the majority and 
minority communities. The document contained general references to a set of 
internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights 
set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, as well as the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. The document also included references to the collective rights 
of ethnic communities. Under the heading “Rights of communities and their members”, 
the constitution “guarantees access to, and representation in the public broadcast media” 
and enlists the right of different ethnic communities to “establish and maintain their 
own media” .
Societal needs with regard to media pluralism, state support and general media 
freedom were also enshrined in the “Kosovo Standards” document,49 naming media 
freedom as one of the many benchmarks that Kosovo has to meet before its “final 
status” can be addressed by the UN. The text lists the following basic operational 
benchmarks for a reformed media system:
•  A range of private, independent print and broadcast media exists, providing 
access to information for all communities throughout Kosovo;
•  There is an independent and effective media regulatory authority, aspiring to 
European standards, recruited without discrimination and according to merit;
46 Freedom House: Yugoslavia, Nations in Transit, 2001
47 For a full analysis of the media démocratisation effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Thompson, M.
& De Luce, D.: Escalating success? The media intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Price & 
Thompson (2002: 201-235)
48 “A Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-government in Kosovo,” UNMIK Regulation 
2001/9, May 15, 2001
49 UNMIK Standards for Kosovo, December 10,2003
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• Hate speech or any form of incitement, is condemned by political leaders, the 
media regulatory authority and media commentators;
• Publicly-funded media devotes a full and proportionate share of its resources 
and output to all ethnic communities;
• Non-governmental organizations, in particular those representing minorities, are 
able to operate freely within the law and individuals are free to join them 
without discrimination.
In 2000, a public service broadcaster (RTK) was set up as the central instrument 
of the new media system, which signalled a clear preference for following the ideas 
prescribed in Horowitz’s model. RTK was mandated to provide programming for all of 
Kosovo’s ethnic groups, but in reality this decision led to a situation where the 
development and professionalisation of the Albanian-language media was given 
priority, and Serbian public communication needs were mainly addressed through the 
permission o f the operation of parallel media structures from Serbia proper. In other 
words, while the Serb community was legally empowered to have its own share of the 
new media system, the development of the Serbian-language media was subsequently 
given less attention. All in all, the ambitious legal framework failed to put in place 
adequate control mechanisms to ensure that the media démocratisation process is in line 
with the declared aims of the political process.
2 . T h e  E x t e r n a l  D im e n s io n  o f  M e d ia  R e f o r m
2 .1 . C h a l l e n g e s  F a c in g  t h e  K -A l b a n ia n  P r in t  S e c t o r
Given that Albanians hardly turned to Serbian television or newspapers after 
1974, the main problem plaguing the K-Albanian media reform process in the late 
1990s was not the cultural impact o f an oppressive communist regime but rather the 
underdeveloped nature of the landscape and the long-standing ethnic tension.
During the 1980s and 1990s, most newspapers served as an integral part of the 
embryonic political institutional mechanism, and were subordinated to the “national 
cause” which was built up against the backdrop of the traumas of the ethnic cleansing 
and the refugee crisis. Journalists interpreted their “fourth estate” mandate in a 
politicised manner, and directly supported political causes. Meanwhile, as regards the 
Serbian print media in Kosovo, the main challenge was the lack of local outlets, and the 
uncertainties regarding Kosovo’s “final status”, which significantly weakened the 
willingness o f the Serbs to participate in the print media reform.
Initially, the biggest technical hurdle of media development was coordinating 
support from both international governmental donors and international NGOs. In the 
first two years, there was a critical lack of coordination, resulting in the general feeling 50
50 Until 2001, the largest one-time media donor was the Japanese government, with a USD 15.2 million 
contribution for the reconstruction of the terrestrial broadcast network, and for the starting up of public 
service broadcasting. Other major funders included the US government (through IREX), the OSCE, as 
well as the European Agency for Reconstruction, and national governments of the UK, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Holland. Germany, France, Norway, Denmark. NGOs such as the Open Society Institute of the 
Soros network were also deeply involved. Sources: OSCE internal documents and UNDP report on the 
“Kosovo Independent Media Project“.
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that donors were ill-informed about the societal impact and context of their donations. 
For instance, during the initial chaotic period, much of the donated equipment and funds 
ended up with media outlets which pursued dubious agendas. The lack of coordination 
also led to both an over-investment in some media outlets (e.g. Koha Ditore51) and to 
the mushrooming of small, isolated and unsustainable outlets. Thousands o f young 
journalists were hired by a new media elite which attached more importance to short­
term personal gains than issues of long-term sustainability.
One of the first moves of the International Community was to suspend 
Milosevic’ Information Law within Kosovo. Following the lessons leamt from the 
international-assisted media reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, UNMIK 
decided to set up a media affairs department within the OSCE pillar, with clear 
authority to oversee regulatory work, media development and media monitoring.52 
UNMIK’s aim was to develop the local media so that they “contribute to the creation of 
conditions that support freedom of the press and freedom of information in Kosovo.”53 
In addition, the leader of the UN mission -  the so called Special Representative of the 
UN Secretary General (or SRSG) -  was to appoint a media regulatory commission to 
issue licences and manage the frequency spectrum, and to establish and monitor 
compliance with broadcast and press codes of conduct.
However, the OSCE’s plans for the creation of a normative base for regulatory 
work were soon attacked by proponents of the libertarian media theory. The New York 
Times54 called the planned authority an “incipient media ministry” while the World 
Press Freedom Committee (WPFC) complained to the UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan of the “plans for a media control system in Kosovo” which was “in conflict with 
the principles of democracy and freedom that the United Nations is pledged to 
uphold”.55 The debate in the international press prompted the UN pillar to reconsider its 
position, and to try to curb the OSCE’s role over media regulation. In August 1999, the 
UN created a parallel media department and insisted that the UN take over the 
management o f the frequency spectrum.56 The disagreement over this plan, as well as 
the use of the contentious term “regulator” blocked the establishment of the media 
body, leading to a regulatory vacuum.
In September 1999, the two offices arrived at a consensus solution regarding the 
institution for regulation -  they abandoned the term “regulator”, and agreed to set up the 
Temporary M edia Commissioner (TMC). The debate, however, was only just beginning 
regarding the substance of future regulations, and more specifically on a need for a code 
of conduct for the press. Following an outcry from advocacy groups “Article 19” and 
the International Federation of Journalists, the OSCE’s confidence shook as to the 
contents and feasibility of its ambitious media mandate. At this point, it was considered
51 At the first donor conference, it emerged that Koha Ditore was receiving funds from six separate 
international sources, none of which knew of the others’ activity. Source: Op. cit. Thompson (2000: 72)
52 This decision was made on the basis of a report commissioned from officials with prior media 
démocratisation experience in the Balkans. The report said that International Community experience in 
Bosnia and Croatia confirms that “democratic media cannot be established on the basis of incomplete or 
weakly asserted authority to regulate, monitor and reform existing media.” Source: Op. cit. Thompson 
(2000: 63)
53 UNMIK internal document quoted by Op. cit. Thompson (2000: 63)
54 The New York Times, A u g u s t 30 , 1999
55 Quoted in Op. cit. Thompson (2000: 64)
56 Ibid. Thompson (2000: 64)
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that the OSCE's print media mandate would be restricted to encouraging the self­
regulation of the press (such as voluntary codes of conducts and implementation bodies 
i.e. press councils)57, and assisting in setting up a journalists' association.
As the debate continued in the tense political atmosphere of the winter, several 
vigilante Albanian print and broadcast outlets issued threats of violence against groups 
and individuals (e.g. by naming and shaming possible war criminals) -  seeking to incite 
unrest and inter-ethnic hatred. 8 There was no hate speech or defamation legislation in 
place (only the criminal law of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo of 
Yugoslavia was “in effect”), and there was a tangible increase in the number of 
inflammatory articles against the Serb community, against the moderate factions of the 
Albanian community,59 as well as against the UNMIK authority. The already precarious 
security situation -  in which revenge on returning Serbs and Roma families was a daily 
event through public beatings, arson, and killings, and where Serbian speaking 
internationals were assaulted, and in one case killed,60 -  seemed to be dramatically 
worsened by the media.
Realising that this will complicate the overall democratisation effort, and in the 
absence of other instruments to address this deteriorating situation, the SRSG 
promulgated on February 1, 2000 a draconian legislation punishing hate speech with a 
maximum penalty of 10 years of imprisonment.6'T h is  legislation was the first element 
of a normative base for media regulation which was planned for a temporary (although 
indefinite) period, until a formal systems of laws would be in place and become 
operational. The local media had a mixed reaction. Koha Ditore and Zeri came out in 
favour of this legislation,62 supporting the argument that the authority has the right to 
discipline irresponsible media outlets in a lawless society where violence is widespread 
and societal tension is high. However, the rest of the local journalistic community was 
angered by it, and -  in return -  unleashed a campaign against UNMIK and KFOR, 
accusing the internationals of being “in league with the Serbs” against the Albanians.
Most media outlets continued with what they considered their genuine post­
conflict mandate -  i.e. to address the perceived injustices of the past. The m edia's 
disrespect for UNMIK's “crusade” to curtail their newly found freedom was indicated 
by their coverage of the first major clash between the two ethnic groups since the war. 
In February 2000, a bus explosion killed nine Albanians and caused widespread hysteria 
among the K-Albanian community. Articles published in Bota Sot and Rilindja, as well 
as those by Radio Rilindja put the blame on Serbs even before an investigation could
57 For a detailed discussion on self-regulatory mechanisms, see for instance the “Proceedings of the 
information seminar on self-regulation by the media”, Conference held by the Council of Europe, 
Directorate of Human Rights, October, 1998
58 Annual report by the Temporary Media Commissioner, 2001
59 For example, the moderate Kosovar opinion-leaders, Veton Surroi and Baton Haxhiu (the publisher and 
editor-in chief of Koha Ditore, respectively) were personally attacked through vitriolic articles by the 
Switzerland-based news agency Kosova Press. On October 2, 2000 the agency called for Surroi’s 
assassination after he criticised and dubbed “fascist” the systematic, Serb intimidation policy of the 
interim government and the KLA. Source: Borden (1999)
60 An American/Bulgarian UNMIK employee was killed on the street in the first month of his deployment 
for telling the time in Serbian.
61 The UNMIK Regulation no. 2000/4 forbids any public incitement or spreading of hatred, discord or 
intolerance between national, racial, religious, ethnic or other such groups in Kosovo.
62 Op. cit. Sullivan (2000:8)
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had been launched into the incident, while the emotionally charged reports about the 
subsequent fighting in the divided city of Mitrovica further incited hatred against all 
Serbs. 3
The media also heightened the post-conflict internal security difficulties by 
giving excessive coverage to allegedly armed groups such as the Serbian State Security 
Service (DB) which were believed to be operating routinely in north Kosovo, as well as 
the so-called “bridge watchers” who guard the Serb side of the line in Mitrovica 
(allegedly by orders from the Belgrade police).
The internationals were doubtful as to whether further print regulation would be 
effective. Several arguments surfaced in support of limiting the mandate to designing 
the basic legal framework (i.e. laws on hate speech, access to public documents and 
defamation) and encouraging the privately-owned print media to adopt a self-regulatory 
mechanism. (Similarly to Western European print regulation.) Meanwhile, another 
counter-argument was that direct print regulation was not used in Bosnia either. There, 
the regulation establishing the Independent Media Commission (1998) gave a license to 
the regulatory authority to curb the negative effect of hate speech, but the IMC never 
used its power to sanction the print media. Instead it encouraged the swift adoption by 
the local journalistic community of a voluntary, self-regulatory code of conduct.63 4 In 
addition, the OSCE Head of Mission confirmed that they are “determined not to have [a 
press] law, given that it “smacks of censorship.”65
Another factor holding back the process was the international criticism of the 
hate speech regulation. The NGO “Article 19” argued that the regulation is broad and 
unclear (especially regarding the definition of what classifies as public incitement and 
spreading of hatred, and what goes as intolerant behaviour), and the judicial system was 
inadequately developed to apply such a sensitive legislation.66 The advocacy group also 
expressed concern about the fact that the regulation goes beyond the scope of 
restrictions on the freedom of expression right permitted under international law.
In the end, it was a single vigilante article which prompted UNMIK to perform a 
180 degree turn and go ahead with press regulation. On April 27, 2000, the newspaper 
Dita published a story, along with a photograph and a home address, o f a Serb UNMIK 
employee, accusing him of killing Albanians during the NATO intervention. A few 
weeks later, the man was found dead. While no connection could be proved regarding 
the story and his death, the SRSG shut down the paper for eight days.67 The tough 
decision generated solidarity for Dita amongst the other papers -  Koha Ditore for 
instance offered its printing service.68
The case also turned out to be a defining moment for the emerging institution of 
the TMC.69 In June 2000, the SRSG promulgated two regulations -  on the licensing and
63 The local coverage can be looked up on the UN’s media monitoring site, 
http://www.unmikonline.org/press/lmmOO.htm
64 The press code of conduct was endorsed by six journalist associations in 1999, and is available from the 
website of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia -  www.ohr.int
65 Speech by OSCE Head of Mission, Daan Everts, February, 2000
66 Statement on UNMIK Regulation no. 2000/4, Article 19 press release, February 2000, Downloaded 
from www.articlel9.org
67 Executive order by SRSG Bernard Kouchner, June 3, 2000
68 Press release by www.advocacvnet.org. August 28, 2000
69 Annual report by the Temporary Media Commissioner, 2001
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regulation o f the broadcast media, and on the conduct of the press.70 The legislations 
officially established the office o f the TMC, and gave it the authority -  pending the 
establishment of a permanent Independent Media Commission -  to control the 
broadcast media through licensing, and to impose sanctions on both broadcast and print 
media -  such as requiring to run a correction or apology, issuing a warning, issuing a 
fine between 1,000-100,000 DM, the suspension of broadcast licenses, the seizure of 
equipment, or the closing down of operations. Fines were seen as an important 
mechanism to introduce some form of law-enforcement into the media sector given that 
there were no judges to try potential defamation cases or other violations. The laws also 
created an appeals mechanism.71
The two legislations also allowed the TMC to issue the so-called “Temporary 
Codes of Conduct”. These codes -  separate for the two types of media -  formalised the 
fundamental rights of Kosovar journalists, and referred explicitly to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Article 19, freedom of opinion and expression, and 
Article 29, exercise of rights is subject to the limitations of law needed to secure 
recognition and respect for the rights of others). The codes make reference to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, including Article 2 (right to life to be protected 
by law), Article 5 (right to liberty and security of the person), Article 6 (those accused 
of a crime are innocent until proven guilty), and Article 10 (right to freedom of 
expression, subject to restrictions of law necessary in the interests of society).
But most importantly, the codes listed in detail the obligations and 
responsibilities of media outlets -  providing direction regarding the democratic role of 
journalists, and outlining the borders of responsible journalism. Media outlets were 
prohibited to publish or broadcast material that invades privacy, encourages crime, and 
denigrates an ethnic or religious group. In order to fill in for the non-existent defamation 
law, the codes barred media outlets from attributing criminal responsibility to anyone, 
prior to them being found guilty by a lawful tribunal, or to run material known to be 
deceptive. The outlets were also required to distinguish between comment, conjecture 
and fact, to print or publish a correction with equal prominence, to provide a right to 
reply and to keep archives of their work. While the print media was not required to be 
impartial, the broadcast media -  similarly to the European practice -  was hereby 
obligated to ensure “fairness and impartiality in all reporting,” and prohibited from 
“promoting the interests of one political party, or one political point of view”.
However, the codes of conduct were perceived as another draconian attempt, 
similar to the Milosevic era, to control Kosovo's newly found press freedom. 
Domestically, the regulations were widely considered to bring about renewed 
censorship of the media. The move was loudly protested by most leading Kosovar 
journalists, including the BBC's local correspondent (Muharrem Nitaj) as well as Bota 
Sot and Koha Ditore editors. Much of the confusion was rooted in the fact that the codes 
of conduct reflected the persistent tension that is inherent worldwide between free 
expression guarantees and the need to protect the individual’s right to physical security.
70 UNMIK regulations 2000/36 and 2000/37.
71 Article 19 was critical of these regulations as well, pointing out that “it sets a dangerous precedent, and 
is a gift to any government seeking for examples to use when reining in the media.” They also claimed 
that the Appeals Board is not sufficiently independent (as it is gathered by the OSCE/ TMC) and thus 
there would be no true independent check and balance on the TMC’s work. Source: Article 19 press 
release, June 30,2000, Downloaded from www.articlel9.org
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They also highlighted the contradiction between individual freedom of speech rights 
and the perceived collective interests of society.
To the surprise of the internationals, Dita decided to ignore the regulations, and 
continued to publish inflammatory articles. It first ran a story naming an alleged Serbian 
war criminal, and providing his address. A few days later, the paper ran photos of 
several other accused Serbs. In view of that, in the same month that the print code of 
conduct was released (June 2000), the TMC required the paper to print a reply by the 
first offended Serb. Given that the paper failed to publish a reply, the TMC levied a 
20,000 DM fine on the editors. When the fine was not paid, the TMC closed down the 
publication. The tough approach angered local journalists and editors, who saw Dita's 
“exclusive story” as a reflection of the K-Albanians’ anger and disillusionment with the 
fact that war criminals still live amongst them.72
The chairman of an embryonic journalist association (Haqif Mulliqi) said that 
the regulations represent a “political act” intended to control free speech, discipline the 
Kosovar media, and that they would generate an unwanted self-censorship among 
journalists.73 He also urged journalists not to recognize UNMIK’s regulations but 
instead sign up for his association’s Code of Ethics. This text opposes hate speech but 
supports all methods of investigative reporting, including the controversial routine of 
attributing direct criminal responsibility to Serb individuals.74 He argued that -  in the 
absence o f an operational judiciary and police — it was justified for the media to perform 
some of these institutions’ functions. However, few journalists endorsed this proposal, 
as a result of which the idea never became representative of the local media community.
The Dita case was a dramatic beginning of the TM C’s operation, and it seriously 
damaged the relations between the OSCE and the local media community.75 This 
occurred at a time of a general upsurge in media criticism regarding UNMIK’s 
activities, and an obvious growth of critical articles regarding the internationals’ 
achievements,76 including their incapacity to arrest war criminals and failure to repair 
the Kosovar electricity network. There were also a growing number of unwarranted, 
direct personal attacks on UNMIK officials, including accusations of corruption.77
2 .2 . T h e  K -A l b a n ia n  N e w s p a p e r  L a n d s c a p e
By 2000, the Albanian-language print media landscape was overcrowded. 
Following Rilindja, Bota Sot, Koha Ditore, and Kosova Sot, three more dailies started 
up in the year 1999 -  Zen, Epoka e Re, and Dita, later followed by even more dailies
12 Haqif Mulliqi, head of the Kosovar Journalists Association, interviewed by www.advocacvnet.org. 
August 2000
73 Interview in Kosova Sot, translated by UNMIK Local Media Monitoring Report, June 25, 2000
74 Haqif Mulliqi, head of the Kosovar Journalists Association, interviewed bv www.advocacvnet.org. 
August, 2000
75 Because of the growing tension, careful attention was paid to the due-process in this case. The Media 
Appeals Board -  made up of two international media experts as well as a local -  reassured the TMC that 
its actions complied with the European Convention on Human Rights, and thereby confirmed the TMC in 
its first ruling. Source: Annual report by the Temporary Media Commissioner, 2001
76 Various OSCE Media Monitoring reports
77 Interview with Gyorgy Kakuk, UN spokesperson, North Kosovo, April 2004
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and monthlies. There was also an independent news agency, KosovaLive.78 Initially, the 
print media was practically the only source of information79 , as the infrastructure of 
Radio Television Prishtina had been destroyed, and the UN information television 
station only broadcasted a few hours a day due to the regular power cuts. According to 
the first comprehensive audience survey results (2001), 29% of K-Albanians (over 12) 
read newspapers, while the figure was 41% for the K-Serb community.80 By 2003, the 
relative importance of the print press diminished, and circulation figures dropped to 4% 
of the total population,81 but the newspaper landscape remained diverse.
In 2004, there were six K-Albanian dailies -  ranging from a highly professional 
and balanced Koha Ditore to the two party mouthpieces -  Bota Sot (supporting the most 
popular party, the Democratic League of Kosovo, LDK) and Epoka e Re (supporting the 
second biggest party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo, PDK). While the balanced 
papers strove to constantly improve their reporting, the language of party papers became 
increasingly aggressive as political competition intensified. The estimated total 
circulation o f dailies is between 20,000 to 25,000, suggesting that newspaper 
penetration per 1000 person is around 14. (In Hungary, this figure was 174, while in 
Ukraine 162.) The following table lists some fundamental statistics regarding the main 
daily newspapers.
Editorial profile Circulation 
figures (2004)*
Koha Ditore (Daily Times) Independent 10,000
Zeri (Voice) Independent 8,000
Bota Sot (World Today) LDK-leaning 5,500
Epoka e Re (New Epoch) PDK-leaning Less than 1,000
Kosova Sot (Kosovo Today) Independent Less than 1,000
Rilindja (Renaissance)
(ceased publishing in 02/2002)
Independent Not available
* Source: Kosovo Media Assessment (2004) by USAID/ ARD Inc. (Note in addition that Koha Ditore 
and Bota Sot also sell a considerable number of copies abroad.)
78 Sponsored by IREX, this successful venture received more that 2 million hits on its website during 
November 2001. Many local media outlets take stories straight from KosovoLive, reprinting and 
rebroadcasting them verbatim. USAID continues to provide in-house training and technical assistance to 
KosovaLive and is helping them make the transition from a free service to a paid one. Source: USAID 
Annual Report 2002
79 This is confirmed by a poll conducted among 1,000 ethnic Albanians by the Sofia-based Balkan British 
Social Surveys (BBSS) and Gallup International in October, 1999, which concluded that newspapers were 
the preferred choice.
80 Source: IREX/ Index Kosova audience survey, 2001. Although it has to be noted that while it is not 
specified in the survey, these figures likely refer to all kinds of print media, including entertainment and 
theme papers.
85 Index Kosovo, December 2003 Media Survey, available from www.indexkosova.com
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The post-conflict period also witnessed the launch of some entirely new political 
dailies, such as 24 Ore (which supported the third biggest political party, the Alliance 
for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) between May 2002 and January 2003), the political 
daily entitled Pavaresia (set up in March 2004 to support the small Albanian Christian 
Democratic Party of Kosovo, PSHDK) as well as the British 5««-like tabloid Lajm 
(owned by a Swiss Albanian businessman, started in September 2004). While 24 Ore 
and Pavaresia were similarly politicised and radical in their language as Bota Sot, Lajm 
focused on entertainment, crime and scandal as opposed to political party activities. The 
independent papers not only provided more thought-provoking opinion pieces and 
generally more reliable and in-depth reporting, but offered some coverage about issues 
effecting the Serbian minority. Meanwhile, the politicised and low-quality newspapers 
remained ethnically-biased and negative toward the Serbs.
Every newspaper had a serious impact on public debates, as their key articles 
were translated and distributed to both the local international community and to foreign 
government officials, researchers and academics. Irrespective of their local popularity, 
all these newspapers therefore carried the potential to shape policy developments and to 
influence the political agenda. During the period under review, an increasing number of 
active politicians became associated with various newspapers, either through ownership 
or other types of affiliation. After its owner and editor Veton Surroi ran for political 
office in the 2004 general elections, Koha Ditore found itself in close association with 
the opposition party ORA, while Lajm  and Bota Sot are owned by businessman Bexhet 
Pacolli, who -  among others -  uses the papers to settle scores between organised 
criminal groups. (Given that many of Kosovo’s local leaders are thought to have links to 
organised crime, this strategy has worked “successfully” in the past for Pacolli, who is 
himself believed to be embedded in Russian organised crime.)
Throughout the post-conflict period, the highest number of complaints addressed 
to the TM C’s office fell into the category of “vigilante journalism”. An analysis of the 
complaints received between 2000 and 2003 shows that complaints were initiated 
against every newspaper, except Kosova Sot. All politically-affiliated papers were 
subsequently found to be in violation of the print code of conduct, most frequently for 
their unrelenting war crimes accusation against individuals. For example, the newspaper 
24 Ore ran a series of articles in the summer of 2002, attacking a former KLA leader 
Tahir Zemaj, who was known to be a close ally of Rugova. The paper accused Zemaj of 
dozens of murders against Albanians through his activities as an active member of the 
Serbian paramilitary group “Death Arrow”.82 A few months later the man was 
assassinated along with two other family members. In the wake of threats against the 
paper, 24 Ore ceased publication in January 2003 to escape the TMC’s sanctions.
This type of vigilante conduct -  characteristic of all radical newspapers -  sought 
to ease deep-rooted tensions between the various power groups which grew out of the 
KLA movement (PDK and AAK), and those groups which have followed Rugova 
throughout. The papers considered it a primary goal to discredit various individuals and 
in some cases, to annihilate select leadership figures. Overall, the politically-affiliated 
dailies remained oblivious to their obligation to respect the privacy and safety of 
citizens, and seemed impatient to wait for the emergence of a professional court system 
to try crimes and investigate these allegations. Between 2000 and 2003, the PDK-
82 OSCE Media Monitoring reports, June, July 2002
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affiliated Epoke e Re was fined to 5,000 DM once (2000), while the LDK-supporting 
Bota Sot was fined seven times to a total of 75,000 euro for such vigilante actions.
Given that there is no civil law on defamation, and self-regulation of the press 
does not exist, the TMC considered the temporary codes of conduct “more valid than 
ever”83 even three years after their promulgation as extraordinary and temporary 
measures. While the TMC’s sanctions ultimately strove to protect the principles of rule 
of law and human rights, the decisions implied that neither the radical language in these 
papers nor political affiliation per se are considered acceptable norms for an emerging 
democracy. The radical newspapers thus felt threatened in their existence and could not 
count on any donor funding.
It was thus not surprising when it emerged that the sanctioned newspapers 
refused to pay the fines. On this occasion, instead of swiftly closing down the papers, 
the TMC termed the newspapers’ behaviour a “blatant defiance of the rule of law”84 and 
turned to UNMIK for assistance in enforcement. However, to further complicate things, 
the TMC was told that the sanctions cannot be enforced in the absence of a relevant 
legislation.85 These debates seriously damaged the credibility of the TMC and the legal 
system as a whole, while complicating the TMC’s work. It took over a year for the 
TMC to secure the participation of district courts in the enforcement,86 and, in the end, 
reached an out-of-court settlement with the papers. Given that the TMC was a 
temporary office with only limited resources,87 it was increasingly unable to carry out 
its regulatory work to the highest standards.
Throughout this period, the rivalry of political platforms also extended to a 
competition for distribution facilities88 and most importantly -  for donor funds. From 
the outset, donors preferred newspapers which upheld the standards of independent, 
moderate-toned journalism. (Koha Ditore, Zeri) After a peak in 2002, the donor funds 
gradually shrank, and these two papers marginalized all other papers on the local 
advertising market. Meanwhile, political party accounts remained non-transparent and it 
has been suspected that Bota Sot and Epoka e Re are financing operations from political 
party coffers. In terms of self-sustainability and future prospects, only Bota Sot and 
Koha Ditore, the two largest publications with Europe-wide distribution networks, were 
considered to have a long-term potential.89 Overall, the trends have been leading toward 
a gradual consolidation of the market, which will most likely see the bankruptcy of 
some of the smaller titles.
83 Annual report by the Temporary Media Commissioner, 2002
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 UNMIK Administrative directive 2003/8 on the Enforcement of TMC sanctions and fines was signed 
by the SRSG on April 8,2003. The TMC was thereby allowed to file an application to enforce 
outstanding fines with a District Court, which could then take the money from the media outlet’s bank 
account, or seize its assets.
87 The TMC, for instance, had to rely on the OSCE’s Media Monitoring department to check for 
violations of the Codes of Conduct.
88 Initially, newspaper distribution was complicated by the continuing monopoly of Rilindja kiosks in 
Kosovo, which -  following the conflict and the diversification of newspaper editorial lines -  often 
declined to sell LDK-critical publications such as Koha Ditore, and particularly Epoka e Re. There was 
also a lack of funds and operators -  up until 2000, only Koha, Zeri and Kosova Sot had distribution 
facilities, the other four papers had to rely on those. Data from OSCE Media Department “Media 
database” 2001
89 Media Sustainability Index, IREX, 2001
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In addition to the above, the development of the print media sector was also 
complicated by the general perception that journalist were unsafe. Only one Albanian 
journalist was killed for her work in post-conflict K osovo,90 but a murder attempt on 
the Serbian editor of Radio Kontakt, and the death of Bota Sot journalist Bekim Kastrati 
in a drive-by shooting during the 2001 elections91 placed added pressure upon 
journalists. As indicated by a 2001 survey by the OSCE, 78% Kosovar journalists are 
unable to undertake investigative projects without fear of threat or reprisal, and almost 
as many think that the general climate for investigative journalism is unsafe. (Details of 
this survey can be found in the Internal aspects section.)
Overall, the international administration’s logic was to discourage and minimise 
the interaction between emerging political elites and the media, and prevent the media 
system in general from developing any kind of political parallelism. While the local 
political and media elites intended to build relations in the style of the development 
assistance model, this was clearly opposed by the electoral laws. During every electoral 
campaign which preceded the municipal and general elections (held a total of four times 
between 2000 and 2004), all political K-Albanian media outlets (such as political 
dailies, and both regional and nationwide television and radio channels airing political 
programming) were obliged to provide “fair and equitable” coverage to all political 
entities which run for office.92 The outlets were not required to provide “equal” 
coverage, but the regulations tried to limit favouritism to a single political party or 
entity, or more directly -  to constrain the party propaganda pushed by the political 
press. While, to a degree, this was a justified attempt to control the aggressive political 
propaganda steaming from some of the publications, it was an obscure piece of 
legislation, which generated a heated interpretation debate during every election.
Prior to the 2004 elections, the TMC attempted to clarify the meaning when it 
said that “Fair and equitable coverage requires the print media to provide a sufficient 
minimum of fair and factual coverage of all political entities so as to permit readers to 
understand the full range of political choices available to voters without 
discrimination.”93 However, this was not helpful given that as many as 32 entities 
competed in these elections, making it difficult to operationalise the concept of 
“sufficient minimum”. Overall, it seems that the “fair and equitable” policy was too 
unrealistic and thus generally failed. During all election campaigns, the political dailies 
whose conduct inspired the regulation failed to comply.94 Bota Sot and Epoka e Re were 
sanctioned on several occasions by the Election Complaints and Appeals sub- 
Commission (ECAC).95 Meanwhile, in the case of balanced publications, the electoral 
rules weakened the journalists’ independent analysis of newsworthiness, and
90 The woman worked for the daily R ilin d ja  for 26 years, and her murder was interpreted as a direct attack 
on the LDK which both outlets were supporting in their editorial lines. Original news item: IFJ press 
release, September 12, 2000
91 Kastrati was in a car with a former KLA leader who is believed to be the target of the attack but was 
only wounded. See K-Albanian newspapers, October 20, 2001
92 Annually published UNMIK “Electoral rules on media during the electoral campaign”
93 Report entitled “Compliance with media election rules. Status report,” released by the TMC, October 
11,2004
94 This is confirmed by the monitoring work results of the OSCE and the local NGO Gani Bobi.
95 During the 2001 general and 2002 municipal elections, ECAC fined B ota  So t (once and twice 
respectively) and E p o ka  e Re (once in each case) for bias and unfairness in reporting. Source: TMC tables 
of cases, 2002
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subordinated the media to political parties. A survey of their coverage indicated that 
editors felt that every political event must be reported on, despite its newsworthiness 
under normal circumstances.96 One positive element of the sanctions practice was 
however, that media-related fines were limited to media outlets and were not extended 
to political parties, as the case had been in Bosnia.
In more general terms, the newspapers’ criticism of these regulations is not only 
indicative of their hostility toward the international authority but also of a more 
theoretical opposition with the regulations themselves. A large number of Kosovar 
editors and journalists have a deep conviction that the K-Albanian print media should be 
divided up according to political groups. Many journalists argue that most of the media 
démocratisation goals advocated by the internationals, especially ideals like 
“independence” and “objectivity” do not make sense in such a politically heated 
environment, and that voters need to be clear on what the various parties represent.97 98
Even independent journalists believe that the “fair and equitable” policy reduces the 
news-making and gathering function of the press to zero. Meanwhile, others point to 
the fact that Kosovo was required to fulfil conditions which are not fulfilled even by 
advanced democracies of the European Union.
The general conviction about the necessity of a political mandate is aptly 
illustrated by the journalists’ guiding philosophy, according to which, they are 
“Albanians first, and then journalists”.99 This, however, does not exempt journalists 
from the obligation to offer high-quality content for readers. The local and 
parliamentary elections -  which resulted in the victory o f the LDK on four occasions 
since 2000 -  tested the newspapers’ ability to prove their emerging professionalism by 
applying the skills which were developed as a result of donor-organised trainings. 
However, the newspapers generally remained passive observers of the elections, failing 
to generate any spirited debate. Newspaper coverage overwhelmingly dealt with 
political rallies (over 50%), official visits by campaigning politicians and party press 
conferences (referred to by Kosovar journalists as “protocol journalism”) while the 
media’s independent, theme-based discussion of election issues remained limited.100
Due to the weakness of the judiciary and the powerlessness of the civil society, 
the identification both within society and the media with political parties is not 
surprising. The new political parties are the only institutions to represent K-Albanian 
interests, and the existence of a discursive space to debate matters of public concern is 
essential. According to a local poll in 2001, 64% of the K-Albanian community had 
stable political preferences prior to the elections, and 27% voted with the family (this 
might overlap with the previous group), leaving a minority of undecided voters.101 The 
large majority of the above mentioned voters were LDK supporters, which is not 
surprising given the LDK’s history and legitimacy. The strong, deeply-rooted political 
preferences seem to have been confirmed by the October 2004 elections, and are 
unlikely to change before the new government and assembly are given more 
responsibilities, and political parties are measured against their real performance.
96 Ibid. OSCE Media Monitoring reports, 2001 elections
97 Conversation with Besim Beqaj, senior political advisor to Prime Minister Rexhepj, October 2004.
98 See for instance, Baton Haxhiu: Equal airtime rule kills off debate, IWPR, October, 2004
99 Interview with Aferdita Kelmendi, managing director of TV 21, March 2002
100 OSCE Media Monitoring reports, 2001 elections
101 Survey by NGO Kosovo Action for Civic Initiatives (KACI), October 2001
Due to the media community’s strong preference for the development assistance 
model, it could be argued that some form of “transitional media model” -  suggested in 
the conclusions of the Hungary case study -  could have been considered, in which 
partisan press is an accepted element of a print media landscape, and the emphasis is on 
establishing a strong, politically-independent public service broadcaster. In view of the 
OSCE’s media monitoring exercise, and the TMC’s sanctioning practice, it seems that 
there was a disproportionately high focus by the internationals on getting the print 
media “right”.
2 .3 . T h e  K -S e r b ia n  N e w s p a p e r  L a n d s c a p e
In order to reach the declared political goal o f the internationals -  i.e. to create 
an integrated and sustainable multi-ethnic society, the first and most important step 
should have been to develop separate, but equally functional print media structures for 
the Serb community. However -  partly because of the uncoordinated nature of donor 
funding -  no clear strategy was developed for the creation of local K-Serbian print 
outlets. The internationals provided support for journalism training, but there was no 
financial support available for local Serb publications. Consequently, the local Serbian- 
language print media landscape remained practically empty.
In 1999, the only locally-printed Serbian daily, Jedinstvo was required to move 
out of its headquarters in central Prishtina, and its office was given to Albanian papers. 
Belgrade strongly protested the joint move by UNMIK and the TMC, and accused the 
Albanians of looting over 70,000 DM equipment from the office with the help o f 
KFOR.102 The paper’s editorial office subsequently moved to the countryside (Zvecan), 
and continued to publish the paper as a weekly. There are no reliable figures regarding 
its circulation, but it is estimated to be between 5,000 and 7,000 copies each week.
Unlike Serbian radio stations, the paper never received any donor funding,103 and
survived only through funding from Belgrade.104 Its editorial line represents the 
interests of the Serbian community throughout Kosovo and Serbia proper, but it is not 
as extreme in its language as some Albanian newspapers.105 1067*Several further regional 
papers appeared sporadically, but only few of them managed to stay afloat (e.g. Glas 
Juga).
Overall, Kosovo’s estimated 130,000-member Serbian community relies on 
newspapers from Serbia proper. The most popular papers are Blic (76%), Vecemje 
Novosti (61%) and Politika (15%), as well as the weekly Nedeljni T elegra f07 -  the 
distribution of which for isolated Serbian enclaves in Kosovo has been organised by 
OSCE and other NGOs. The OSCE also distributes newspapers which have a specific 
audience, for example 8,000 copies of the Serbian children newspaper Male Novine.m  
The circulation of Serbian newspapers in Kosovo complicated the application of the
102 Novo Jedinstvo, December 23, 1999, available at www.serbia-info.com
103 OSCE internal report of the “Status o f minority media in Kosovo”, May 2002
104 Interview with Gyorgy Kakuk, UN spokesperson, North Kosovo, April 2004
105 Ibid.
106 OSCE internal report of the “Status o f minority media in Kosovo”, May 2002
107 Calculated as an aggregate percentage of the first and second choices by those in the K-Serb 
community who read newspapers. IREX/ Index Kosova audience survey, 2001
103 Information from OSCE Media Department
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codes of conduct and the electoral rules regarding the press -  so much so that the TMC 
did not even try to enforce them despite the fact that the applicable legislation is 
applicable for all printed media “published and/  or distributed” within the territory of 
Kosovo. The TMC’s ignorance of all Serbian media output (including locally produced) 
generated complaints from Albanian journalists who pointed to the existence of 
violations within the local Serbian media.
In defence of the internationals’ encouragement of these parallel structures, it 
has to be pointed out that given the uncertainties over the participation of Serb 
politicians in Kosovo’s institutions, there was no real reason for the Serb community to 
establish their own newspapers. The voluntary development of the Serb media would 
have been an endorsement of the international mandate, signalling a move toward the 
acceptance of an independent Kosovo, which the Serb community has been vehemently 
against. It also underscores the societal rejection of the power-sharing arrangement by 
both intellectuals and K-Serb community-at-large. However, this development 
suggested that if the establishment of vertical lines of communication are discouraged 
by both the Serbs and the international donors, then the prospects for a more ambitious 
system of mixed, multi-ethnic outlets -  an idea that was later promoted in the broadcast 
media -  are relatively bleak.
3 . B r o a d c a s t  M e d ia  D e v e l o p m e n t
3 .1 . C r e a t in g  a  K -A l b a n ia n  B r o a d c a s t  L a n d s c a p e  F r o m  S c r a t c h
While the print media segment was developed largely without a comprehensive 
strategy, the internationals had strong ideas regarding the most appropriate broadcast 
landscape for Kosovo. However, these ideas did not amalgamate into one clear policy 
solution, but rather, two opposing ones -  leading to momentous disputes between the 
democratising internationals. Once again, despite the declared goal of creating a multi­
ethnic society, little attention was paid to the needs of the Serb community, and the 
focus of the discussion was on the modalities of creating a democratic media system for 
the Albanian majority. This section will review the broadcast media development policy 
with a particular focus on the divergent “European” and “American” positions.
Despite the unresolved legal issues concerning Belgrade’s authority over the 
broadcast spectrum, broadcast media liberalisation had been initiated prior to the 
establishment of the Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC) -  without a 
comprehensive plan, or any expert oversight. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, 
KFOR allocated 39 FM frequencies to radio stations,109 while the UNMIK Division of 
Press and Public Information and later the OSCE, issued provisional broadcast licenses 
on an ad hoc basis.110 The guiding philosophy was that the emerging Kosovar media 
should not be constrained by the regulatory vacuum. As a result, within the first four 
months after the conflict, ten local television stations and 72 radio stations have been 
started up using international donor funds.111
109 Annual report by the Temporary Media Commissioner, 2001
110 Interview with OSCE officials, 2002
111 Source: Annual report by the Temporary Media Commissioner, 2001. This, again, is a very high 
number for the size of Kosovo, which is illustrated aptly by the operating income of the public service 
broadcaster, RTK’s which is 20 times as little as a that of the Czech Republic (12 million DEM annually).
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Due to the lack of donor coordination, most of the funding was initially picked 
up by electronic outlets supporting the interim government of Hashim Thaci (PDK). At 
this time it was typical that funding and equipment would be donated in haste, without 
the organisations’ checking where the money goes and whether it fits in with any larger 
political and social plan. (It was not until mid-2000 that the OSCE and the Open Society 
Institute eventually began to assist with donor coordination.) Ownership issues 
regarding office space and pre-conflict equipment often remained unresolved, but the 
local media activity nevertheless boomed amidst the hope that the donor-supported 
“market” will lead to permanent jobs. The editorial offices of Koha Ditore, Zeri, 
Kosova Sot, Bota Sot, Rilindja, as well as Radio 21 were all hoping to secure enough 
donor funding to set up Kosovo-wide television channels.11'
The initially chaotic broadcast landscape was put in order after the TMC 
reviewed all licensing decisions and required all broadcasters to reapply. Through the 
TM C’s review, many broadcast outlets -  set up by extremist journalists with loyalties 
either for Milosevic or the interim Thaci-govemment -  were closed down. However, 
there was nothing the TMC could do about the fragmented and unsustainable broadcast 
market which grew out of the uncoordinated donor effort. In 2003, there were 92 radio 
stations (local and K-wide), 26 television stations (local and K-wide)12 13 -  far too much 
for the province’s size and market potential. Of these, 100 were monolingual (of which 
67 are Albanian, while 27 Serbian language) and 18 bi- or multi-lingual.114 Apart from 
RTK, the large majority of multi-lingual broadcast outlets are small, local stations, 
unable to serve the information needs of the Serb community.
After KFOR’s arrival, a group of former employees, with allegedly close ties to 
the Kosovo Liberation Army, attempted to occupy the premises of the Radio Television 
Prishtina (RTP).115 KFOR’s prompt intervention prevented this from happening and the 
station soon started operations under the management of the European Broadcasting 
Union (EBU). Renamed Radio Television Kosovo (RTK), the station was re-launched 
on satellite in September 1999. Its daily one hour “emergency operation” served both as 
a relay for UNMIK public information programmes, and as the nucleus of a future 
multi-ethnic public service broadcaster.116
In the first six months, RTK acted as an extension of the UN administration. 
While this was criticised by the locals, it seems to have been unavoidable given that the 
most important public service mandate in those complicated months was the facilitation 
of dialogue between the arriving internationals and the locals.117 Due to the differences 
in theoretical and methodological priorities, the design format of a democratic broadcast 
landscape became one of the most contentious issues in the K-Albanian media 
démocratisation project. The Americans and the Europeans could only agree on the
112 Op. cit. Sullivan (2000: 11)
113 Annual report by the Temporary Media Commissioner, 2002
114 Ibid.
115 Op. cit. Thompson (2000: 67)
116 Illuminating details about the launch can be found in an interview with Christabel King, RTK’s 
editorial director in the first nine months. In Roques, An ne-Elisabeth (2003): PSB vs. commercial 
broadcasting? What type of broadcasting system do Americans and Europeans want to develop in 
Kosovo? Unpublished MA thesis, School of Journalism of Cardiff University
117 By February 2000, RTK had over one hundred employees, most of them former RTP staff who 
insisted on getting their former jobs back. RTK got to keep many of the young journalists it hired in the 
first few weeks as well, but not as many as it would have liked to.
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rhetorical goal i.e. the need for the creation of a “free and democratic media system”, 
but not on how to establish that. The American view, represented by the US Office in 
Prishtina and IREX, has focused on achieving a bottom-up consolidation of democratic 
standards, and sustainable political independence. They advocated a libertarian 
broadcast landscape where the PSB is marginal, and media pluralism is ensured by 
private channels.1 8
Meanwhile, the Europeans (OSCE, TMC) took the view that similarly to other 
broadcast media reforms in the advanced part of the post-communist region, the media 
structure for Kosovo should be a dual system, made up of public service and 
commercial stations. Their preference for the application of the social democratic theory 
was rooted in two essential goals -  to ensure a mediated space which would assist the 
badly needed societal dialogue in the post-conflict era, and to guarantee the right to 
information of all of Kosovo’s ethnic communities. It was hoped that RTK alone would 
lead to the satisfaction of both main objectives of the media development mandate.
Due to a lack of consensus and a clear roadmap on how to achieve common 
aims, the two sides embarked on entirely separate development programmes. The 
difference emerged early on when the US response to the OSCE efforts to develop an 
ambitious and costly public service broadcaster was a calculated development of two 
commercial rivals to RTK. The US office, and most crucially IREX, helped the 
journalists around Koha Ditore and Radio 21 to prepare bids for the two remaining K- 
wide frequencies in order to ensure an external pluralism within the new media system. 
The American insistence regarding the TMC’s allocation of both K-wide licences has 
been characterised as a “strategic mistake” by most European observers and participants 
of the policy design process, 9 given that three Kosovo-wide broadcasters were never 
going to be sustainable in the weak economic climate. The creation of TV21 and 
Kohavision (from now on KTV) in December 2000 led to the emergence of three under­
funded stations, which all struggled under the burden of their new missions.
In the first three years, neither the commercial channels nor RTK’s management 
could deliver a medium-term financial plan, as funding remained uncertain and the 
stations had little stable income.18 920 The advertising market was seriously restricted, and 
all three stations remained dependent on outside aid.121 Despite the financial problems, 
all three television stations performed well, playing a positive overall role in informing 
the public. They also operated in line with applicable regulations which prohibit the 
promotion of political party interests, oblige them to practice accurate, fair and impartial 
reporting, and similarly to the case of newspapers, require them to provide “fair and
118 From the outset, the US considered Kosovo a clean and fertile ground for implementing its version of 
democracy. An excerpt from a USAID document aptly characterises the US position: “Old structures in 
the public and private sectors have largely been swept away, and our interlocutors are highly receptive to 
advice, particularly from Americans. We have a chance to “green-field” a government, a democracy, and 
a market economy, which can serve as important examples in a problematic region. [...] Government 
institutions, though underpaid and under-skilled, are not as yet bloated and for the most part do not 
exhibit signs of predatory behaviour.” (USAID, 2003 annual)
119 See for instance the interview with Mark Thompson, in Op. cit. Roques (2003)
120 Interview with Richard Lucas, Managing director of RTK, December 2001
321 By 2003, RTK was only generating 29% of its own income, while the same figure for the much 
smaller TV21 and KTV operations was 50%. In case of RTK, the rest came from donors (31 %) and funds 
from the Kosovo Consolidated Budget (40%), while in case of the commercial channels, exclusively from 
donor funds. Sources: RTK annual report 2002, USAID annual report 2002
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equitable” coverage to all political entities during elections.122 The OSCE, which 
closely monitored and analysed the compliance of all media during the electoral period, 
acknowledged their “remarkable maturity”, especially compared to the biased and often 
radical newspaper scene.123
RTK, which reaches 70% of Kosovo’s population, operated without a charter for 
two years, but in June 2001 it was officially established as a “not-for-profit public 
service broadcaster”. According to the law, RTK’s director is chosen by a 9-member 
independent board (six locals and three internationals), and not by elected politicians 
like in many European countries. In order to prevent conflict of interest and to safeguard 
RTK’s independence from politics, the board members cannot hold elected public 
positions, be members of the executive body of a political party or have financial 
interests in the telecommunications or broadcasting industries.
Even more importantly, RTK was formally obliged to “give a voice to all 
communities in Kosovo”, and run 15% of its programming in minority languages, 
including 15% of its prime time news.124 It was also mandated to design a programming 
structure which strikes a balance between programmes with popular appeal and those 
which serve the needs o f niche audiences. While initially RTK’s broadcasts were 
mainly UN-produced or donated programming from Europe, by 2003, in-house 
productions increased to 70% .125 All audience surveys confirmed the leading position of 
RTK -  according to a viewer preference survey, 91% of K-Albanians like to watch 
RTK,126 while according to a more comprehensive, audience measurement survey RTK 
attracts 32,7% of the entire television audience, while KTV and TV21 draw 25,9% and 
11,7% of the audiences, respectively. RTK’s evening news programme, however, is 
unrivalled -  it attracts over 63% of the total news-watching audience.127 Its two radio 
stations, Radio Kosova (36%) and Radio Blue Sky (9%) were second and third in 
popularity after the most heavily funded, entertainment focused station Radio Dukadjini 
(47%).12*
Until the outbreak of inter-ethnic violence in March 2004, RTK was generally 
considered a “success story” .129 It increased its airtime to 24 hours a day, and through 
its public service and news programmes it had a positive impact on Kosovar society. 
Studies show that the difficult living conditions and the 58% unemployment rate (2002) 
have rendered most Kosovars disillusioned with the post-1999 developments -  the
m  Code of Conduct for the Broadcast Media (in effect since September 8, 2000), and annually released 
Electoral rules regarding the broadcast media
123 What also contributed to the stations’ ability to remain politically neutral has been that the electoral 
rules banned paid political advertising on all broadcasters in all three elections to date.
124 UNMIK regulation 2001/13 On the establishment of Radio Television Kosovo, June 15, 2001
125 RTK Annual report, 2002
126IREX/ Index Kosova audience survey, 2001, general cumulative data of first, second and third choices 
among K-Albanians
127 Survey conducted by Helen Harrison and Co. & Kosovar research agency Prism. Conducted in July, 
date released in September 2003.
128 RTK Annual report, 2002
129 For instance, whenever the station was accused of biased coverage, the challenges were later proved 
wrong. One example is when in 2000, Hashim Thaci complained with the TMC of RTK’s biased 
coverage against himself and in favour of Rugova. RTK’s archived material was no longer available, thus 
the TMC turned to the OSCE’s Media Monitoring section to check its own monitoring archive to verify 
the claims. However, the OSCE found no evidence to support Thaci’s contention. Source: OSCE Media 
Monitoring archives
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majority do not believe in the effectiveness of various mechanisms of civic participation 
to influence change in local political and social issues and only 31% expressed 
willingness to perform volunteer work in their communities.130 Despite these trends, 
Kosovars were interested to follow political and social developments -  and the most 
watched programme on all channels in Kosovo was the news (68%).131
While its management claims that RTK’s success was due to its “balance 
between quality and professionalism”,132 the present author considers other factors to be 
more determining. First of all, the programming structure of RTK shows that its 
management decided to opt for a more mainstream, second-cluster approach (i.e. 
resembling commercial stations with regard to its focus on entertainment programming 
and advertisement), as opposed to a high-quality, third cluster approach which the 
management originally planned.133 Secondly, RTK’s success might also have to do with 
the familiarity and credibility which was created in viewers as a result of RTK’s pre- 
conflict existence. Finally, for several years, RTK had no functioning government to 
guard its independence from, thus the question of political dependence was initially 
irrelevant.
The violent events of March 2004 -  in which 19 people died, nearly 900 were 
wounded and 4,500, mainly Serbs, were forced out of their homes -  drastically changed 
the internationals’ perception of RTK’s professional conduct. While all three K-wide 
television channels were accused of being instrumental in inciting the violence, RTK 
received the harshest criticism, and was accused by several watchdogs to have applied a 
technique of “reckless and sensationalist reporting”.134 They condemned RTK’s 
premature editorial judgement regarding the death of two Albanian children, which -  
according to RTK’s unverified, yet widely aired reports -  was the result of a deliberate 
attack by Serbs. Even though no comprehensive, official investigation has been 
completed into the violence by the final drafting of this chapter, it seems likely that the 
unprofessional, anti-Serb news stories were key in mobilising the Albanian mob against 
the Kosovar Serbs.
The professional failings occurred despite RTK’s development of an elaborate 
Code of Ethics for its staff in January 2004. The 50-page document entitled 
“Professional standards and principles of journalistic ethics in the programming of 
RTK” require full impartiality and accuracy in reporting. While it cannot be expected of 
all RTK journalists to internalise such a large document, it is one of the first points (on 
page 1) that “reporting should be dispassionate, wide-ranging and well informed” and 
that “reporting has to avoid anything causing reasonable doubt regarding the 
impartiality of the journalist or the public service broadcaster, or might create the idea
130 UNDP (2003): The Kosovo mosaic - Perceptions of local government and public services in Kosovo, 
March 2003, Report based on a comprehensive, 6,000 people public opinion survey
131 Survey conducted by Helen Harrison and Co. & Kosovar research agency Prism. Conducted in July, 
date released in September 2003.
132 RTK Annual report, 2002
133 Interview with Richard Lucas, Managing director of RTK, December 2001
134 Report by the International Crisis Group (April 2004), Report by the OSCE Representative of the 
Freedom of the Media (April, 2004), Report by Temporary Media Commissioner (April, 2004)
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that the journalist or broadcaster are exposed to the pressure of a certain group, be it of 
an ideological, political, financial, social, religious or cultural nature.” 135
The debates that followed the March events highlighted the extreme antagonism 
which had built up between RTK’s management and the internationals. Findings by the 
TMC and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media were vehemently 
disputed by RTK, some local journalists’ associations and local politicians, who 
claimed that the reports were face-saving measures for the internationals who had failed 
to control the crowds.136 The RTK management went as far as claiming that the TMC 
report and the subsequent fines were driven by the US Office’s anti-RTK agenda (the 
TMC at the time was a former JREX official).137 The dispute lasted for much o f the year 
2004, until a compromise solution was found, in which the stations admitted violations 
of the broadcast code of conduct and agreed to allocate funds to staff training in conflict 
reporting (i.e. the fines per se were waved).138
The roots of the RTK-related problem are best understood against the backdrop 
of the pre-March dilemmas regarding RTK’s operation, which were widely discussed in 
international circles but did not get much local coverage.
1. One fundamental problem with RTK has been that it failed to become a multi­
ethnic broadcaster, as required by law. Its management claimed that the station 
broadcasted the required amount (15%) of its programmes in minority 
languages, and that it exceeded that (26%) in relation to its daily news 
programming.139 But in reality, the station did not prioritise between the length 
of Serbian, Turkish and Bosnian-language programming (all 105 min. per 
week)140 despite the fact the Serbs constitute the biggest minority group. Also, 
minority representatives complained that the lack o f subtitling alienates the non- 
Albanian population, and have mentioned that the “neutrally-presented” 
Serbian-language news do not address their specific concerns.
2. The second basic problem was that the RTK management somewhat 
subordinated to the governing parties (and particularly the first Prime M inister’s 
party, the PDK), and during the nights, began showing patriotic Albanian 
propaganda to protest the international pressure to become a multi-ethnic 
broadcaster. In the words of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, 
it became an organisation “not committed to politically correct reporting.”141 
The management became so powerful that it assumed control over its 
supervisory board, and thereby rendered dysfunctional the only internal, 
independent quality control mechanism.
135 “Professional standards and principles of journalistic ethics in the programming of RTK”, January 
2004
136 See for instance the conclusions reached by the Media Committee o f the Kosovo Assembly, in OSCE 
Media Monitoring, May 13, 2004, and May 18, 2004
137 See “A critical view of the Temporary Commissioner Report”, RTK management, May 2004
138 See “Statement on the settlement of sanctions cases,” TMC, December 17, 2004
139 Data from RTK website, www.rtklive.com
140 Interview with Elvana Prekazi, Head of Administration, RTK, February 2004
141 Conversation with Miklós Haraszti, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, July 2004, 
Brussels
160
3. Thirdly, despite the fact that RTK’s remit was to run programming “dealing 
with significant social issues,” RTK did little to promote inter-ethnic 
reconciliation.142 In addition, despite the RTK legislation’s recommendation that 
the board of directors should “reflect a cross-section of Kosovo’s civil and 
multi-ethnic society as well as the regions of Kosovo,”143 only one Serb has 
been appointed to the supervisory board, and no Serb has worked in RTK’s 
highest management since the organisation was set up.144 Also, only 18 of 
RTK’s 336 permanent employees are Serbs. (5.3%) As a result, RTK was often 
accused by Serb political representatives to be “freezing inter-ethnic 
confrontations”.145
4. Lastly, RTK’s pool o f young K-Albanian journalists were not trained, or 
experienced in dealing with sensitive, breaking stories in the area of Albanian- 
Serbian relations.
At the same time, it needs to be pointed the “March 2004” assessments reports 
did not take into account the contradiction between production patterns (i.e. the need to 
make rapid editorial decisions in television coverage) and the Kosovo-wide uncertainly 
regarding the future political settlement, which has resulted in an unclear framework for 
the coverage of sensitive inter-ethnic issues. Despite the five years of peaceful co­
existence, the ethnic tensions in the society remained high and explosive, creating a 
difficult environment for the practicing of democratic journalism skills. Despite that, 
most internationals and minority representatives seemed to expect RTK to resolve 
societal tensions overnight, and failed to acknowledge that RTK is, in fact, the mirror 
image of all the sensitive issues which confront the Kosovo society and the 
democratising internationals.146
There were also basic structural problems on the Kosovar media landscape. 
Overall, the large majority of donor funds went to the Albanian language media, and 
only a small number of multi-ethnic broadcast outlets were set up (i.e. those which 
broadcast on three or four minority languages e.g. Bosnian, Turkish, Roma and 
Serbian). Given a combination of factors -  the weak business potential, the lack of 
easily accessible and stable donor funds, as well as the lack of initiative on behalf of the 
Serbs, little success was achieved in creating viable Serbian-language, public 
information providing outlets.147 The few Serbian-language television and radio outlets 
either became firmly oriented toward Belgrade (in the north of Kosovo where Serbs are 
a majority) or remained isolated outlets with limited audiences and communication
142 UNMIK continually called on grassroots organizations -  including media outlets -  to promote 
tolerance, to foster inter-ethnic dialogue, and to disseminate information regarding minority returns, and 
related issues such as property rights, but no political agreement was reached on the establishment of a 
televised Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which would have made RTK's situation easier.
143 UNMIK regulation 2001/13 On the establishment of Radio Television Kosovo, June 15,2001
144 Interview with Elvana Prekazi, Head of Administration, RTK, February 2004
145 Report by Medienhilfe’s Support Programme for Independent Media in Kosovo, 2001, Chapter 
entitled “Main problems and needs”
146 According to a UNDP survey, only 4%  of the Kosovar society seems to be willing to volunteer in 
activities promoting inter-ethnic tolerance. (UNDP, 2003)
147 Some donor funding went toward Serbian radio and television stations, as well as network of radios, 
but these either remained isolated or failed to provide the type of public service broadcasting that would 
have been needed.
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potential (in enclaves in the South of the river Ibar). Thereby, the majority of the Serbs 
remained without Kosovo-based representation on the broadcast media landscape, too. 
The RTK failed to attract Serbian audiences,148 and for news programming, the 
community continued to rely on radio and television broadcasts from Serbia proper.149
RTK was created to serve as a shared communication platform between the 
Albanian and Serb communities, and the internationals seemed to believe that, in the 
long term, RTK alone would be the central institution to satisfy the information needs of 
all ethnic communities. However, in light of the above, it is argued here that while RTK 
has been an adequate foundation for the communication system of this conflict-ridden 
society, its operation would have been more successful if complimented by the 
development of mono-lingual Serbian broadcast media outlets. A multi-ethnic television 
could have only worked toward reconciliation if the different communities were 
interested in each other’s culture and language,150 but in the case o f Kosovo, this was 
never a realistic possibility.
Given that the potential for multi-ethnic media projects has been limited by the 
low willingness to return to previously multi-ethnic areas,151 several leading UNMIK 
officials have suggested that the Serbs should be assisted with the establishment of a 
local, Serbian-language PSB television station.152 Following the March violence, this 
view became even stronger, as an increasing number of internationals and observers 
began to argue (including the US State Dept, in Washington) that only a Kosovo-wide 
Serbian television station could provide the local Serbs with adequate psychological 
support to remain in Kosovo.153 Thereby, it is being increasingly realised that a multi­
ethnic RTK might have been too ambitious from the start, and the level o f inter-ethnic 
intolerance had been underestimated.
3 .2 . C o n t r o v e r s y  O v e r  R e g u l a t o r y  is s u e s
The heated policy debate regarding the draft law on the Independent Media 
Commission (commonly referred to as the IMC law) heightened the differences 
between the conceptual positions about the structure and organisation of the Kosovar 
media system. The IMC law was designed to supplement the regulation establishing 
RTK,154 and replace all other media regulations and codes of conduct, as well as the 
institution of the TMC. As its main mandate, it should provide for the creation of a 
locally-run permanent regulatory authority, regulate the operation of the already 
existing Media Appeals Board, and establish a procedure for appointing the board of 
RTK. (Stipulations on RTK’s financing were also incorporated into the text, although
148 A 2001 IREX-commissioned media consumption survey confirmed that RTK is not among the top six 
television channels, which Serbs watch. 66% have declared to never watch RTK at all. No other survey is 
currently available.
149 The local Serbian-language radio and television stations predominantly feature entertainment 
programming. Source: IREX/ Index Kosova audience survey, 2001
50 In the case of RTK, neither of the two communities watched programming aired in the other’s 
language.
151 UNHCR Minority Returns report, 2003
152 UN Head of Press and Public Information, Simon Haselock and others have advocated the 
establishment o f an independent, separate local Serbian PSB.
153 Conversation with USAID Kosovo officials, June 2004, Brussels
154 UNMIK regulation No. 2001/13 on the Establishment of Radio Television Kosovo, June 15, 2001
162
1this was not the original intention.) Let us first list the key steps in the draft law 's 
development between 2000 and 2005.
The journey o f the IMC law. Prepared for the first time in 2000, and since then 
redrafted several times, the IMC legislation was only passed by parliament in April 
2005, and is currently pending promulgation by the SRSG who had serious reservations 
about some of the provisions. The first draft was prepared by UN/ OSCE experts and 
the TMC, and in 2002 the Interim Administrative Council, which was a transitional 
government made up of international and Kosovar members, endorsed the draft. Due to 
objections from the US Office over the envisaged funding portfolio, the SRSG however 
refused to sign it. The draft was then transferred back to the TMC’s office, who along 
with a so-called Media Task Force (a team of international experts) redrafted and 
finalised the text.155 The new version recommended that RTK be funded through a 
combination of licence fees and advertising only (no budget allocation), and suggested 
that the advertising issue should be dealt with in the context of an Administrative 
Directive on RTK funding -  separate from the EMC regulation. However, the 
commercial channels rejected that idea.156 The TMC called for a swift passage of the 
long-awaited law, and placed a moratorium on the issuance of new broadcast licenses 
until the IMC was set up.157 Simultaneously, it also requested donors not to encourage 
the establishment of new broadcast outlets.
In February 2003, however, UNMIK transferred the competencies relevant to 
media policy and legislation to the Kosovar-led Provisional Institutions of Self- 
Government. The “final international draft” was thus handed over to the Kosovar Prime 
Minister’s Office for consideration.158 Despite the internationals’ expectation of a swift 
endorsement, the Kosovar government began a lengthy review -  thereby allowing time 
and opportunity for the US Office to continue pushing the libertarian agenda. When 
presented in 2003 to international and local stakeholders, the first Kosovar EMC draft 
gathered storm, and drew objections even from international organisations outside of 
Kosovo -  the EU, the Council o f Europe, as well as RTK’s founder the European 
Broadcasting Union (EBU).159 The bodies pointed out numerous internal contradictions 
and loopholes within the new draft and criticised it for the discretionary political 
interference which it allowed. With regard to RTK’s funding, the apparent triumph of 
the US position was criticized for placing the positive trends in RTK “under serious 
threat”. 160
Main bones o f contention. Between 2003 and 2005, the various “theoretical” 
positions became mixed and difficult to follow, as the new TMC (this time an 
American, former IREX official) was representing more of a libertarian position on 
certain aspects, while the locals campaigned for a license to exercise control over the 
broadcast media. In the meantime, the OSCE withdrew itself from the debate, and
155 Report by the International Advisory Group to the Task Force on the Independent Media Commission 
(IMC) to the SRSG, released on October 6, 2002
156 Annual report by the Temporary Media Commissioner, 2002
157 TMC press release, March 26, 2003, and RFE/ RL Newsline, March 29, 2003. The moratorium was 
eased in December 2003, to encourage the establishment of more multi-ethnic broadcast outlets. TMC 
press release, December 11,2003
,5S February 13, 2003
159 OSCE Background report, Status of the IMC draft law, June 6, 2003
160 EBU press release, May 16, 2003
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admitted that it had “lost the plot”.161 After the local elites assumed responsibility for 
the IMC law, the ensuing debate continued to highlight differences of opinion in two 
main areas -  the relationship between the incumbent government and the public media 
bodies (RTK, IMC), and the financial sustainability of RTK.
The first issue to cause disagreements was political influence over RTK and the 
IMC. The prolonged drafting process demonstrated that local politicians regarded a 
fully independent IMC and an independent RTK a possible danger with regard to their 
authority and power. After having been given the firs t opportunity to rework the 
international IMC law draft, local politicians incorporated amendments to the 
international draft of 2003 allowing for a more politicised operation. They created a 
non-transparent appointment system for the IMC council, as well as the RTK board 
(which was to be appointed by the former), creating opportunities for politically-driven 
appointments and decision-making.162 Under this proposal, the parliament was given 
disproportionately more power in removing than in appointing Council members, and 
the rules of dismissals were not defined clearly.
According to the proposal, RTK would be obliged to carry out an ambitious 
public service mission, but its financial survival would be increasingly dependent on the 
public budget given the envisaged phasing out of advertising revenues by 2008. As the 
Council of Europe pointed out, the draft not only showed preference for commercial 
broadcasting but was also “certain to leave the public service broadcaster under­
financed and incapable of performing its obligations properly.”163 The governing elites 
also sought to place RTK under the direct control of the parliamentary committee of 
media affairs, by assigning an annual compulsory efficiency review. They also created a 
system in which RTK’s budget could be revised at any time, and without elaborate 
checks-and-balances assurances.
Given the limited growth potential of the Kosovar economy and advertising 
market, the second main bone of contention emerged in relation to the public service 
broadcaster's financial sustainability. In an apparent effort to correct the financial 
enabling environment in favour of the commercial broadcasters, the firs t locally 
produced (and US Office supported) draft placed RTK on the path of certain death by 
prescribing a gradual phase-out of advertising. Despite the elaborate programming 
obligations for RTK, local political elites -  who began to see the three television 
stations as three possible political party associates for the future -  were convinced by 
the argument made by the US office-financed commercial broadcasters which insisted 
on ensuring “fair and correct competition”. Similarly to the Hungarian case, this aimed 
to correct an imbalance which the media landscape inherited from the past.
Due to its pre-1999 history, RTK’s overwhelming success with Albanian 
audiences and its satellite outreach to the émigré community meant that it had secured a 
leading position (68%) in generating advertising revenue.164 Travel agencies, airlines
161 Conversation with Jeremy Lidstone, former OSCE Head of Media Department, May 2005
162 For a detailed analysis, see Council of Europe (2003): Comments on the Kosovo draft Law on the 
Independent Media Commission and broadcasting, prepared by Karol Jakubowicz, released May 19, 2003
163 Council of Europe (2003): Comments on the Kosovo draft Law on the Independent Media 
Commission and broadcasting, prepared by Karol Jakubowicz, released May 19,2003
164 In 2001,68% of all advertising was on RTK, while TV21 had a 18% share, and KTV a 14% share. 
Source: “Advertising on the spot in Kosovo,” Report by the International Advisory Group to the Task 
Force on the Independent Media Commission, October 4, 2002, Prishtina, Kosovo
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and insurance companies were particularly interested to advertise on RTK.165 For years, 
the commercial channels argued that RTK’s excessive funding through various donors 
and the budget, coupled with the potential of revenues from the license fee, had already 
given RTK a competitive advantage, and it should not be allowed to advertise. Despite 
the fact that RTK needed a diverse and stable financing structure to perform its 
ambitious public service remit, the commercial broadcasters campaigned on the 
principles of competition law, and argued for the need to regulate the advertising market 
to avoid the development of an RTK monopoly. The US Office’s libertarian convictions 
to reduce state involvement in media affairs were a welcome support.
Creating legal guarantees for stable and non-political funding has been a 
cornerstone of the European, social democratic position. The Europeans argued that 
only a public service broadcaster can provide the diversity of programming and the 
internal pluralism of voices that are necessary to create constructive social dialogue and 
a democratic policy sphere. They were driven by the conviction that RTK would be an 
all-encompassing response to both the needs in the area of high-quality public service 
programming and the challenge of multi-ethnic co-existence. Their approach was 
supported by the conclusions of an SRSG-commissioned report on RTK’s financing, 
which concluded that both license fees and advertising are central to RTK’s success. 
Also, the RTK’s managing director argued that RTK would lose its political 
independence if it had to rely solely on licence fees.166 The European partners insisted 
that a market consolidation process should only affect the commercial broadcasters, and 
in case of a weak advertising market, the commercials should either merge or go out of 
business.167
Embedded in the economic and political realities of post-conflict Kosovo, the 
social democratic logic seems to be the only one which offers the potential to meet all 
the needs -  as well as the ambitious benchmarks -  in the broadcast segment. However, 
it is debatable whether the costly and ambitious public service operation was realistic in 
the first place, as Kosovo does not have the necessary economic vitality to support such 
a large-scale endeavour. In addition, RTK was dependent on the questionable success of 
the Kosovo-wide license fee collection. European experience shows that only developed 
markets and trustworthy taxpayers -  such as the UK, Germany and the Scandinavian 
countries -  can afford to have a strong and ambitious PSB. As the Ukrainian case aptly 
illustrated, media pluralism and media freedom are highly dependent on economic 
conditions, and a pluralistic media landscape cannot be created, not to mention 
maintained on the long run, under weak economic conditions. It was gradually 
recognised, although never formally admitted, by European policy-makers that -  even if 
the revenues from license fees and advertising were stable -  RTK would still be 
unlikely to succeed in its remit without external support.168
The Americans were not overly concerned with the issue of multi-ethnic co­
existence, and designed their strategy around the core aim of assuring that the television 
landscape remains independent of the emerging Kosovar government. Similarly to the
165 Interview with Richard Lucas, Managing director of RTK, December 2001
166 Interview with Richard Lucas, Managing director of RTK, December 2001
167 EBU's Werner Rumphorst, in Op. cit. Roques (2003)
168 Werner Rumphorst of the European Broadcasting Union, for instance, said that unless RTK is funded 
proportionately in the same way as the BBC, ARD, SVT or Swiss broadcasting, there will be a serious 
risk that it will become a US-style marginalized PSB. Op. cit. Roques (2003)
165
Europeans, they used RTK’s financial vulnerability as an argument, and cited regional 
examples where governments failed to ensure the independence of costly public service 
broadcasting operations. Given that political interference was tangible on both the part 
of the internationals169 and the locals170 during the period of investigation, the prime 
libertarian concern was that one station alone would not be able to resist either political 
pressure from the government, or financial pressure from future business leaders or 
oligarchs. At the same time, the US was undoubtedly also trying to protect its 
“investment” in media development. They knew that if RTK continues to be as 
successful as it is, the channels they have sponsored would eventually have to merge or 
disappear altogether.
The US Office suggested that all possible revenue sources should be fairly 
divided among broadcasters i.e. if  RTK already receives public funding it should not be 
allowed to use advertising funds as well. They argued that a large-scale PSB operation 
would be anachronistic and controversial as no politically independent PSB can be 
created despite the best intentions. However, they overlooked the fact that every post­
communist country, which reformed its state media, has designed a mixed funding 
system, which includes advertising.171 They also disregarded the opinion o f a 2002 
independent expert group which warned that curbing advertising would also discourage 
competition and thereby put an obstacle before Kosovo’s economic development.172 
Another overlooked aspect was the fact that license fee collection was far from being a 
certain and stable source o f revenue, in fact it was more a burden than assistance.173 174
Finally, the advertising revenues for commercial channels became so high by 2004 that 
the channels became sustainable, and could fund all operational costs without further 
donor support.
All in all, it seems that while implementing the respective theories, the two sides 
failed to consider all dimensions o f the démocratisation effort. A libertarian model alone 
would not address the problem of multi-ethnicity and reconciliation, the need for high- 
quality programming, the promotion of social dialogue and a general remit of nation 
building. At the same time, while the suggested social democratic model would in 
theory cater for all those needs (except for the Serb interests of course), it is a very 
expensive model, unfit for the current conditions of Kosovo. Some observers argued 
that instead of applying these theories, the two parties should have designed a brand 
new model, which is specific for the unique Kosovar situation. Some have indicated that
169 r t k  has been “subject to the manipulation of the protectorate power, just like in Bosnia.” (Thompson 
in Op. cit. Roques (2003)
170 Interview with Richard Lucas, Managing director of RTK, December 2001
171 Only in Estonia was advertising banned, in 2002.
172 "Advertising on the spot in Kosovo," Report by the International Advisory Group to the Task Force on 
the Independent Media Commission, October 4, 2002, Prishtina, Kosovo
173 In keeping with the traditions of Kosovo, the license fees were began to be collected by the Kosovo 
Electricity Co. (KEK) in November 2003. This fee of 3,5 euro was levied on all households, businesses 
and other organizations, as a separate item on the electricity bill. While collection has been “difficult” 
with Albanians, it has been virtually impossible with the Serbian community who have no interest in 
RTK, and do not rely on KEK for electricity. (The north of Kosovo is quasi integrated with Serbia in 
terms of electricity, television, and mobile phone networks.) Details regarding the license fee can be 
obtained from http://www.rtklive.com/site/etc/Questions.php
174 See ARD Inc. (2004): Kosovo Media Assessment, Final report, commissioned by USAID, March 
2004, available at http://www.usaid.gov/missions/kosovo/pdf/Kosovo Media Assessment.pdf. pp. iii
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the solution might be in creating private broadcasters with a strong public service remit 
to act as the central instrument o f the new broadcast segment.175
The fin a l version. In January 2005, the Kosovar parliament agreed the draft law 
“in principle” 176 and passed the legislation in April 2005. The law, as adopted by the 
parliament, terminates the authorities competence in regulating the print media, and thus 
makes the print codes of conduct redundant. (Several versions of the draft law provided 
for the temporary transfer to the IMC of the TMC functions with regard to the print 
media, “pending the establishment of effective professional self-regulation by the print 
media in Kosovo”. However, following the passage of a Press Code in March 2005, this 
was considered redundant and was deleted from the final version.)
Despite the years of debate, the law exhibits major omissions, weaknesses and 
flaws. One major omission is the failure to settle the conflict between this and the 
existing Law on Telecommunications177, under which broadcasters are subject to the 
full range o f the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority’s regulatory powers 
including licensing, frequency assignment, and license fee collection. Another omission 
is that it fails to create clear rules for the participation of the Serb community in the 
regulatory work. Meanwhile, a major weakness is that several unclear stipulations 
remained in the texts, including a reference to a yet non-existent “broadcast policy”, 
which the Council of Europe requested to amend in 2003. Another weakness is that 
while reference to the IMC’s power to suspend broadcasting licences in case of 
“emergency situations, including unavoidable dangers of public unrest or other material 
damage” was deleted from the final text, the law empowers the IMC Council to set fines 
on RTK if it breaches its own Code o f Conduct. This is a very vague formulation and 
can also lead to abuse, especially given the fact that the Code is 50-pages long. Finally, 
it is also considered a weak point that the fines collected from broadcasters are not 
envisaged to be re-channelled into the media sector to serve a positive purpose (i.e. 
sponsorship of art or cultural production, or training), they will instead be deposited in 
the government’s budget.
There are many outright flaws as well. Despite the stipulation that the IMC is 
“independent of any political influence”, the law creates a highly politicised system of 
appointments for the IMC Council, and gives the parliament a proportionally high role 
in dismissing members. It could be argued therefore that the law fails to guarantee the 
IMC’s independence from political forces, and violates the Council of Europe 
Recommendation 2000/23 on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities 
for the broadcasting sector. The TMC commented that this law also fails to satisfy the 
media-related stipulations in the so-called “Kosovo standards” which are necessary to 
complete before status talks can begin, and has requested several changes to be made 
before the SRSG promulgates the law. In addition, the law envisages the phasing out of 
both budget and advertising funds for the RTK (although without a target date), in order 
to “promote a fair broadcasting competition”, while the IMC Council is given unlimited 
authority to set the advertising quotas on RTK (while no specific mention is made with 
regard to commercial channels). It is unfortunate that the RTK-related stipulations were 
not enshrined in a more elaborate regulation on broadcasting policy. The gloomy
175 Interview w ith TMC Anna Di Lellio, in Op. cit. Roques (2003)
176 Draft IMC legislation, proposed by the Kosovar Parliament’s Committee on Public Services, Local 
Administration and Media, January 2005
177 Passed by the Kosovo Parliament in 2002 and promulgated by the SRSG in 2003.
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perspective for RTK’s funding questions much of the international effort that went into 
building a genuine public service broadcaster.
4 . T h e  I n t e r n a l  D i m e n s io n  o f  M e d ia  R e f o r m
By late 2004, newspapers gradually moved away from hardline vigilante 
journalism but a considerable number of outlets remained strongly politicised, at times 
demagogue, seeking to increase polarisation and hatred within society.
The poor quality of Kosovar journalism was initially attributed to two 
interlocking historical elements -  the decade o f oppression by Milosevic" regime, and 
the poor economic conditions which prevented the media’s technological and 
democratic advancement since the 1970s. These two aspects led to the emergence of a 
handicapped system of societal communication, which, in the late 1990s, emerged 
embodied in a lack of media ethics and standards, as well as a widespread affinity for 
applying unprofessional journalistic techniques. Media organisations which started up 
in the post-conflict period were all excessively politicised as most reporters saw 
themselves employed to promote a particular political party or viewpoint. As the 
previous section has analysed, there was little interest in producing original, let alone 
investigative stories, and the print media commonly engaged in publishing 
unsubstantiated reports, as well as slander and hate speech.
The journalism profession has had to develop in an environment where due to 
the political instability and the prevalent legal vacuum, it was initially plagued by the 
lack of clarity regarding accountability systems and authority structures. But despite the 
media’s serious identity and mandate crisis in the post-conflict period, the abundant 
donor funding made journalism a popular and privileged profession overnight. There 
was a substantial demand for journalists, and media organisations could pay double or 
often triple the salaries of employees at local businesses and Kosovar state institutions 
(a monthly USD 500 as opposed to 150-200178).
At the outset, the media community was largely made up of inexperienced 
journalists. While some leading journalists (mainly Koha Ditore's editorial staff) had 
been trained abroad, the large majority received no training at all. This was true for both 
the journalists from the “old school” (older journalists who were put out of work during 
the 1990s), as well as those who belonged to the “new school” (young graduates with 
no work experience but great enthusiasm). Despite the international efforts to create a 
university-level journalism programme, by the end of 2004, no such programme had 
been set up in Kosovo. Thus, aspiring journalists only have access to an overcrowded 
private course at the local institute Faik Konica.
The OSCE and IREX quickly recognised that journalism training was going to 
be a key condition for any internal media démocratisation to begin, and began a mass 
training of journalists. Overall, donor funds were spent in seven main priority areas:
a) support for broadcast outlets (both local, regional and K-wide);
b) assistance for cooperation between and joint programming for radio stations;
c) support for multi-ethnic media and minority language outlets (including Serbian,
Roma, Turkish, Bosniak, etc.);
178 Media Sustainability Index, IREX, 2001
168
d) funds for the distribution of Serbian newspapers;
e) women’s and children’s projects;
f) press clubs, associations, internet centres; and
g) training projects and conferences.179
Not necessarily a direct result, but the media gradually spent more time on 
corruption issues. One well-known story dealt with illegal fuel smuggling on the 
Kosovo-Montenegro border, which involved a high-ranking KFOR officer as well as 
police and customs officers, while another revealed large-scale corruption at the 
internationally-managed Kosovo Electricity Company. Nevertheless, despite the 
extensive training, the large majority of journalists failed to adopt some basic principles 
and methods of investigative journalism. Journalists mostly worked with press releases 
or material they are given at UNMIK or party press conferences, and rarely set the 
agendas themselves. As a result, newspaper articles resembled opinion pieces as 
journalists rarely attributed information to sources. On average, only under 2% o f all 
front-page news articles were connected to a named source, while over 60% were based 
on unnamed sources, often referred to as “own source” or “our investigation 
suggests”.180
In another negative development, the competition for donor funds has led to a 
polarisation of the community, and fragmentation across lines of loyalty to various 
international offices. Instead of organising themselves into one professional association 
which would develop a widely endorsed code of ethics as well as a self-regulating 
mechanism, the journalists ended up founding four different associations: the 
Federation o f Journalists, the Association o f Economic Journalists, the Association o f  
Independent Broadcasters, and the Association fo r  Professional Journalists. For years, 
these associations showed little interest in taking upon the task of establishing self- 
regulating mechanisms, which would replace the temporary codes of conduct for the 
print and broadcast media. Eventually, when journalist associations agreed on a Code of 
Ethics for the print media March 2005, it was only endorsed by the independent and 
already relatively professional print outlets, and not those which have caused most 
headaches for the internationals and in particular, the TMC.
The “Press Code”, developed by the Association fo r  Professional Journalists, 
IREX and the OSCE, hopes to be “the foundation of the system of self-regulation that 
shall be considered morally and professionally binding on reporters, editors and the 
owners and publishers of newspapers and periodicals.” Among others, the code also 
urges news organisations to “demonstrate transparency in matters of media ownership 
and management, enabling citizens to ascertain clearly the identity of proprietors and 
the extent of their economic interests in the media.” It also calls on editorial offices to 
separate between facts and opinions, and obliges journalists to make references to a 
person’s “ethnic group” only when directly relevant to the event being reported. It also 
formalises the responsibility of media outlets to accord a right of reply. Finally, it also 
includes a ban on accepting “bribes or other inducements which cause a conflict of
179 For an overview of the main donor organisations, see report entitled “Kosovo Media Assessment” by 
ARD Inc. (2004: 9-13)
180 OSCE Media Monitoring reports, 2002 election campaign (prepared originally by the author)
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interest with their profession, and which compromise their professional and moral 
credibility.” 181
Despite the adoption of the Code, it is still unknown whether this will be 
sufficient to encourage the print m edia to increase the quality of reporting and generally 
the standards in print media. The Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan, which sets 
out the actions and policies to reach the standards set out in the document “Standards 
for Kosovo” published in December 2003 and subsequently endorsed by the UN 
Security Council, also required the creation of a “multi-ethnic” press council. While the 
Code envisages the creation of a Press Council which would settle complaints and 
violations o f this Code, media reports were rather pessimistic about the swift setting up 
of this body.182
Professional solidarity was far from emerging in the broadcast segment too,
where the IMC debate triggered significant animosity between the journalists working
for public service and commercial channels. The commercial broadcasters accused RTK
and its workers of having an unfair advantage, and claimed that RTK’s advertising
monopoly would push them into bankruptcy.183 They also complained that the IMC
draft was not sufficiently discussed in public. Meanwhile RTK argued that “a campaign
of misinformation and slanderous accusations” had been launched against them, as part
of a “dishonest war” in which “some media outlets cannot compete with RTK’s
professionalism.” 184 185The IMC debate further crystallised the positions o f the two
communities, and led to a fragmentation in their emerging representative 
• • 1 organisations.
Throughout the period of review, journalists were more united in relation to 
problems of isolation, political and economic dependency -  and most importantly, 
safety. As indicated by a 2001 survey by the OSCE, both Albanian and Serb journalists 
are seriously concerned about the general safety environment. The Kosovo-wide threat 
assessment survey found that 39% of the respondents have been threatened in some way 
while investigating stories.186 For the whole of Kosovo, 19% of those who have been 
threatened experienced an “explicit threat to their safety”, 10% said they experienced an 
“implied threat to their safety” , 9% said the threat entailed pressure from local 
authorities, 9% experienced “interference” while doing their job, while 7% were victims 
of direct physical attacks. The survey also concluded that Prishtina-based journalists felt 
more threatened than those in the regions. (While 68% of those in the capital have been 
threatened, only 26% of those working in the regions have had similar experiences -  a 
figure still unacceptably high.) 46% o f threats reported by respondents were believed to 
be from a public figure, a politician or their representative, 33% from anonymous 
sources, and in 12% of cases, the threat came from an organized criminal group. 53% of 
the journalists informed their editor, 22% did not follow up on the threat and only 14%
181 “press CO(je for Kosovo”, March 2005
182 “Media spectacle and exaggerated optimism”, Editorial on the Press Code, Zeri, March 21,2005
183 Koha Ditore, April 25,2002, OSCE Media Monitoring Print report, April, 25, 2002
184 RTK Evening news, OSCE Media Monitoring Broadcast report, April, 24, 2002
185 For instance, the commercial broadcasters grouped themselves together in the Association of 
Independent Broadcasters (AMPEK) on USAID advice, excluding RTK journalists.
186 Conducted by the OSCE Media Department, this survey was carried out on a sample of 75 Albanian 
and Serbian journalists working in Kosovo. The author took part in the assessment and wrote the final 
report.
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informed the police. 11 % informed a member of the International Community. All of 
these measures, however, do not seem to have helped the situation -  61% of the 
journalists said their actions bore no fruits.
As a direct consequence, few of the alleged high-profile scandals have been 
thoroughly investigated and substantiated, and most articles on corruption remained 
sketchy and often exaggerated.187 The international critics of the media’s practices 
pointed out that some of this distorted coverage leads to undesired, possibly irreversible 
consequences for the emerging Kosovar democracy. A USAID survey, for instance, has 
concluded that “public opinion and discussions in the mass media presume very high 
levels of public corruption [while] it does not appear that corruption is a pervasive force 
in the governance process, and it does not appear to significantly undermine the 
capacity of government to perform its duties and deliver services in a fundamental 
way.” '®8
Journalists would in turn point to the lack of relevant laws which would support 
them. On one memorable occasion, the OSCE’s 2001 journalist safety conference was 
hijacked to talk about the future o f the freedom of information law -  epitomizing the 
incapability of the media to hold UNMIK accountable.189 Media representatives 
complained that they are not allowed to access official documents, and that they have 
been “advised” to cease investigations by UN officials. They were also critical of the 
2003 Freedom of Information Law, which failed to list the UN authority amongst the 
institutions to be considered governmental and thus accountable to the public and to the 
media.190 Journalists complained that despite the law, access to public information 
continues to depend on the quality of connections that journalists cultivate, and sources 
often demand anonymity to provide information.191
However, many UN officials recognised that it should have been in UNMIK’s 
interest to facilitate the media’s work in this regard, as according to popular belief, 
corruption is present within most governmental functions and institutions but most 
pervasive in customs, public procurement, the energy sector, telecommunications (i.e., 
the Kosovo Post Office), healthcare, education, municipal services, the justice system, 
and NGOs.192 Even UNMIK’s prestige has been impaired by the emergence o f facts 
pointing to fraud and embezzlement at international-administered organisations such as 
the Prishtina municipality, the University of Prishtina as well as at the Kosovo 
Electricity Company, USAID concluded that “the UNMIK administration has been a
187 Gani Bobi research (2002) and USAID (2003): Corruption in Kosovo: Observations and Implications 
for USAID, Final report, 2003
188 Op. cit. USAID (2003:2)
189 In the OSCE’s journalist safety survey (2001), journalists named the following areas as those which 
would benefit from investigation (in order of mentions): corruption, political life, economic crime, drug 
trafficking and organised crime. When asked what would help journalists to investigate more safely, these 
issues were considered most crucial: introduce laws to protect journalists, ensure freedom of movement 
(mentioned by Serb journalists only), improve the general security situation, freedom of expression, a 
more efficient police force and higher salaries. Support from editors and the society-at-large as well as 
increased transparency of institutions were also marked. Source: Internal OSCE document, on file with 
author
190 UNMIK regulation no. 2003/32 on the “Promulgation of a law adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo on 
Access to Official Documents”, November 6, 2003
191 Media Sustainability Index 2003, IREX, published in July 2004
192 Op. cit. USAID (2003:28)
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poor role model for the Kosovars when it comes to transparency and accountability. It 
has created a situation where the appearance of impropriety has become more potent 
than perhaps the actual occurrence o f corruption within the UNMIK administration/’193
At the same time, other UN officials argued that the local media cannot have a 
limitless access to UN-administered information, and cannot perceive every incident of 
delay or non-cooperation by the UN authority as a violation of the right to public 
documents (which they do, more and more vocally). For the UN to be efficient, most o f 
its communication with the public must be done through a clear public information 
system, with strict internal rules and hierarchy. If journalists undermine the public 
information operation, their work could contribute to a deterioration of the 
organisations’ efficiency and prestige. Despite that, it has become a common place that 
the Kosovo media attacks the internationals and characterises them as “authoritarian” in 
both their handling of media affairs and providing information regarding matters o f 
public concern.
There were also a few success stories in the Kosovar media. RTK’s elaborate 
Code of Ethics, developed in 2004, provides a comprehensive guidebook to the 
operation of journalists in a  professional and politically independent media 
environment. The 50-page document covers every aspect of reporting work, including 
fact-checking options, language quality, ways to balance information, the use of exit 
polls during election campaigns, investigative journalism techniques (such as the use of 
library material), the appropriate attribution of quotes to sources and many others. Also, 
in off-election periods, there been an improvement in the relations with the TMC, and 
more and more outlets started using the right o f reply when a complaint was made. By 
the end of 2003, all newspapers were more willing to publish corrections and replies 
sent to editors. In addition, the high overall number of complaints suggested that the 
TMC was increasingly viewed as a complaint-driven mediator, and not as a media 
ministry, as feared earlier. (During elections, however, tensions remain between the 
politically-connected parties and the TMC.)
Overall, while the media’s contribution to creating a more informed public and 
policy sphere has to be acknowledged, it should also be pointed out that some internal 
deficiencies have created possibly long-term defects for the overall reform dynamic. By 
2003, it became widely noted that journalism is a highly dangerous profession, and 
journalists are not compensated enough for the risks they are required to take. (During 
the first five years, there was a wide disparity between the salaries of Kosovar 
journalists and locals working for international organisations.) In addition, the excessive 
and uncoordinated distribution o f international funds has led to strong donor 
dependence. It is feared that once the donor funds are pulled out, politicians and 
oligarchs will dominate the scene, and Kosovo’s media landscape will be transformed 
into one similar to Ukraine.
193 Op. cit. USAID (2003: 36)
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5 . C o n c l u s io n
Together with all its democratic institutions, Kosovo’s media landscape has been 
created with overwhelming international assistance. However, this assistance has been 
complicated by the difficult political and social conditions, and the lack of a unified 
approach between the international partners. As this research project concludes, 
Kosovo’s media outlets are still not well-managed businesses and remain donor- 
dependent. In 2004, Kosovo’s media system was rated in the lower echelons of “near 
sustainability” by IREX, along with Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Albania.194
The case study has illustrated that increased state regulation of the media has 
been justified in a post-conflict environment, where enmities are easily inflamed, rule of 
law is fragile, and the judicial system is in its infancy. However, it also showed that the 
media regulator could not curb the media’s power to diffuse hateful content, and could 
not prevent the media’s participation in the inter-ethnic violence of March 2004. Also, 
many media outlets continue to exhibit low levels of professionalism, ignore copyright 
rules, produce unsubstantiated news and rely on political parties for support. The culture 
of investigative journalism has been slow to emerge. On a positive note, however, the 
K-Albanian media scene has developed a plurality of outlets, and the majority o f news 
sources (counting both broadcast and print) are independent and relatively professional.
During the entire period under review, the official UNMIK policy was to 
encourage Serb returns, and to establish a multi-ethnic state. The media démocratisation 
mandate had two essential dimensions -  the first task was to establish a strong 
Albanian-language media system, and the second to create an overall media system 
which effectively represents all ethnic communities and interests. Unfortunately, these 
two issues were not given the same amount of attention, and the internationals hoped 
that by creating a multi-ethnic public service broadcaster (RTK) they would achieve 
both core objectives at one time. Overall, the emphasis was placed on developing an 
Albanian-language media system, despite the fact that it was never going to be viable 
unless the foundations for co-existence are laid through addressing the second 
challenge.
Establishing separate media systems for the two main ethnic communities would 
have initially led to largely isolated and separate media spheres, but it was argued here 
that this arrangement could have contributed to facilitating co-existence between 
Albanians and Serbs by giving both communities psychological support, points of 
identification and mediated fora to discuss local issues. UNMIK’s attempts to create an 
even more ambitious, integrated multi-ethnic media-system were implemented despite 
the failure of many multi-ethnic projects such as mixed educational institutions, health 
care services and a multi-ethnic police force, and the growing scepticism about the 
establishment of a multi-ethnic society.195 All in all, the Kosovo media démocratisation 
policy has been out of step with the societal realities -  it was more progressive than 
what the society was willing to accept.
On the ground, there was a strong public and expert support for both the 
European-style social democratic theory and the US-style libertarian theory. However,
154 Media Sustainability Index 2003, IREX, published in July 2004
195 See for instance the 2004 annual report by the Kosovo Ombudsperson, Mark A. Nowicki, July 2004
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instead of aiming for a consensus solution, the internationals went separate ways, 
following their respective convictions. They repeatedly clashed with locals on many 
issues of media regulation, and were internally divided over some basic conceptual 
issues, including the raison d'être o f public service broadcasting. The competition 
between the internationals could have been avoided had the local US office not 
perceived libertarian media ideals as “the norm” during the implementation of its 
démocratisation programme.196
Given that across the Southeast European region, the prospect of European 
Union accession (or strengthening ties with the EU) is a key catalyst for economic and 
democratic reform, the US assistance for Kosovo’s media démocratisation should have 
been conceived in a manner supporting the reforms advocated by Kosovo’s European 
partners. Also, the divided Kosovar society could have been a fertile ground for a 
consistent extension of the consociational power-sharing model to the media sphere. At 
the same time, the need for egalitarian political and social systems, the degree of 
economic deprivation and poverty, as well as the traumas of the conflict would have 
been more appropriately addressed through the comprehensive application of selected 
elements of the social democratic model. While no European model could have been 
transplanted directly, the internationals should have worked toward the development of 
a “third-route” model for Kosovo.
It is suggested here that -  similarly to the proposed “transitional model” in 
Hungary -  one such possibility could have involved the assignment of different roles for 
different media segments. By allowing the print media to accommodate politically- 
associated newspapers, the development assistance theory in this segment would have 
created more transparency for the media community regarding their roles and mandates 
-  in both the politicised and the independent sector -  and therefore could have advanced 
their professionalisation. Despite the fact that the best European practices do allow the 
print media to have a distinct political leaning, this was treated with disproportionate 
strictness by the international regulators in Kosovo, so much so that in the last elections 
(2004), two newspapers (Bota Sot and Pavaresia) were fined a fatal 144,000 euros (in 
total) for violating the “fair and equitable” requirement.197 While the international 
offices spent most of their energy on fighting the indigenous support for the 
development assistance model, their attention escaped the increasing development of an 
informal lotizazzione among the national television channels.
Given the scale o f the démocratisation exercise, and the multiplicity of 
international perspectives and mandates with regard to media development in Kosovo, 
the failures of some aspects of the reform might be considered natural. The reform of 
media structures has had challenging political, legal and economic dimensions, and has 
required support from a large number of stakeholders. The political situation in Kosovo 
has been characterised by extensive democratic deficits, and the current multi-ethnic 
structure does not seem sustainable. One reason for the failure of the media policy could
,96 Even the German Marshall Fund (GMFUS) stressed on several occasions that “US assistance agencies 
and their implementing partners must understand that while some elements of US experience with 
democracy and the market economy are transferable, the interplay among civil society, government, the 
private sector, and the media in the United States is probably not directly transferable to these societies.” 
See for instance, “Future directions for US assistance in Southeastern Europe”, Report by the German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, February 2001, pp. 11.
197 Kosovo newspapers, May 10, 2005
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thus be the very political soil that it was conceived in. No constructive media policy can 
be designed in a country where the basic institutions of democracy are not endorsed by 
the society and their representatives, and where the power-sharing idea on the political
level does not match its arrangements for the societal level.
Another reason why the conclusions are so negative might be that the time- 
frame for the assessment has been very short. Five years is a very limited time to 
achieve results in an area of démocratisation where both institutions and cultures need 
to be reinvented and reinterpreted. The import of democratic institutional and cultural 
solutions on such a large scale is an unprecedented endeavour, and its evaluation might 
be more successful after the process reaches a consolidation phase, or at least a few 
years after the agreement on Kosovo’s “final status”.
Chapter VI. 
Conclusion
After the collapse of communism, the media sector’s structural organisation and 
societal function dramatically changed, and media coverage of matters o f public 
concern improved across the region. However, in most countries, the media reform 
process has proved to be a significant challenge, and the large majority of the region’s 
governments have been criticised by the West for failing to create a favourable enabling 
environment for media démocratisation. This thesis has been trying to find out why and 
how the various governments have applied pressure on the new media systems, and 
what impact intervention “from above” has had on the democratic development of 
societal communication. Case studies of Hungary, Ukraine and Kosovo were chosen as 
part of a “most different systems” analysis, which facilitated the understanding of 
country-specific and regional problems.
The work began with the examination of the political thought regarding the 
media’s perceived positive and negative influences on societal developments and the 
state of democracy. After a review o f the relevant literature on democratic theory and 
mass communication theory, it was concluded that the most conducive methodology 
would be a policy studies perspective, and that the research would be guided by four 
different normative media models. The central hypothesis was that the identification of 
these basic media models (or lack thereof) within the complex media reform process 
would lead to an understanding of the basic characteristics of the new media systems, as 
well as the underlying principles guiding policy reform. It was also hoped that this 
approach would help to dissect the anatomy of political and societal conflicts arising 
from incompatible ways o f theoretical conceptualisation and argumentation.
Our three focus countries belonged to different historical-cultural regions of 
Europe, with contrasting transition paths since 1990. W hile the Hungarian economic 
and societal climate has been relatively conducive for democratic transition, the political 
transformations in Ukraine and Kosovo have been challenged by linguistic, ethnic, and 
cultural heterogeneity, as well as weak economic performance. Despite the differences, 
many similar impediments could be identified throughout the work, which suggests that 
certain problem areas are generic.
The studies showed that significant political parallelism developed between the 
media and political parties in all three countries -  this trend could thus be considered an 
unavoidable dimension of any political elite driven transition. While, to different 
degrees, broadcast media systems were attempted to be reformed according to the social 
democratic model (with the exception of Ukraine), these reforms were not fully 
successful, due to a multiplicity of reasons which included weaknesses in the economic 
enabling environment, the lack of commitment on behalf of political elites, or in 
Kosovo’s case, the complicated social-political environment.
System-changing elites considered liberalisation the first priority in every 
country where media reform began. However, the ensuing theoretical vacuum regarding
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the most appropriate media system led to the conceptualisation of media reform as “a la 
carte”, leaving it vulnerable to manipulation by the reforming elites. Even in Hungary 
and Kosovo, where there was clear democratic commitment to reform, a major source 
of conflict has been the fact that no widely accepted definition emerged over the 
definition o f the “public interest” and its media representation -  leading to continued 
political interventionism, and at places, the emergence of authoritarian tendencies.
Let us now briefly summarize the main country-specific findings. In Ukraine, 
President Kuchma built up a regime in which a handful of financial and political groups 
have acquired an estimated 95% of all media outlets. With the Western-inspired, 
ambitious legal framework mostly ignored or manipulated to further political and 
business interests, Ukraine’s post-Soviet media system has been a unique version of the 
authoritarian model where state interference and financial dependence on oligarchs have 
entirely subordinated the media. Therefore, the media continues to be highly politicised 
and coercive, failing to offer a pluralism of ideas, and a genuine, sustainable diversity. 
Numerous press freedom violations have been documented over the years -  among 
them the murder of prominent journalists and a massive number of libel suits which 
have threatened the survival of independent and professional media enterprises. There is 
also a profound lack of transparency and openness in government, despite promises to 
guarantee the right of access to official information.
Due to the authorities’ attempts to marginalize the non-state press, the 
fragmented anti-Kuchma opposition developed relatively few ties to the political media, 
and the number of party-independent quality newspapers and broadcast outlets is very 
low. One explanation for Ukraine’s blatant failure in the media field might be that 
Ukraine lacks a democratic political culture and tradition which would have prepared 
political elites and the civil society for the successful negotiation of the media reform 
process. As the Hungarian case showed, no media reform can begin without the 
insistent and organised effort of a democratically-minded group of elites or civil society 
representatives, which would drive democratic change from below. It seems that 
throughout the entire period of review, Ukraine was at best in a stage of gathering these 
democratic forces to join together -  a period which took decades in both Hungary, 
Poland and the rest of the advanced region.
As the case of Hungary showed, better initial conditions, a stronger civil society 
and political culture, a more conducive economic climate, and a stronger democratic 
commitment could provide a good starting point, but this may not be enough to 
guarantee a smooth journey through the hurdles of media reform. Every step in the 
process -  if not conducted in a transparent manner, with societal and political consensus 
-  might prompt rival political elites to design “correctional” policies, which, if 
implemented through public funds, will further increase the tension that is already 
inherent in this sensitive area of reform. Here, a considerable number of political elites -  
as well as journalists -  put forward arguments for state-subordinated loyal media 
structures, both in print and broadcast media which, they argued, would democratise the 
sector. The study concluded that while some of the right-wing “correctional” arguments 
in the print media may have been justified, the failure of all successive governments to 
ease the political dependence of the public service broadcaster added an authoritarian 
flavour to the originally development assistance-fashioned argument.
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Intellectual elites predominantly argued for the application of the libertarian and 
social democratic models, but there was only limited consensus about the methods 
through which to operationalise them, and ultimately about the efficiency and 
usefulness of the ideas they represent. The print media system exhibited signs of both 
strong and partial political parallelism, while there was only limited clarity about the 
actual degree of political connectedness. The fight for print media influence spilled over 
to the broadcast sector, which, the 1996 law left vulnerable to discretionary political 
interference. Overall, the Hungarian public service broadcaster has not been reorganised 
to perform its intended social and cultural functions, and the interventionist policies by 
all Hungarian governments seem to have been designed to serve party, rather than 
societal interests. Also, the political conflicts largely annihilated the potential of any 
consensus-seeking debate on a long-lasting, non-politically managed system of media 
support. The media reform process has led to the emergence of an ideologically divided, 
excessively politicised societal realm.
Meanwhile, Kosovo’s media landscape was developed with overwhelming 
international assistance, and the tendencies to build partisan structures of any kind were 
discouraged and even punished by the governing internationals. Kosovar media outlets 
remain donor-dependent, and the scarcity of financial resources has resulted in a fairly 
unprofessional media system, which has failed to build up the prowess to set its own 
agendas (at least compared to Hungary). The media démocratisation process has mainly 
focused on encouraging diversity, regulating the extent of emotional reporting, and 
seeking to limit the subordination of the media to political power struggles. One of the 
main findings of the Kosovo case study (similarly to the Ukrainian) was that without 
strong economic enabling conditions, the media market would never be sustainable and 
independent of the political sphere.
The international “democracy assistants” repeatedly clashed with locals on many 
issues of media regulation, and were divided internally over some basic conceptual 
issues, including the raison d ’être o f public service broadcasting. The drafting process 
of a major media law text aptly represented the competitiveness between diverging 
media models within one country, or media system, and highlighted the key differences 
between proponents of the libertarian and social democratic theories. The progress 
towards adopting a new legal regulatory framework has been slow, and the failure to 
clarify Kosovo’s future political direction and to create efficient power-sharing political 
structures left their mark on the media reform process, especially with regard to the 
needs of the Serbian community.
The development of pluralistic media structures has produced both conducive 
and detrimental results in all three countries. Generally, there was a high degree of 
media diversity, but political newspaper penetration levels have significantly dropped 
since the beginning of transition. In all three cases, a pluralistic structure did develop 
through liberalisation and/ or the privatisation of the state-controlled media sector (to 
different degrees though), but government policies (in Hungary and even more so in 
Ukraine) failed to put in place comprehensive mechanisms which would protect media 
markets from concentration. The authorities in all three countries have signed up to 
safeguard a multiplicity of media freedom principles but failed to fully satisfy them, 
with Ukraine producing the worst results.
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The case studies also confirmed the argument that liberalisation alone leads to 
the emergence of oligarchic structures, and an increasingly restricted cultural diversity, 
as shown by the example Ukraine. The “liberalisation without démocratisation” policy 
created an environment where severe restrictions emerged on the editorial integrity of 
the media -  particularly in terms of their ability to investigate and criticise corporate 
power. The difference in the source of capital between Hungary and Ukraine (mostly 
foreign capital in Hungary, and local in Ukraine) showed that the emergence of a 
dominant local oligarchic structure is more destructive than the effects of globalisation, 
as oligarchs have a vested interest in controlling domestic politics.
The empirical evidence also showed that arguments in favour of the libertarian 
and development assistance models were widespread. The libertarian argument was 
mostly characteristic of the Kosovar context, given the strong American advocates of 
limited state involvement in media affairs. Meanwhile, the ideas and values enshrined in 
the social democratic model were popular but failed to generate the necessary critical 
mass in terms of support. As a result, while deregulation and liberalisation were 
conducted (although to different degrees), the reforming elites failed to complete the 
démocratisation effort. The biggest failing in the Hungarian and Kosovar cases was the 
failure to make the public service broadcasters fully independent of political elites, 
while in Ukraine, the more fundamental problem was the lack of commitment to even 
embark on the transformation of the old state broadcaster.
It is, of course, not surprising that the creation of a large scale, high quality 
public service operation (and thus the implementation of the social democratic model) 
has proved to be difficult. It is a relatively expensive model, and puts a burden on the 
budgets of all, even advanced Western European countries. The Western European 
experience shows that only developed markets -  such as Germany and the Scandinavian 
countries -  can afford to have strong and efficient public service broadcasters. Beyond 
the affordability claim, it seems that solid backing for a social democratic model only 
emerges in a more mature stage of democratic development, following years of 
negotiations and societal debate on issues of media démocratisation. It can only be 
successful if it receives both bottom-up societal support, and a strong parliamentary 
consensus. Even in more democratically advanced countries, laws may be passed to 
create such a system, but implementation is in the hands of the elites, and civil societies 
need to be active and strong to push for the creation and maintenance of a sustainable 
arrangement.
The analysis of three countries in different stages of development has confirmed 
the theory that the more the social democratic principles are applied, the more the new 
media system would be democratic and guarantee the application of the central 
communication values. It also partly confirmed the central methodological hypothesis 
that the proposed “Four theories” can provide an efficient framework for the analysis of 
media reform in post-communist transition. However, here “partly” is the operational 
term. As it was somewhat expected, this approach did prove to be more applicable and 
useful in some countries more than in others. In the case of Hungary and Kosovo, it was 
easier to identify developments according this framework, and the application of these 
theories did clarify some key issues. In the Hungary study for instance the biggest 
achievement was to have been able to assess the “media equilibrium” policy in an 
objective and independent manner, and avoid the trap o f calling it “anti-democratic” just
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because it does not easily fit into the traditional social democratic or libertarian 
frameworks. Meanwhile, in Kosovo, many of the policy developments would have been 
impossible to understand without knowing the background of the different policy 
entrepreneurs.
In relation to the Ukraine study, however we have to conclude that the “Four 
theories” framework was not very useful, as very few reform measures could be 
categorised according to the open models. In this case, it is thus also difficult to provide 
policy recommendations regarding the appropriate balance of the models. However, the 
failure to find clear traces of these models has been informative, and seems to be in 
correlation with the degree of reform that has been achieved -  suggesting that studies 
conducted with a “Four theories” approach could be indicative of the advancement of 
the media démocratisation process, and the quality o f the relevant debate in a given 
country. Risking extreme simplification, we can also posit that the fewer open models 
can be identified, the more likely it is that -  despite the changes which occurred in the 
redistribution of wealth ~ the political system as a whole remains authoritarian.
The second hypothesis of the thesis was that destructive political interference 
can be identified in all post-communist transitions, irrespective of the state or method of 
media démocratisation. In Ukraine, interference proved to be an essential and confessed 
ingredient o f exercising political power, so this point is better illustrated through the 
case studies of Hungary and Kosovo, where the subordination of the media was more 
subtle and hidden. These two cases have illustrated that even in countries where 
political elites condemn all means of oppression (and probably mean it), they still revert 
to such means in order to further party-specific goals. The temptation that the media’s 
symbolic powers create for political actors in an era o f self-definition and party 
consolidation has proved difficult to fight.
To a different extent, but in all three cases, the media-political conflict did not 
occur solely because of the initial conditions, or the lack o f competence by elites, rather 
it was the result of calculated political efforts to consolidate political power. It was also 
illustrated that political elites who favoured the development of increased political 
parallelism were discouraged from promoting a transparent media-political relationship 
as that was perceived non-democratic and thus unacceptable by the wider society. The 
power struggles over the media have led toward the fragmentation and atomisation of 
these fragile societies, and the mistakes which have been made for short-sighted 
political ends might take several decades, or even longer, to eventually correct.
As I argued in the Theory chapter, due to the very difficult starting conditions, 
the simultaneity of economic, societal and political change, the weakness of civil 
societies, political cultures, and initially the rule of law, it is crucial that the media 
reform process is conducted as part o f a larger discussion on the public good, and future 
visions of society. It therefore needs to be inclusive and transparent. The process also 
requires patience and a gradual approach, and if political elites aim for an immediate 
transition to implement the “highest standards” or the “best European practices”, that 
might further impede the process. Following this logic, the third hypothesis has been 
that the more a process lacks strategy, the less chance there is for media reform to 
unfold without major societal frictions. Strategy has referred to two things -  a systemic 
approach to allocating roles and functions to various media segments, and a consensus­
seeking approach by political elites, where the interests o f society are placed higher than
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direct political party or business interests. Meanwhile, closely associated with this has 
been the concept of transparency, particularly with regard to upholding the rule of law, 
the clearness of the above mentioned strategy to all stakeholders, and the general 
openness about institutionalised links of political parallelism (if any).
This issue of transparency proved to be complicated in all three cases, be it 
about ownership or informal links between political parties and media outlets. It was 
however most problematic in the case of Ukraine, where the issue of transparency did 
not even seem to emerge as a problem for the large majority of the journalistic 
community. Instead, oligarchic ownership patterns and political servilism was a fa it 
accompli, which few journalists seem to have wanted to fight. Strategy seems to have 
been problematic in all three cases as the only real pronounced target was the creation 
of a “free and democratic” media system, and little intellectual and political energy was 
spent on designing models which could be most suited to the specific needs of post­
communist transition. This is probably strongly connected to the failure on behalf of 
political parties to create better relations with electorates which would have facilitated 
discussion on the possible benefits o f institutionalised and transparent links between 
political parties and the media.
The hypothesis, however, failed in a sense that there seemed to be no direct 
correlation between the degree of strategy and the societal tension caused by the process 
of media reform. Had the hypothesis been confirmed, there should have been less 
societal friction in Hungary than in Ukraine or Kosovo, but this is not at all the case. In 
fact in the Hungarian case, the lack of consensus over the media’s democratic functions 
and organisational structures has probably caused more damage than the actual political 
interference itself. Given that this is very difficult to measure, and the data generated in 
this thesis fails to prove it, this remains an intuitive remark. Also, perhaps it is more 
conducive to think about societal frictions as having both a negative and positive 
dimension -  the negative being its divisional influence, but the positive being the debate 
and the engagement of civil society during this most important period.
Because of the global trends in liberalisation and commercialisation during this 
democratic transition, the relationship between political elites and the media changed 
too suddenly and too radically to occur smoothly. One main tension generator was the 
fact that in countries where there was a will to democratise, the media community was 
given too much responsibility too fast to be able to live up to all perceived and real 
responsibilities. In other words, it was given legal and moral support mechanisms to 
fight for “full independence” from the political system, but it was not ready to assume 
this role in terms of its level of professionalisation. As this thesis has argued, a 
transitional period could thus be considered to create structures which would restrict to 
the minimum the tensions which arise from the changing media-political relationship.
At the outset of this thesis, we assumed that political parallelism should not be 
treated as an automatically negative concept for post-communist countries, but rather 
like an unavoidable development. As a result, we argued, the analysis should focus 
more on how parallelism emerges and is maintained, in other words, on whether is it 
financed in a transparent manner or through covert means. The Hungarian case 
illustrated that any kind of political parallelism in the print media could backfire on 
elites, and could lead to disenchantment within the publics. It therefore might be more 
conducive from the beginning to encourage policy-makers to work with different
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conceptualisations for the different segments of the media, and thus apply a more 
“systemic” view to resolving the challenges o f the new media-political relationship. 
What we need is clear guidelines and flexible foundations, and which may both inspire 
and follow change in political power-relations.
As the Hungary chapter discussed, through the creation of a “transitional model” 
political elites might be able to resolve some issues related to political parallelism, and 
better focus reforms and determine priorities. In particular, post-communist elites could 
strive for a systemic model in which the broadcast segment according to the social 
democratic concept (as expected) and the print realm is structured largely according to 
the development assistance model. While allowing for both market-based competition 
(and thus the emergence of independent publications) and openly political newspapers, 
this arrangement would concentrate power struggles between political parties in a print 
space which is not as dominant and controlling as television. It would also create a 
media system which is transparent and pluralistic in terms of political party 
representation. This arrangement would create a more viable environment for public 
service broadcasters as it would push political power wars outside of broadcast studios. 
It would also provide a clear framework for a new system of societal participation and 
representation in the new policy sphere, and satisfy political party needs to directly 
communicate with publics.
Even though this systemic arrangement would give political elites the flexibility 
to apply different reform methods within the two segments, its is recognised that it is a 
controversial proposition, as it implies that “media freedom” and démocratisation 
contradict each other during transition. However, it does hold advantages as it would 
eradicate the subtlety and non-transparency which has created much suspicion and 
cynicism in societies about the functioning of the media. It would also create a stronger 
relationship between voters and political parties and put parties more into the spotlight, 
forcing them to deliver on their pledges. With regard to the overall quality of the 
political debate, it could thus have positive effects.
By the creation of openly political media outlets, independent outlets can offer a 
real alternative, they can be identified in relation to outlets which apply a different 
philosophy altogether -  as a result o f which people will have a real choice between 
independent and party-oriented media. The existence of independent newspapers in this 
model would guarantee that there is a quality competition between the newspapers, and 
would not necessarily mean that the politically-aligned papers develop radical language 
and content. In theory, this model would also be complemented by a social democratic 
element, in the form of state-funded, politics-neutral support schemes for marginal 
publications.
This systemic arrangement could also help to address the imbalances which are 
created in all post-communist countries during the time of system-change. The 
increasing commercialism, the negativity in political campaigning, and the fact that the 
more adversarial journalism roles seems to dominate (i.e. watchdog and advocacy 
functions, as opposed to more constructive and inclusive, “civic journalism” roles), also 
suggest that some sort of transitional model could been conducive to create a more 
positive and constructive relationship between the political system and society. By 
default, the adversarial position of the media worked largely against the potential of
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powerful political-civic alliances, which could have been crucial during post-communist 
transition.
Before we go any further, it needs to be reiterated that this transitional idea is 
based on the specific Hungarian experience only, and remains a highly hypothetical 
suggestion. Given the “what-if’ nature of the proposition, it is impossible to test 
whether it would have worked, while further theoretical elaboration would be necessary 
to see whether it could be applicable in earlier stages of democratic transition elsewhere. 
It was however suggested that it may also prove useful in the Kosovo case, at least in a 
sense that it might change the international perception that the political orientation of 
the print media causes as much harm as it was believed. This transition model would 
alleviate pressure on the partisan press to have to comply with, among others, strict “fair 
and equitable coverage” regulations.
In continuing with the potentially positive aspects of applying the development 
assistance model in the print segment, we would have to note that the emergence of 
openly political media outlets would not necessarily lead to a deterioration of quality. 
The modernisation of the overall media environment is general -  the emergence of 
independent, market-based outlets -  would raise the standards in the political press as 
well, making it impossible to return to the old political communication styles of the 
1980s. In a democratising society, voters increasingly demand high-quality information 
and analysis, therefore the political-party connected media could give parties a chance 
to exhibit their intellectual ambition (or even desire for independent coverage), while at 
the same time, it could provide a direct communication channel do conduct a dialogue 
with citizens.
Politically-connected papers could therefore serve both as the main point of 
connection with political parties, and as the location of information archives. The most 
recent developments in setting up political party internet websites, seem to confirm the 
assumption that politicians would not automatically “abuse” this opportunity. After a 
review of all existing Hungarian party websites, we can state that all main party 
websites contain civilised language, while most of them even seek to be inclusive, 
universal portals to information, as opposed to acting as radical propaganda channels.
However, what the application of this model would certainly do is confuse the 
most widely accepted definition of journalistic professionalism. While there are stark 
differences between the presentation and organisation of news in the US and European 
systems, in both the libertarian and social democratic traditions, professionalism is 
based on the journalist’s capacity to collect and transmit information in an independent 
and responsible manner. Education, intelligence and commitment to reporting the facts 
are basic values, while “pure” advocacy journalism is no longer considered a respected 
form of practicing this vocation.
We could see in these case studies that the directional development of 
professionalism seems to have been influenced by different variables in the different 
countries, and the co-existence of conceptually different “schools” of journalism 
contributed to the tensions experienced within the media reform process. The 
“independent” journalists looked down on those practicing advocacy journalism, and 
vice versa, while neither group acknowledged the value that other group was adding to 
the dialogue.
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In reality, journalistic professionalisation was complicated for other reasons too. 
In Ukraine, journalists were forced to take sides mainly for economic reasons, while in 
Kosovo, they served parties because of their natural, psychological linkage with the 
revolutionary elites. In Hungary, there was a significant number of partisan journalists 
by default, while many developed partisanship after having accepted the insistence of 
political elites (and mainly the right-wing) that no objective and impartial reporting 
exists. In both Kosovo and Ukraine, media outlets continue to ignore copyright rules, 
produce unsubstantiated news and practice self-censorship according to the interests of 
their owners or supporters. The culture of investigative journalism has been slow to 
emerge due to the lack of a supporting legal environment and the lack of skills. 
Journalistic associations have mushroomed in all three countries, but there is limited 
professional solidarity across the board.
The transitional model would resolve neither of the problems generated by the 
weak economic enabling environment, or the abuses carried out by political elites. But 
what it could do in more economically and democratically advanced countries is that it 
could make journalists more aware of systemic issues, and lead them toward 
interpreting their own roles in a more clear and positive manner. The exercise could 
contribute to the overall transparency of the way the media system functions, and could 
thus bring about an improvement in the relations between different journalistic camps.
Finally, we may conclude from this thesis that there was a difference between 
the three cases as to which basic ingredients were missing -  in Hungary the missing 
element was a clear model/ theory, in Ukraine it was a political commitment to reform, 
while in Kosovo, it was the stable social-political environment. But even more crucially, 
the research showed that the redistribution of political, economic and cultural power 
during the initial years of transition has a determining influence on the prospects of 
reform, implying that in order to be able to think about media reform, we may need to 
lower our expectations of system-change. For media reform to be successful, it may not 
be conducive to set ambitious short-term benchmarks regarding full political and 
economic independence, but instead we might consider creating concrete models to 
guide media démocratisation.
The Kosovo study showed that despite the negative findings, targeted financial 
aid for media development and regulatory reform can dramatically improve the enabling 
conditions for an underdeveloped media landscape. However, it was also clear that any 
Western assistance can only be successful if there is consensus between donors (and 
between donors and the locals) on the priorities and the methodologies. If designed in 
consultation with local elites and civil societies, well-administered Western aid can 
facilitate both a top-down and bottom-up support for media démocratisation, and can 
eliminate some of the financial burden on the reform process. In the context of the 
struggling democracies of the post-communist region, the power of a committed 
Western involvement (irrespective of its timing) should thus not be underestimated. It is 
in the European Union’s interest to assist these societies so that they can cleanse 
themselves of old, incompetent elites, o f governmental mismanagement and corruption, 
so that they can begin a civilised dialogue on the difficulties of transition, while 
maintaining their stamina and dignity throughout.
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APPENDIX
The following people have given in-depth interviews for this research project:
1. György Schöpflin, Professor, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, 
University of London/ Member of the European Parliament (2004 June- 
present)
2. Miklós Haraszti, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (2004- 
present)
3. Elemér Hankiss, Sociologist, Head of Hungarian Television (1991-1993)
4. Gabor Jelinek, Editor-in-Chief, Budapest Business Journal (1999-2004)
5. Agnes Csonka, Senior journalist with Budapest Business Journal (1996-)
6. Tamas Kocsis, Deputy Head of Hungarian State Treasury (1998-2004)
7. Istvan Hegedüs, Head o f the Budapest-based intellectual circle, Hungarian 
Europe Society
8. Carlos Pascual, US Ambassador to Ukraine (2000-2003)
9. Mikolai Ryabchuk, Ukrainian intellectual, author of several chapters and 
books on Ukraine, Editor-in-Chief of the publication Krytyka
10. Ivan Lozowy, Editor of Ukraine Insider, and director of the Institute for 
Statehood and Democracy, an independent Ukrainian think tank
11. Jan Maksymiuk, Senior journalist with Radio Free Europe (Prague), Ukrainian 
section
12. Tom Warner, Senior Financial Times correspondent, Ukraine
13. Simon Pirani, UK journalist, working on an International Federation of 
Journalists inquiry into the Gongadze-affair
14. Jeremy Lidstone, Head of OSCE Media Department (2001-2003)
15. Anna Di Lellio, Temporary Media Commissioner (2001-2003), Kosovo
16. Richard Lucas, Managing director, RTK, Kosovo (2000-2001)
17. Elvana Prekazi, Head of Administration, RTK, Kosovo
18. György Kakuk, UN Spokesperson, Mitrovica region, Kosovo
19. Aferdita Kelmendi, Managing director, TV 21, Kosovo
20. Angela Tenbruck, Head of OSCE Media development, Kosovo
21. Sandra Khadhouri, Pristina region media development officer, OSCE Media 
Department, Kosovo (2001-2003)
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